REESE  LIBRARY 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 


,  IQO 
Accession  No^  o5522        .   Class  No. 


HISTORICAL  SKETCH 


ORGANIZATION,  ADMINISTRATION,  MATERIEL  AND  TACTICS 


OF 


THE  ARTILLERY,  UNITED  STATES  ARMY, 


WILLIAM  E.  BIRKHIMER, 

FIRST    LIEUTENANT,    THIRD   REGIMENT,   U.  S.   ARTILLERY. 


WASHINGTON,   D.  C. : 

JAMES    J.  CHAPMAN, 

AGENT. 
1884. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1884,  by 

WILLIAM  E.  BIRKHIMER, 
In  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


PRESS  OP  THOMAS  McGiu.  &  Co., 

WASHINGTON,   D.  C. 


TO 
BREVET    MAJOR-GENERAL 

HENRY    J.    H  UNT, 
COLONEL   (RETIRED)   UNITED   STATES    ARMY, 

WHOSE  DISTINGUISHED  SERVICE  IN   PEACE  AND    CONDUCT  IN    WAR,   DURING 

FORTY-POUR   YEARS   OF    ACTIVE    MILITARY    LIFE, 

EVER    CONTRIBUTED    TO    THE    HONOR    OF    THE    ARTILLERY    ARM, 

THIS  WORK   IS   RESPECTFULLY  INSCRIBED. 


85522 


ERRATA. 


Page  7,  thirtieth  line,  for  1776  read 

Page  135,  seventeenth  line,  for  (U)  read  (M). 

Page  180,  twenty-sixth  line,  omit  l  a.' 

Page  231,  seventh  line,  insert  'had'  after  'also.' 

Page  269,  eighth  line,  for  k  representative  '  read  'representatives.' 

Page  273,  the  note  belongs  to  paragraph  above. 

Page  322,  second  line  from  bottom,  insert  the  words   "'battery'   to  the" 

before  '  front.' 

Page  328,  in  both  fifteenth  and  nineteenth  lines,  insert  (3)  before  '  guide.' 


PREFACE. 


WHEN  the  writer  of  this  work  joined  the  army  as  a  commissioned  officer, 
in  1870,  he  cast  about  with  a  view  to  learning  something  of  the  career  in  this 
country  of  the  arm  to  which  he  had  been  assigned— the  artillery.  The 
result  was  unsatisfactory.  Of  record  there  was  almost  nothing,  and  that 
little  was  sometimes  glaringly  erroneous.  Experienced  officers  who  were 
consulted  could  give  little  information  regarding  matters  of  a  date  anterior 
to  their  entry  into  service,  and  when  they  wished  to  speak  positively  con- 
cerning those  things  of  which  they  were  personally  cognizant  their  memories 
were  frequently  so  defective  as  to  surprise  even  themselves. 

All  this  was  a  subject  for  wonder  to  the  writer.  It  seemed  strange  that 
with  our  admiration  for  and  knowledge  of  foreign  services  our  own  had  not 
received  more  attention  ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  study  of  its  organization 
and  administration  had  been  neglected.  Since  the  Civil  war  much  has 
been  said  and  written  concerning  our  military  establishment.  The  matter 
has  received  no  little  attention  in  the  deliberations  of  the  National  Legisla- 
ture ;  but  it  has  always  seemed  that  such  legislation  would  be  none  the  less 
certain  of  being  wise  and  permanent  if  more  were  known  of  the  history  of 
our  army,  especially  of  its  combatant  branches. 

Of  late  years  there  has  been  a  seemingly  increasing  disposition  with  us  to 
inculcate  the  precepts,  if  we  could  not  attain  to  the  practice,  of  European 
Services.  There  are  undoubtedly  many  admirable  features  in  the  organiza- 
tion of  some  foreign  armies ;  but  instead  of  blindly  following  them,  it  would 
be  wiser  to  first  thoroughly  familiarize  ourselves  with  our  own  service  and 
its  relations  to  our  civil  institutions,  to  see  whether  principles  which  lead  to 
such  happy  results  elsewhere  would  be  equally  applicable  here;  indeed, 
•whether  they  would  not  be  positively  injurious.  As  to  the  artillery,  how- 
ever, there  is  left  no  room  for  doubt.  The  technical  and  the  combatant 
branches  are  everywhere  else  united  under  a  single  superior  direction,  and 
so  they  must  be  with  us  before  either  can  attain  to  highest  efficiency. 

It  would  have  been  interesting  to  have  touched  upon  the  subject  of  projec- 
tiles and  powder,  in  the  manufacture  of  which  there  has  been  vast  im- 
provement. Indeed,  powder  has  largely  revolutionized  methods  of  gun 
construction.  But  these  advances  in  the  refinements  of  modern  warfare 
are  of  so  recent  date  as  to  remove  them  from  the  domain  of  history  accord- 
ing to  the  plan  of  this  work.  On  the  other  hand,  questions  involving  the 
construction  of  carriages,  the  metals  of  which  cannon  should  be  made,  and 
the  character  of  the  'artillery  system'  which  would  best  meet  the  necessities 
of  Government  have  been  of  constant  recurrence  since  the  beginning  of  the 
Kevolutionary  war.  For  this  reason  the  latter  alone  have  been  considered 
in  treating  of  MATERIEL. 

With  us  the  employment  of  guns  in  masses  was  not  practiced,  and^was 
almost  unknown  even  in  theory,  before  the  Civil  war.  In  earlier  days, 


VI  PREFACE. 

nothing  beyond  the  manoauvres  of  a  single  battery  was  attempted.  Hence, 
but  a  passing  notice  has  been  taken  of  the  use  of  artillery,  in  conjunction 
with  the  other  arms,  as  an  important  factor  on  the  battle-field.  Yet,  broadly 
speaking,  this  is  the  true  province  of  ARTILLERY  TACTICS.  To  have  entered 
it  would,  however,  have  transcended  the  limits  within  which  it  was  deter- 
mined to  restrict  the  consideration  of  tactical  questions,  and  which  did  not 
extend  beyond  a  brief  review  of  the  main  points  of  difference  between 
successive  systems  of  instruction  which  have  been  adopted.  Until  quite 
recently  there  is  discernible,  running  through  the  latter,  evidence  of  an 
effort  being  made  to  maintain  the  tactics  abreast  with  improvements  affecting 
artillery  organization  and  materiel.  When  pieces  were  hauled  around  by 
drag-ropes,  field  exercises  were  very  limited.  The  prolonge  greatly  added 
to  the  mobility  of  the  system.  This  was  again  enhanced  many  fold  by  the 
introduction  of  the  stock-trail  carriage.  Kequisite  mobility  being  secured, 
the  next  feature  appearing  in  our  works  of  instruction  related  to  administra- 
tion, and  embraced  a  comprehensive  article  on  the  interior  economy  of  the 
battery,  in  so  far  as  related  to  strictly  artillery  affairs.  Lastly,  there  was 
formulated  the  'assimilation  '  idea,  in  which  the  dominating  principle  seems 
to  be  to  convert  as  nearly  as  possible  both  artillery  and  cavalry  into  infantry : 
to  consider  the  questionable  advantage  of  mere  similarity  in  commands  as 
of  more  consequence  than  the  preservation  of  the  natural  elements  into 
which  experience  has  divided  the  different  arms  of  service :  and  to  leave 
the  light  artilleryman  and  the  cavalryman  in  doubt  whether,  after  all,  the 
most  important  part  of  their  service  is  not  performed  on  foot,  where  they 
are  at  every  disadvantage  when  compared  with  their  more  fortunate  coad- 
jutor— the  infantryman. 

Researches,  the  results  of  which  are  given  in  the  following  pages,  were 
begun  in  1872-73,  when  the  writer  was  at  the  artillery  school  of  practice. 
It  was  not  with  the  intention  of  publishing  a  book  that  they  were  com- 
menced, but  simply  to  increase  knowledge  of  a  subject  of  great  personal 
interest.  The  scope  of  his  labors  has  been  enlarged  since  that  time,  due  in 
great  degree  to  the  suggestions  of  friends  and  others  interested,  and  to  a 
hope  he  was  led  to  entertain  that  in  this  way  the  army,  particularly  the 
artillery,  would  acquire  information  which  would  be  acceptable  to  it.  The 
work  has  been  prosecuted  with  as  much  assiduity  as  circumstances  would 
permit.  Facilities  afforded  at  the  ordinary  military  post  for  the  collection 
of  facts  which  could  be  utilized  are  not  worth  considering.  But  the  writer 
was  fortunate  in  being  stationed  for  some  time  in  the  vicinity  of  New  York, 
and  afterwards  in  Washington  city,  where  he  availed  himself  of  opportu- 
nities to  gather  together  data  other  than  is  found  in  ordinary  histories.  He 
was  also  generously  assisted  by  friends,  who  placed  their  collections  of  papers 
at  his  disposal.  Press  of  official  duties  for  several  years  precluded  attempts 
to  arrange  in  a  connected  manner  any  portion  of  what  he  had  accumulated  ; 
but,  so  far  as  affects  the  artillery,  the  first  available  moments  have  been 
made  use  of  for  this  purpose. 

Others  may  possess  knowledge  which  would  have  enabled  them  to  per- 
form the  task  here  essayed  in  a  more  thorough  or  acceptable  manner.  If 
so,  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  they  have  not  published  and  made  it  available 
to  those  who  are  interested. 

The  writer  is  under  obligations  to  the  Honorable  Robert  T.  Lincoln,  Sec- 


PREFACE.  Vll 

retary  of  War,  to  Adjutant-General  Drum,  and  to  General  Bene"t,  chief  of 
ordnance,  for  facilities  extended  to  him  in  the  prosecution  of  his  work,  in 
the  course  of  which  the  wisdom  of  the  existing  relation  between  the  ord- 
nance department  and  the  artillery  regiments  is  brought  in  question.  To 
be  known,  however,  it  needs  not  to  be  pointed  out  here,  that  the  chief  of 
ordnance  is  not  responsible  for  a  state  of  affairs  which  he  did  not  create. 
It  is  only  regretted  that  the  gentleman  at  the  head  of  that  department 
is  not  now,  what  it  is  hoped  he  may  yet  be — chief  of  a  reorganized  and 
reunited  artillery. 

To  General  Henry  J.  Hunt  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Kobert  N.  Scott  the 
writer  is  under  particular  obligations  for  suggestions,  the  use  of  documents 
and  books  of  reference.  To  Mr.  David  Fitzgerald,  the  efficient  librarian  of 
the  War  Department,  he  desires  to  make  acknowledgments  for  courtesies 
so  willingly  extended  on  every  occasion  ;  while  to  General  E.  P.  Alexander, 
late  0.  S.  army,  to  Major  J.  P.  Sanger  and  Lieutenant  E.  S.  Dudley,  of 
the  artillery,  and  to  Captain  James  Kockwell,  Jr.,  of  the  ordnance,  who 
kindly  read  over  and  corrected  different  portions  of  the  manuscript,  he  now 
returns  sincere  thanks  for  their  valuable  assistance. 

LITTLE  KOCK  BARRACKS, 

ARKANSAS,  November  1st,  1884. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 
ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY. 

CHAPTER  II. 

ORGANIZATION— FIELD  ARTILLERY  SINCE   1821. 

CHAPTER  III. 

ORGANIZATION — FIELD  SERVICE. 

CHAPTER  IV. 
ORGANIZATION— ARTILLERY  RESERVES. 

CHAPTER  V. 
ADMINISTRATION — INSTRUCTION. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

ADMINISTRATION — DUTIES  :  TECHNICAL. 
CHAPTER  VII. 

ADMINISTRATION— DUTIES  :  As  AN  ARM  OF  SERVICE. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

ADMINISTRATION— DUTIES  :    CHIEF    OF   ARTILLERY    IN    THE 

FIELD. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

MATERIEL — CARRIAGES. 

CHAPTER  X. 

MATERIEL — METAL. 

CHAPTER  XI. 

MATERIEL — SYSTEMS  OF  ARTILLERY. 

CHAPTER  XII. 
TACTICS — GENERALLY. 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

TACTICS — FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

APPENDICES. 

[A],  ORGANIZATION  ;  [B],  ADMINISTRATION  ;  [C],  MATERIEL. 


HISTORICAL  SKETCB 


THE  ARTILLERY,  UNITED  STATES  ARMY. 


ORGANIZATION-GENERALLY. 

THE  ARTILLERY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  ARMY  dates  from 
the  beginning  of  the  American  Revolution,  when,  as  part  of  the 
continental  forces,  it  became  a  recognized  arm  of  the  military 
establishment.  Prior  to  that  time,  however,  some  of  the  colonies 
had  limited  experience  in  the  organization  and  management  of 
this  branch  of  service.  Companies  had  been  formed  and  trained 
at  Boston,  Philadelphia,  Charleston,  S.  C.,  and  other  cities, 
some  of  which  saw  active  service  in  the  wars  with  the  French 
North  American  possessions,  wherein  were  associated  with  them 
companies  of  the  English  Royal  Artillery  Regiment.  When 
Louisburg  was  captured  in  1745,  three  companies  of  the  latter, 
with  some  Massachusetts  militia,  manned  the  artillery  of  the 
besiegers.  Braddock,  ten  years  later,  was  accompanied  by  a 
company  of  the  Royal  artillery  in  his  disastrous  expedition. 

At  the  epoch  of  the  American  Revolution  the  British  artillery, 
after  a  protracted  but  triumphant  struggle  -with  prejudice,  had 
vindicated  its  right  to  be,  and  was,  considered  an  important  com- 
batant arm.  Its  laws,  customs,  and  traditions  were  ingrafted  into 
the  new-formed  artillery  of  the  Colonial  army.  This  naturally 
resulted  from  that  association  of  Colonial  with  the  Royal  artillery 
to  which  allusion  has  been  made.  The  organization  of  the  first 
artillery  regiment  arrayed  against  the  forces  of  the  Crown,  at 
Boston,  in  June,  1775,  gave  proof  of  this.  Raised  by  the  Colony 
of  Massachusetts  and  adopted  by  the  continental  Congress,  the 
regiment  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Richard  Gridley,  a  half- 
pay  British  officer,  who  had  rendered  distinguished  service  as  an 
engineer  and  artillerist.  The  number  and  designations  of  the 


2         HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

officers,  and  of  the  rank  and  file,  were  very  similar  to  those  of  a 
battalion  (at  the  time  four  in  number)  of  the  Royal  Artillery 
Regiment,  the  most  marked  difference  being  that  a  greater  num- 
ber of  field  officers  was  given  the  American  regiment  than  be- 
longed to  a  battalion  of  the  English  artillery.  The  difference 
was  not  accidental,  but  well  considered,  and  was  to  the  advantage 
of  the  colonists.  It  showed  that  Gridley,  under  whose  advice 
the  regiment  was  raised,  had  profited  by  his  experience  with  the 
Royal  Regiment,  in  which,  because  of  the  few  field  officers,  it 
had  been  found  necessary  to  organize  a  new  battalion  every  few 
years,  in  order  that  those  who  remained  in  service  should  have 
a  reasonable  chance  of  promotion.  (Organization  of  Gridley's 
regiment,  Appendix  A  [i];  Organization  of  Fourth  Battalion, 
Royal  artillery,  1771,  Appendix  A  [2].) 

There  was  associated  with  Gridley  at  the  siege  of  Boston  a 
company  of  Rhode  Island  artillery,  commanded  by  Major  John 
Crane.  The  personnel  consisted  of  one  major  and  commandant, 
one  captain,  three  lieutenants,  (no  distinction  as  to  grade,)  two 
sergeants,  four  corporals,  two  bombardiers,  four  gunners,  four 
musicians,  (drums  and  fifes,)  seventy-four  matrosses,  and  one 
conductor — who  was  the  company  ordnance  officer.  This  was  a 
large  number  of  men  to  manage  the  four  field  guns  which  consti- 
tuted their  armament;  but  in  those  days,  and  for  many  years 
afterwards,  field  artillery  in  this  country  was  manoeuvred  by  drag- 
ropes,  manned  by  matrosses,  who  occupied  the  grade  now  corre- 
sponding to  that  of  private  soldier. 

The  field  officers  of  Gridley's  regiment,  under  the  colonel, 
were :  William  Burbeck,  lieutenant-colonel ;  David  Mason,  first, 
and  Scarborough  Gridley,  second  major.  The  latter  was  dis- 
missed the  service  in  September,  1775,  for  misconduct  at  the 
battle  of  Bunker  Hill,  where  the  artillery  did  not  cover  itself 
with  glory,  as  five  of  its  six  pieces  present  remained  in  possession 
of  the  enemy.  The  influence  of  the  colonel  on  the  discipline  of 
the  regiment  does  not  seem  to  have  been  good,  as  in  the  report 
of  a  committee  sent  by  the  continental  Congress  to  visit  the  army 
at  Boston  in  the  fall  of  1775,  it  is  stated  that  he  had  become  very 
obnoxious  to  that  corps  (the  artillery  regiment),  and  would  prove 
its  destruction  if  continued  in  command.  It  was  recommended 
that  he  be  superseded  in  some  honorable  way,  Congress  making 
good  the  half-pay  he  had  renounced  on  entering  the  service  of 


ORGANIZATION— GENERALLY.  3 

the  colonies.  Mr.  Henry  Knox,  a  young  man  of  twenty-five,  and 
who  had  been  serving  as  a  volunteer  in  the  army  under  General 
Washington,  was  recommended  as  his  successor — an  appointment 
duly  conferred  by  Congress  on  the  iyth  of  November  following.* 
He  was  announced  as  colonel  of  the  artillery  in  general  orders 
dated  December  i2th,  1775.  At  that  time  Knox  had  been  sent 
on  special  duty  to  New  York,  Albany,  and  Ticonderoga  to  pro- 
cure siege  material  for  the  army  before  Boston.  Gridley  contin- 
ued to  command  the  regiment  until  January  ist,  1776,  on  which 
date  the  term  of  service  for  which  the  latter  had  enlisted  expired. 

Meanwhile  Congress,  at  the  instance  of  the  commander-in-chief, 
had  resolved  to  reorganize  the  regiment,  with  one  colonel,  two 
lieutenant-colonels,  two  majors,  and  twelve  companies.  It  was 
recruited  immediately  upon  the  old  regiment  being  mustered  out, 
and  to  a  great  extent  by  re-enlisting  for  one  year  the  discharged 
artillerymen  of  Gridley's  regiment,  together  with  Crane's  com- 
pany of  Rhode  Island  artillery.  (Organization  of  Knox's  reg- 
iment, Appendix  A  [3].)  The  field  officers  were  :  Henry  Knox, 
colonel ;  William  Burbeck,  first,  and  David  Mason,  second  lieu- 
tenant-colonel ;  John  Crane,  first,  and  later  in  the  year  John 
Lamb,  of  the  New  York  artillery,  second  major.  These  offi- 
cers had  rendered  service  before  the  enemy,  all  except  Lamb 
at  the  siege  of  Boston,  and  he,  with  Montgomery,  at  the  assault 
on  Quebec,  where  he  fell,  severely  wounded,  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  The  appointment  to  Knox's  regiment  was  given  him 
by  General  Washington  as  a  reward  for  his  conduct  on  that 
occasion. 

It  was  fortunate  for  the  artillery  that  there  was  placed  thus  early 
at  its  head  an  officer  of  acknowledged  ability,  experience  in  busi- 
ness affairs,  and  an  aptitude  for  the  duties  of  that  arm.  Under 
Knox's  command  it  took  and  maintained  a  position  second  to  none 
during  seven  years  of  an  eventful  war.  When  compared  with  the 
best  appointed  of  the  present  day,  it  is  true  that  the  artillery  of 
our  Revolutionary  army  seems  a  crude  affair;  but  when  tested 

*  General  Henry  Burbeck,  in  a  letter  of  April  30th,  1847,  stated  that  the 
colonelcy  of  this  regiment  was  offered  his  father,  at  that  time  lieutenant- 
colonel,  but  he  declined,  and  recommended  Knox,  whom  he  knew,  and  who 
was  a  soldier  in  every  way ;  that  his  father,  though  well  informed  as  an  artil- 
lerist and  in  laboratory  duties,  was  by  habit  nothing  of  a  soldier,  and  was 
about  sixty  years  of  age. 


4         HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.   S.    ARMY. 

by  the  true  standard — the  character  of  its  officers  and  its  efficiency 
in  the  field — it  appears  favorably  when  placed  side  by  side  with 
other  artilleries  of  that  time. 

The  straightened  condition  of  the  force  invading  Canada,  after 
Montgomery's  death  and  the  failure  of  the  attack  on  Quebec,  de- 
termined General  Washington,  after  the  enemy  had  left  Boston, 
to  detach  two  companies  of  the  artillery  regiment  to  the  assistance 
of  the  commander  (Arnold)  in  that  quarter.  With  them  were 
dragged  through  the  wilderness  two  thirteen-inch  mortars. 
Nine  companies  moved  with  Knox  to  New  York  city  in  April, 
1776,  while  one  remained  in  the  defenses  of  Boston.  To  replace 
the  three  absent  companies,  there  joined  and  did  duty  with  the 
regiment,  two  New  York  artillery  companies,  one  under  Captain 
Sebastian  Beauman,  afterwards  major  in  the  Second  Regular  Ar- 
tillery, and  the  other  under  a  youth  destined  to  act  a  distinguished 
part  in  the  history  of  his  adopted  country — Alexander  Hamilton. 
Of  the  field  officers  before  mentioned,  Lieutenant- Colonel  Mason 
and  Major  Crane  were  present ;  Lieutenant-Colonel  Burbeck, 
having  refused  to  leave  Boston  when  the  army  marched,  was  in 
May  summarily  dismissed  the  service ;  Major  Lamb  was  still  a 
prisoner. 

After  the  defeat  of  the  Americans  on  Long  Island,  August  27th, 
1776,  and  their  retreat  from  New  York  city,  Congress  resolved 
upon  an  entire  reorganization  of  the  army.  The  number  of  in- 
fantry battalions  was,  September  i6th,  fixed  at  eighty-eight.  As 
to  the  artillery,  nothing  was  immediately  determined  on ;  but  the 
congressional  committee  appointed  to  investigate  the  subject  of 
army  reform  called  upon  Knox  for  suggestions  concerning  that 
arm.  These  he  communicated  as  follows : 

"I.I  recommend  that  there  be  one  or  more  capital  laboratories  erected  at  a 
distance  from  the  seat  of  war,  in  which  shall  be  prepared  large  quantities  of 
ordnance  stores  of  every  species  and  denomination. 

"  2.  That  there  be  at  the  same  place  a  number  of  able  artificers  employed  to 
make  carriages  for  the  cannon  of  all  sorts  and  sizes,  ammunition  wagons,  tum- 
brels, harness,  &c. 

"3.  That,  as  contiguous  as  possible  to  this  place,  a  foundry  for  casting  brass 
cannon,  mortars,  and  howitzers  be  established  upon  a  large  scale. 

"  4.  And,  as  officers  can  never  act  with  confidence  until  they  are  masters  of  their 
profession,  an  academy  established  upon  a  liberal  plan  would  be  of  the  utmost 
service  to  the  continent,  where  the  whole  theory  and  practice  of  fortification 
and  gunnery  should  be  taught,  to  be  nearly  on  the  same  plan  as  that  at  Wool- 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  $ 

wich — making  allowances  for  differences  of  circumstances — a  place  to  which 
our  enemies  are  indebted  for  the  superiority  of  their  artillery  to  all  who  have 
opposed  them. 

"  5.  That  these  and  all  other  matters  respecting  the  artillery  and  artillery  stores 
be  under  the   direction  of  a  board  of  ordnance,  whose  business  shall  be    the 
regulation  and  management  of  the  affairs  of  this  department,  and   to   wbrrm  - 
returns  shall  be  made. 

"  6.  The  corps  of  artillery  now  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  is  exceedingly 
insufficient  for  the  operations  of  an  extensive  service.  It  consists  of  a  little 
more  than  600,  officers  included  ;  of  these,  100  are  in  the  northern  army,  where 
their  numbers  are  very  unequal  to  the  service.  His  excellency  General  Wash- 
ington has,  to  supply  the  deficiency  of  this  corps,  drafted  from  the  different 
regiments  600  men,  and  General  Gates  a  proportionate  number.  This  is  a  tem- 
porary remedy,  attended  with  a  variety  of  inconveniences. 

"  7.  There  ought  to  be  a  respectable  body  of  artillery  established  which  shall 
be  equal  to  all  the  services  of  the  war.  In  proportion  to  every  1000  men  of  the 
marching  regiments,  there  ought  to  be  one  company  of  60  men,  including  offi- 
cers. This  number  will  be  found  to  be  small  when  the  various  contingencies 
of  the  artillery  shall  be  considered.  Supposing,  then,  the  army  to  consist  of 
80  battalions  of  726  men  each,  making  nearly  60,000  men,  the  number  of  artil- 
lery requisite  will  be  3360.  These  may  be  thrown  into  two  or  three  battalions, 
as  may  be  thought  best. 

"  8.  If  any  circumstances  shall  happen  to  render  the  movement  of  this  army 
necessary,  one  hundred  covered  wagons  will  be  wanting  to  transport  the  stores  ; 
three  hundred  strong  horses  to  draw  the  travelling  artillery  ;  (the  heavy  artil- 
lery on  garrison  carriages  and  the  heaviest  stores  are  not  included  in  the  above 
estimate  ;)  wagons  and  drivers  for  the  above  ;  a  wagonmaster  to  be  established 
for  the  artillery  ;  also  a  quartermaster  for  the  horses  and  wagons,  whose  busi- 
ness it  shall  be  to  purchase  hay,  horses,  &c.,  as  may  be  needed. 

"  9.  Exclusively  of  the  artificers  at  the  fixed  laboratories,  there  must  be  100 
of  different  branches  attached  to  the  artillery,  to  repair  carriages  when  broken, 
make  platforms,  and  a  thousand  other  matters  belonging  to  the  artillery. 

"  10.  Besides  the  commissary  of  stores,  it  will  be  necessary  to  have  a  deputy 
commissary,  who  shall  be  a  capable,  active  man  ;  the  number  of  conductors 
and  clerks  to  be  twelve ;  if  the  service  should  require  more,  they  to  be  added 
during  the  pleasure  of  the  commander-in-chief ;  the  commanding  officer  of 
artillery  to  have  a  clerk  attached  to  him,  for  the  purpose  of  arranging  and 
disposing  the  various  returns  of  cannon  and  stores. 

"  11.  The  following  brass  field  pieces  are  wanting,  (and  as  there  is  a  consider- 
able quantity  of  copper  collected,  it  is  to  be  wished  that  the  founder  might  be 
employed  to  cast  some  immediately,)  viz.,  eighteen  six-pounders  and  eighteen 
three-pounder  cannon." 

These  recommendations  evince  that  the  commander  of  artillery 
was  cognizant  of  the  requirements  of  that  arm,  and  of  the  proper 
means  to  secure  them;  and,  though  not  always  in  the  manner  con- 


6         HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

templated,  most  of  the  measures  here  proposed  were  favorably 
acted  upon  by  Congress.  The  prominence  given  to  the  supposed 
excellence  of  the  English  artillery  system  is  worthy  of  notice.  It 
was  upon  this  as  a  model  that  Knox  sought  to  build  up  the  United 
States  service,  and  not  upon  the  French,  as  has  been  erroneously 
supposed.  It  is  true  that  several  officers  of  the  latter  service 
sought  and  obtained  positions  in  the  continental  army ;  that  in 
their  own  country  the  new  and  improved  system  of  Gribeauval 
was  at  last,  spite  of  every  opposition,  firmly  established  ;  but  in 
the  American  army  English  ideas  of  organization  and  materiel 
had  taken  too  deep  root  to  be  shaken ;  as  to  organization,  this 
has  already  been  illustrated.  And  though  much  artillery  ma- 
teriel was  purchased  in  France,  it  was  almost  entirely  confined 
to  the  one  item  of  cannon  without  carriages.  It  was  the  not  un- 
natural expectation  of  French  officers  to  give  shape  to,  and  com  - 
mand,  the  American  artillery ;  but  they  found  already  on  the 
ground  those  capable  of  conducting  its  management,  in  every 
detail,  with  distinguished  success. 

The  elaboration  of  a  plan  for  establishing  the  artillery  upon  a 
scale  commensurate  with  the  requirements  of  the  contemplated 
regular  army,  of  possibly  more  than  one  hundred  regiments,  em- 
bracing troops  of  all  arms,  was  a  task  devolved  upon  Colonel 
Knox.  He  recommended  to  the  commander-in-chief  that  the 
number  of  artillery  battalions  be  fixed  at  five,  each  to  consist  of 
one  colonel,  one  lieutenant-colonel,  one  major,  and  twelve  com- 
panies ;  each  company  one  captain,  one  captain-lieutenant,  four 
lieutenants,  six  sergeants,  six  corporals,  six  gunners,  six  bombar- 
diers, and  twenty-eight  matrosses.  From  this  it  appears  that 
each  company  was  to  manoeuvre  two  pieces,  with  their  ammu- 
nition wagons.  The  "battalion"  was  in  fact  a  regiment;  the  for- 
mer designation  was  given  in  conformity  with  the  English  system 
that  Knox  so  much  admired,  and  which,  he  remarked,  "  we  will 
have  no  reason  to  blush  for  imitating." 

Alarmed  at  the  retreat  of  the  army  through  New  Jersey  and 
the  proximity  of  the  enemy  to  the  seat  of  government,  Congress 
adjourned  from  Philadelphia  to  Baltimore,  first  delegating  to 
General  Washington,  December  i2th,  1776,  power  to  "order  and 
direct  all  things  relative  to  the  department  and  operations  of 
war."  By  virtue  of  this  authority  steps  were  at  once  taken  for 
raising  three  of  the  five  battalions  proposed  by  Colonel  Knox. 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  7 

(Appendix  A  [6].)  This  action  was  confirmed  by  Congress,  De- 
cember 27th,  when  Knox  was  chosen  brigadier-general  of  artillery 
— a  grade  which,  in  the  regular  army,  has  been  held  to  this  day 
by  that  officer  alone. 

The  five  battalions  proposed  by  Colonel  Knox  were  intended 
to  supply  artillery  to  all  the  armies  of  the  United  States.  That 
number  was  organized  in  a  few  months,  but  one  of  them  was  con- 
verted into  an  artificer-regiment,  and  ingrafted  into  the  "  Depart- 
ment of  the  Commissary- General  of  Military  Stores."  (Appen- 
dix A  [n].) 

Of  the  four  remaining,  one  was  recruited  in  Virginia,  pursuant 
to  resolution  of  Congress,  November  26th,  1776,  and  embraced  two 
companies  raised  in  that  State  by  General  Charles  Lee.  The 
field  officers  of  the  regiment  were  :  Charles  Harrison,  colonel ;  Ed- 
ward Carrington,  lieutenant-colonel ;  Christian  Holman,  major. 
Two  regiments  were  raised  pursuant  to  the  orders  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief,  issued  under  the  extraordinary  powers  conferred 
by  Congress,  December  i2th,  1776.  The  other  artillery  regiment 
raised  pursuant  to  this  authority  was  that  converted  into  artifi- 
cers. The  commanders  of  the  latter  regiments  were  Colonels 
Crane  and  Lamb  for  the  artillery  and  Flower  for  the  artificers. 
The  other  artillery  regiment  necessary  to  complete  the  number 
came  from  Pennsylvania.  This  was  raised,  pursuant  to  resolution 
of  the  State  authorities,  in  February,  1777,  and  on  the  2oth  of 
June  following  was  taken  by  Congress  into  the  continental  estab- 
lishment. Its  field  officers  were  :  Thomas  Proctor,  colonel ;  John 
Martin  Strobagh,  lieutenant-colonel;  Thomas  Forrest,  major. 

The  regiments  of  Colonels  Harrison,  Crane,  Lamb,  Proctor, 
and  Flower  constituted,  therefore,  the  artillery  of  the  regular 
army  after  June,  1776.  Of  these,  Flower's  was  never  arranged 
properly  as  a  regiment;  it  was  never  anything  but  an  assem- 
blage of  mechanics,  with  some  degree  of  military  organization. 
It  will,  therefore,  not  hereafter  be  considered  as  belonging  to  the 
artillery,  which,  omitting  this,  was  made  up  of  the  four  other  regi- 
ments mentioned.  It  may  remove  misapprehension  to  mention 
that  the  terms  "regiment"  and  "battalion"  were  synonymous  as 
they  appear  in  the  resolutions  of  Congress  and  in  the  army  orders 
of  the  time. 

No  sooner  were  the  four  regiments,  or,  for  that  matter,  any  two 
of  them,  brought  together  than  disputes  arose  as  to  their  order 


8         HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

of  precedence  and  the  relative  rank  of  their  officers.  The  diffi- 
culty was  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  some  officers  of  service  under 
previous  engagements  had  now  commissions  of  a  more  recent 
date  than  others  who  had  originally  entered  the  service  long  after 
them.  To  put  an  end  to  daily  bitter  controversies,  a  board  of 
officers  was  assembled  at  general  headquarters  in  August,  1779. 
The  board  decided  that  the  colonels  ranked  in  the  following 
order:  Crane,  Lamb,  Harrison,  and  Proctor;  but  that  their  regi- 
ments should  be  designated  and  take  precedence  as  follows  :  First, 
Harrison's;  Second,  Lamb's;  Third,  Crane's;  Fourth,  Proctor's. 
This  decision  was  never  afterwards  modified.  Those  are  the 
designations  which  will  hereafter  be  given  the  four  regular  regi- 
ments. 

By  reference  to  Appendices  A  [5],  [6],  [7],  [8],  [9],  and  [10]  it 
will  be  seen  that  the  organizations  of  these  regiments  or  battal- 
ions were  dissimilar.  This  was  to  be  expected  from  the  various 
sources  whence  they  came.  When  originally  organized,  both 
Harrison's  and  Proctor's  were  State  troops  ;  but  Lamb's  and 
Crane's  were  recruited  from  the  States  at  large.  It  was  not  until 
May  of  1778  that  all  were  given,  on  paper  at  least,  the  same 
organization. 

There  was  difficulty  in  obtaining  the  complement  of  field  offi- 
cers for  Crane's  and  Lamb's  regiments.  John  Popkins  was  lieu- 
tenant-colonel of  the  former  and  Eleazer  Oswald  of  the  latter ; 
but  in  neither  was  the  office  of  major  filled  until  September,  1778, 
when  William  Perkins  was  appointed  major  of  Crane's  and  Se- 
bastian Beauman  major  of  Lamb's  regiment.  At  the  same  time 
that  the  latter  appointments  were  made,  Oswald's  resignation 
caused  the  assignment  to  the  Second  Artillery  of  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Ebenezer  Stevens,  commander  of  artillery  in  the  northern 
department.  The  position  of  the  latter  officer  was  anomalous. 
In  the  fall  of  1776,  when  the  terms  of  service  of  the  two  com- 
panies of  Knox's  regiment,  in  command  of  which  Captain  Ste- 
vens had  marched  to  join  the  northern  army,  had  expired,  Gen- 
eral Schuyler,  commanding  that  department,  had  authorized  him 
to  recruit  a  corps  of  one  artificer  and  three  artillery  companies. 
This  he  did,  principally  in  Massachusetts,  where,  at  the  same 
time,  Colonel  Crane  was  enlisting  for  his  (3d)  regiment.  The 
latter  officer  claimed  Stevens'  corps  as  part  of  his  regiment, 
in  which  he  had  the  support  of  the  authorities  of  Massachu- 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  9 

setts,  as  well  as  the  favorable  indorsement  of  General  Knox. 
Stevens,  however,  maintained  that  he  was  independent;  and 
as  he  served  altogether  in  the  northern  department  until  the 
fall  of  1778,  removed  from  all  other  artillery,  he  succeeded  in 
practically  sustaining  his  claim.  His  companies  formed  wTiaT 
was  known  as  "Stevens'  Corps  of  Artillery,"  which  never  ac- 
knowledged any  connection  with  Crane's  regiment,  although 
the  latter,  without  these,  had  but  nine  of  the  twelve  compa- 
nies authorized  by  Congress.  (Organization  of  Stevens'  Corps, 
Appendix  A  [7].)  In  the  movements  of  the  army  towards 
Canada  at  various  times  under  Generals  Schuyler,  Gates,  and 
St.  Clair,  the  services  of  Stevens'  corps  and  the  ability  of 
its  commander  were  conspicuous,  particularly  in  the  campaign 
terminating  in  the  surrender  of  Burgoyne.  Congress  conferred 
upon  its  commander  the  brevet  of  major,  May  22d,  1777  ;  the  bre- 
vet of  lieutenant-colonel,  April  3d,  1778;  November  24th,  1778, 
passed  a  resolution  conferring  the  full  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel 
of  artillery,  to  date  from  the  preceding  3d  of  April,  he  to  be 
assigned  to  the  first  vacancy  in  that  grade  happening  in  the  four 
regular  artillery  regiments.  When,  therefore,  in  the  fall  of  1778 
Oswald  resigned,  on  a  point  of  rank,  Stevens  was  assigned  to  the 
Second  Artillery.  The  companies  of  his  corps  were  incorporated 
into  Crane's  regiment ;  his  artificers  were  at  the  same  time  at- 
tached for  general  service  to  the  artillery  of  the  main  army. 

While  the  four  regiments  before  mentioned  formed  what  was 
considered  the  regular  artillery,  there  were  other  companies  and 
battalions  of  that  arm  organized  by  the  colonies,  some  of  which 
were  in  continental  pay,  and  in  a  limited  sense  might  be  consid- 
ered as  belonging  to  the  continental  establishment.  New  Jersey 
raised  two  companies — one  for  the  eastern,  the  other  for  the  west- 
ern division  of  the  colony  ;  each  of  one  captain,  one  captain- 
lieutenant,  one  first  and  one  second  lieutenant,  one  fire-worker,  four 
sergeants,  four  corporals,  one  bombardier,  and  fifty  matrosses. 
Rhode  Island  raised  more  than  three  hundred  artillerymen  to 
guard  her  coast.  In  Massachusetts  there  was  an  artillery  regi- 
ment, intended  for  local  defense  alone,  with  a  personnel  of  one 
colonel,  one  lieutenant-colonel,  one  major,  one  adjutant,  one  quar- 
termaster, and  ten  companies.  The  provincial  Congress  of  South 
Carolina,  in  November,  1775,  put  on  foot  an  artillery  battalion  of 
three  companies,  one  hundred  men  each.  (Appendix  A  [12].) 
2 


10      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

This  organization,  in  which  the  men  were  enlisted  for  two  years, 
was  taken  by  Congress  into  continental  pay.  Owen  Roberts  was 
lieutenant-colonel  commandant  and  Barnard  Elliott  major.  The 
former  was  mortally  wounded  in  the  affair  of  June  2oth,  1779,  at 
Stono  River,  and  the  regiment,  with  the  volunteer  companies  of 
Charleston  artillery,  was  captured  at  the  surrender  of  that  city 
to  the  British,  May  i2th,  1780.  Georgia  contributed  her  artillery 
quota,  concerning  which  the  continental  Congress,  February  6th, 
1777,  resolved  :  "That  as  soon  as  the  artillery  companies  already 
ordered  to  be  raised  in  Georgia  are  completed,  one  other  be 
raised,  to  consist  of  one  captain,  two  lieutenants,  and  fifty  pri- 
vates. ' '  What  the  organization  of  these  was,  except  the  last,  is  not 
known  ;  but  Captain  Defatt  was  appointed  inspector  of  the  whole, 
and  a  French  officer — Major  Roman  de  Lisle — commander. 

Although  the  expenses,  including  the  pay  of  the  foregoing- 
State  organizations,  were  borne  by  the  United  States,  their  status 
was  different  from  that  of  the  four  regular  artillery  regiments. 
The  companies  of  South  Carolina  and  Georgia  wrere  not  expected 
to,  nor  did  they,  move  beyond  the  immediate  boundaries  of  those 
States;  the  continental  Congress  bore  their  expenses  with  this 
understanding,  and  for  the  reason  that  the  States  themselves  were 
not  able  to  do  it.  Knox,  as  head  of  the  artillery,  never  exercised 
any  control  over  these  organizations. 

While  the  army  lay  at  Valley  Forge  in  the  winter  of  1777-' 78 
many  measures,  some  of  which  affected  the  artillery,  were  adopted 
by  Congress.  It  was  then  that  a  junto  in  that  body,  aided  by  the 
Conway  cabal  in  the  army,  was  endeavoring  to  undermine  the 
influence  and  prestige  of  the  commander-in-chief.  To  under- 
stand the  course  of  legislation  at  this  time  it  is  necessary  to  ap- 
preciate the  character  of  this  short-lived  intrigue. 

With  the  exception  of  the  surprise  at  Trenton,  the  forces  under 
the  immediate  orders  of  General  Washington  had  been  defeated 
wherever  they  met  the  enemy  in  the  open  field.  Gates,  on  the 
contrary,  had  compelled  a  splendidly-equipped  British  army  to 
lay  down  their  arms.  The  opponents  of  the  former  were  not 
slow  to  institute  comparisons  which  were  to  the  disadvantage  of 
the  commander-in-chief.  This  movement  was  strengthened  by 
the  caustic  pen  of  General  Charles  Lee,  who  hinted  at  General 
Washington's  indecision  of  character.  The  first  act  in  the  pro- 
gramme to  supersede  the  latter  was  the  remodeling  of  the  Board 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  II 

of  War  and  Ordnance.  This  board,  organized  in  June,  1776,  was 
at  first  composed  of  Members  of  Congress.  Its  duties,  in  brief, 
were  to  see  that  military  affairs  were  conducted  properly,  that 
supplies  were  furnished,  and  proper  care  taken  of  those  not  in 
use.  It  was  the  direct  military  organ  of  Congress.  The  duties 
of  the  Secretary  of  War  to-day,  in  his  relations  to  the  President, 
are  analogous  to  those  of  the  Board  of  War  at  that  time.  It  was 
proposed,  after  eighteen  months'  trial,  to  relieve  Congress  of  this 
duty,  so  extensive,  important,  and  demanding,  for  proper  per- 
formance, both  technical  knowledge  and  unremitting  attention. 
To  do  this,  gentlemen  were  to  be  selected  who  were  in  no  way 
connected  with  that  body,  yet  who  would,  as  a  board,  be  subject 
to  its  orders  and  direct  supervision.  Quartermaster-General  Mif- 
flin,  Adjutant-General  Pickering,  and  Colonel  Harrison — General 
Washington's  secretary — were  the  first  members  appointed,  the 
latter  declining.  A  few  days  later  Gates  was  chosen  by  Congress 
president  of  the  board,  with  Joseph  Trumbull  and  Richard  Peters 
as  additional  members.  There  can  be  little  doubt  but  that  Gen- 
eral Mifflin  was  mainly  instrumental  in  bringing  about  this  read- 
justment of  the  board.  He  was  clever  enough  to  discern  that  if  he 
could  control  the  Board  of  War,  with  Gates  as  its  nominal  head, 
he  would  virtually  command  the  army.  Arrangements  were  now 
complete  for  General  Washington's  opponents  to  assume  direc- 
tion of  military  affairs.  The  first  act  was  to  bring  to  the  front  an 
officer — General  Conway — more  obnoxious  to  the  commander-in- 
chief  than  perhaps  any  other  in  the  army,  and  make  him  in- 
spector, with  the  increased  rank  of  major-general.  It  is  to  be 
understood  that  Congress  alone  had  the  authority  to  originate 
this  or  any  other  measure  affecting  the  organization  of  the  army  ; 
but  at  this  time  it  was  very  willing  to  adopt  any  suggestions  ema- 
nating from  the  Board  of  War  ;  so  that,  in  effect,  the  latter  con- 
trolled military  measures.  The  Quartermaster's  Department  was 
remodeled  under  the  auspices  of  the  new  board,  which  rightly 
judged  that  the  building  up  of  the  administrative  bureaus  was  a 
long  step  in  the  direction  of  that  consolidation  of  powers  in  their 
own  hands  for  which  they  planned,  and  for  the  consummation  of 
which  nothing  was  left  undone.  A  blow  was  struck  at  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  artillery  by  the  organization  of  the  ' '  Department  of 
the  Commissary-General  of  Military  Stores."  (See  Technical 
Artillery.)  This  temporarily  rendered  the  commander  of  that 


12      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

arm — one  of  General  Washington's  trusted  lieutenants — power- 
less to  effect  reforms  or  improve  his  service.  But  this  attempt 
to  concentrate  authority  in  the  hands  of  those  who  knew  not 
how  to  use  it  failed  of  any  useful  purpose,  and  was  but  ephem- 
eral in  its  effects.  Concerning  the  board  itself,  little  more  need 
be  said.  Its  efforts  to  render  the  commander-in-chief  impotent  at 
the  head  of  his  army  failed  signally.  Its  influence  faded  away  in 
that  majestic  presence  as  dew  before  the  sun.  No  effort  was  made 
to  enforce  the  new  inspectorship,  to  put  in  operation  the  machin- 
ery of  the  new  Quartermaster's  Department,  or  to  carry  into  exe- 
cution many  other  resolutions  of  Congress  based  on  the  recom- 
mendations of  this  new  Board  of  War.  Those  members  who  had 
been  moved  more  by  ambition  than  by  patriotism  naturally  be- 
came disgusted.  Gates  sought,  and  was  given,  a  command.  Mif- 
flin  requested  a  similar  favor,  but,  finding  himself  unpopular,  re- 
signed from  the  army.  The  prestige  of  the  commander-in-chief, 
and  the  confidence  reposed  in  him  by  his  countrymen,  had  but 
gathered  strength  under  factious  opposition. 

Congress  resolved,  January  6th,  1778,  to  send  a  committee  to 
the  camp  at  Valley  Forge  to  concert  measures  for  the  reduction  of 
the  number  of  regiments,  and  placing  those  retained  upon  a  more 
efficient  footing.  One  of  the  results  was  the  reorganization  of  the 
army  the  27th  of  May  following,  by  which,  in  each  branch  or  arm 
of  service,  the  regiments  (called  battalions)  were  arranged  uni- 
formly. For  the  first  time  the  artillery  was  now  placed  on  the 
same  basis  in  all  the  regiments ;  the  same  personnel  given  each. 
(Appendix  A  [8].)  This  was  simply  bringing  Harrison's  and 
Proctor's  regiments  to  the  same  standard  fixed  for  both  Crane's 
and  Lamb's  when  (January  ist,  1777)  they  were  first  authorized. 

Harrison's  was  brought  up  to  twelve  companies  by  attaching  to 
it  two  companies  from  Maryland,  commanded,  respectively,  by 
Captains  Brown  and  Dorsey.  Lamb  had  twelve  companies  ;  but 
Crane,  due  to  the  fact  that  Stevens  would  not  join  him,  had  but 
nine  companies,  until,  as  before  narrated,  Stevens'  corps  was 
absorbed  in  the  Third  Regiment  in  the  fall  of  1 778.  The  First,  Sec- 
ond, and  Third  regiments  had,  therefore,  their  complement  of  com- 
panies, and  were  organized,  as  contemplated  by  Congress,  before 
the  end  of  the  year  ;  but  Proctor's  retained  the  eight  companies  with 
which  it  was  organized  the  year  before,  and  gained  none.  The 
Fourth  Artillery  never  had  the  organization  provided  by  the  resolu- 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  13 

tion  of  May  27th,  1778,  nor  was  it  given  ten  companies  even,  until 
1780,  when  the  other  regiments  were  razeed  from  twelve  to  ten 
companies  each,  and  two  of  the  surplus  companies  attached  to  the 
Fourth.  The  resolution  of  May  27th  provided  further  that  in  all 
the  regiments  the  adjutants  and  quartermasters  should  be  chosen 
by  the  field  officers,  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  commander- 
in-chief  or  the  commander  of  a  separate  department ;  and  that  the 
regimental  paymasters,  who  also  had  charge  of  the  clothing, 
should  be  selected  by  the  officers  of  their  own  regiment  from 
among  the  captains  and  subalterns. 

The  new  regiments  had  but  three  field  officers.  Gridley's  regi- 
ment in  1775  had  four,  and  Knox's  five  in  1776.  The  change  had 
not  been  for  the  better.  The  lessons  which  in  the  British  service 
were  at  that  time  being  taken  to  heart,  causing  the  organization 
of  new  battalions  in  the  Royal  Artillery  Regiment,  in  order  that 
more  field  officers  might  be  appointed,  thus  giving  promotion  to 
the  lower  grades,  were  unheeded.  The  battalion  organization  of 
the  enemy — the  weakness  of  which  the  enemy  himself  acknowl- 
edged— was  blindly  followed.  The  result  was  a  foregone  conclu- 
sion :  promotion  in  the  artillery  was  so  slow  as  to  deter  many  from 
entering  that  arm,  and  caused  others  of  its  best  officers  to  leave  it 
in  despair.  After  the  four  regular  regiments  were  established  in 
1777,  and  until  the  end  of  the  war,  not  more  than  a  half-dozen  or 
so  captains  were  promoted,  or  at  a  rate  but  little  greater  than  one 
captain  a  year  for  the  Artillery  Brigade.  This  state  of  affairs, 
which  should  not  exist,  was  partially  due  to  the  mistake,  made 
after  the  year  1776,  of  reducing  the  number  of  field  officers,  as 
before  indicated.  Gridley,  who  knew  from  a  long  experience  the 
inconvenience  of  this  arrangement,  understood  the  proper  organi- 
zation for  this  arm,  and  the  regiment  he  commanded  gave  proof 
of  it.  It  had  been  better  had  his  precepts  and  example  in  this 
particular  been  followed  by  his  successors  in  service.* 


*  Incidents  trivial  in  themselves  often,  from  their  associations,  indicate  a 
great  deal.  As  illustrating  the  manner  in  which  the  British  idea  had  taken 
possession  of  their  rebellious  subjects,  it  will  not  be  uninteresting  to  note 
that  in  some  of  the  official  returns  Knox's  command  is  designated  the 
"American  Regiment  of  Artillery,"  of  which  the  four  regular  regiments 
were  style  1  "battalions."  To  those  acquainted  with  the.  organization  of 
the  Royal  Artillery  Regiment  at  that  time  it  need  not  be  pointed  out  that 
a  more  complete  case  of  military  and  official  plagiarism,  with  slight  foun- 
dation to  base  it  upon,  can  scarcely  be  conceived  of. 


14      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

In  common  with  the  rest  of  the  army,  the  artillery  was  next  re- 
organized, pursuant  to  resolves  of  Congress  of  October  3d  and  2ist, 
1780.  On  the  farmer  date  a  proposition  was  carried  through  that 
body  to  retain  as  the  artillery  of  the  ' '  regular  army  of  the  United 
States"  the  four  existing  regiments,  but  with  the  number  of  com- 
panies cut  down  to  nine,  each  of  sixty-five  enlisted  men,  the  com- 
missioned officers  remaining  as  before.  Upon  consultation  with 
General  Washington  this  was  modified,  on  the  second  date  men- 
tioned, so  as  to  fix  the  number  of  companies  at  ten  per  regiment. 
(Appendix  A  [13].)  '  The  change  here  contemplated  was  effected 
by  transferring  two  Pennsylvania  companies  from  the  Second  to 
the  Fourth  Artillery.  In  the  First,  natural  causes  so  reduced  the 
number  of  companies  that  neither  consolidation  nor  muster-out 
was  necessary.  It  went  south  with  Gates,  and  suffered  severely 
at  Camden ;  never  rejoined  the  main  army,  but  the  fragments 
remained  in  the  Carolinas  and  in  Georgia  until  the  end  of  the  war. 
In  the  Third,  two  companies  were  absorbed,  the  men  transferred, 
and  the  surplus  officers,  as  provided  by  Congress,  placed  on  the 
list  of  supernumeraries.  The  organizations  here  given  were  re- 
tained unchanged  until  the  end  of  the  war. 

When  the  regular  army  was  being  prepared  for  the  field  in 
1776-' 77  it  was  given  out  that  the  artillery  was  to  be  recruited  at 
large,  and  without  regard  to  State  limits,  as  is  customary  now 
for  all  branches  of  service;  but  those  regiments  soon  found,  to 
their  cost,  that  it  was  far  better  to  be  assigned  to  the  quota  of 
some  particular  State,  each  of  which,  to  some  extent,  furnished  its 
own  troops  with  food  and  clothes.  .  Accordingly,  under  the  re- 
solves of  October  3d  and  2ist,  1780,  the  First  Artillery  was  as- 
signed to  Virginia,  the  Second  to  New  York,  the  Third  to  Mas- 
sachusetts, the  Fourth  to  Pennsylvania.  To  the  latter  State  was 
also  accredited  a  regiment  of  artificers;  but  as  it  afterwards  became 
a  matter  of  doubt  whether  Congress  intended  to  retain  Flower's 
artillery  artificers  or  Colonel  Baldwin's  quartermaster  artificer- 
regiment,  both  were  mustered  out  of  service,  and  the  artificers,  as 
a  distinct  organization,  entirely  disappeared. 

The  Fourth  Artillery  served  a  short  time  in  the  southern  de- 
partment with  the  First  Regiment.  The  former  moved  to  join 
Greene  after  the  siege  of  Yorktown,  with  the  commands  of  St. 
Clair  and  Wayne.  The  Second,  with  the  Fourth,  composed  the 
artillery  in  the  trenches  at  that  memorable  siege.  Except  this 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  15 

Service  of  the  Second,  and  the  detachment  with  Lafayette  into 
Virginia  of  part  of  the  same  regiment,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Stevens,  early  in  1781,  the  Second  and  Third  regiments  served 
wholly  in  the  northern  section  of  the  United  States,  and  mostly 
with  the  main  army. 

The  rule  of  promotion  in  the  artillery  during  the  Revolution 
underwent  several  changes.  In  the  first  period  of  that  war,  and 
before  the  regiments  were  organized  into  a  brigade,  promotions 
were  regimental.  This  is  stated  in  a  letter  from  General  Wash- 
ington to  Major  Forrest,  of  the  Pennsylvania  artillery  (Proctor's), 
in  1777.  Replying  to  a  complaint  that  Major  Popkins  had  been, 
July  1 5th,  1777,  promoted  to  lieutenant-colonel  of  Crane's  regi- 
ment, when  Forrest  antedated  him  in  the  former  grade,  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  remarked:  "Each  regiment  of  artillery  is  as  dis- 
tinct as  are  the  regiments  of  foot  belonging  to  the  various  States, 
and  promotion  in  Crane's  regiment  does  not  affect  you."  When, 
however,  the  brigade  had  been  formed,  there  was  established  a 
closer  bond  of  union  than  was  here  indicated.  This  will  appear 
in  the  following  letter  of  Knox  to  General  Washington,  dated 
New  Windsor,  March  27th,  1781: 

"There  is  now  no  established  rule  for  filling  vacancies  that  occur  in  the 
artillery.  Some  doubts  have  arisen  since  the  last  regulation  of  the  army  (Octo- 
ber, 1780)  whether  the  right  of  appointment  is  in  Congress,  as  usual,  or  in  the 
States  to  which  the  artillery  regiments  were  then  assigned.  New  appointments, 
made  since  the  regiments  were  originally  organized  and  placed  on  the  conti- 
nental establishment,  have  been  made  by  Congress  on  requests  and  certificates 
of  regimental  commanders,  countersigned  by  the  general  commanding  the 
corps.  All  line  officers  have  been  promoted  regimentally,  field  officers  in  line 
of  the  corps  at  large  ;  this  principle  connects  the  artillery  regiments  ;  without 
it  they  would  be  four  separate  and  distinct  organizations.  If  States  interfere 
with  the  appointments,  this  connection  between  the  regiments  will  be  destroyed. 
The  principles  of  appointments  and  promotions  should  be  fixed  in  the  most  ex- 
plicit terms.  *  *  *  I  propose  that  appointments  originate  with  the  colonels, 
as  before  indicated,  with  certificate  of  qualifications.  Unless  something  of  this 
kind  be  done,  the  best  officers,  seeing  how  uncertain  promotion  is,  will  leave 
the  service.  The  present  state  of  the  artillery,  the  work  of  years,  may  be 
ruined  in  an  hour  unless  this  matter  be  settled." 

It  will  not  escape  notice  that  the  principle  of  promotion  here 
announced  as  that  which  cemented  together  the  various  parts  of  the 
artillery  is  precisely  that  which  governs  in  the  premises  at  this  time 
— one  hundred  years  later.  The  only  instance  during  the  Revolu- 
tion in  which  it  was  practically  illustrated  was  the  case  of  Captain 


16      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

Benjamin  Eustis,  of  the  Third  Artillery,  who,  December  2d,  1778, 
was  promoted  to  major  of  the  Fourth  Artillery.  On  that  date 
Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  M.  Strobagh,  of  the  latter,  died,  and  Major 
Forrest,  of  the  same  regiment,  succeeded  him.  Eustis  was  the 
ranking  captain  of  artillery,  and  for  this  reason  was  promoted 
major,  vice  Forrest.  (Appendix  A  [10].)  The  principle  on  which 
this  was  done,  however  well  it  might  have  been  understood  in  the 
army,  was  little  understood  outside  of  that  institution.  The  officers 
of  the  Fourth  Regiment  remonstrated  against  Eustis'  transfer, 
nor  was  President  Reed,  of  Pennsylvania,  inclined  to  look  with 
favor  on  this  injection  of  a  Massachusetts  officer  into  what  was 
looked  on  as  the  artillery  of  the  State  of  Pennsylvania.  Mr.  Reed 
was  satisfied  when  the  commander-in-chief  explained  the  rule  to 
him,  but  the  officers  of  the  Fourth  Regiment  were  slower  to  acqui- 
esce in  what  they  considered  an  infringement  on  their  rights  ;  and 
it  required  all  the  authority  of  the  commander-in-chief  to  sustain 
Major  Eustis  in  his  position,  which  he  filled  until  his  death,  Octo- 
ber 6th,  1781.* 

The  assignment  in  the  reorganization,  October,  1780,  of  the 
artillery  to  certain  States  for  recruitment  was  followed  by  a  reso- 
lution of  Congress,  May  25th,  1781,  making  promotion  regimental. 
But  the  power  to  appoint  officers  of  the  line  up  to  and  including 
colonels  was,  by  the  adoption  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation, 
March  ist,  1781,  given  the  States,  each  for  its  quota.  This,  whe- 
ther intended  or  not,  wrought  new  and  diverse  rules  of  promotion. 
The  power  to  appoint  was  found  to  carry  with  it  that  of  prescrib- 
ing how  the  officers  should  advance  from  one  grade  to  another. 
Hence  each  State  both  appointed  and  promoted  officers  as  it  saw 
fit.  These  frequent  changes  where  there  should  be,  and  in  every 

*  Writing  to  President  Reed  concerning  the  remonstrance  of  the  Fourth 
Artillery  officers,  General  "Washington  remarked:  "From  1777,  when  it  was 
taken  on  the  continental  establishment,  until  October,  1780,  Proctor's  regi- 
ment was  not  credited  to  the  quota  of,  nor  did  it  belong  to,  any  State. 
In  consequence,  the  various  resolutions  of  Congress  regulating  promotions 
in  State  quotas  did  not  apply  to  this  regiment.  When  Forrest  was  pro- 
moted, vice  Strobagh,  Eustis  was  the  ranking  captain  of  artillery.  Up  to 
that  time  there  had  arisen  no  occasion  for  promoting  field  officers  of  artil- 
lery, or  it  would  have  been  done  on  the  principles  here  used."  In  the  latter 
statement,  however,  the  commander-in-chief  was  not  strictly  correct,  as  the 
case  of  Forrest,  who  sought  the  lieutenant-colonelcy  of  Crane's  regiment, 
evinces.  (See  p.  15.) 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  17 


well-regulated  system  is,  stability,  caused  misunderstandings,  bit- 
ter controversies,  and  consequent  disappointment.  This  was 
particularly  the  case  when  Proctor  resigned,  April  gth,  1781. 
Carrington,  as  ranking  lieutenant- colonel  of  artillery,  claimed  the 
vacancy.  He  at  the  time  was  deputy  quartermaster-general  of 
the  southern  department,  but  Greene  permitted  him  to  leave  that 
station  and  assume  command  of  his  (supposed)  regiment.  His 
claims  were  supported  by  General  Washington ;  but  the  matter 
being  referred  to  Congress,  that  body  decided  that,  under  the 
Articles  of  Confederation,  it  was  not  legal  to  appoint  a  Virginia 
lieutenant-colonel  to  the  command  of  a  Pennsylvania  regiment. 
Carrington' s  pretensions  were  therefore  disallowed.  He  resumed 
his  duties  of  deputy  quartermaster-general,  which  he  performed 
with  distinguished  ability  until  the  end  of  the  war.  The  vacant 
colonelcy  was  never  filled.  Forrest  remained  lieutenant-colonel 
of  the  regiment  until  October  7th,  1781.  The  ranking  major — 
Andrew  Porter — commanded  until  January  ist,  1782,  when  he 
was  promoted  to  lieutenant-colonel  commandant.  The  vacancy  in 
the  rank  of  major  thus  created  was  filled  December  24th,  1782,  by 
the  promotion  of  Captain  Francis  Proctor,  Jr. ,  to  date  back  to  Jan- 
uary ist,  1782,  when  Porter  was  promoted.  The  vacancy  caused 
by  Eustis'  death,  was  filled  by  the  promotion  of  Captain  Isaac 
Craig.  All  these  officers  belonged  to  the  Fourth  Artillery.  Under 
the  provisions  of  resolution  of  Congress  of  August  7th,  1782,  con- 
solidating and  reducing  the  number  of  regiments  and  retiring 
supernumerary  officers,  Major  Proctor  retired  from  active  service 
January  ist,  1783. 

As  the  time  for  disbanding  the  Revolutionary  army  approached, 
the  serious  consideration  of  Congress  was  directed  to  providing  a- 
proper  peace  establishment.  A  committee  composed  of  Messrs. 
Hamilton,  Madison,  Ellsworth,  Wilson,  and  Holten  was  appointed 
to  examine  into  and  submit  a  report  on  the  subject.  They  solicited 
the  views  of  numerous  officers  of  rank  in  the  army  ;  and  as  some 
of  the  views  elicited,  as  well  as  those  contained  in  the  committee's 
report,  are  interesting  and  pertinent,  they  will  be  inserted  here. 
Du  Portail,  the  chief  of  engineers,  in  a  letter  to  General  Washing- 
ton, September  3Oth,  1783,  gave  as  his  opinion  that,  for  the  fol- 
lowing among  other  reasons,  it  would  be  best  to  unite  the  artillery 
and  engineers : 

' '  The  preliminary  knowledge  of  each  is  the  same.     There  is  a 

3 


l8      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

very  great  relation  between  the  professions  themselves.  The 
most  important  use  of  cannon  is  in  attack  and  defense  of  forti- 
fied places.  In  some  European  countries  they  are  united,  and 
where  they  are  not,  it  is  in  contemplation.  In  France  they  were 
united  at  a  time  of  active  hostilities,  and  the  scheme  for  uniting 
was  bad  ;  besides,  the  private  interests  of  some  of  the  first  officers 
were  injured  by  the  union ;  add  to  this  the  injury  to  their  corps 
pride,  one  of  long  standing,  and  the  opposition  to  the  union,  upon 
the  wisest  basis,  can  be  accounted  for.  However,  almost  all  officers 
of  engineers  are  persuaded  of  the  advantage  of  it. 

' '  In  making  my  calculations  of  force,  I  suppose,  agreeably  to  his 
excellency's  letter,  that  it  is  to  be  used  solely  to  protect  ourselves 
against  the  British  ;  for  if  the  United  States  are  to  have  fortified 
harbors,  what  I  am  proposing  will  be  insufficient.  I  propose 
two  regiments,  each  five  companies  of  gunners,  one  of  bombar- 
diers, one  of  sappers  and  miners,  one  of  artificers  ;  each  company 
in  peace  to  have  three  sergeants,  six  corporals,  twenty-four  pri- 
vates, commanded  by  one  first  and  one  second  captain,  one  first 
and  one  second  lieutenant ;  in  time  of  war  the  number  of  privates 
to  be  doubled  ;  each  regiment  to  have  one  colonel,  one  lieutenant- 
colonel,  one  major,  one  adjutant,  one  paymaster,  one  quarter- 
master, two  surgeons,  one  sergeant-major,  one  drum-major,  six 
drums  and  fifes ;  total  to  each  regiment,  327. 

' '  The  four  officers  to  each  company  provides  for  detached  serv- 
ice on  fortifications,  &c. 

"The  British  frontier  should  be  divided  into  three  parts  ;  at  the 
head  of  each  a  brigadier-general  or  colonel  will  control  what  con- 
cerns artillery  and  fortifications  in  that  part.  Above  and  com- 
manding all  these  must  be  a  director-general  of  the  United  States 
artillery  and  fortification.  All  officials  of  the  department  are 
accountable  to  the  director ;  he  is  the  head  of  the  administration 
of  the  corps.  Through  him  the  orders  of  Congress  and  of  their 
Board  of  War  will  be  transmitted  to  the  corps.  Such  an  officer 
as  director  seems  absolutely  necessary  to  have  that  important 
branch  of  the  administration  governed  upon  the  same  plan  and 
constant  principles.  If  there  be  at  the  head  of  the  department  of 
artillery  and  fortification  many  officers,  independent  one  of  an- 
other, great  inconvenience  will  result. 

' '  The  necessity  of  an  academy  to  be  a  nursery  for  the  corps  is 
too  obvious  to  be  insisted  upon.  It  must  be  commanded,  under 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  1 9 

the  director,  by  a  field  officer,  assisted  by  a  captain.  The  students 
should  spend  three  years  at  least  at  the  academy.  Ten  or  twelve 
students  would  be  sufficient  to  keep  the  corps  complete.  To 
secure  places  in  the  corps  as  soon  as  possible  for  men  of  theory 
and  knowledge,  keep  vacant  the  second  lieutenancies  for  the  first 
graduates.  At  the  academy  there  should  be  one  master  of  math- 
ematics, one  of  natural  philosophy  and  of  chemistry,  and  one  of 
drawing.  As  for  military  matters,  it  belongs  to  the  officers  of  the 
head  of  the  academy  to  give  that  kind  of  instruction." 

Colonel  Hamilton  penned  the  committee  report  submitted  to 
Congress,  when  all  suggestions  had  been  received  and  considered. 
In  this  it  was  recommended  "that  the  military  peace  establish- 
ment of  the  United  States  shall  consist  of  four  regiments  of  in- 
fantry, one  of  artillery,  into  which  regiment  the  engineers  will  be 
incorporated,  the  consolidated  body  to  be  called  the  Corps  of 
Engineers. ' ' 

Each  regiment  of  infantry  "to  contain  two  battalions  of  four 
companies  each  ;  the  companies  to  have  each  sixty-four  rank 
and  file,  to  be  recruited  to  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  rank  and 
file  in  time  of  war,  preserving  proportion  of  corporals  to  privates. 
The  entire  personnel  of  the  infantry  regiment  to  be  :  one  colonel, 
two  majors,  eight  captains,  eight  first  lieutenants,  thirteen  second 
lieutenants,  (to  furnish  paymaster,  quartermaster,  and  adjutant, 
and  also  two  ensigns,  one  to  each  battalion,)  one  chaplain,  one 
surgeon,  one  mate,  two  sergeant-majors,  two  quartermaster- 
sergeants,  two  drum  and  fife  majors,  thirty-two  sergeants,  sixty- 
four  corporals,  (included  in  rank  and  file, )  four  hundred  and  forty- 
eight  privates,  sixteen  drums  and  fifes.  The  corps  of  engineers  to 
consist  of  one  regiment,  or  two  battalions  of  artillery;  each  battalion 
four  companies;  each  company,  sixty-four  rank  and  file;  and  a  corps 
of  artificers.  The  personnel  of  the  corps  of  engineers  to  consist  of 
one  major-general  commandant,  one  colonel,  two  lieutenant-col- 
onels, four  majors,  eight  captains,  sixteen  first  lieutenants,  nineteen 
second  lieutenants,  (to  provide  corps  paymaster,  quartermaster,  and 
adjutant,)  one  professor  of  mathematics,  one  professor  of  chemistry, 
one  professor  of  natural  philosophy,  one  professor  of  civil  archi- 
tecture, one  drawing  master,  one  chaplain,  one  surgeon,  one  mate, 
one  sergeant-major,  two  quartermaster-sergeants,  one  drum  and 
fife  major,  thirty-two  sergeants,  (four  to  a  company,) thirty-two 
bombardiers,  (included  in  rank  and  file,)  three  hundred  and 


20      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.   S.   ARMY. 

eighty-four  cannoneers,  ninety-six  sappers  and  miners,  sixteen 
drums  and  fifes."  The  artificers  forming  part  of  the  engineer 
corps  were  to  be  workers  in  brass  and  iron,  armorers,  engravers, 
cutters,  blacksmiths,  carpenters,  wheelwrights,  masons,  saddlers, 
cartridge-box  makers  of  the  first,  second,  and  third  classes.  The 
committee  thought,  also,  that  ' '  there  would  be  necessary  one  com- 
missary of  military  stores,  five  deputy  commissaries,  and  a  cer- 
tain number  of  conductors,  all  of  whom  should  be  taken  from 
among  the  non-commissioned  officers." 

Of  the  general  staff  in  time  of  peace  there  would  be  necessary, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  committee,  one  general  commanding  the 
troops,  one  general  commanding  the  artillery  and  engineers,  and 
one  inspector-general. 

As  to  a  military  academy,  that  would  not  be  advisable ;  active 
service,  in  the  opinion  of  the  committee,  was  the  school  of  the 
soldier.  To  disseminate  throughout  the  military  establishment 
the  necessary  scientific  knowledge,  the  professors  in  the  corps  of 
engineers  were  provided,  and  would  be  sufficient. 

Touching  the  subject  of  appointment  to  office  in  the  peace  army, 
as  well  as  promotion  therein,  the  report  proceeds  :  ' '  The  idea  of 
the  Confederation  being  adhered  to,  the  number  of  troops  to  be 
raised  must  be  distributed  to  the  several  States  according  to  the 
proportion  of  their  respective  populations,  and  each  must  appoint 
regimental  officers  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  men  furnished  ; 
but  as  no  State  will  have  to  furnish  a  complete  regiment,  this 
apportionment  of  the  officers  will  become  extremely  difficult,  if 
not  impracticable,  on  any  satisfactory  footing,  and  the  filling  up 
vacancies  as  they  arise  will  create  endless  perplexity.  It  would 
be  much  to  be  preferred  that  the  States  could  be  induced  to  trans- 
fer this  right  to  Congress ;  and  indeed  without  it  there  can  never 
be  regularity  in  the  military  system.  It  would  also  be  much  for 
the  best  that  the  men  should  be  enlisted  under  continental  direc- 
tion, which  will  be  a  more  certain  and  frugal  mode. ' ' 

The  rule  of  promotion  suggested  by  the  committee  was  that  of 
seniority  in  each  regiment,  to  include  the  advancement  of  captain 
to  major,  and  after  that  in  the  arm  at  large ;  and  if  dragoons 
should  be  introduced  into  the  army  by  subsequent  resolution  of 
Congress,  then  the  officers  of  infantry  and  dragoons  to  be  placed 
on  one  roster  for  promotion  to  lieutenant-colonel  and  colonel. 
In  the  engineer  corps,  advancement  to  follow  strictly  the  rule  of 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  21 

seniority.  It  was  provided,  however,  that  in  no  part  of  the  army 
could  an  officer  claim  exemption  from  being  overslaughed  by 
another  for  brilliant  services  or  peculiar  talents  ;  but  this  exception 
to  the  ordinary  rule  was  never  to  be  made  but  on  recommenda- 
tion of  the  general  commanding  the  army,  accompanied  by  facts 
and  reasons,  and  with  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

General  Washington,  to  whom  this  report  was  referred,  strong- 
ly indorsed  the  views  therein  set  forth  respecting  the  appointment 
and  promotion  of  officers ;  but  with  reference  to  those  relating 
to  the  necessity  for  a  military  academy,  he  stated  that  he  would 
pass  them  by  without  remark.  He  favored  the  establishment  of 
that  institution,  as  did  also  Colonel  Hamilton  when  he  had  more 
maturely  considered  the  importance  of  the  measure. 

But  not  even  Colonel  Hamilton's  array  of  facts,  nor  his  forcible 
method  of  presenting  them,  could  remove  the  insurmountable 
obstacles  that  arose  to  the  formation  of  a  peace  establishment. 
The  opinion  very  generally  prevailed  that  it  was  a  violation  of  the 
fundamental  principles  of  the  Confederation  to  maintain  a  standing 
army  in  time  of  peace ;  that  each  State  should  maintain  order 
within  her  own  borders,  and  .without  others  helping  to  bear  the 
expense.  Militia  only,  according  to  this  theory,  could  be  lawfully 
brought  into  service,  except  when  a  national  danger  called  the 
whole  country  to  arms ;  when  that  time  arrived,  the  Confedera- 
tion involved  in  war,  a  regular  army  was  admissible.  It  need  not 
be  mentioned  that  these  views  were  not  those  entertained  by 
Colonel  Hamilton,  who  struck  at  the  root  of  these  dangerous  here- 
sies when  he  urged  that  the  States  should  surrender  to  Congress 
the  power  of  appointing  and  promoting  officers  in  the  proposed 
national  army.  The  States  would  surrender  nothing ;  and  when 
afterwards  General  Knox,  as  Secretary  of  War,  attempted  to  lay 
down  rules  governing  the  relative  rank  of  officers  in  the  army,  he 
found  they  could  not  be  enforced ;  the  States  accepted  them,  or 
not,  as  they  chose.  As  a  consequence,  diversity  prevailed  in  these 
matters;  and  when,  in  1789,  President  Washington  nominated 
the  officers  of  the  Confederation  army  for  appointment  in  the 
army  of  the  United  States,  he  remarked :  "It  is  to  be  observed 
that  the  order  in  which  the  captains  and  subalterns  are  named  is 
not  to  affect  their  relative  rank,  which  has  hitherto  been  imper- 
fectly settled,  owing  to  the  perplexity  of  promotions  in  the  State 
quotas  conformably  to  the  late  Confederation." 


22      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

Various  causes  operated  to  prevent  the  Revolutionary  army 
being  entirely  disbanded  November  3d,  1783,  as  directed  in  the 
proclamation  of  Congress  the  preceding  i8th  of  October,  and  the 
remnant  designated  which  was  to  remain  in  service.  The  portion 
of  the  army  thus  retained  formed  in  no  sense  a  peace  establish- 
ment. When  the  time  came  to  disband  the  troops  there  were 
large  quantities  of  public  stores  scattered  at  numerous  places  all 
over  the  country ;  these  had  to  be  guarded ;  it  was  expected  the 
British  \vould  vacate  the  posts  they  occupied  within  the  northwest 
boundaries  of  the  United  States,  and  it  was  necessary  that  troops 
should  occupy  them.  For  these  and  other  necessary  purposes 
one  infantry  regiment  five  hundred  strong,  and  one  battalion  of 
artillery  composed  of  one  hundred  and  thirty-eight  officers  and 
men,  with  a  few  from  the  invalid  regiment,  were  kept  in  service. 
They  were  all  selected  from  the  army  on  the  Hudson  River,  which 
was  under  the  immediate  orders  of  General  Washington.  (For 
statement  of  force  retained,  see  Appendix  A  [14].)  Except  the 
small  battalion  here  mentioned,  the  four  regular  artillery  regiments 
had  disappeared,  the  First  and  Fourth  under  Greene  to  the  south- 
ward, the  Second  and  Third  in  the  north.  Of  the  battalion, 
four  officers  and  fifty-five  men  were  from  the  Third  Artillery  ;  the 
rest  from  the  Second.  Those  were  retained  who,  by  the  terms  of 
their  enlistments,  had  longest  to  serve. 

The  maintenance  of  any  military  establishment  was  beset  by  so 
many  difficulties — the  principal  of  which  seemed  to  be  the  ex- 
pense attending  the  measure — that  many  expedients  were  proposed 
in  Congress  whereby  the  absolutely  necessary  military  service  of 
the  Government  could  be  performed.  Colonel  Hamilton's  plan 
for  an  army  dropped  apparently  out  of  sight.  Another  commit- 
tee, to  which  had  been  intrusted  the  duty  of  devising  measures  for 
taking  possession  of  the  forts  held  by  the  British,  submitted  May 
1 2th,  1784,  a  scheme  for  this  purpose  which  embraced  the  forma- 
tion of  three  battalions  of  infantry,  one  battalion  of  artillery,  and 
a  few  engineer  officers.  (Appendix  A  [15].)  It  was  understood 
that  these  troops  \vere  for  the  purpose  specified,  and  not  to  form  a 
permanent  force ;  the  term  of  enlistment  three  years,  each  State 
furnishing  a  contingent.  This  report,  like  its  predecessor,  was 
rejected  ;  and  as  the  terms  of  service  of  the  few  men  of  the  old 
army  were  about  expiring,  it  was  resolved,  as  a  preliminary  step 
to  the  raising  a  proper  peace  establishment,  to  discharge  all 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  23 

those  who  had  been  retained.  This  was  accordingly  done  by 
resolution  of  Congress  June  2d,  1784,  but  eighty  men— fifty-five 
at  West  Point  and  twenty-five  at  Fort  Pitt — being  kept  to  guard 
stores,  with  a  proportionate  number  of  officers,  none  above  the 
rank  of  captain.  (Appendix  A  [16].)  The  next  day  it  was  re- 
solved that,  "as  it  appeared  absolutely  necessary  to  have  seven 
hundred  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  properly  officered, 
it  was  recommended  to  the  following  States,  as  most  conven- 
ient to  the  posts  shortly  to  be  vacated  by  the  British,  to  furnish 
from  their  militia :  Connecticut,  165  ;  New  York,  165 ;  New 
Jersey,  no  ;  Pennsylvania,  260 — to  serve  twelve  months,  unless 
sooner  discharged. ' ' 

The  Secretary  at  War  was  directed  to  form  these  troops  into 
one  regiment  of  ten  companies — eight  of  infantry,  two  of  artil- 
lery ;  the  officers  to  be  one  lieutenant-colonel  commandant,  from 
Pennsylvania ;  two  majors,  one  from  Connecticut,  the  other  from 
New  York,  each  major  to  command  a  company  ;  eight  captains, 
to  be  taken  from  the  States  in  proportion  to  their  quotas  ;  ten 
lieutenants,  one  to  act  as  adjutant ;  ten  ensigns,  one  chaplain, 
one  surgeon,  and  four  mates.  As  there  was  no  Secretary  at 
War  until  March,  1785,  the  duty  of  arranging  the  organization, 
further  than  here  given,  devolved  on  the  States  furnishing  the 
troops  and  upon  the  regimental  commander. 

Among  those  kept  to  guard  stores,  under  resolution  of  June  2d, 
1784,  was  the  artillery  company  of  Brevet  Major  John  Doughty, 
Alexander  Hamilton's  successor*  in  the  New  York  artillery. 
Doughty' s,  with  one  from  Pennsylvania  under  Captain  Thomas 
Douglass,  late  of  the  Fourth  Continental  Artillery,  were  assigned 
as  the  two  artillery  companies  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Harmar's 
regiment. 

Thus,  in  the  fall  of  1784,  the  only  force  in  the  service  of  the 
United  States — aside  from  a  few  of  the  old  Maryland  line  at  Fort 
Pitt — was  a  regiment  of  detached  militia  enlisted  to  serve  one 
year,  and  styled  by  the  War  Department  the  ' '  First  American 
Regiment."  Upon  this  as  a  basis  was  gradually  built  up  the  reg- 
ular army,  into  which  passed  by  absorption  several  companies  of 
the  First  American  ;  among  others,  the  artillery  company  of  Cap- 
tain and  Brevet  Major  Doughty. 

By  resolution  of  March  3ist,  1785,  it  was  determined  to  dis- 
charge that  part  of  the  regiment  not  actually  in  service  on  the 


24      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

frontier.  It  was  soon  evident  that  the  term  of  engagement  was 
too  short  for  any  useful  purpose  ;  and  in  April,  (ist,  yth,  i2th,) 
1785,  it  was  resolved  to  replace  the  one-year  militia  by  others  to 
serve  three  years.  The  quotas  of  States  remained  unchanged, 
and  in  fact  the  personnel  of  the  new  regiment  was  little  else  than 
the  old  re-enlisted.  The  former  officers  were  generally  retained, 
among  others  Captain  Doughty  ;  but  Pennsylvania  replaced  Cap- 
tain Douglass  by  Captain  William  Ferguson,  also  late  of  the 
Fourth  Continental  Artillery.  At  this  time  a  change  was  made 
in  the  designations  of  enlisted  men  of  artillery.  In  Douglass' 
company  they  had  been  divided  into  sergeants,  corporals,  bom- 
bardiers, gunners,  drummers,  fifers,  and  matrosses  ;  whereas  in 
Ferguson's  the  terms  bombardier  and  gunner  did  not  appear, 
and  matross  was  supplanted  by  the  term  private.  The  person- 
nel of  Douglass',  company,  on  December  ist,  1784,  as  shown  by 
his  return,  was  :  one  captain,  one  lieutenant,  four  sergeants,  three 
corporals,  three  bombardiers,  three  gunners,  two  drums  and  fifes, 
and  thirty-five  matrosses.  That  of  Ferguson's,  August  7th,  1787, 
was  :  one  captain,  one  lieutenant,  three  sergeants,  three  corporals, 
two  drums  and  fifes,  and  forty-two  privates. 

Resemblance  to  Colonel  Hamilton's  plan,  or  that  reported  by 
the  committee  May  I2th,  1784,  will  be  looked  for  in  vain  in  the  or- 
ganization of  the  army  actually  adopted.  A  regiment  composed 
partly  of  infantry  and  partly  of  artillery  companies  was  not  appar- 
ently thought  of  by  those  to  whom  had  been  intrusted  the  devis- 
ing a  plan  for  a  military  establishment.  The  regiment  served  on 
the  northwest  frontier,  where  its  duties  were  principally  to  keep 
'the  Indians  in  good  order  ;  but  small  as  was  the  force,  insignificant 
as  were  its  operations,  the  uniting  artillery  and  infantry  in  the 
same  regiment  was  found  to  be  as  inconvenient  as  it  was  incon- 
gruous. When,  therefore,  the  military  establishment  was,  Oc- 
tober 2Oth,  1786,  increased  to  2040  enlisted  men,  including  those 
in  service,  and  Secretary  Knox  given  authority  to  organize  the 
whole,  he  formed  them  into  a  legion,  the  artillery,  under  a  major, 
making  a  separate  battalion.  (Appendix  A  [17].)  From  that  day 
— January  3Oth,  1787 — to  this  the  artillery  has  been  organized  as 
an  arm  distinct  from  the  infantry,  though  generally  in  peace,  and 
sometimes  in  war,  performing  the  duties  of  the  latter.  The  major 
and  commandant  of  the  new  artillery  battalion  was  John  Doughty. 
The  captains  were  William  Ferguson,  of  the  Pennsylvania  com- 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  25 

pany  ;  James  Bradford,  late  first  lieutenant  Second  Artillery,  and 
who,  remaining  in  service  with  him,  was  now  promoted,  vice 
Doughty  ;  Henry  Burbeck,  (son  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Burbeck, 
of  Gridley's  regiment,)  late  captain  of  the  Third  Artillery  ;  and 
Joseph  Savage,  late  captain  in  the  Second  Artillery. 

Excepting  the  companies  of  Burbeck  and  Savage,  the  troops 
enlisted  pursuant  to  resolution  of  October  2oth,  1786,  were,  by 
resolution  of  April  Qth,  1787,  ordered  to  be  discharged.  This  vacil- 
lation was  due  to  the  deranged  state  of  the  public  finances.  It  was 
felt  that  the  protection  of  the  frontier  and  the  vindication  of  the 
national  honor  required  these  troops,  but  economy  was  more  im- 
portant. This  left  in  service  Harmar's  eight  companies  of  infantry 
and  Doughty' s  four  companies  of  artillery. 

The  re-enlistment  of  the  seven  hundred  men  engaged  under  reso- 
lution of  April  1 2th,  1785,  and  their  rearrangement  with  Burbec.k's 
and  Savage's  companies  into  an  infantry  regiment  of  eight  and  an 
artillery  battalion  of  four  companies,  was  authorized  by  Congress 
'October  3d,  1787.  All  companies  were  given  the  same  organization. 
(Appendix  A  [ 1 8]. )  The  staffremained  unchanged.  This  regiment 
and  this  battalion,  commanded,  respectively,  by  Lieutenant-Colonel 
and  Brevet  Brigadier-General  Harmar  and  Major  Doughty,  were 
adopted,  September  29th,  1789,  as  the  regular  army  of  the  United 
States  under  the  constitutional  Government.  The  former  had  re- 
ceived the  brevet  of  brigadier-general,  with  the  emoluments  of 
the  office  but  without  the  pay  proper.  He  remained  lieutenant- 
colonel  of  the  regiment  of  infantry,  and  performed  the  duties  of 
the  latter  office  as  well  as  those  of  commander  of  the  forces  in 
the  northwest.  (Appendix  A  [19].) 

Affairs  on  the  frontier  had,  under  the  Confederation,  gradually 
grown  worse,  the  Indians  more  haughty  ;  and  there  was  reason  to 
believe  they  were  urged  on  by  the  British,  who  still,  seven  years 
after  the  Revolutionary  war  had  ended,  held  to  the  posts  they  were 
expected  to  deliver  up  on  the  ratification  of  peace.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances the  infantry  regiment,  by  act  of  April  3Oth,  1790, 
received  an  addition  of  four  companies,  and  the  twelve  of  which  it 
was  now  composed,  were  arranged  to  three  battalions.  Except  a 
slight  increase  in  the  rank  and  file,  this  act  left  the  artillery  un- 
changed. (Appendix  A  [20].)  It  was  with  these  troops  that 
Harmar  marched  against  the  Miami  Indians,  by  whom  he  was 
defeated  October  2oth,  1790.  This  disaster  caused  a  further  in- 
4 


26      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.   ARMY. 

crease  of  the  army  by  one  regiment  of  infantry  similar  to  that  in 
service,  the  appointment  of  St.  Clair  to  the  position  of  major- 
general  and  Samuel  Hodgdon  to  the  office  of  quartermaster- 
general. 

Major  Commandant  John  Doughty,  of  the  artillery,  was  nom- 
inated and  confirmed  lieutenant-colonel  commandant  of  the  new 
regiment  of  infantry.  The  ranking  artillery  captain — Ferguson — 
was  confirmed,  vice  Doughty,  as  commandant  of  the  artillery. 
Doughty,  however,  declined  the  appointment  thus  tendered  ;  but 
as  Ferguson  had  been  confirmed  major  of  artillery  in  his  stead,  he 
was  considered  as  ousted  from  the  service.  The  battalion,  under 
its  new  commander,  accompanied  St.  Clair  on  his  expedition 
against  the  Miami  Indians,  when,  on  the  4th  of  November,  1791, 
Ferguson,  with  other  officers  and  many  men,  fell  by  the  side  of 
the4  guns  they  could  not  take  off  the  field.  Bradford,  the  rank- 
ing captain,  having  been  killed,  Ferguson  Was  succeeded  as  major 
commandant  by  Captain  Henry  Burbeck. 

The  defeats  in  succession  of  Harmar  and  St.  Clair  caused  the 
army,  by  act  of  March  5th,  1792,  to  be  still  further  increased  to  5120 
men  ;  and,  under  the  authority  given  him  in  the  act,  President 
Washington  arranged  this  force  to  one  legion  and  four  sub-legions. 
This  plan  had  been  advocated  by  Baron  Steuben,  who  often  during 
the  Revolution  pressed  the  principles  and  advantages  of  the  legion- 
ary formation  upon  the  attention  of  the  commander-in-chief.  A  few 
months  after  Steuben' s  arrival  in  this  country  and  his  appointment 
as  inspector-general,  an  attempt  was  made  in  Congress  (May, 
1778)  to  have  the  army  organized  in  this  manner,  but  it  failed  of 
adoption.  Replying  in  1783  to  General  Washington's  request  for 
suggestions  upon  the  subject  of  a  peace  establishment,  Steuben 
had  again  urged  the  legionary  as  the  best  organization.  It  was 
doubtless  under  his  influence  that  Knox  became  imbued  with  the 
same  views,  as  is  evinced  in  his  arrangement  of  the  army  in  Jan- 
uary, 1787,  and  his  celebrated,  but  Utopian  and  impracticable, 
plan  of  1790  for  the  organization  of  the  militia  of  the  United 
States. 

As  the  army  was  arranged  in  1792,  the  major  commandant  was 
of  the  legionary  staff,  and  one  company  of  artillery  was  assign- 
ed to  each  sub-legion.  (Appendix  A  [21].)  Under  St.  Clair' s 
successor,  Major-General  Anthony  Wayne,  the  Americans  at  last 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  27 

defeated  and  dispersed  the  Indians  at  the  Miami  Rapids,  August 
20th,  1794. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  gth  of  the  preceding  May,  (1794,)  the  ar- 
tillery had  been  (for  those  times)  largely  increased  in  numbers, 
and  had  received  an  important  change  of  organization.  Since-the 
disbanding  of  the  artillery  of  the  Revolution,  that  arm  had  been 
maintained  in  but  insignificant  numbers,  with  an  eye  single  to 
economy,  at  whatever  sacrifice  of  efficiency.  The  infantry  and 
artillery  had  been  organized  and  used  together  on  the  frontier, 
and  the  only  difference  between  them  was  that  the  artillery,  in 
addition  to  duty  as  infantry,  managed  their  guns,  repaired  and 
kept  in  order  every  species  of  armament,  small-arm  or  otherwise, 
with  which  the  troops  were  equipped.  For  this  extra'  service 
they  received  neither  pecuniary  nor  other  reward.  The  pay  of 
the  same  grade  of  officers  in  different  branches  of  service  was  the 
same.  In  one  word,  the  artillery,  except  in  name,  had  been  only 
infantry,  with  the  additional  duties  imposed  of  acting  as  artificers 
for  the  army,  and  managing  the  pieces  of  ordnance  with  which 
the  western  forts  and  the  Indian  expeditions  were  supplied. 

The  act  of  May  gth,  1794,  by  combining  the  artillery  with  the 
engineers,  contemplated  a  very  different  status  for  the  arm  from 
that  to  which  it  had  been  relegated  since  the  Revolution.  For 
furnishing  merely  a  combined  infantryman,  gunner,  and  artificer, 
without  regard  to  efficiency,  former  practices  had  been  sufficient. 
When,  however,  the  scene  of  operations  was  transferred  from  the 
wilderness  to  the  sea-coast, — the  objects  to  be  defended,  instead 
of  log  forts  became  populous  cities,  the  repositories  of  the  nation's 
wealth  ;  the  enemy,  instead  of  the  wild  Indian  became  a  military 
nation  supported  by  the  most  powerful  navy  in  the  world, — the 
necessity  for  reorganizing  and  increasing  the  artillery  to  meet  the 
new  order  of  things  became  apparent.  That  this  was  the  matur- 
ed judgment  of  the  country,  proof  was  given  in  the  prompt  pas- 
sage by  Congress  of  the  act  of  May  9th,  1794.  The  Executive 
evinced  his  appreciation  of  the  situation  by  appointing  to  the  first 
positions  in  the  new  corps  gentlemen  of  approved  scientific  attain- 
ments. The  field  officers  were :  Stephen  Rochefontaine,  lieuten- 
ant-colonel commandant ;  to  the  original  vacancies,  Lewis  de 
Tousard,  John  Jacob  Ulrick  Rivardi,  Constant  Freeman,  majors  ; 
and,  as  the  artillerists  and  engineers  absorbed  the  old  artillery 
battalion,  Burbeck,  by  virtue  of  his  former  rank,  entered  as  major. 


28      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

Rochefontaine  and  Rivardi  were  at  the  time  civil  engineers  in 
the  employ  of  the  Government,  constructing  fortifications  ;  Tou- 
sard  was  an  accomplished  artillerist ;  Constant  Freeman,  late 
captain-lieutenant  Crane's  regiment,  was  an  officer  of  great  ex- 
perience, and  had  a  thorough  knowledge  of  his  duties  as  an  ar- 
tillery officer. 

The  plan  of  organization  for  the  artillerists  and  engineers  (Ap- 
pendix A  [22])  had  some  of  the  features  proposed  by  both  Gen- 
eral Du  Portail  and  Colonel  Hamilton's  committee,  before  men- 
tioned. But,  like  many  other  attempts  at  army  legislation,  there 
was  more  form  than  substance  in  it.  Both  Du  Portail  and  the 
committee,  while  proposing  to  unite  the  artillery  and  engineers  in 
one  corps,  contemplated  the  organization  of  that  corps  into  one  com- 
pact and  well  proportioned  body,  with  a  regular  chain  of  surbor- 
dination  extending  from  top  to  bottom,  so  that  unity  of  purpose 
and  action  might  characterize  every  movement.  Both  recognized 
the  necessity  that  existed  in  such  a  corps  for  the  subalterns  re- 
ceiving special  instruction  to  teach  them  the  fundamental  princi- 
ples of  their  profession.  The  act  of  May  gth,  1794,  was  drafted 
apparently  with  the  same  general  principles  for  a  groundwork. 
But,  while  the  form  was  there,  the  practical  facilities  to  secure 
efficiency  were  lacking.  The  section  of  the  law  authorizing 
cadets  to  be  instructed,  and  the  procurement  of  the  necessary 
apparatus  for  the  purpose,  while  well  meaning,  was  never,  except 
to  demonstrate  the  inadequacy  of  educating  officers  in  this  man- 
ner, of  any  utility  whatever.  Then  the  absorption  of  the  old  bat- 
talion of  artillery  was  a  mistake;  it  had  never,  in  fact,  been  any- 
thing but  infantry,  except  in  name,  and  the  personnel  was  not 
possessed  of  the  theoretical  knowledge  and  scientific  attainments 
which  it  was  intended  should  distinguish  the  officers  of  artillerists 
and  engineers.  The  scattered  condition  of  the  corps  on  the 
western  frontier,  in  the  east  and  on  the  sea-board,  was  prejudicial 
to  its  interests;  the  parts  did  not  serve  together;  were  unknown 
to  each  other,  and  the  colonel,  serving  constantly  as  an  engineer, 
was  given  no  opportunity  to  attend  to  the  interior  arrangements 
of  his  command.  Moreover,,  though  Rochefontaine  and  his  asso- 
ciates were  capable  officers,  there  was  an  element  of  weakness  in 
having  a  corps  French  at  the  head  and  American  at  the  foot. 
Opportunity  was  not  given  for  the  cultivation  of  that  sympathy 
between  these  parts  which  grows  out  of  a  community  of  interests; 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  29 

thus  the  naturally  delicate  and  difficult  task  of  uniting  heterogen- 
eous elements  into  one  harmonious  whole,  with  the  cultivation  of 
a  proper  esprit  de  corps,  was  practically  impossible.  The  disad- 
vantage of  this  situation  was  something  for  which  no  one  was  re- 
sponsible; the  attempt  had  been  made  to  build  up  the  corps  with 
the  best  material  obtainable,  and  it  was  but  an  incident  of  the 
imperfectly  developed  resources  of  the  country  that  features  which 
it  was  expected  would,  and  which  actually  did,  give  strength  to 
the  system,  were  at  the  same  time  sources  of  weakness.  Under, 
all  the  circumstances,  however,  it  was  not  a  matter  to  excite 
wonder  that  the  artillerists  and  engineers  failed  to  accomplish 
what  was  expected,  or  that  in  eight  years  the  corps  passed  away 
leaving  scarcely  a  trace  to  show  that  it  had  existed. 

This  was  but  facilitated  by  the  organization  of  a  regiment  of 
artillerists  and  engineers,  in  addition  to  the  corps,  by  act  of  April 
27,  1798.  (Appendix  A  [23].)  The  two  organizations  were 
separate  and  distinct,  and  the  sequel  verified  the  prediction  of  Du 
Portail  years  before  that:  "  If  there  be  at  the  head  of  the  depart- 
ment of  the  artillery  and  fortifications  many  officers,  independent 
one  of  another,  great  inconvenience  will  result. ' ' 

The  field  officers  of  the  regiment  were  :  John  Doughty,  lieuten- 
ant-colonel commandant;  Benjamin  Brooks,  Adam  Hoops,  and 
Daniel  Jackson,  majors.  Of  these,  Doughty  was  the  old  major 
commandant  of  artillery,  and  Jackson  had  been  a  first  lieutenant 
in  Crane's  Revolutionary  artillery. 

It  will  be  noticed  that,  whereas  a  preponderance  of  rank  and 
influence  had  been  given  foreign  officers  when  the  corps  was  or- 
ganized in  1794,  in  the  regiment  of  artillerists  and  engineers  all 
the  field  officers  were  native  Americans.  The  presence  of  the 
former  at  this  juncture  was  a  source  of  solicitude  to  the  President, 
which,  from  the  friends  of  government  in  his  confidence,  he  did 
not  attempt  to  conceal.  He  summarily  dismissed  Rochefontaine 
in  May,  1798,  although  for  what  reason  is  not  known.  When 
Inspector- General  Hamilton  urged  the  appointment  of  Major 
Tousard  to  the  position  of  inspector  of  artillery — an  office  created 
by  act  of  July  i6th,  1798 — the  President  replied  that  there  was  so 
much  uneasiness  felt  because  of  the  French  officers  of  artillery, 
he  expected  much  trouble  ;  and  although  Tousard,  in  April,  1801, 
received  this  appointment  to  date  back  to  May,  1800,  there  was 
no  denying  the  fact  that  President  Adams  was  right ;  at  that  early 


30      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

day,  when  the  machinery  of  government  was  not  yet  in  working 
order,  it  was  dangerous  to  intrust  the  inspection  and  proof  of  ar- 
tillery to  any  officer  with  whose  native  country  the  United  States 
was  preparing  to  go  to  war. 

By  the  same  act  which  created  the  office  of  inspector  of  artillery, 
the  President  was  authorized  to  appoint  not  exceeding  four 
teachers  of  the  arts  and  sciences,  for  the  instruction  of  the  cadets 
of  artillerists  and  engineers.  They  were  to  do  the  duties  contem- 
plated for  the  professors  in  Colonel  Hamilton's  plan  for  an  army 
before  given,  and  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  their  employment  now 
was  suggested  by  that  gentleman,  whose  influence  with  Secretary 
McHenrywas  unbounded.  Concerning  these  teachers  the  Secre- 
tary remarked  :  ' '  Their  employment  would  give  the  intended 
effect  to  the  provision  of  the  law  of  May  gth,  1794,  authorizing  the 
appointment  of  two  cadets  to  each  company  of  artillerists  and  en- 
gineers, who  would,  it  was  supposed,  form  a  nursery  from  which 
qualified  officers  might  be  drawn  to  fill  vacancies."  It  is  not 
known  that  these  teachers  were  appointed.  It  is  probable  that 
they  were  not,  as,  when  the  cadets  were  drawn  together  in  1801  at 
West  Point,  they  gave  little  evidence  of  having  been  the  subjects  of 
Scientific  instruction.  ' '  The  school  as  started  at  this  time  was 
under  the  direction  of  a  private  citizen,  and  was  nothing  more  than 
a  mathematical  school  for  the  few  cadets  then  in  service.  It  was 
found  that  the  government  of  young  men  was  incompatible  with  the 
ordinary  system  of  schools,  and  consequently  the  institution  ran 
into  disorder  and  the  teacher  into  contempt. ' ' 

The  act  of  March  3d,  1799,  reorganized  the  army  upon  a  plan 
drafted  by  Lieutenant-General  Washington.  It  provided  for 
placing  the  corps  and  the  regiment  of  artillerists  and  engineers 
upon  the  same  footing,  giving  the  latter,  like  the  former,  four  bat- 
talions. (Appendix  A  [24].)  Thereafter  the  two  organizations 
were  called,  respectively,  the  first  and  second  regiments  of  artil- 
lerists and  engineers. 

The  United  States  had  but  few  more  scientific  officers  in  1798 
than  the  colonies  had  in  1775.  In  both  instances  the  Government 
turned  abroad — to  Europe — for  the  desired  knowledge  and  experi- 
ence not  found  at  home.  To  the  corps  of  artillerists  and  engineers 
the  country  had  looked  for  the  requisite  talents  and  knowledge, 
and  the  personnel  in  1795  gave  promise  that  this  confidence  was 
not  misplaced  ;  but  events  had  unexpectedly  changed.  Those  for- 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  3! 

merly  relied  upon  were  now  mistrusted  ;  and,  through  neglect  to 
cultivate  native  talent,  the  attainments  essential  to  an  army  scien- 
tific corps  had  now,  in  face  of  the  enemy,  to  be  picked  up  wher- 
ever found.  These  facts  made  a  profound  impression  on  thoughtful 
men  of  the  day.  The  revival  soon  after  of  the  attempt  to  re-establish 
the  military  school,  which  for  years  had  languished  from  inatten- 
tion, gave  proof  that  the  lesson  had  been  taken  to  heart.  Ad- 
verting to  this  subject  in  a  letter  of  December  24th,  1798,  Mr. 
McHenry  said  : 

"It  is  deeply  to  be  regretted  that  a  precious  period  of  leisure 
was  not  improved  toward  forming  among  ourselves  engineers 
and  artillerists,  and  that,  owing  to  this  neglect,  we  are  in  danger 
of  being  overtaken  by  war  without  a  competent  number  of  charac- 
ters of  these  descriptions.  To  form  them  suddenly  is  impracticable ; 
much  previous  study  and  experiment  are  essential.  If  possible  to 
avoid  it,  war  ought  not  to  find  us  unprovided.  *  *  *  jn  the 
meanwhile  it  is  considered  to  be  advisable  to  endeavor  to  intro- 
duce from  abroad  at  least  one  distinguished  engineer  and  one 
distinguished  officer  of  artillery.  They  may  be  sought  for  pref- 
erably in  the  Austrian,  and  next  in  the  Prussian  armies.  It  is  also 
suggested  that  an  inspector  of  fortifications  is  much  wanted. 
#  *  *  The  officer  may  be  drawn  from  the  corps  of  artillerists 
and  engineers,  or  it  may  be  left  discretionary  with  the  President 
to  choose  him  where  he  pleases." 

These  suggestions  had  been  made  to  Mr.  McHenry  by  Lieu- 
tenant-General  Washington  in  his  letter  submitting  the  plan  for 
the  reorganization  of  the  army.  In  conformity  therewith,  the 
President  was  authorized,  by  act  of  March  3d,  1799,  to  engage  and 
appoint  two  engineers  with  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel,  distinct 
from  the  corps,  and  also  an  inspector  of  fortifications,  who,  if  not 
taken  from  the  corps,  should  have  the  rank  of  major. 

There  at  this  time  entered  the  artillerists  and  engineers  as  major 
of  the  Fourth  Battalion,  Second  Regiment,  Jonathan  Williams,  a 
gentleman  of  ability  and  attainments,  the  result  of  combined  talent, 
travel,  study  and  reflection.  He  at  once  took-  a  prominent  posi- 
tion among  those  who- were  to  re-establish  confidence  in  the  native 
American  officers  of  the  army.  He  was,  December  i4th,  1801, 
made  inspector  of  fortifications,  and  at  the  same  time  superintend- 
ent of  the  military  school  for  cadets  at  West  Point,  into  which  it 
was  proposed  to  instill  new  life.  His  appointment  in  1802  to  the 


32      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

corps  of  engineers  separated  Major  Williams  from  the  artillery  ; 
but,  as  superintendent  of  the  military  academy,  he  laid  the  foun- 
dation of  an  institution  which,  for  its  special  purposes,  is  second 
to  none. 

President  Adams  contemplated  the  appointment  of  a  civilian  to 
be  commander  of  the  corps  of  artillerists  and  engineers  in  place 
of  the  dismissed  Rochefontaine  ;  but  the  nomination  of  the  Hon. 
Jonathan  Dayton  of  New  Jersey  to  the  office  was  not  confirmed,  as 
it  should  not  have  been,  being  a  most  dangerous  innovation  upon 
the  well-understood  rule  for  making  appointments  and  promo- 
tions in  the  army.  No  successor  to  Rochefontaine  was  appointed 
until  February  2Oth,  1799,  when  Henry  Burbeck,  ranking  major, 
was  promoted  to  the  vacancy,  to  date  from  May  yth,  1798,  the  day 
of  Rochefontaine.' s  dismissal.  The  office  of  lieutenant-colonel 
commandant  of  the  Second  Regiment  of  artillerists  and  engineers, 
vacated  by  the  resignation  of  Doughty,  May  26th,  1800,  was  filled 
by  the  promotion  of  Tousard,  the  ranking  major  in  that  arm  of 
service.  But  fate  had  decreed  that  neither  Tousard' s  nor  his 
compatriot  Rivardi's  connection  with  the  American  artillery  was 
to  be  prolonged.  They  were  not  in  favor  with  Secretary  Dear- 
born, a  rough,  practical  soldier,  who  had  imbibed  military  ideas 
in  the  field  during  the  Revolution,  and  who  then  conceived  what 
he  never  overcame — a  prejudice  against  foreigners  and  their  ways 
of  doing  things.  The  correspondence  betweeen  the  Secretary 
and  these  officers  was  often  of  such  nature  that  no  one  familiar 
with  it  was  surprised  when,  in  Mr.  Jefferson's  political  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  army  in  1802,  both  were  mustered  out  of  service. 

In  this  reorganization  the  artillerists  and  engineers  as  a  com- 
bined arm  disappeared.  Out  of  a  part  of  the  old  material  a  regi- 
ment of  artillerists  was  formed,  while  a  corps  of  engineers  was 
created  as  a  distinct  part  of  the  military  system.  The  colonel  of 
the  former  was  Ikirbeck,  ranking  lieutenant-colonel  commandant 
of  artillerist  and  engineers  ;  the  lieutenant-colonel,  Constant  Free- 
man ;  the  majors,  Daniel  Jackson,  Decius  Wadsworth,  Moses 
Porter,  and  William  MacRea.  This  absorbed  all  the  field  officers 
of  the  late  artillerists  and  engineers  save  four.  Of  these,  Will- 
iams was  appointed  major  of  the  engineer  corps ;  Tousard  and 
Rivardi,  with  Mahlon  Ford,  were  discharged.  The  arm  was  here 
deprived  of  some  of  its  best  educated  and  most  capable  officers. 

Before  the  reduction  the  artillerists  and  engineers  embraced 


ORGANIZATION— GENERALLY.  33 

one  hundred  and  eighty-two  officers,  surgeons,  mates  and  cadets. 
In  the  regiment  of  artillerists  there  were  one  hundred  and  seven 
of  these  grades.  The  enlisted  force  was  at  the  same  time  cut 
clown  from  2152  to  1520.  But  though  forty  per  cent,  of  the 
first  mentioned  left  service,  it  will  be  noticed  that  both  Bur- 
beck  and  Freeman  were  promoted  by  the  change,  thus  going  up 
in  the  scale,  while  many  others  went  not  only  down  but  out  of 
service.  As  illustrating  the  mutability  of  military  fortune  in  those 
days  of  frequent  changes,  it  may  be  mentioned  that  both  these 
officers — Burbeck  in  1815  and  Freeman  in  1821 — were  placed  to 
one  side  to  make  room  in  their  turn  for  others. 

If  we  compare  the  organization  of  the  artillery  under  the  act  of 
March  i6th,  1802,  (Appendix  A  [25],)  with  that  of  the  artillerists 
and  engineers  before  that  time,  it  will  be  found  in  some  respects 
to  have  gained  by  the  change..  True,  the  staff  of  the  regiment 
and  the  battalions  were  either  wanting  or  entirely  inadequate  ;  but 
this  disadvantage  was  far  more  than  offset  by  the  fact  that  the 
arm  was  again  given  a  single  head.  The  complete  failure  of  the 
artillerists  to  rise  to  a  plane  of  scientific  excellence  commensurate 
with  the  needs  of  service — a  fact  which  led  directly  to  the  separa- 
tion in  1812  of  the  technical  from  the  combatant  artillery  and  the 
formation  of  the  technical  branch  into  an  ordnance  department — 
was  due  not  to  faults  of  organization  but  to  incompetent  personnel. 

The  large  number  of  musicians  given  each  company,  (four  out 
of  seventy-six  enlisted,)  was  for  the  purpose,  as  the  Secretary  of 
War  explained,  of  providing  the  colonel  with  a  fine  regimental 
band, — a  luxury  "in  which  Crane,  Proctor,  and  perhaps  other 
artillery  commanders  were  indulged  during  the  Revolution. 

There  was  little  in  the  history  of  the  artillery  between  1802  and 
1812  to  call  for  remark  except  that  important  event,  the  organi- 
zation of  the  light  artillery  regiment.  On  the  26th  of  February, 
1808,  Mr.  Jefferson  recommended  to  Congress  that,  in  view  of 
complications  growing  out  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  an  addition 
should  be  made  to  the  regular  army.  Accompanying  the  com- 
munication of  the  President  was  one  from  Secretary  Dearborn, 
suggesting  that  this  increase  should  be  fixed  at  six  thousand  men, 
arranged  to  five  regiments  of  infantry,  one  of  riflemen,  one  of 
light  artillery,  and  one  of  light  cavalry.  This  was  authorized 
by  act  of  April"  1 2th,  1808.  (Organization  of  Light  Artillery, 
Appendix  A  [26].)  Profiting  by  experience,  the  introduction  of 
5 


34      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

•unnaturalized  foreigners  as  officers  was  prevented  by  a  clause 
restricting  such  appointments  to  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

Examination  of  all  correspondence  bearing  on  the  subject  leads 
to  the  belief  that,  when  the  light  artillery  was  recommended  by 
the  Secretary  and  authorized  by  Congress,  the  question  as  to  its 
equipment  had  not  been  decided.  No  provision,  based  on  the 
hypothesis  that  it  would  be  mounted,  was  made  for  any  part  of  the 
establishment ;  in  fact,  as  provided  for  in  the  law,  the  light  differ- 
ed from  the  other  artillery  only  in  name.  The  expense  that  neces- 
sarily attended  fitting  out  a  regiment  of  this  character  was  more 
than  the  administration  was  willing  to  authorize,  and  no  sooner 
were  the  light  companies  recruited  than  they  were,  with  a  single 
exception,  marched  off  with  muskets.  To  such  lengths  was  this 
spirit  of  economy  carried,  that  the  lieutenant-colonel  was  not 
appointed  until  December,  1811,  and  the  colonel  for  some  months 
later.  Captain  John  Saunders  of  the  artillerists  was,  January, 
1809,  appointed  major  of  the  new  regiment,  but  this  was  after  the 
companies  were  nearly,  if  not  quite  all,  fully  recruited.  The  cap- 
tains and  subalterns  were  active  young  men,  who  eagerly  sought 
opportunity  to  distinguish  themselves  in  an  arm  of  service  ren- 
dered famous  in  the  contemporaneous  wars  of  Europe.  George 
Peter,  who  had  the  honor  of  commanding  the  first  properly 
equipped  light  artillery  company  in  the  American  army,  headed 
the  list  of  captains ;  Winfield  Scott,  afterwards  general-in-chief, 
stood  second  on  the  list;  Abraham  Eustis,  who  rose,  zyth  No- 
vember, 1834,  to  be  colonel  of  the  present  First  Artillery,  was  third. 
These  and  many  others  who  started  with  them  rendered  distin- 
guished service.  The  regiment  was  full  of  life,  the  officers  young 
enough  to  be  ambitious,  and  had  opportunity  offered  under  any- 
thing like  favorable  conditions,  the  light  artillery  would  have 
made  a  record  honorable  alike  to  itself  and  to  the  service  of  which 
it  formed  a  part. 

Secretary  Dearborn  lost  no  time  in  organizing  the  first  company 
as  field  artillery  proper.  The  following  is  his  letter  of  instructions 
to  Captain  Peter,  then  stationed  at  Fort  McHenry,  Baltimore, 

Maryland : 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT,  Gth  May,  1808. 

GEO.  PETER — Sir:  As  soon  as  you  can  have  two  six-pounders  properly 
mounted,  with  one  ammunition  wagon  and  one  light  horse  wagon,  for  convey- 
ing four  men  besides  the  wagoner,  prepared  for  service,  I  will  order  the  pur- 
chase of  a  sufficient  number  of  horses  for  making  an  experiment  with  one  field 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  35 

piece,  with  its  ammunition  wagon  containing,  say,  fifty  cartridges,  ten  of  which- 
ought  to  have  round  shot,  and  ten  of  grape  or  cannister.  The  officers,  with  one 
sergeant  and  three  men  on  horseback,  and  four  men  in  the  light  wagon,  are  to 
proceed,  at  the  rate  of  five  or  six  miles  an  hour,  from  Baltimore  to  this  city, 
and  to  make  some  experiments  at  this  place  by  manoeuvring  the  cannon  in 
different  directions.  *  *  *  For  one  six-pourider,  one  ammunition  and  one 
light  wagon,  and  for  the  officers  and  others  on  liorseback,  it  will,  I  presume, 
require  from  thirteen  to  sixteen  horses.  I  wish  you  to  endeavor  to  have  a 
sufficient  number  of  suitable  men  well  trained  to  the  business  before  the  gen- 
eral experiment  is  made." 

On  the  1 6th  of  the  same  month,  ten  days  after  the  Secretary's 
letter  was  written,  Peter  replied  that  he  had  the  requisite  number 
of  horses  in  training,  and  that  the  carriages,  harness,  saddles, 
bridles,  &c. ,  would  be  ready  in  a  few  days.  Upon  this  letter  the 
Secretary  indorsed  an  order  to  the  surveyor  of  supplies  directing 
that  he  send  twenty-six  suits  of  light  artillery  uniform  to  Captain 
Peter  as  soon  as  possible.  Everything  having  been  put  in  order 
for  the  purpose  of  making  a  display  with  the  new  arm,  the  novel 
feature  of  the  succeeding  4th  of  July  parade  in  Washington  city 
was  Captain  Peter's  field  artillery  company. 

This  was  properly  looked  upon  as  an  important  event,  and  one 
of  great  interest  both  to  the  Secretary  and  the  President.  Artil- 
lery moving  at  the  rate  of  five  or  six  miles  an  hour  was  a  great 
advance  on  anything  that  had  been  seen  before  in  this  country. 
The  equipment  was  unique,  and  must  have  originated  with  Secre- 
tary Dearborn.  Different  from  anything  then  practiced  elsewhere, 
it  was,  both  in  simplicity  and  mobility,  certainly  not  second  to 
the  system  at  the  time  in  vogue  in  some  parts  of  Europe,  and  of 
which  the  Wurst  caisson  formed  a  prominent  feature.  The  gun 
carriages  and  limbers,  of  nearly  the  Gribeauval  pattern,  were  made 
by  the  artillery  artificers  stationed  at  Fort  McHenry. 

Orders  having  been  issued  directing  that  the  light  artillery  com- 
panies raised  south  of  New  Jersey  should  be  concentrated  at  New 
Orleans,  Peter,  augmented  in  men  and  guns,  left  Baltimore  De- 
cember 24th,  1808,  and  marched  to  Pittsburg  en  roiite  to  that  city. 
Writing  to  Secretary  Dearborn  from  Pittsburg,  January  gth,  1809, 
Captain  Peter  said  :  ' '  The  performance  of  the  light  artillery  in  the 
late  march  has  exceeded  my  most  sanguine  expectations.  The 
gun  carriages,  ammunition  wagons,  fixed  ammunition,  &c.,  have 
arrived  without  the  smallest  injury,  and  I  really  believe  that  the 
march  could  have  been  performed  in  ten  days  could  the  baggage 


36      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

'wagons  have  kept  pace  with  us."  In  conjunction  with  other 
forces  destined  for  New  Orleans,  the  company,  with  men,  guns, 
and  horses,  were  embarked  on  the  Ohio  in  the  latter  part  of  Jan- 
uary. After  many  delays,  due  to  inclement  weather  and  other 
causes,  the  command  reached  its  destination  in  the  latter  part  of 
March,  1809.  Soon  after,  the  army  moved  to  Terre  au  Bceuf,  below 
the  city,  and  Peter  resigned  his  commission.  The  company,  left  in 
command  of  Lieutenant  James  Gibson,  was  in  1812  absorbed  in 
the  companies  of  the  artillerist  regiment  in  that  vicinity ;  while 
Gibson,  returning  north,  raised  and  marched  to  the  field  one  of 
the  first  horse  artillery  companies,  which  joined  the  army  on  the 
Niagara  frontier. 

Ere  this,  Secretary  Dearborn  had  been  succeeded,  under  the 
new  administration  of  Mr.  Madison,  by  Doctor  William  Eustis. 
This  gentleman  had  been  surgeon  of  Gridley's  regiment  in  1775. 
He  had  seen  something  of  military  affairs,  but  wholly  from  the 
standpoint  of  a  non-combatant.  In  this  he  was  a  marked  contrast 
to  his  predecessor,  and,  unlike  him,  failed  to  appreciate  the  impor- 
tance of  maintaining  some  portion  of  the  field  artillery,  equipped  as 
such,  in  a  state  of  efficiency.  On  the  2d  of  June,  1809,  he  wrote 
to  General  Wilkinson  :  "I  am  informed  by  the  accountant  that  the 
amount  of  expenditures  at  New  Orleans  is  great ;  the  charges  for 
house  rent,  forage,  and  other  articles  are  such  as,  if  admitted  and 
continued,  will  soon  devour  our  appropriations.  The  inclosed 
memorandum  will  give  you  an  idea  of  them.  I  beg  of  you  to 
interpose  your  authority  to  put  an  end  to  them.  Horses  for  the 
artillery  cannot  be  maintained  at  such  an  expense ;  they  must 
either  be  sent  to  some  part  of  the  country  where  they  can  be  main- 
tained at  one-fourth  of  the  present  expense,  or  they  may  be  sold. 
On  those  waters  I  should  suppose  they  might  be  dispensed  with. 
The  drivers  should  be  taken  from  the  line ;  there  is  no  lawful 
authority  for  the  employment  of  other  persons.  Imagine  for  a 
moment  the  whole  regiment  of  light  artillery  on  this  scale  of  ex- 
pense. Consider  the  prejudices  against  the  army  in  general 
which  an  inspection  of  such  charges  by  members  of  the  Govern- 
ment is  calculated  to  impress  on  their  minds."  Replying  to  this, 
August  27th,  1809,  Wilkinson  said  :  "Finding  that  it  is  impossible 
to  maintain  the  light  artillery  horses  on  anything  like  the  terms 
you  stipulate,  I  have  ordered  them  to  be  sold  at  vendue."  Thus, 
after  a  service  of  little  more  than  one  year,  the  first  light  artillery 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  37 

company  of  the  United  States  army,  serving  as  such,  was  dis- 
mounted. 

From  the  date  of  this  event  until  war  with  Great  Britain  became 
inevitable,  nothing  was  done  to  further  the  interests  of  the  light 
artillery  arm  beyond  preparing  the  materiel  necessary  for  its 
equipment,  which  was  to  be  on  the  Gribeauval  system.*  In  this 
Secretary  Dearborn  had  resolved  on  uniformity,  and  his  successor 
followed  in  his  footsteps.  Meanwhile  a  bold  front  was  put  on 
when  the  subject  of  adding  to  the  efficiency  of  the  practically- 
discarded  arm  was  suggested  as  a  measure  worthy  the  attention 
of  Government.  To  a  French  gentleman  who  had  presented  a 
memoir  on  the  advantages  of  horse  artillery  organized  as  in 
Europe,  pointing  out  the  deficiencies  of  the  United  States  in 
this  particular,  Secretary  Eustis,  January  loth,  1810,  replied: 
' '  The  use  of  horse  artillery  has  been  suspended  in  practice  for  rea- 
sons which  cannot  at  this  time  be  entered  upon.  The  importance  of 
this  limb  of  an  army  has  never  been  uncontemplated  or  under- 
valued. The  measures  of  availing  ourselves  of  it  are  not  so  remote 
as  may  be  imagined. ' '  But  in  fact  there  was  little  upon  which  to 
base  this  air  of  confidence.  The  means  at  hand  to  form  an  effi- 
cient horse  artillery  were  too  meagre  to  be  relied  upon  for  this 
purpose.  They  consisted  of  a  so-called  light  artillery — but  really 
an  infantry — regiment,  possessing  neither  a  horse  nor  a  gun,  and 


*  In  the  spring  of  1810,  the  death  of  Major  John  Saunders  gave  rise 
to  a  controversy  regarding  the  right  to  promotion  of  an  officer  under 
suspension  which,  because  of  the  important  precedent  established  by  the 
decision,  as  well  the  subsequent  prominence  of  the  person  at  the  time  prin- 
cipally affected,  is  of  interest.  Captain  Winfield  Scott,  the  ranking  officer 
of  light  artillery  after  Saunders,  claimed  the  majority,  under  the  regular  rules 
for  promotion.  But  he  was  at  the  time  under  suspension  by  sentence  of  a 
court-martial,  and  the  Secretary  of  War,  not  being  acquainted  with  the  pre- 
cedents in  the  case  in  our  army,  referred  the  matter  to  a  board,  of  which 
Colonel  Burbeck  was  president,  for  advice  ;  the  report  was  adverse  to  Cap- 
tain Scott's  pretension,  and  was  to  the  effect  that  officers  forfeited  their  right 
to  promotion  while  under  suspension,  and  the  next  on  the  list  eligible  in 
other  respects  acquired  them.  Under  this  ruling  Eustis  overslaughed  Scott, 
and  was  made  major  of  the  light  artillery.  Although  this  was  not  in  ac- 
cordance with  precedents,  had  the  Secretary  but  known  what  they  were,  it 
is  an  eminently  just  decision,  and  has  governed  similar  cases  in  the  army 
since. 


38      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

of  some  materiel  for  its  equipment,  when  mounted,  scattered  at 
the  arsenals  and  artillery  posts. 

It  was  not  until  February,  1812,  that  the  officers,  even  when 
mounted,  were  authorized  by  law  to  draw  forage  for  their  horses, 
having  previously  been  required  to  feed  them  at  their  own  expense. 
At  the  same  time  the  President  was  empowered  to  mount  the  entire 
regiment,  while  to  each  company  thus  mounted  there  was  allowed 
one  saddler  and  one  farrier.  This  was  four  years  after  the  organiza- 
tion was  put  on  foot,  and  shows  what  erroneous  ideas  prevailed  as 
to  the  requisites  for  a  proper  light  artillery.  In  the  following 
May,  when  preparing  to  take  the  field,  each  company  was,  by 
law,  allowed  twelve  drivers,  who,  when  the  companies  were  not 
mounted,  were  at  all  times  liable  to  do  duty  in  the  ranks.  This 
was  a  wise  measure.  Enlisting  drivers  in  the  company  with  which 
they  served  was  far  more  conducive  to  efficiency  and  discipline 
than  the  practice  then  in  vogue  in  some  European  armies  of  hav- 
ing them  drawn  from  corps  attached  to  the  artillery,  yet  inde- 
pendent of  it. 

The  condition  of  the  light  artillery  at  the  commencement  of 
the  year  1812  demonstrated  the  impossibility  of  combining  the 
duties  of  that  arm  with  those  of  the  infantry.  The  attempt  failed ; 
it  was  seeking  to  obtain  something  for  nothing — to  have  the 
moral  effect  and  prestige  of  this  powerful  auxiliary  arm  without 
paying  for  it.  That  there  was  not  an  efficient  horse  artillery  dur- 
ing the  war  of  1812,  resulted  from  the  fact  that  the  Government 
was  not  willing  to  complete  the  work  it  had  begun.  The  person- 
nel was  of  the  best;  the  materiel  was  practically  equal  to  that  of  the 
enemy,  (owing  to  the  relatively  slight  use  made  of  field  artillery;) 
but  from  first  to  last  the  policy  was  pursued  of  dismounting  the 
companies  almost  as  fast  as  equipped,  to  the  discouragement  of  the 
men  and  the  disgust  of  the  officers,  who  could  not  reasonably  be 
expected  to  take  pride  in  a  light  artillery  regiment  which  existed 
as  such  in  name  only. 

Under  the  pressure  of  impending  war,  larger  additions  were 
made  to  the  army  by  act  of  January  nth,  1812.  The  combatant 
force  thereby  authorized  embraced  two  regiments  of  artillery, 
one  of  dragoons,  and  ten  of  infantry.  (Organization  of  Artillery, 
Appendix  A  [27].)  The  two  artillery  regiments  were  desig- 
nated the  Second  and  Third,  the  old  artillerists  being,  for  con- 
venience, known  as  the  First  Regiment  of  regular  artillery.  But, 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  39 

as  regards  promotion  of  officers,  these  regiments  were  always 
distinct.  The  First  belonged  to  what  was  officially  known  as 
the  "  peace  establishment;"  the  Second  and  Third  to  the  <(  addi- 
tional military  force;  "  and  if  during  the  lifetime  of  the  latter  two 
regiments — January  nth,  1812,  to  March  3Oth,  1814 — there  had 
happened,  in  either,  a  vacancy  in  the  grade  of  major,  for  instance, 
the  ranking  captain  of  the  artillery  line  could  not  claim  it.  After 
the  original  vacancies  in  the  Second  and  Third  regiments  were 
filled,  advancement  in  each  was  distinct ;  it  was  not  until  the 
reorganization  of  March  3Oth,  1814,  when  the  regiments  were 
broken  up  and  formed  into  a  corps,  that  promotion,  under  exist- 
ing rules,  became  general  throughout  the  foot  artillery  arm. 

Captain  George  Izard,  formerly  of  the  artillerists,  was  appointed 
colonel;  Captain  Winfield  Scott,  of  the  light  artillery,  lieutenant- 
colonel;  William  Lindsay  and  Daniel  M.  Forney,  majors  of  the 
Second  Regiment;  the  other  lieutenant-colonel,  Francis  K.  Huger, 
was  not  appointed  until  1813.  Concerning  the  colonel  of  the  Sec- 
ond, it  is  proper  to  remark  that  there  was  not  in  the  United 
States  his  superior  in  military  knowledge.  Educated  in  the  mili- 
tary schools  of  France,  he  had,  by  several  years'  experience  in 
the  army,  supplemented  by  study  and  reflection,  methodically 
digested  in  his  mind  the  whole  subject  of  army  organization  and 
supply.  This  fact  made  his  counsel  particularly  valuable  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  upon  which,  with  little  preparation,  the 
Government  had  now  embarked.  Both  the  colonel  and  lieuten- 
ant-colonel of  this  regiment  rose  to  the  grade  of  general  officer. 

The  Third  was  not  completed  in  organization  so  rapidly  as  the 
Second  Artillery.  Of  the  field  officers,  only  the  colonel,  Alexan- 
der Macomb,  late  of  the  engineer  corps,  and  Major  George  E. 
Mitchell  from  civil  life,  were  appointed  in  1812.  Early  in  1813 
the  complement  of  field  officers  was  completed  by  raising  Mitchell 
to  the  grade  of  lieutenant-colonel,  transferring  into  the  like  grade 
Captain  James  House,  of  the  First  Artillery,  and  appointing  a 
civilian,  Mr.  Samuel  Nye,  with  Captain  George  Armistead,  of  the 
First  Artillery,  majors. 

When  Izard  waspromoted,  March  i2th,  1813,  he  was  succeeded 
by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Scott;  the  latter  by  Major  Lindsay,  and  he 
by  Captain  Hindman — all  agreeably  to  the  regimental  plan  of 
promotion. 

Macomb  was  appointed  brigadier-general  January  24th,  1814, 


40      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF  THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

and  Scott  on  March  Qth  following.  The  vacancies  thus  created 
were  not  filled;  in  the  corps  of  artillery  organized  from  the  three 
regiments  March  3Oth,  same  year,  the  grade  of  lieutenant-colonel 
was  the  highest  for  which  provision  was  made  by  law. 

The  artillery  was  generally  well  officered  during  the  war  of  181 2, 
but  it  suffered  then,  as  it  has  since,  from  not  having  a  single  head  to 
direct  its  affairs.  Prior  to  the  year  mentioned,  Burbeck  was  theo- 
retically serving  as  such;  but  by  July,  1812,  three  other  officers  of 
equal  rank  were  appointed  in  that  arm,  viz.,  Porter  of  the  light 
artillery,  Izard  and  Macomb.  These  officers  were  independent 
the  one  of  the  other,  and  neither  was  appointed  to  the  com- 
mand of  the  artillery  of  the  whole  army,  as  might  easily  have 
been  done.  While  Secretary  Eustis  expressed  himself  as  deeply 
impressed  with  the  importance  of  training  all  troops  at  the  ser- 
vice of  artillery,  and  sought  to  render  the  arm  itself  efficient,  he 
failed  to  appreciate  the  fact  that,  to  do  this,  unity  in  purpose  and 
action,  which  alone  can  exist  under  the  supervision  of  one  direct- 
ing mind,  was  the  first  thing  to  be  secured.  The  Secretary  was  a 
man  of  peace,  not  of  war,  and  seems  to  have  lost  his  head  amidst 
the  multiplicity  of  affairs  that  pressed  upon  him,  and  which  soon 
drove  him  from  his  office  in  despair.  Not  only  was  no  one  ap- 
pointed to  command  the  whole,  but  the  principal  officers  were 
scattered  everywhere  except  with  their  own  arm.  Izard  did  not 
serve  a  day  with  the  artillery,  although  from  taste,  education, 
and  experience  he  was  well  qualified  for  it.  Burbeck  was  not  act- 
ing as  an  artillery  officer  proper,  although,  first  in  New  York  Har- 
bor and  afterwards  at  New  London,  he  had  troops  under  him  of  that 
arm,  but  always  in  conjunction  with  infantry,  in  a  general  com- 
mand. Porter  was  commander  of  artillery  on  the  Niagara  fron- 
tier from  the  fall  of  1812  until  he  retired  through  sickness,  one 
year  later.  Macomb  was  commander  of  the  artillery  brigade  at 
Sackett's  Harbor  in  the  summer  of  1813,  and  at  other  times  was 
chief  of  artillery  in  Wilkinson's  army,  but  it  was,  except  for  a 
very  short  time,  merely  as  an  adjunct  to  his  duties  as  an  infantry 
commander.  His  own  regiment,  the  Third,  served  almost  wholly 
as  infantry.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fenwick  commanded  the  light 
artillery  under  various  generals  whose  armies  operated  on  the 
Canadian  frontier,  but  he  was  transferred  to  a  staff  department. 

Thus  it  was  with  the  most  prominent  and  efficient  officers ;  that 
they  were  efficient  was  considered  a  reason  for  assigning  them  to 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  41 

duty  elsewhere.  As  a  result,  commanders  were  embarrassed  in 
the  management  of  their  artillery,  and,  to  secure  its  even  tolerable 
service,  it  was  often  necessary  to  assign  to  duty  therewith  officers 
from  other  branches  of  the  army.  Writing,  August  29th,  1812, 
from  his  grand  camp  at  Greenbush,  near  Albany,  N.  Y.,  General 
Dearborn  said  :  "  I  am  in  want  of  experienced  artillerists.  We  have 
none  here  of  any  kind,  excepting  light  artillery  unprepared  for 
actual  service.  Whatever  relates  to  our  artillery  and  ammunition 
remains  in  a  chaotic  state  for  want  of  suitable  officers."  In  the 
summer  of  1813  General  Hampton  complained  that  he  was  left 
with  only  raw  captains  just  entering  the  artillery  service,  and  asked 
authority  to  appoint  Lieutenant  Lomax  an  assistant  adjutant- 
general,  that  he  might  be  assigned  to  the  command  of  that  arm 
over  the  heads  of  those  officers.  Soon  after  Major  McRee,  of  the 
engineer  corps,  was  appointed  chief  of  artillery  in  Hampton's 
army.  The  instances  cited  sufficiently  illustrate  the  difficulties 
experienced  in  securing  the  services  of  competent  artillery  officers, 
who,  instead  of  being  with  their  commands,  were  performing  what 
was  considered  indispensable  duty  elsewhere  ;  but  it  was  at  a  sac- 
rifice of  the  efficiency  and  credit  of  their  own  arm.  It  all  resulted 
from  one  cause,  viz. ,  the  want  of  a  chief  -of  artillery  for  the  whole 
army,  as  Knox  was  in  the  Revolution,  who  could  assign  duties  to 
his  own  officers,  each  in  the  sphere  for  which  he  was  best  fitted. 
Colonel  Izard  well  understood  this  fact.  He  urged  on  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  early  in  1812,  a  reorganization  of  the  artillery  to 
secure  its  efficiency,  stating  at  the  same  time  that  he  was  willing 
to  serve  in  a  subordinate  capacity  ;  but  his  suggestions  came  too 
late  to  work  a  practical  reformation.  War  was  at  hand  ;  all  were 
preparing  for  the  field  ;  the  time  for  wisely  carrying  out  the  pro- 
posed work,  which  must  always  be  the  result  of  deliberate  reflec- 
tion, had  passed,  and,  though  Mr.  Eustis  was  favorably  disposed, 
he  resigned  before  congressional  action  could  be  taken  ;  the  artillery 
was  left  to  drift  without  a  directing  hand  ;  and  finally,  March  3Oth, 
1814,  a  distorted  plan,  miscalled  a  reorganization,  entirely  devoid  of 
the  substance,  while  having  in  some  degree  the  form  of  a  scheme 
proposed  by  Colonel  Izard,  was  enacted  into  law  ;  but  by  this, 
the  regiments,  instead  of  being  drawn  more  closely  together,  were 
broken  into  still  smaller  fragments,  each  independent  of  the  other. 
(Izard's  Plan  of  Organization,  Appendix  A  [29].) 

In  common  with  each  regiment  of  dragoons,  infantry,  and  rifles, 
6 


42      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,  U.   S.   ARMY. 

the  light  artillery  was,  by  act  of  January  2oth,  1813,  given  another 
major.  This  was  more  particularly  to  facilitate  recruiting,  as  it 
was  intended  that  the  extra  major  should  supervise  that  service 
for  his  regiment.  In  addition  there  were,  as  to  every  other  in 
the  army,  added  to  each  company  of  light  artillery  a  third  lieu- 
tenant and  a  fifth  sergeant. 

Thomas  Pitts,  senior  captain  of  the  light  artillery,  was  appointed 
to  the  original  majority  thus  created  in  his  regiment.  He  resigned 
August  3ist,  1814.  The  President  appointed  Captain  McPherson 
to  be  Pitts'  successor,  overslaughing  Captain  William  Campbell. 
This  was  during  the  recess  of  the  Senate,  which  body  did  not  con- 
sent to  the  appointment.  Captain  Campbell's  name  was  then  sent 
in,  and  he  was  confirmed  major  in  the  light  artillery,  to  date  back 
to  the  day  of  Pitts'  resignation.  The  circumstance  receives  sig- 
nificance from  the  fact  that  it  was  an  attempt,  on  the  part  of  the 
Executive,  to  ignore,  in  the  interests  of  favorites,  the  rules  of  pro- 
motion established  by  law.  It  is  one  of  the  many  instances  in 
which  the  Senate  stood  firm  in  defense  of  right.  To  that  body,  and 
to  it  alone,  the  army  owes  it  that  promotions  are  made  otherwise 
than  at  the  will,  perhaps  the  caprice,  of  the  President. 

By  the  law  of  March  ^oth,  1814,  the  First,  Second,  and  Third 
regiments  of  artillery,  as  has  been  mentioned,  were  arranged  to  a 
Corps  of  twelve  battalions.  (Appendix  A  [28].)  The  light  artil- 
lery remained  unchanged.  The  pay  of  all  was,  for  the  first  time, 
fixed  at  that  of  dragoons.  The  President  was  authorized  to 
assign  one  of  the  second  lieutenants,  of  which  each  company  of 
the  Corps  was  given  two,  to  duty  as  conductor  of  artillery,  i.  e. 
company  ordnance  officer,  for  which  he  received  ten  dollars  per 
month  extra  compensation.  The  artificers  introduced  into  the 
artillery  in  1802  were  not  provided  for  in  the  corps  organization  ; 
they  were  generally  superior  workmen,  and  since  their  introduc- 
tion in  1802  had  made  much  of  the  materiel,  such  as  carriages, 
caissons,  <&c.  Their  loss  now  deprived  the  artillery  of  some  of 
its  most  useful  members,  whose  duties  under  the  law  of  1812  were 
devolved  on  the  ordnance  department. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  no  authentic  information  has  been  ob- 
tained concerning  the  reasons  which  led  to  the  formation  of  the 
Corps  of  Artillery.  Before  this  law  was  enacted  promotion  was 
regimental,  and  afterwards  it  followed  the  general  rule,  only  the 
Corps  was  considered  a  single  body.  This  undeniably  tended  to 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  43 

unity  throughout  the  system,  and  thus  far  the  change  was  for  the 
better  ;  but  this  advantage  was  dearly  purchased  at  the  price  of  a 
still  further  dispersion  of  the  arm  into  twelve  instead  of,  as  for- 
merly, four  independent  units.  Though  the  law  contemplated 
the  consolidation  of  many  organizations  and  the  mustering  out  of 
supernumerary  officers,  more  of  the  latter  were  provided  for  in  the 
Corps  than  in  the  three  old  artillery  regiments.  This  increase 
was,  however,  in  the  lower  and  at  the  expense  of  the  upper  grades. 
Macomb  and  Scott  had  recently  been  promoted.  Burbeck  was  a 
brevet  brigadier,  assigned  to  duty  as  such.  At  the  date  of  the 
passage  of  the  act  of  March  3Oth,  1814,  there  was  not  a  colonel 
serving  with  these  three  regiments.  The  fact  might  have  been 
used  as  an  argument  for  abolishing  the  grade  ;  but,  if  so,  it  was 
illusory,  illogical,  and  struck  a  fatal  blow  at  soldierly  ambition. 
Because,  forsooth,  colonels  of  artillery  proved  themselves  worthy 
of  promotion,  the  vacancies  thus  created  were  not  to  be  filled! 
The  men  upon  whose  conduct  they  had  to  a  great  extent  built  up 
their  fame  were  not  worthy  to  succeed  them  !  If  this  is  to  be 
their  reward,  what  incentive  to  honorable  action  can  subordinates 
have  ? 

But  whatever  may  have  been  the  motives  which  actuated  the 
legislature,  the  practical  effect  of  the  reorganization  upon  the  ar- 
tillery was  prejudicial  to  its  interests.  Denominated  a  Corps,  it 
was  such  in  no  sense  indicating  unity  either  in  mind  or  body.  It 
had  no  head.  It  was  only  small,  separate  fragments  thrown  to- 
gether. The  many  distinguished  subordinate  officers  of  artillery 
who  had  won  brevets  on  brevets  in  battle  were  now  given  to  un- 
derstand they  need  expect  no  more  substantial  rewards.  The 
battalions  of  the  so-called  "Corps"  were  composed  of  four  com- 
panies each,  half  commanded  by  lieutenant-colonels  and  half  by 
majors — an  incongruity  at  variance  with  the  simplest  rules  ol 
correct  military  organization.  The  radical  defect,  however,  lay 
in  the  fact  that  no  officer  commanded  the  different  parts  of  the 
Corps. 

By  Colonel  Izard's  scheme  for  the  reorganization  of  the  ar- 
tillery, it  was  proposed  to  replace  the  regiment  by  a  battalion, 
to  unite  the  engineers  with  the  artillery,  and  to  impose  on 
the  new  corps  all  the  duties  devolving  by  law  upon  the  artil- 
lery, the  engineer  corps,  and  the  ordnance  department.  This 
was  in  substance  what  Du  Portail  and  Hamilton  had  advocated  in 


44      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.  S.   ARMY. 

1783.  Izard  favored  an  artillery  corps  composed  of  battalions  ; 
the  act  of  March  3Oth,  1814,  provided  such  a  Corps.  So  far  as 
names — words — were  concerned,  the  act  supplied  what  Izard  had 
advocated ;  but  here  similarity  ceased.  Words  are  not  things. 
The  organization  actually  given  was  but  a  soulless  form,  devoid 
of  life,  or  that  which  could  impart  animation  to  the  system. 

Brevet  Brigadier-General  Burbeck  ceased  now  to  be  colonel  of 
artillery,  but  he  continued  in  service  until  the  reduction  and  dis- 
banding of  the  army  the  following  year,  when,  after  having  served 
almost  continuously  for  forty  years,  he  was  relegated  to  civil  life. 

The  act  of  reorganization,  March  3Oth,  1814,  increased  by  one 
the  number  of  lieutenant-colonels  in  the  artillery,  to  which  orig- 
inal vacancy  Major  MacRea,  of  the  First  Regiment,  was  ap- 
pointed ;  and  as  there  existed  a  vacancy  in  the  grade  of  major 
in  one  of  the  regiments,  but  one  other  field  officer  besides  Bur- 
beck  was  retired  from  the  service.  This  was  Major  A.  Y.  Nicoll, 
late  adjutant  and  inspector-general  of  the  army,  who  resigned  June 
ist,  1814. 

The  act  fixing  the  military  establishment,  approved  March  3d, 
1815,  authorized  the  President  to  determine  what  proportion  of 
the  ten  thousand  men  forming  the  peace  army  should  be  artillery, 
infantry,  and  riflemen.  Regarding  the  former,  the  law  provided  that 
the  Corps  should  retain  its  existing  organization,  and  that  the  light 
artillery  should  be  maintained  as  organized  in  1808,  thus  muster- 
ing out  of  the  latter  the  second  major,  the  third  lieutenant  and 
fifth  sergeant  for  each  company,  the  drivers,  saddlers,  and  far- 
riers. (Appendix  A  [30].) 

There  were  mustered  to  form  the  Corps  of  Artillery  the  old  corps, 
the  regiment  of  dragoons,  the  4ist,  42d,  and  43d  regiments  of  in- 
fantry. Seven  of  the  eight  field  officers  retained  were  from  the 
old  corps  ;  the  eighth  and  junior  was  Major  W.  H.  Overton,  of  the 
3d  rifles,  who  resigned  a  few  months  later,  and  was  succeeded  by 
Major  James  Bankhead,  late  of  the  yth  infantry. 

To  form  the  new  light  artillery  there  were  mustered  the  existing 
regiment,  the  i5th,  26th,  3oth,  3ist,  33d,  34th,  and  45th  regiments 
of  infantry.  All  the  field  officers  of  the  old  light  artillery  regi- 
ment and  four  of  the  ten  captains  were  retained.  Among  those 
transferred  to  the  light  artillery  at  this  time  was  Captain  Nathan 
Towson,  of  the  Corps  of  Artillery,  afterwards  paymaster-general, 
whose  good  fortune  it  had  been  to  be  present  with  his  company 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  45 

in  almost  every  affair  of  importance  on  the  northern  frontier  during 
the  years  1812-' 14. 

By  the  War  Department  order  which  reduced  and  reorganized 
the  army,  (iyth  May,  1815,)  the  territory  of  the  United  States 
was  divided  into  nine  military  departments,  five  of  which  made  up 
the  northern  and  four  the  southern  division.  The  dividing  line  be- 
tween the  divisions  may  be  roughly  stated  to  have  been  the  parallel 
of  Washington  city.  In  assigning  the  artillery,  the  light  regi- 
ment, with  four  battalions  of  the  Corps,  were  apportioned  to 
the  northern  ;  the, other  four  battalions  to  the  -southern  division. 
The  battalions  were  officially  known  as  the  first,  second,  third, 
and  fourth  of  the  divisions  to  which  they  belonged.  In  each  di- 
vision the  companies  of  the  battalions  were  designated  by  the  let- 
ters of  the  alphabet  from  A  to  Q,  both  inclusive,  excluding  the 
letter).  (Appendix  A  [32].)  To  point  out  a  particular  company 
it  was  necessary  to  specify,  for  instance,  ' '  Company  (Q)  Fourth 
Battalion,  southern  division,"  and  they  are  so  designated  in  the 
official  records.  If  Company  (Q)  of  the  southern  were  ordered 
into  the  northern  division,  a  company  must  leave  the  latter  to 
take  its  place ;  whereupon  these  two  changed  their  official  desig- 
nations, which  were,  consequently,  never  permanent.  This  at- 
tempt to  maintain  an  artillery  equipoise  in  the  two  great  military 
divisions  was  as  inconvenient  as  the  organization  of  the  Corps 
itself  was  impotent.  The  awkwardness  of  the  arrangement  was 
clearly  demonstrated  before  the  reorganization  of  March  2d,  1821, 
when  the  army  was  reduced  from  ten  thousand  to  six  thousand 
men,  and  the  Corps  of  Artillery  put  an  end  to. 

By  act  of  April  2Oth,  1818,  slight  changes  were  made  in  the 
personnel  by  giving  each  company  of  the  Corps  one  captain,  two 
first  lieutenants,  two  second  lieutenants,  and  to  each  company  of 
light  artillery  one  captain,  one  first  and  two  second  lieutenants ; 
while  to  each  battalion  of  the  Corps  and  to  the  light  regiment 
there  was  allowed  one  armorer.  It  was  further  provided  that  in 
each  artillery  company  one  of  the  second  lieutenants  should  be 
conductor,  for  which  $10  per  month  extra  pay  was  allowed. 
The  act  affected  the  commissioned  officers  to  the  extent  that  in 
the  Corps  of  Artillery  each  company  was  given  another  first  lieu- 
tenant and  its  third  promoted  to  second  lieutenant ;  while  in  the 
light  artillery  an  additional  second  lieutenant  was  given  each 
company. 


46      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

The  ist,  2cl,  3d,  and  4th  regiments  of  artillery  of  the  present 
regular  army  date  from  the  act  of  March  2d,  1821.  Although 
the  number  of  companies  in  each  regiment  has  been  increased, 
and  other  modifications  have  been  introduced  as  circumstances 
have  made  them  proper,  the  organization  then  given  these  regi- 
ments has  remained  essentially  unchanged.  (Organization,  Ap- 
pendix A  [31].)  In  Appendix  A  [32]  will  be  found  a  state- 
ment showing  which  companies  of  the  Corps  and  of  the  regiment 
of  light  artillery  were  retained,  and  their  designations,  in  the  new 
regiments.  Under  the  terms  of  the  reorganizing  act  the  light 
artillery  regiment  ceased  to  exist ;  but  provision  was  made  for  this 
species  of  troops  by  a  mandatory  clause  in  the  law  directing  that 
one  of  the  nine  companies  in  each  regiment  should  be  designated 
and  equipped  as  light  artillery.  (See  Field  Artillery.) 

The  field  officers  of  the  artillery  regiments  retained  were  :  Moses 
Porter,  Nathan  Towson,  Walker  K.  Armistead,  John  R.  Fen- 
wick,  colonels ;  George  Bomford,  James  House,  G.  E.  Mitchell, 
William  MacRea,  lieutenant-colonels  ;  John  B.  Walbach,  J.  Hind- 
man,  James  Bankhead,  Abraham  Eustis,  majors.  Of  these, 
Armistead  was  transferred  from  the  head  of  the  engineer  corps ; 
Bomford  from  the  ordnance  department ;  while  Towson  was  taken 
from  the  head  of  a  civil  department,  the  pay  corps.  When  the 
name  of  the  latter  officer  came  before  the  Senate,  that  body  re- 
fused to  give  its  consent  to  the  appointment.  Then  commenced 
a  struggle  between  the  Executive  and  the  Senate  which  it  is 
believed  is  without  a  parallel  in  the  history  of  the  Government. 
Three  successive  administrations  became  involved  in  the  contro- 
versy, and  finally,  after  eleven  years,  during  which  time  the 
Second  Artillery  remained  without  a  colonel,  the  matter  was  set- 
tled by  a  compromise.  * 

*  The  President  maintained  in  the  1821  reduction  that  he  had  a  perfect  light 
to  make  the  new  corps  of  the  army  out  of  the  old,  in  any  manner  he  saw  lit. 
That  no  officers  could  claim  legal  exemption  from  being  deranged,  nor  could 
any  have  legal  claim  to  being  retained.  The  selection  of  officers  for  the  new 
army,  from  those  belonging  to  the  former,  was  a  matter  entirely  at  the  discre- 
tion of  the  President. 

From  these  broad  propositions,  all  and  singular,  t'he  Senate  dissented.  Many 
interesting  points  were  raised. in  the  ensuing  discussions  that  must  be  consid- 
ered as  corollaries  to  the  main  proposition  stated  above. 

The  President  maintained  that  the  pay  department  was  one  of  the  "  corps  "  of 
the  army  ;  the  Senate  denied  it  and  rejected  the  nomination  of  the  paymaster-gen- 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  47 

The  law  of  April  5th,  1832,  introduced  into  the  army  a  class  of 
under  officers  (ordnance  sergeants)  who,  while  belonging-  neither 
to  the  ordnance  department  nor  to  the  artillery,  are  intimately 
connected  with  both.  During  the  Revolutionary  war  the  office 
of  conductor  of  artillery  was  one  of  the  subordinate  positions 
assigned  to  artillery  officers.  It  disappeared  with  that  war,  and 
was  revived  again  by  section  17  of  the  act  of  March  28th,  1812, 
which  directed  the  President  to  appoint  four  conductors,  to  be 
entitled  to  the  pay  and  emoluments  of  a  lieutenant  of  artillery. 
As  has  been  noticed,  the  acts  of  March  3Oth,  1814,  and  April  2Oth, 
1818,  had  imposed  the  duties  of  conductor  on  one  of  the  two  sec- 
ond lieutenants  given  each  artillery  company,  and  for  the  perform- 
ance of  which  $10  per  month  extra  pay  was  allowed.  These  duties 
had  been  to  receive,  account  for,  issue,  and  keep  in  repair  the 
artillery  and  other  material  of  the  company,  garrison,  brigade,  or 
other  organization  to  which  the  conductor  was  attached.  It  was 
a  position  in  war  of  great  property  responsibility,  and,  though 
sometimes  intrusted  to  warrant  officers  and  at  others  to  those 
holding  commissions,  it  had  been  the  practice  to  allow  additional 
compensation  to  the  incumbent.  The  reorganizing  and  reducing 
act  of  March  2d,  1821,  neither  made  mention  of  nor  provision  for 

end  for  the  colonelcy  of  one  of  the  regiments.  The  President  held  that  no  particu- 
lar officers  were  entitled  to  the  colonelcies  of  the  eleven  new  regiments.  The  Sen- 
atc  held  that,  by  directing  the  Executive  to  arrange  the  officers  of  the  old  army 
to  the  new,  he  was  bound  to  put  the  eleven  old  colonels  in  these  new  places. 
Therefore,  according  to  the  Senate's  views,  the  colonels  dropped  out  were  still 
legally  in  service. 

The  President  mentioned  that  he  was  prepared  to  take  the  ground  that  Con- 
gress could  not,  constitutionally,  limit  by  law  his  choice  of  individuals  to  fill 
original  vacancies  from  the  whole  body  of  his  fellow  citizens.  The  Senate  re- 
marked,  incidentally,  that  they  were  prepared  to  combat  that  proposition  ; 
basing  their  argument  on  the  clause  of  the  constitution  giving  Congress  power 
to  prescribe  rules  for  the  government  and  regulation  of  the  land  and  naval 
forces. 

The  Senate  held  that  the  offices  that  Towson  and  Gadsden  were  nominated 
for  were  created  during  a  session  of  the  Senate,  and  therefore  the  President  had 
no  right  to  fill  them  during  a  recess  of  that  body.  Here  again  the  President 
was  at  issue  with  them. 

The  House  also  became  involved  in  the  controversy.  So  far  as  the  views  of 
thai  body  ran  be  gathered,  they  at  that  time  sustained  the  Senate  in  all  points 
upon  which  they  (the  House)  expressed  an  opinion. 

The  Senate  and  House  maintained  that,  in  the  new  army,  officers  should  be 


48      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

conductors  of  artillery,  and  their  duties  devolved  upon  command- 
ing officers,  who  thus,  instead  of  being  able,  if  so  disposed,  to 
devote  their  time  and  attention  to  other  and  relatively  more  im- 
portant matters,  were  compelled  to  give  a  large  part  of  it  to  petty 
details  connected  with  the  keeping  in  order  of  ordnance  and  other 
property.  It  was  with  the  double  object  of  relieving  commanding 
officers  of  the  duties  of  receiving  and  preserving  ' '  the  ordnance, 
arms,  ammunition,  and  other  military  stores,"  and  transferring 
them  to  meritorious  non-commissioned  officers  of  long  service, 
with  an  increase  of  pay  and  a  permanency  of  station,  that  the 
grade  of  ordnance  sergeant  was  created. 

The  Seminole  war  having  drawn  all  the  troops  into  the  field 
and  strained  to  the  utmost  the  resources  at  his  command,  the 
Secretary  of  War,  in  his  report  of  1837,  recommended,  among 
other  measures  looking  to  the  perfection  of  the  military  system, 
the  increase  of  the  number  of  companies  in  each  regiment  of  artil- 
lery. This  was  done  by  act  of  July  5th,  1838.  One  company 
was  added  to  each  regiment,  and  the  number  of  privates  in  each 

kept,  when  possible,  in  same  corps  as  before  the  reduction  ;  and  rejected  Gads- 
den  for  adjutant-general  on  that  ground,  he  having  formerly  been  an  inspector. 

The  House  became  interested  in  this  controversy  from  the  fact  that,  through 
a  transfer  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Lindsay  back  to  the  artillery  from  the  infantry, 
Major  Eustis  was  kept  out  of  his  lieutenant-colonelcy.  Major  Eustis  had  an 
uncle,  the  Hon.  William  Eustis,  formerly  Secretary  of  War,  who  was  chairman 
of  the  House  Military  Committee,  and  who  was  looking  after  the  major's  in- 
terests. 

The  Senate  having  rejected  the  paymaster-general's  nomination  for  colonel 
of  the  2d  artillery,  the  regiment  was  without  a  colonel.  Of  the  four  colonels 
discharged,  viz.,  Wads  worth,  Smith,  King,  and  Bissell,  the  first  and  third  died 
soon  afterwards.  Smith  was  appointed  a  U.  S.  judge,  leaving  Bissell  alone  to 
be  provided  for.  The  President  maintained  he  was  out  of  service  ;  the  Senate 
that  he  was  in  service  ;  he  took  the  latter  view,  and  reported  regularly  to  the 
War  Department,  but  was  not  assigned  to  duty.  When  Mr.  J.  Q.  Adams  be- 
came President,  Bissell  reported  for  duty  as  usual.  He  was  not  assigned,  but 
Mr.  Adams  nominated  him  as  from  citizen  life  for  the  colonelcy  that  the  Senate 
had  contended  all  along  of  right  belonged  to  him.  The  Senate  did  not  act 
directly  on  the  nomination,  but  expressed  the  opinion  that  Bissell  was  entitled 
to  the  place,  and,  as  he  had  never  been  out  of  service,  the  President  might  ar- 
range him  to  the  2d  artillery.  To  this  proposition  Mr.  Adams  would  not  agree. 
He  renominated  Bissell,  but  nothing  came  of  it.  In  his  annual  message,  De- 
cember, 1826,  he  recommended  such  legislation  as  the  case  might  require,  as 
there  was  no  hope  of  the  President  and  Senate  agreeing.  A  bill  was  reported 
by  the  Senate  Military  Committee  looking  to  the  legislating  of  Bissell  into  office, 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  4$ 

company  was  increased  from  forty-two  to  fifty-eight.  At  the 
same  time  the  number  of  second  lieutenants  allowed  each  artillery 
company  was  reduced  from  two  to  one,  but  the  filling  original 
vacancies  created  by  the  new  companies,  together  with  the  en- 
largement of  several  staff  corps,  obviated  the  necessity  for  muster- 
ing any  officer  out  of  service.  (Appendix  A  [31].) 

The  vacancies  in  the  grade  of  captain  created  in  the  four  regi- 
ments were  filled  by  appointing  in  each,  except  the  First,  the 
ranking  first  lieutenant.  For  particular  reasons,  that  officer  in 
the  First  Artillery  stood  still  and  was  overslaughed.  This  was 
the  first  instance  in  the  history  of  the  artillery  that  offices  newly 
created  (original  vacancies)  in  that  arm  had  been  filled,  prefer- 
ably, by  selections  made  from  those  already  in  service.  The 
practice  in  the  early  years  of  the  Government  was  the  reverse. 
When  the  corps  of  artillerists  and  engineers  was  raised  in  1794, 
the  regiment  of  the  same  arm  in  1798,  the  2d  and  3d  regiments 
of  1812,  officers  of  the  army  received  very  few  of  the  appointments 
thus  made  available  to  them ;  they  were,  with  rare  exceptions, 

but  it  failed  to  become  law.  The  House  Military  Committee  also  reported  a 
bill  looking  to  the  same  end,  but  its  fate  was  like  the  other.  In  presenting  this 
bill  the  House  Military  Committee  was  called  on  to  express  an  opinion  on  the 
construction  of  the  reducing  act  of  1821.  They  sustained  the  Senate  so  far  as 
Towson  was  concerned,  but  maintained,  with  the  late  President,  that  the  old 
colonels  had  no  legal  right  to  the  new  colonelcies  ;  in  which  view  they  were 
opposed  by  the  Senate.  The  House  Military  Committee,  therefore,  in  1827, 
concurred  in  President  Monroe's  view  expressed  in  1822,  that  the  only  limita- 
tion placed  on  him  was  that  he  should  take  the  officers  of  the  new  army  from 
those  of  the  existing  army  ;  but  they  disagreed  from  his  views  as  to  who  were 
officers  of  the  army  before  the  reduction.  The  House  Committee  intimated 
very  strongly,  but  did  not  say,  that  in  their  opinion  Bissell  was  entitled  to  the 
colonelcy. 

President  Jackson  suggested  that  an  explanatory  act  be  passed,  designating 
the  class  of  officers  from  which  the  colonelcy  of  the  2d  regiment  of  artillery 
should  be  filled.  This  called  forth  a  report  from  the  House  Military  Committee, 
January  18th,  1830.  In  this  it  was  held  that  Bissell  was  not  entitled  to  it,  but 
the  vacancy  belonged  to  the  ranking  lieutenant-colonel  of  artillery,  Lindsay. 
The  Senate  Military  Committee  was  now  under  the  leadership  of  Mr.  Benton. 
It  can  readily  be  surmised  that  it  would  not  assent  to  these  views  of  the  House 
Committee.  The  bill  did  not  become  a  law.  But  the  same  end  was  attained, 
as  the  ranking  lieutenant-colonel  was  promoted  in  accordance  with  this  idea, 
April  26th,  1832  ;  and  thus,  after  being  eleven  years  without  one,  the  2d  regi- 
ment of  artillery  was  given  a  colonel.  ^  (See  Niles'  Register,  vol.  22,  p.  400,  et  seq. 
Mil.  Affairs,  vol.  2,  p.  395;  Vol.  3,  Ibid.,  pp.  259,  290;  Vol.  4,  Ibid.,  p.  248.) 

7 


50      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

conferred  upon  civilians.  The  experience  of  the  war  of  1812  had 
demonstrated  the  superiority,  as  a  rule,  of  officers  versed  in  their 
profession  over  those  newly  selected  from  civil  life.  One  of  the 
results  has  been,  and  the  general  augmentation  of  1838  initiated 
the  system,  that  since  then,  in  the  matter  of  new  appointments, 
those  already  in  the  army  have  received  consideration  in  some 
degree  commensurate  with  their  professional  services  and  attain- 
ments.* 

There  was  begun  a  movement  this  year  which,  in  its  effects  on 
the  artillery,  has  been,  to  a  degree,  unsurpassed  by  any  measure 
of  reform,  permanent  and  salutary.  Reference  is  made  to  the 
mounting,  as  horse  artillery,  in  the  fall  of  1838,  of  Captain  Ring- 
gold's  company  C,  of  the  3d  regiment.  Followed  the  succeeding 
year  by  the  equipping  one  company  in  each  of  the  other  regiments 
as  field  artillery,  it  resulted,  as  did  many  other  improvements  of 
that  arm,  from  the  intelligent,  earnest  efforts  of  the  gentleman  at 
the  head  of  the  War  Department.  Of  the  many  measures  set  on 
foot  for  building  up  the  department  over  which  he  presided  with 
singular,  conspicuous,  and  universally  acknowledged  ability,  none 
contributed  more  to  that  end,  or  to  the  glory  of  his  country's 
arms  in  the  field,  than  did  the  re-establishment,  as  contemplated 
in  the  act  of  March  2d,  1821,  of  this  arm  of  service.  The  subject 
will  be  treated  of  elsewhere ;  for  the  present  it  suffices  to  remark 
that  the  field  batteries  of  the  regular  army,  with  their  honorable 
records,  owe  their  existence  to  the  military  sagacity  of  Secretary 
Joel  R.  Poinsett. 

The  Mexican  war  brought  an  augmentation  and  a  slight  change 
of  organization  to  the  artillery.  In  his  annual  report,  December 
5th,  1846,  Secretary  Marcy  pointed  out  that  the  efficiency  of  the 
regular  troops  in  the  field  was  greatly  impaired  by  the  absence  of 
the  field  officers.  This,  he  stated,  was  in  great  degree  due  to  their 


*"To  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States,  whose  votef  of  the 
10th  of  April,  1846,  in  the  Twenty-ninth  Congress,  gives  hope  of  a  recognition 
of  military  service  as  a  necessary  qualification  for  command,  this  work,  of  four 
years'  labor,  is  humbly  inscribed,  by  C.  K.  Gardner."  (Dictionary  of  the  Army 
of  the  United  States.) 

f  The  vote  was  for  this : 

"  Provided,  That  all  the  officers  of  the  aforesaid  regiment  of  riflemen  shall  be 
selected  from  the  regular  line  of  the  United  States  army."  (Intending  to  em- 
brace, for  the  selection,  the  Avhole  annyjthen  in  service.  Being  defective,  the 
proviso  was  stricken  out  by  the  Senate.) 


ORGANIZATION — GENERALLY.  51 

physical  incapacity.  As  there  was  no  retired  list  on  which  they 
could  be  placed,  the  Secretary  urged,  as  a  means  of  infusing 
younger  blood  into  the  system,  the  appointment  in  the  artillery  of 
an  additional  major  for  each  regiment.  An  increase  also  in  the 
number  of  artillery  troops  seemed  to  be  a  proper  measure  from 
the  fact  that  the  old  organizations  were  absent  at  the  seat  of  war, 
leaving  public  property  inadequately  guarded  and  the  forts  on  the 
maritime  frontiers  almost  without  garrisons.  Ships  of  the  most 
insignificant  nation  can  insult  with  impunity  the  strongest  coast 
devoid  of  defenders.  These  considerations  moved  Congress  to 
augment  the  artillery  and  to  add  slightly  to  the  staff;  to  make  the 
whole  more  complete,  by  acts  of  February  nth  and  March  3d, 
1847.  Two  additional  companies,  a  major,  quartermaster,  two 
principal  musicians,  and  a  principal  teamster,  were  given  each 
regiment ;  two  teamsters  to  each  company ;  while  the  President 
was  authorized  to  designate  four  additional  companies  to  be  equip- 
ped as  light  artillery.  For  the  first  time  since '1821  the  officers 
and  men  of  the  light  artillery,  when  serving  as  such,  were  given 
dragoon  pay  and  allowances.  This  resulted  from  the  brilliant 
actions  of  the  field  companies  on  the  battle-fields  of  the  Rio 
Grande  valley,  where  they  astonished  the  army  and  the  country 
by  their  manoeuvres,  efficiency,  and  power.  (Appendix  A  [33].) 

The  artillery  was  given  the  benefit  of  the  original  vacancies 
created  by  the  acts  cited,  in  filling  which,  as  well  as  in  the  result- 
ing promotions  flowing  therefrom,  due  regard  was  paid  to  the 
actual  rank  of  officers  concerned,  who  were  advanced  to  newly- 
created  offices  upon  the  principle  of  regular  promotion  established 
by  law  for  all  branches  of  the  army. 

From  the  Mexican  war  until  the  breaking  out  of  the  Civil  war 
in  1 86 1,  the  artillery  retained  its  organization  unchanged,  al- 
though attempts  to  modify  it  in  various  ways  were  made  during 
that  time.  Mr.  Shields,  chairman  of  the  Senate  Military  Com- 
mittee, made  a  report,  March  23d,  1852,  advocating  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  head  to  the  artillery,  and  accompanied  by  a  bill  to 
secure  this  desired  amelioration.  (Appendix  B  [2].)  During 
the  session  of  1854-' 55  a  bill  favored  by  Secretary  Davis  was  in- 
troduced, which  provided  for  reducing  the  arm  to  two  regiments, 
to  be  thereafter  equipped  and  trained  strictly  as  artillery  proper. 
At  the  same  time  it  was  proposed  to  cut  off  all  below  the  grade 
of  field  officer  in  the  ordnance,  and  detail  the  captains  and  sub- 


52       HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

alterns  of  that  department  from  the  line  of  the  army.  In  the 
latter  particular  the  measure  was  similar  to  that  proposed  in  1878 
by  the  congressional  committee  on  army  organization.  These 
measures  received  the  approval  of  many  of  the  first  officers,  in 
point  of  intelligence,  in  the  army. 

It  was  expected  that  officers  for  service  in  the  ordnance 
would  be  drawn  from  the  artillery  ;  they  would  ultimately  be- 
come the  field  officers  of  that  department;  these  two  branches  of 
service  would  thereby  be  drawn  more  closely  together,  and,  while 
one  would  not  interfere  with  the  other,  the  interests  of  both  and 
of  the  service  in  general  would  be  enhanced.  As  to  the  effect  on 
the  artillery,  one  of  the  advocates  of  the  measure — an  ordnance 
officer*  second  to  none  for  faithful,  intelligent,  and  successful 
labors  for  the  improvement  of  artillery  materiel — remarked  that, 
' f  Being  thus  reduced  to  the  part  of  the  military  force  of  the  na- 
tion that  can  be  spared  from  the  Indian  frontiers,  it  will  be  restricted 
to  duty  appropriate  to  artillery,  either  with  field,  garrison,  siege 
or  sea-coast  guns — a  service  requiring  much  greater  and  much 
more  difficult  instruction  than  that  of  foot  troops" 

None  of  these  attempts  had  the  effect  to  change  the  status  of 
the  arm.  The  general-in-chief  strenuously  opposed  the  reduction 
contemplated  in  the  last-named  measure,  and  carried  the  point 
with  Congress.  What  could  not  be  effected  by  legislation,  viz., 
placing  the  artillery  in  a  more  advantageous  position  profession- 
ally, was  next  sought  through  the  re-establishment  of  the  artillery 
School  of  Practice  at  Fort  Monroe,  the  organization  of  field  artil- 
lery schools,  and  providing  a  systematic  course  of  instruction  for 
artillery  troops  at  permanent  fortifications.  (See  Instruction.) 

The  scattered  condition  of  the  regular  army  in  1861  rendered 
it  impracticable  for  the  Government  at  the  beginning  of  the  Civil 
war  to  avail  itself  of  the  services  of  the  troops  in  that  prompt  man- 
ner which  the  emergency  demanded.  This,  so  far  as  the  artillery 
was  concerned,  resulted,  at  least  ostensibly,  from  the  attempt  to 
carry  out  an  elaborate  scheme  of  instruction  for  that  arm.  To 
meet  the  necessities  of  the  case  the  President,  by  proclamation  of 
May  3d,  that  year,  increased  the  regular  establishment  by  one 
regiment  of  artillery,  one  of  cavalry,  and  eight  three-battalion 
regiments  of  infantry.  The  Constitution  provides  that  ' '  Congress 


Major  Mordecai. 


ORGANIZATION— GENERALLY.  53 

shall  have  power  to  raise  and  support  armies;"  but  this  was  an 
instance  where  delay  was  not  to  be  tolerated,  and  the  Executive, 
conceiving  that  it  was  always  constitutional  to  save  the  Govern- 
ment from  overthrow,  raised  these  troops  on  his  own  responsibility. 
The  day  following  the  President's  proclamation  a  general  order  - 
was  issued,  fixing  the  organization  and  pay  of  the  additional  reg- 
iments. On  June  i8th  (G.  O.  33,  A.  G.  O.,  1861)  a  roster  of 
the  commissioned  officers  was  promulgated.  In  the  artillery,  the 
higher  positions  in  the  original  vacancies  thus  created  were  filled 
by  selections  from  the  old  artillery  regiments.  The  colonel  was 
taken  from  the  line  of  majors;  the  lieutenant-colonel  and  majors 
from  the  captains.  In  every  instance  they  overslaughed  sev- 
eral in  their  own  arm  of  service.  The  commissions  of  all  were 
dated  May  I4th,  1861.  Nearly  three  months  after  this  addition 
to  the  regular  army  had  been  organized,  .the  act  of  July  29th, 
1 86 1,  was  passed,  giving  legislative  sanction  to  the  increase.  As 
was  the  case  with  the  two  companies  added  to  each  regiment  of 
artillery  by  the  act  of  March  3d,  1847,  it  was  stipulated  that  the 
additional  troops  should  serve  only  during  the  existing  war;  but 
when  the  rebellion  wras  put  down  circumstances  had  changed, 
and  the  Fifth  Artillery  became  a  part,  as  it  has  remained,  of  the 
permanent  military  establishment.  (Appendix  A  [34].)  It  fol- 
lowed that  during  the  Civil  war  the  artillery  regiments  had  differ- 
ent organizations.  This  was  changed  by  act  of  July  28th,  1866, 
which,  except  as  to  the  commissioned  staff,  (made  uniform  for 
all, )  placed  the  four  old  regiments  on  the  same  footing  with  the 
Fifth.  This,  with  some  slight  changes  in  the  non-commissioned 
staff,  affecting  all  regiments  alike,  is  the  status  of  the  artillery  at 
the  present  .day.  (Appendix  A  [35].) 


54      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 


CHAPTER  II. 

ORGANIZATION — FIELD    ARTILLERY    SINCE    1 82 1. 

The  part  of  section  2  of  the  act  of  March  2cl,  1821,  which  direct- 
ed that  one  company  of  each  artillery  regiment  should  be  desig- 
nated and  equipped  as  light  artillery,*  remained  for  seventeen 
years  practically  inoperative.  Aside  from  announcing  the  com- 
panies, a  matter  of  form  merely,  and  giving  their  uniform  some 
slightly  distinctive  feature,  nothing  was  done  during  that  time  to 
carry  the  law  into  effect. 

Mention  has  been  made  incidentally  of  the  equipping  by  Mr. 
Poinsett  of  the  light 'companies  in  1838-' 39.  When  finally  the 
time  came  to  execute  the  law  in  earnest,  no  attention  was  paid  to 
the  previously  existing  light  artillery  designations,  which  had 
been  made  on  the  authority  of  regimental  commanders ;  com- 
panies were  selected  regardless  of  either  service  or  associations, 
and  more  particularly  with  a  view  to  obtaining  efficient  captains. 

The  first  to  be  mounted,  (C)  of  the  Third  Artillery,  retained 
its  light  battery  organization  until  1849,  and,  except  during  one 
interval  of  eighteen  months,  has  been  equipped  as  a  field  battery 
since  then.  The  captain  of  (C)  company  at  that  time  was  Brevet 


*  Light  artillery  is  horse  artillery,  but  the  practice  in  our  service  has  been  so 
opposed  to  the  correct  military  usage  of  the  former  term  that  with  us  it  signifies 
both  horse  artillery,  i.  e.,  wherein  each  man  serves  on  horseback,  and  mounted 
artillery,  in  which  the  cannoneers  mount  on  the  carriages  for  rajiid  movements 
only.  The  person  to  initiate  this  was  Mr.  Poinsett,  who,  as  mentioned  in  the 
text,  in  1838  and  1839  fitted  out  one  company  as  horse  and  three  as  mounted 
artillery,  when  he  essayed  to  execute  the  law  of  1821,  directing  that,  in  each 
regiment,  one  company  should  be  "designated  and  equipped  as  light  artillery." 

Economical  considerations  caused  indirectly  that  to  be  called  light  artillery 
which  was  not  such  in  fact,  and  the  confusion  has  continued  since.  The  term 
"light"  is  now  made  to  do  duty  for  "field"  artillery.  At  the  present  time 
there  are,  under  the  authority  of  the  law  allowing  ten  light  batteries,  that  num- 
ber of  mounted  (field)  batteries  in  service.  Correctly  speaking,  there  is  not  in 
our  army  to-day  a  single  battery  equipped  as  light  artillery. 

The  difficulty  has  not  been  in  the  law,  where  proper  terms  have  always  been 
used ;  it  has  arisen  from  the  erroneous  practice  under  the  law. 

The  Artillery  Tactics  have  until  quite  recently  made  correct  use  of  military 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD  ARTILLERY  SINCE  1821.  55 

Major  Samuel  Ringgold.     It  was  engaged  in  the  Florida  (Semi- 
nole)  war,   whence  its  commander  had  returned  north  on  sick 
leave.     The  intention  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  give  vitality  to 
the  almost  obsolete  law  was  conveyed  officially  to  Major  Ringgold  ' 
in  the  following  communication  : 

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

"WASHINGTON,  September  18th,  1838. 

"Sm:  Having  been  selected  by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  organize,  equip,  and 
command  the  first  company  of  light  artillery  authorized  by  act  of  1821,  you  will 
repair  to  Carlisle  barracks  and  lose  no  time  in  proceeding  to  execute  the  views 
of  the  department.  The  number  of  horses  necessary  for  the  purpose  being  now 
in  depot,  will  require  your  immediate  attention.  As  the  convenience  of  the 
general  service  will  not,  at  this  time,  justify  the  ordering  of  your  company  to 
Carlisle,  you  will  see  by  my  requisitions  on  the  colonels  of  the  First  and  Second 
regiments  of  artillery  of  this  date  the  measures  which  are,  for  the  present,  to  be 
adopted  for  the  formation  of  the  proposed  company.  The  ordnance,  equip- 
ments, and  all  other  supplies  will  be  furnished  in  due  time  by  the  proper  depart- 
ments. You  will  forward  to  this  office  your  requisitions  for  the  approval  of 
the  Secretary  of  War." 

The  horses  referred  to  in  this  letter  were  those  used  by  the 
Government  in  removing  Indians  from  their  lands  east  of  the 
Mississippi  River  to  the  Cherokee  country.  Upon  these  horses, 
now  no  longer  needed,  the  Secretary  relied  for  a  proper  mount, 
and  they  alone  were  used  for  this  purpose.  Mr.  Poinsett  was  not 
one  to  be  deterred  by  lack  of  means ;  having-  the  will,  he  found 
the  way  to  the  building  up  of  this  important  but  neglected  branch 
of  the  artillery  service. 

The  following  is  the  letter  to  the  colonels  of  the  First  and 
Second  artillery  regiments,  referred  to  in  Major  Ringgold' s  in- 
structions : 

"The  Secretary  of  War  being  desirous  to  equip  one  company  to  act  as  light 
artillery  with  as  little  delay  as  practicable,  deems  it  most  expedient,  for  the 
present,  to  organize  the  proposed  company  as  a  detachment  to  be  formed  by 

terms.  In  the  assimilated  edition,  now  in  use,  the  term  "light  artillery"  has, 
however,  been  introduced  with  the  erroneous  signification  above  indicated. 

During  the  Civil  war  many  regular  batteries  were  equipped  as  horse  artillery, 
as  was  Ringgold's,  (C)  of  the  Third,  from  1838  to  1849.  So  far  as  the  author  is 
aware,  no  other  regular  batteries  have  in  time  of  peace  been  so  equipped  since 
1821. 

In  the  text,  the  term  "light  artillery"  is  used  with  its  customary  significa- 
tion ;  the  work  of  reform  in  the  use  of  technical  language  in  our  army  is  too 
onerous  to  be  undertaken  here. 


56      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

detail  or  selection  from  the  First  and  Second  regiments  of  artillery.  Accord- 
ingly he  desires  that  you  select  three  good  men,  such  as  you  may  suppose  best 
calculated  for  the  object  in  view,  from  each  of  the  companies  of  your  regiment, 
which,  on  being  mustered  and  inspected  as  a  detachment,  you  will  order  to 
Carlisle  barracks  with  as  little  delay  as  practicable.  You  will  also  please  to 
assign  two  sergeants  and  two  corporals  to  the  detachment,  who  will  be  reported 
on  the  same  service." 

A  first  lieutenant  was  ordered  from  the  First  and  a  second 
lieutenant  from  the  Second  Artillery  to  act  as  subalterns  in  the 
new  company  for  the  time  being.  Lieutenants  Aisquith  and 
Barry  were  selected  for  this  duty.  The  latter  here  laid  the  founda- 
tion for  that  knowledge  of  light  artillery  service  which,  twenty- 
three  years  afterwards,  he  turned  to  good  account  as  chief  of  artil- 
lery when  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  being  organized  in  1861. 

November  5th,  1838,  by  orders  from  the  War  Department, 
the  men  thus  detached  were  formed  into  a  new  (C)  company, 
Third  Artillery ;  Ringgold'  s  old  company  in  Florida  was  broken 
up,  the  subalterns  ordered  to  join  the  light  company,  and  the 
detached  lieutenants  just  mentioned  of  the  First  and  Second 
ordered  to  join  their  regiments.  Lieutenant  Barry  was,  however, 
at  his  own  request,  allowred  temporarily  to  remain  ;  and  at  Major 
Ring-gold's  request,  the  books  of  his  old  company,  with  one  ser- 
geant and  one  private  soldier  of  his  own  selection  therefrom,  were 
sent  to  his  new  command. 

How  the  light  artillery  should  be  mounted — whether  the  can- 
noneers should  ride  on  the  limbers  and  caissons,  or  each  man  on 
horseback  as  light  artillery  proper — was  a  question  yet  to  be  set- 
tled. There  was  at  the  time  sitting  in  Washington  city  a  board 
composed  of  Fenwick  and  Ewing  of  the  artillery,  Talcott,  Baker, 
and  Mordecai  of  the  ordnance,  and  which  had  been  assembled  to 
fix  upon  a  system  of  artillery  for  field  service,  as  well  as  to  deter- 
mine other  questions  of  a  proper  artillery  materiel.  (See  Materiel.) 
The  question  of  light  artillery  equipment  was  a  peculiarly  appro- 
priate one  to  be  decided  by  the  board,  to  which  it  was  referred 
by  the  following  letter  : 

"ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

"WASHINGTON,  October  24th,  1838. 
"Brevet  Brigadier- General  JOHN  R.  FENWICK,  Fourth  Artillery, 

u  President  of  Board  of  Ordnance,  Washington. 

u  GENERAL  :  I  am  desired  by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  inform  you  that  he  wishes 
the  board  to  communicate  its  views  as  to  the  preferable  mode  of  mounting  the 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD  ARTILLERY  SINCE  1821.          57 

company  of  light  artillery  now  being  organized  at  Carlisle ;  that  is,  whether  it 
be  preferable  that  every  man  be  mounted,  as  is  usual  in  what  is  generally  known 
as  horse  artillery,  or  that  as  great  a  number  be  accommodated  on  the  guns  and 
caissons,  as  is  generally  practiced  in  the  equipment  of  field  artillery.  The 
Secretary  himself  would  prefer  the  latter  mode,  inasmuch  as  the  expenses  of 
the  outfit  would  be  less,  and  he  being  desirous  in  making  his  estimates  for  tin-; 
branch  of  service,  in  fulfillment  of  the  provisions  of  the  act  of  1821,  not  to  swell 
the  amount  beyond  what  may  be  absolutely  indispensable.  The  opinion  of  the 
Secretary  as  to  this  point  is  not  communicated  with  any  view  to  control  that 
of  the  board,  but  only  to  show  the  expediency  of  the  lesser  expenditure,  in 
order  to  insure  the  chances  of  better  success  in  obtaining  the  necessary  appro- 
priation by  Congress." 

The  gentlemen  addressed  seem  to  have  had  little  difficulty  in 
determining  the  point,  and  adversely  to  the  predilection  of  the 
Secretary,  as  the  next  day  an  answer,  signed  by  the  president  of 
the  board,  was  transmitted  to  the  adjutant-general,  as  follows  : 

"Sin:  In  reply  to  your  letter  relative  to  the  preferable  mode  to  mount  the 
light  artillery  company  at  Carlisle,  I  have  to  state  that  the  views  of  the  ord- 
nance board  relative  to  light  artillery  are  that  it  should  be  organized  as  horse 
artillery,  and  consequently  that  the  men  should  not  be  carried  on  the  guns  and 
caissons,  but  that  each  man  should  be  mounted  separately,  as  is  usual  in  the 
service  of  that  arm;  otherwise  the  exercise  and  manoeuvres  of  the  company 
must  be  conducted  as  for  foot  artillery,  instead  of  light  horse  artillery." 

Notwithstanding  the  prompt  action  of  the  board,  the  question 
was  not  finally  decided  for  a  month  afterwards.  The  matter  of 
relative  expense  was  one  of  grave  moment,  as  the  Secretary  well 
understood,  and  as  subsequent  experience  has  fully  demonstrated. 
October  25th,  1838,  the  adjutant-general  wrote  Major  Ringgold  : 

"  SIR  :  I  am  instructed  to  inform  you  that  your  company  will  be  mounted  as 
horse  artillery,  and  consequently  the  men  should  not  be  carried  on  the  guns 
and  carriages,  but  that  each  man  be  mounted  separately,  as  is  usual  in  the 
field  service  of  that  arm." 

The  company  was  equipped  as  directed,  and  continued  to  serve 
as  horse  artillery  until  dismounted  at  Santa  Fe,  New  Mexico, 
whither  it  had  been  marched  after  the  Mexican  war. 

Particular  attention  is  here  given  to  the  mounting  of  Ringgold' s 
company  for  the  reason  that  doubts  are  sometimes  expressed  as 
to  its  having  been  horse  artillery.  The  letters  quoted  will  dis- 
pel those  doubts,  which  have  arisen  perhaps  from  the  fact  that 
the  light  artillery  companies  of  the  other  three  regiments,  equip- 
ped the  following  year,  were  organized  into  what  was  technically 


58      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

known  as  mounted  artillery,  i.  e.,  the  cannoneers  habitually  walk- 
ed, and  mounted  the  limbers  and  caissons  for  rapid  movements 
only. 

It  seemed  a  peculiarly  appropriate  circumstance  that  General 
Fenwick  should  be  the  officer  to  announce  the  decision  as  to  what 
should  be  the  equipment  of  the  rehabilitated  arm;  for,  although 
he  was  not  the  first  to  organize  a  company  of  that  description  in 
the  United  States  army,  he  was  the  first  to  lead  one  into  the  pres- 
ence of  the  enemy.  This  was  in  September  and  October,  1812, 
when,  as  lieutenant-colonel  of  the  light  artillery  regiment,  he 
marched  a  section  of  Captain  Gibson's  company,  fully  equipped 
as  horse  artillery,  together  with  a  train  of  heavier  ordnance,  to 
the  relief  of  General  Van  Rensselaer,  just  before  the  battle  of 
Queenstown  Heights. 

Having  embarked  in  the  scheme  of  restoring  the  light  artillery 
to  the  service,  Mr.  Poinsett  followed  it  up  with  his  usual  vigor. 
In  his  report  of  December,  1838,  he  pointedly  called  the  attention 
of  Congress  to  the  importance  of  the  measure,  remarking:  "  We 
are  without  light  artillery  entirely,  and  have  yet  to  learn  its  man- 
agement. There  is  not  at  present  a  complete  train  of  artillery  for 
a  single  one  of  the  four  regiments  in  service.  I  beg  leave  to  sug- 
gest the  necessity  of  an  appropriation  for  the  purpose  of  furnish- 
ing the  number  of  pieces  required  to  arm  the  existing  regiments 
properly,  as  well  as  to  furnish  batteries  for  two  battalions  of  light 
artillery." 

The  opportunity  to  still  further  put  into  execution  his  views  on 
this  subject  was  given  the  succeeding  year,  when,  following  up  his 
efforts  to  improve  the  condition  of  the  troops,  not  of  one  but  of 
all  branches  of  service,  sadly  impaired  during  a  protracted  war  in 
the  pestilential  swamps  of  Florida,  Mr.  Poinsett,  by  General 
Orders  No.  28,  Adjutant-General's  Office,  May  2Oth,  1839,  estab- 
lished a  camp  of  instruction  for  the  practice  and  discipline  of 
detachments  from  all  the  fighting  arms.  The  order  was  as 
follows: 

"  With  a  view  to  the  better  instruction  of  the  troops  and  improvement  of  the 
discipline  of  the  army,  such  portions  of  the  regiments  of  dragoons,  artillery, 
and  infantry  as  may  be  withdrawn  from  their  stations  without  detriment  to 
other  interests  of  the  service,  will  be  concentrated  during  the  summer  months 
at  some  convenient  point  best  calculated  for  a  camp  of  instruction. 

"  The  arduous  and   desultory  service  in  which  the  troops  have  been  so  long 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD    ARTILLERY   SINCE    1 82 1.  59 

engaged,  the  unavoidable  dismemberment  of  the  regiments,  and  separation  of 
so  many  officers  from  duty  in  the  line  while  employed  on  other  service,  could 
hardly  fail  greatly  to  impair  the  esprit  de  corpt  of  the  army,  as  well  as  its  dis- 
cipline and  efficiency.  These  must  be  restored,  and  every  proper  effort  speedily 
made  to  place  the  service  on  a  foundation  which  will  insure  its  steady  and 
uniform  advancement. 

"  The  occasional  concentration  of  companies  of  the  same  regiment,  and  the 
bringing  together  troops  of  different  arms  where  all  the  duties  of  the  officer 
and  soldier  of  the  several  corps  of  the  army  may  be  strictly  and  systematically 
performed,  from  the  school  of  the  company  to  the  evolutions  of  the  line,  are 
necessary  steps  to  be  taken  to  effect  this  desirable  amelioration. 

"  .Major-General  Scott  is  charged  with  the  formation  and  direction  of  the  pro- 
posed camp  of  instruction,  the  immediate  command  of  which  will  be  assigned 
to  such  officer  as  he  may  designate.  In  choosing  a  position  for  the  camp, 
regard  Avill  be  had  to  health,  cheapness,  and  facility  of  transportation,  both  of 
troops  and  supplies. 

"  The  rules  and  regulations  and  established  systems  for  each  arm  of  service 
will  be  punctually  observed  and  strictly  practiced,  and  no  other  than  the  pre- 
scribed military  dress  will  be  worn. 

"All  necessary  supplies  and  transportation  will  be  promptly  furnished  by  the 
respective  departments  of  the  staff,  and  two  officers  of  each  bra»ch  of  that  ser- 
vice will  be  ordered  without  delay  to  report  to  Major-General  Scott  for  duty  at 
the  camp  of  instruction." 

The  camp,  named  ''Camp  Washington,"  was  established  near 
Trenton,  New  Jersey,  and  Brevet  Brigadier- General  Abraham 
Eustis,  major  of  the  light  artillery  regiment  of  1808,  and  at  this 
time  colonel  of  the  First  Artillery,  was  appointed  commandant. 
To  this  camp  Ringgold  marched  his  company  of  horse  artillery, 
fitted  out  with  an  entirely  new  armament,  prepared  by  the  ord- 
nance department.  Here  were  found  also  (K)  of  the  First 
Artillery,  a  new  company,  added  to  the  regiment  by  act  of  July 
5th,  1838;  (A)  of  the  Second,  and  (B)  of  the  Fourth  Artillery, 
all  destined  to  become  the  field  companies  of  their  respective 
regiments.  (A)  received  its  battery  at  the  camp  of  instruction; 
(K)  at  Plattsburg,  New  York,  immediately  after  the  camp  was 
discontinued;  while  the  order  dated  September  27th,  1839,  Head- 
quarters Eastern  Division,  breaking  up  the  camp,  directed  the 
dragoon- horses  to  be  turned  over  to  (B),  Fourth  Artillery,  which 
was  then  equipped  as  a  field  company. 

Simultaneously  with  the  equipping  of  the  last  three  companies, 
there  appeared  a  tactics  adapted  to  the  service  of  this  species  of 
troops.  This  was  the  ' '  Instruction  for  Field  Artillery,  Horse 
and  Foot,"  translated  from  the  French  and  arranged  for  the  service 


60      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

of  the  United  States,  by  First  Lieutenant  Robert  Anderson,  Third 
Artillery.  This  work,  the  appearance  of  which  was  most  oppor- 
tune, was,  by  orders  from  the  War  Department,  April  2oth,  1840, 
adopted  as  the  authorized  field  artillery  tactics,  except  that  por- 
tion relating  to  horse  artillery,  which  it  was  directed  was  not  to 
be  put  in  practice  until  further  orders — a  suspension  which  was 
terminated  by  General  Order  No.  46,  Adjutant- General's  Office, 
August  i gth,  1841.  From  this  date  until  1845  Anderson's  trans- 
lation was  the  prescribed  field  artillery  tactics  for  the  army. 

The  opposition  to  that  part  of  the  tactics  relating-  to  horse  artil- 
lery has  been  stated  by  good  authority  to  have  been  due  to  the 
influence  of  Major  Ring-gold.  Previous  to  his  company  being 
mounted  he  had  studied  the  exercises  of  the  British  light  artillery, 
upon  which  he  had  modeled  his  own,  and  his  wish  was  to  adhere 
to  their  system.  The  adoption  in  1845  of  a  course  of  field  artil- 
lery instruction  supplanting  Anderson's  work,  in  a  measure  ac- 
complished his  wishes  in  this  respect.  (See  Tactics.) 

It  has  been  mentioned  that,  by  act  of  July  5th,  1838,  the 
number  of  enlisted  men  in  the  companies  of  artillery  had  been 
increased  to  seventy-one.  This  sufficed  to  enable  the  captains 
of  the  light  companies  to  man  (in  a  most  imperfect  way  to  be 
sure)  six  pieces  ;  but  the  return  of  a  general  peace,  after  the  Sem- 
inole  war,  having  caused  a  reduction  to  be  made  in  each  company 
of  one  artificer  and  sixteen  privates,  the  number  of  pieces  in  each 
was  restricted  by  Special  Orders  No.  96,  Adjutant-General's  Of- 
fice, 1842,  to  four;  the  other  two  in  each  company  being  stored 
for  use  when  required. 

To  still  further  reduce  expenses,  and  in  total  disregard  of  those 
considerations  for  public  interests  which  had  but  recently  led  to 
their  proper  equipment,  the  question  began  to  be  agitated  whether 
or  not  it  would  be  expedient  to  dismount  the  field  companies, 
either  wholly  or  in  part.  As  had  been  the  case  in  1809,  the  suc- 
cessor to  the  Secretary  of  War,  who  had  attempted  to  place  this 
branch  of  the  artillery  upon  an  eligible  footing*  did  not  appreciate 
as  did  that  officer  the  value  to  the  combatant  arms  of  this  species 
of  troops.  Change  of  policy  followed  change  of  administration  in 
the  War  Department.  Fortunately  for  the  artillery,  at  this  juncture 
there  was  a  staunch  old  soldier  in  the  office  of  adjutant-general 
who  knew  something  of  war  and  its  necessities  from  experience, 
and  who  had  the  courage  to  avow  and  defend  his  convictions. 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD   ARTILLERY    SINCE    l82I.  6l 

In  a  communication  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  J. 
M.  Porter,  and  commenting  upon  the  proposition  mentioned,  he 
remarked : 

"  The  arming  and  equipping  of  the  light  companies  of  artillery  with  their 
appropriate  arms  has  been  attended  with  the  best  results.  Considering  tke 
character  of  our  maritime  frontier,  rendering  field  and  horse  artillery  pecu- 
liarly efficient  as  a  means  of  national  defense,  and  the  little  knoAvledge  of  their 
management  possessed  in  the  country  even  among  the  educated  classes,  this 
powerful  arm  is,  in  my  opinion,  vitally  important  and  ought  to  be  encouraged; 
and  therefore  it  would  be  inexpedient  to  dismount  any  of  the  companies  now 
mounted  as  light  artillery." 

On  this  letter  General  Scott  indorsed  the  brief  but  expressive 
sentence,  "I  fully  concur  in  the  above." 

The  companies  in  question  were  in  the  meantime  being  brought 
in  an  unobtrusive  manner  to  a  high  state  of  excellence  as  regards 
discipline,  drill,  and  generally  whatever  would  enhance  their  effi- 
ciency. The  selection  of  their  commanders — Captains  Ringgold 
of  the  Third,  Taylor  of  the  First,  Washington  of  the  Fourth,  and 
Lieutenant  Duncan  of  the  Second  Regiment — had  been  well  calcu- 
lated to  bring  about  that  result.  They  were  men  well  fitted  by 
nature,  taste,  and  training  for  the  work  here  given  them  in  hand. 
The  duty  was  attended  by  positive  pecuniary  disadvantages. 
Although  subjected  to  all  expenses  attending  mounted  service,  they 
did  not  receive  mounted  pay.  This  circumstance,  which  was  in 
effect  a  discrimination  against  the  field  artillery,  made  the  duty 
undesirable  to  many  officers,  captains  as  well  as  subalterns.  Few 
men  have  the  virtue,  esprit  de  corps,  or  whatever  it  may  be  called, 
to  sacrifice  themselves  and  their  material  interests  for  sentiment's 
sake  and  without  compensation  ;  few  can  afford  to  do  it  even  if  so 
disposed  ;  nor  does  sound  policy  require  it  at  the  hands  of  public 
servants.  Yet  this  was  demanded  of  the  commanders  in  question. 
Undeterred,  these  officers  pursued  the  even  tenor  of  their  ways, 
faithfully  attending  to  whatever  would  enhance  the  professional 
standing  of  their  companies.  The  battle-fields  of  the  Mexican 
war,  on  which  the  latter  soon  after  acted  so  conspicuous  a  part, 
bore  testimony  before  the  army  and  the  'country  to  the  thorough 
manner  in  which  they  had  been  prepared  for  their  as  yet  untried 
and  arduous  duties  in  the  field. 

It  is  not  intended  here  to  do  more  than  mention  the  field  artil- 
lery companies  that  did  service  in  Mexico.  What  that  service 


62       HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

was  is  a  matter  of  history,  written  more  eloquently  than  elsewhere 
in  the  brief  but  spirited  and  business-like  official  reports  of  the 
various  commanders  under  whom  they  won  their  way  to  the  first 
rank  in  the  fighting  arms  of  service.  Company  (E),  Third  Regi- 
ment, Lieutenant  Bragg  commanding,  was,  under  War  Depart- 
ment instructions,  furnished  with  a  battery  consisting  of  two  guns 
and  two  howitzers  in  the  summer  of  1845.  It  joined  General 
Taylor's  army,  and  immediately  after  the  first  battles,  in  May, 
1846,  was  fully  equipped  as  field  artillery.  Captain  T.  W.  Sher- 
man; subsequently  one  of  the  most  distinguished  officers  of  that 
arm,  succeeded  to  the  command  of  this  company,  by  regular  pro- 
motion, May  28th,  1846.  The  companies  organized  by  Mr.  Pom- 
sett  were  also  with  General  Taylor  in  his  advance  into  the  enemy's 
territory  ;  Ringgold's  equipped  as  horse  artillery  ;  the  others  con- 
tinuing, as  they  had  started  in  1839,  to  be  what  is  now  technic- 
ally known  as  mounted  artillery.  Major  Ringgold  was  mortally 
wounded  at  Palo  Alto,  May  8th,  1846,  and  died  three  days  later. 
His  successor,  Morris  S.  Miller,  assistant  quartermaster,  relin- 
quished the  captaincy  June  i8th,  to  be  followed  by  Braxton  Bragg, 
who  proved  himself  to  be  a  worthy  successor  to  the  first  com- 
mander of  the  horse  artillery  company. 

By  the  act  of  May  i3th,  1846,  the  number  of  privates  in  com- 
panies of  the  regular  army  was  authorized,  at  the  discretion  of 
the  President,  to  be  increased  to  one  hundred.  This  enabled  the 
field  artillery  companies,  if  filled,  to  man  six  guns  each.  Of 
Ringgold's  old  company,  an  officer  who  joined  it  at  Monterey 
says  : 

11  It  was  then  commanded  by  Bragg*,  and  Avas  in  the  highest  state  of  efficien- 
cy, discipline,  and  drill  of  any  organization,  of  any  arm,  that  1  have  ever  seen. 
It  had  six  guns,  six  caissons,  two  battery  wagons,  and  two  forges,  each  having 
six  horses  as  teams,  and  each  gun  served  by  a  detachment  of  twelve  men 
mounted,  not  on  the  boxes,  but  on  high-mettled  and  well-trained  horses,  which 
followed  the  guns  as  they  moved  at  a  gallop,  and  swept  over  the  plain  of  exer- 
cise like  a  whirlwind." 

That  its  action  on  the  field  of  battle  was  as  conspicuous  as  were 
its  manoeuvres  on  the  drill-ground,  it  gave  ample  proof,  particu- 
larly at  Buena  Vista,  where  its  service  is  best  described  in  the  lan- 
guage of  the  commanding  general  : 

"Captain  Bragg,  who  had  just  arrived  from  the  left,  was  ordered  at  once 
into  battery.  Without  any  infantry  to  support  him,  and  at  the  imminent  risk 


ORGANIZATION FIELD    ARTILLERY    SIXTH    IvS2I.  63 

of  losing  his  guns,  this  officer  came  rapidly  into  action,  the  Mexican  lines  being 
but  a  few  yards  from  the  muzzles  of  his  pieces.  The  first  discharge  of  cannis- 
ter  caused  the  enemy  to  hesitate;  the  second  and  third  drove  him  back  in  dis- 
order, 'and  saved  the  day.'' 

The  services  of  the  field  artillery  companies  proving  so  valua- 
ble, Congress,  by  act  of  March  3d,  1847,  provided  that,  "in 
addition  to  the  four  companies  authorized  by  the  act  of  March  2C\, 
1821,  to  be  equipped  as  light  artillery,  the  President  is  hereby 
empowered,  when  he  shall  deem  it  necessary,  to  designate  four 
other  companies,  one  in  each  regiment,  to  be  organized  and 
equipped  as  light  artillery.  *  *  *  That  the  officers  and  men 
of  the  light  artillery,  when  serving  as  such  and  mounted,  shall 
receive  the  same  pay  and  allowances  as  provided  by  law  for  the 
dragoons."  By  War  Department  General  Orders  No.  16,  April 
1 5th,  1847,  the  duty  of  designating  the  four  additional  field  com- 
panies was  imposed  on  the  general-in-chief,  then  in  the  field. 
Accordingly j  in  General  Orders  No.  218,  Headquarters  of  the 
Army,  Pueblo,  Mexico,  July  i6th,  1847,  the  following  companies 
were  so  announced:  Captain  J.  B.  Magruder's,  (I)  of  the  First; 
J.  F.  Roland's,  (M)  of  the  Second;  T.  W.  Sherman's,  (E)  of  the 
Third,  and  Captain  S.  H.  Drum's,  (G)  of  the  Fourth  Artillery. 
So  far  as  (E)  of  the  Third  Regiment  was  concerned,  the  order 
simply  legalized  a  state  of  affairs  that  had  existed  for  a  year.  All 
the  companies,  except  (M)  of  the  Second,  had  participated  in  the 
battles  either  in  the  Rio  Grande  valley,  or  in  General  Scott's 
campaign  on  the  southern  line  of  operations.  (M)  was  one  of 
the  companies  added  to  the  Second  Regiment  by  the  same  act 
which  increased  the  number  of  light  artillery  companies,  but  it 
was  not  organized  in  time  to  render  services  in  the  field  during 
that  war. 

After  the  close  of  hostilities  with  Mexico  all  the  field  compa- 
nies of  artillery,  with  the  exception  of  (C)  and  (E)  Third,  and 
(B)  Fourth,  turned  their  horses  over  to  the  quartermaster's  de- 
partment at  New  Orleans,  in  compliance  with  orders  from  Head- 
quarters First  Military  Department.  They  were  legally,  however, 
field  companies,  and  all  hoped  to  be  remounted ;  but  a  circular 
from  the  Adjutant-General's  Office,  September  3Oth,  1848,  directed 
that  but  one  in  each  regiment  should  be  equipped  as  a  company 
of  field  artillery.  In  compliance  therewith  the  original  four  field 
companies  were  retained  as  such,  and  (E)  of  the  Third  turned 


64      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

in  its  horses  accordingly.  (K)  of  the  First  and  (A)  of  the  Sec- 
ond were  provided  with  horses  in  November,  1848,  and,  with 
(C)  of  the  Third  and  (B)  of  the  Fourth,  formed  the  mounted 
field  companies  of  the  regular  army.  This  was  but  a  temporary 
arrangement.  It  was  soon  resolved  to  equip  four  other  compa- 
nies, as  contemplated  by  the  law  of  March  3d,  1847  ;  and  as  the 
assignment  of  these  companies  by  the  general-in-chief  while  in 
the  field  was  considered  to  be  but  provisional  in  its  nature,  it  was 
deemed  proper  to  announce  them  anew.  This  was  accordingly 
done  in  General  Orders  No.  22,  War  Department,  Adjutant- 
General's  Office,  April  2ist,  1849,  as  follows  : 

"1.  Under  the  provisions  of  the  act  of  March  3d,  1847,  authorizing  four 
additional  companies  '  to  be  organized  and  equipped  as  light  artillery/  the 
President  directs  the  following  designated  companies  to  be  so  organized  and 
equipped  : 

"First  Regiment  of  Artillery,  Company  (I),  Captain  Magruder. 

"Second    do  do  do        (M),  Captain  Roland. 

"  Third      do  do  do         (B),  Captain  Shover. 

"  Fourth    do  do  do        (G),  Captain  Freeman. 

"  Four  pieces  and  forty-four  horses  will  be  allowed  each  company,  and  all 
the  necessary  supplies  will  be  furnished,  on  requisitions  duly  forwarded  to  the 
proper  departments  of  the  staff,  agreeably  to  regulations. 

"Company  (B),  Third  Artillery,  will  proceed,  without  unnecessary  delay,  to 
take  post  at  West  Point,  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  in  the  practical  instruction 
of  the  cadets  in  this  important  branch  of  the  military  service,  under  its  cap- 
tain, Brevet  Major  Shover,  the  present  instructor  of  artillery  at  the  academy. 
The  lieutenants  on  extra  duty  will  join  the  company." 

The  only  change  made  by  this  order  was  that  affecting  (E)  of 
the  Third,  for  which  (B)  of  the  same  regiment  was  substituted. 
This  was  a  discrimination  against  the  former  company  which  its 
commander,  Captain  T.  W.  Sherman,  energetically  and  success- 
fully combated.  The  company  had  earned  in  the  field  honorable 
distinction  as  field  artillery  even  before  the  law  authorizing  its 
equipment  was  passed.  The  proposed  substitution  for  it  of  -(B) 
Company  was  not  carried  into  execution,  as  in  General  Orders 
No.  29,  Adjutant- General's  Office,  May  i2th,  1849,  it  was  an- 
nounced that  ' '  the  execution  of  paragraph  2  of  General  Orders 
No.  22,  dated  April  2ist,  1849,  having  been  suspended,  and  Com- 
pany (B),  Third  Artillery,  ordered  to  rejoin  its  station  at  Fort 
Adams,  considerations  of  the  public  service  no  longer  require 
a  deviation  from  the  rule  observed  in  designating  the  companies 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD    ARTILLERY    SINCE    l82I.  65 

of  the  other  regiments  of  artillery  to  be  remounted.  Accordingly 
Company  (E),  Third  Artillery,  Captain  T.  W.  Sherman,  will  be 
organized  and  equipped  as  light  artillery,  instead  of  Company 

(By 

The  selection  of  field  artillery  commanders  was  about  the  same 
time  regulated  by  General  Orders  No.  12,  War  Department,  1849, 
which  were  dictated  by  Secretary  Marcy,  and  to  the  following 
effect  : 

"  If  a  vacancy  happen  in  the  grade  of  captain  of  a  company  designated  as  a 
light  artillery  company,  it  will  be  filled  by  the  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
on  the  recommendation  of  the  colonel,  who  will  name  the  captain  best  quali- 
fied for  the  service." 

This  has  been  the  rule  by  which  the  assignment  of  captains  to 
this  duty  has  been  supposed  to  be  regulated  down  to  the  year 
1882,  when  captains,  equally  with  lieutenants,  were  made  detail- 
able  according  to  seniority,  and  the  former  for  a  tour  of  three 
years.* 

Under  the  provisions  of  the  orders  of  April  2ist  and  May  I2th, 
quoted,  (I)  of  the  First,  (E)  of  the  Third,  and  (G)  of  the  Fourth 
Artillery  were  equipped  as  directed.  Company  (M),  Second 
Regiment,  was  not  so  equipped  up  to  1851. 

The  supposition,  based  in  error,  that,  the  war  being  over,  the 
field  companies  had  fulfilled  their  appointed  purpose,  and  were 
no  longer  useful,  led  (March  3ist,  1851,  by  General  Orders 
No.  1 8,  War  Department)  to  the  dismounting  of  six  companies 
of  the  field  artillery,  leaving  only  (K)  of  the  First  and  (C)  of  the 
Third  equipped  with  the  proper  arm.  Referring  to  this  in  his 
annual  report  of  that  year,  Secretary  Conrad  remarked  : 

"  Prior  to  the  late  war  there  were  only  four  light  artillery  companies.  After 
the  war  broke  out  four  more  of  the  artillery  companies  were  converted  into 
light  artillery,  making  in  all  eight  companies.  This  description  of  troops, 
although  extremely  effective  in  regular  war,  are  utterly  useless  in  the  kind  of 
service  in  which  the  army  is  now  employed.  The  department  did  not  hesitate, 
therefore,  to  direct  that  six  of  those  companies  should  be  dismounted.  Of  this 
number  four  will  continue  dismounted,  unless  Congress  should  otherwise 
direct.  But  as  it  is  deemed  important  to  preserve  a  portion  of  this  description 
of  force,  two  others  will  be  mounted  as  soon  as  the  department  is  provided 
with  the  means  of  doing  so.  This  will  make  in  all  four  companies,  or  one  to 
each  regiment  of  artillery,  which  seems  to  have  been  contemplated  by  the  act 
of  1821." 

*  Changed  by  G.  0.  86,  H.  Q.  A.,  series  of  1884,  to  four  years  for  captains. 
9 


66      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

The  "means  of  doing  so"  were  forthcoming  the  next  fiscal 
year;  and  accordingly  Sedgwick's  (A)  of  the  Second  and  Hunt's 
(G)  of  the  Fourth  Artillery  were  remounted  by  General  Orders 
No.  36,  Adjutant- General's  Office,  September  25th,  1852. 

The  statement  of  the  Secretary  of  War  that  four  of  the  field 
companies  would  "continue  dismounted  unless  Congress  should 
otherwise  direct, ' '  was  a  direct  appeal  to  the  sense  of  the  legisla- 
ture upon  the  propriety  of  dismounting  the  artillery,  a  measure 
the  wisdom  of  which  was  doubtful  even  to  himself,  and.  which  had 
been  entered  upon  in  opposition  to  the  advice  of  the  most  expe- 
rienced and  distinguished  officers  in  service,  including  the  gen- 
eral-in-chief.  The  response  was  of  such  a  character  as,  to  some 
minds  at  least,  would  have  carried  conviction  as  to  the  wishes  of 
Congress  in  the  premises;  it  was  announced  by  that  body  appro- 
priating, during  the  session  of  1852-' 53,  the  sum  of  eighteen 
thousand  five  hundred  dollars,  to  be  expended  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  for  the  specific  purpose 
of  mounting  the  four  remaining  field  artillery  companies.  This 
expression  of  congressional  will  was  sufficiently  emphatic  to  im- 
press even  Secretary  Davis,  no  friend  to  the  artillery,  who,  in 
War  Department  General  Orders  No.  15,  May  26th,  1853,  di- 
rected that  (M)  of  the  Second,  (E)  of  the  Third,  and  (B)  of  the 
Fourth  Artillery  should  be  remounted.  Of  the  field  companies, 
(I)  of  the  First  alone  remained  now  without  horses  and  proper 
artillery  equipments. 

Commenting  upon  the  fact  that  Congress  had  in  the  most 
explicit  manner  expressed  a  desire  to  have  all  the  field  companies 
mounted ;  that  Secretary  Davis,  while  partially  carrying  it  into 
effect,  had  acted  with  apparent  desire  to  defeat  the  spirit  of  the 
law,  General  Scott,  in  a  communication  of  May  220!,  1857,10  Sec- 
retary Floyd,  said : 

"The  Congress,  during  the  winter  of  1852-7>3,  made  an  ample,  spec i lie- 
appropriation  for  the  purpose  of  mounting  the  four  dismounted  light  companies. 
The  next  Secretary  (Mr.  Davis)  gave  horses,  &c.,  to  only  three  of  these,  and 
sent  them  to  the  Indian  frontier,  where,  according  to  Mr.  Secretary  Conrad  and 
all  military  men,  they  were  utterly  useless,  and  in  fact  soon  fell  into  decay, 
after  an  enormous  cost  in  forage.  To  correct  this  blunder  (by  another),  Mr. 
Secretary  Davis  (General  Orders  No.  9,  Headquarters  of  the  Army,  October 
30th,  1856)  dismounted  three  companies  and  ordered  them  to  Fort  Monroe,  with 
Magruders  company,  (I)  of  the  First  Artillery,  (which  had  not  been  mounted  in 
many  years,)  to  constitute  a  school  of  practice,  as  sea-coast,  garrison,  and 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD    ARTILLERY    SINCE    l82I.  67 

siege  artillery.  Of  that  school  of  practice  I  think  well,  but  consider  it  a  blun- 
der to  have  dismounted  those  companies.  In  conclusion,  I  hope  that  they, 
together  with  Magruder's,  may  soon  be  remounted." 

It  was  at  this  time  that  General  Scott  expressed  the  urgent 
desire  to  assemble  the  field  companies  in  pairs,  at  the  posts  best 
adapted  to  that  end,  for  purposes  of  instruction;  forming,  in  fact, 
field  artillery  schools. 

The  companies  dismounted,  as  mentioned,  by  General  Orders  No. 
9,  of  1856,  were  (M)  of  the  Second,  (C)  of  the  Third,  and  (G)  of 
the  Fourth  Artillery  ;  (C)  had  not  before  been  dismounted,  except 
temporarily  and  for  change  of  station,  since  it  was  organized  as  a 
horse  artillery  company,  in  1838.  Having  marched  to  Santa  Fe, 
New  Mexico,  after  the  Mexican  war,  it  was  there  for  a  time  con- 
verted into  a  company  of  cavalry,  the  materiel,  guns,  caissons, 
&c.,  being  stored.  In  1850  the  remaining  personnel,  without  the 
guns,  &c.,  returned  to  Jefferson  Barracks,  Missouri,  where  Cap- 
tain Bragg  joined  it,  and  rehabilitated  the  company  as  field  artil- 
lery ;  but  this  time  as  mounted,  not  as  horse  artillery. 

Acting  .on  General  Scott's  suggestion,  Secretary  Davis'  suc- 
cessor had  scarcely  assumed  the  duties  of  his  office  before  he 
began  seriously  to  consider  the  advisability  of  remounting  the 
companies  of  field  artillery  dismounted  but  six  months  previously. 
One  week  after  General  Scott's  communication  was  written,  Ma- 
gruder's company,  (I)  of  the  First,  was,  by  General  Orders  No.  6, 
Adjutant-General's  Office,  May  29th,  1857,  ordered  to  be  equipped 
as  field  artillery.  This  was  followed  by  the  equipment  of  (M)  of 
the  Second,  pursuant  to  "  Special  Orders  No.  70,  Headquarters 
Troops  Serving  in  Kansas,"  dated  September  i8th,  1857,  issued 
under  instructions  from  the  War  Department  of  the  7th  of  that 
month.  It  was  fitted  out  completely  as  a  four-gun  battery. 

By  Special  Orders  No.  52,  Headquarters  of  the  Army,  April  loth, 
1858,  Captain  and  Brevet  Major  J.  F.  Reynolds'  company,  (C)  of 
the  Third;  was  directed  to  proceed  to  Leavenworth,  Kansas,  for 
horses,  and  thence  to  Utah  to  receive  the  guns,  caissons,  and  other 
materiel  from  a  detachment  of  the  ordnance,  in  whose  charge 
they  had  been  placed  by  the  commanding  general  of  the  army  in 
Utah. 

Touching  the  subject  of  this  transfer,  the  remarks  of  Colonel 
H.  K.  Craig,  head  of  the  ordnance  department,  are  worthy  of 
record  as  illustrating  the  spirit  of  fairness  regarding  the  proper 


68      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.   S.   ARMY. 

service  of  artillery  which  had  succeeded  to  the  intriguing  of  the 
disgraced  late  head  of  that  bureau.  In  a  letter  to  the  Secretary 
of  War,  Colonel  Craig  observed  : 

"The  efficient  performance  of  his  ordnance  duties  will  occupy  Brevet  Cap- 
tain Reno's  time  and  that  of  his  ordnance  detachment.  It  was  not  supposed 
that  he  would  be  diverted  from  these  legitimate  and  proper  duties  to  be  assign- 
ed to  those  which  pertain  properly  and  exclusively  to  the  artillery.  Every 
consideration  of  justice  and  propriety  demands  that  all  batteries  of  artillery, 
and  especially  those  in  active  service,  should  be  manned  and  served  by  artillery 
troops,  under  the  direction  of  officers  of  that  arm;  and  the  assignment  of  such 
duties  to  ordnance  officers  and  soldiers,  or  to  any  other,  is  wrong.  It  is  also 
adverse  to  the  interests  of  public  service,  inasmuch  as  it  tends  to  lessen  the 
artillery  esprit  de  corps,  and  assigns  very  important  military  service  to  troops 
who  cannot  be  supposed  to  take  much  interest  in  it,  or  to  be  as  efficient  for  its 
performance  as  those  to  whom  it  legitimately  pertains." 

It  is  all  the  more  pleasurable  to  note  the  views  here  expressed 
upon  the  relative  proper  functions  of  the  artillery  and  the  ord- 
nance, under  the  existing  organization,  from  the  fact  that  it  has 
been  found  necessary  elsewhere  in  this  work  to  expose  and  ani- 
madvert upon  the  manner  in  which  the  latter  usurped,  in  large 
degree,  the  functions  of  the  former  during  the  Mexican  war. 

The  resuscitation  of  (C)  of  the  Third  restored  to  their  proper 
status  seven  of  the  eight  field  artillery  companies,  leaving  (G)  of 
the  Fourth  Regiment  alone  dismounted.  The  pieces  of  this  com- 
pany were  inspected  and  condemned  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kan- 
sas, May  1 8th,  1855.  The  following  month  it  was  mounted  as  cav- 
alry, and  acted  as  such  during  the  Sioux  expedition,  returning  to 
Fort  Leavenworth  in  November,  1856.  It  was  not  again  equipped 
as  field  artillery  until  June,  1861. 

Six  of  the  seven  mounted  field  artillery  companies  were  either 
in  Utah,  or  marching  to  join  the  army  there,  when  the  adjustment, 
in  a  measure,  of  the  difficulties  that  had  caused  the  Government 
to  concentrate  its  troops  in  that  quarter  left  the  "batteries,"  as 
they  were  now  often  officially  designated,  free  for  duty  elsewhere. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  War  Department  Order  No.  10,  of  1859, 
was  issued,  elaborating  a  plan  for  "the  better  instruction  of  the 
artillery  in  its  appropriate  duties,  and  at  the  same  time  to  secure 
an  efficient  disposition  of  it  for  actual  service."  (See  Instruc- 
tion.) Notwithstanding  the  expressed  views,  already  quoted,  of 
the  general-in-chief,  that  "according  to  Secretary  Conrad  and  all 
military  men"  they  would  thereby  be  rendered  "utterly  useless," 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD    ARTILLERY    SINCE    1 82 1.  69 

the  batteries  were  distributed  at  various  points  on  the  Indian  fron- 
tier, where,  as  it  proved,  they  were  not  available,  but  utterly 
useless  when  most  needed,  in  1861,  and  those  in  Texas  only 
escaped  the  enemy  by  sacrificing  their  horses  and  materiel. 

It  was  this  dispersed  condition  of  the  companies,  resulting  nal 
from  Secretary  Floyd's  treachery,  as  is  sometimes  asserted,  but 
from  a  desire  in  certain  quarters  (not,  so  far  as  known,  on  the  part 
of  the  Secretary)  to  experiment  with  an  impracticable  system  of 
instruction,  which  brought  the  Government  face  to  face,  in  1861, 
with  the  necessity  for  providing  itself  with  more  field  artillery, 
and  was  the  immediate  cause  of  the  Fifth  Regiment  being  organ- 
ized ;  for  although,  when  the  Civil  war  broke  out,  the  companies 
were  called  in  as  quickly  as  possible,  in  many  cases  it  could  not 
be  done  soon,  and  in  some  instances  it  was  not  known  that  it 
could  be  done  at  all. 

The  law  designated  as  "batteries"  the  tactical  units  of  this 
regiment.  This  was  the  first  time  this  designation  was  legalized, 
although  for  several  years  the  terms  "light  company"  and  "bat- 
tery" had  been  treated  as  synonymous  in  orders  from  army 
headquarters.  The  Fifth  was  equipped  throughout  as  field  ar- 
tillery ;  but  the  law  did  not,  as  was  the  case  with  the  eight  old 
companies,  direct  that  this  should  be  done ;  it  followed  from  the 
necessity  that  existed  for  fitting  out  many  more  batteries,  com- 
manded by  regular  officers,  for  service  with  the  armies  then  being 
organized. 

The  importance  of  placing  on  a  field  artillery  footing  every 
company  of  the  old  regiments  that  could  by  any  means  be  made 
available  was  quickly  appreciated  ;  and,  for  the  reason  that  the 
enemy  was  not  a  maritime  power,  it  became  the  easier  and  more 
reasonable  thing  to  do,  to  take  for  this  work  the  companies  from 
the  sea-coast  as  well  as  those  from  the  interior.  August  23d, 
1 86 1,  General  Barry,  chief  of  artillery,  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
addressed  General  McClellan  on  the  subject  as  follows  : 

"  To  insure  success,  it  is  of  vital  importance  that  the  army  should  have  an 
overwhelming  force  of  field  artillery.  To  render  this  the  more  effective,  the 
field  batteries  should,  as  far  as  possible,  consist  of  regular  troops." 

A  few  days  after,  the  commanding  general  urgently  appealed 
to  the  Secretary  of  War  to  send  in  the  Third  Artillery  from 
the  Pacific  coast,  to  give  him  half  the  companies  forming  the 
late  artillery  school  at  Fortress  Monroe,  and  followed  it  up 


JO      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

later  with  the  recommendation  "  that  the  whole  of  the  regular 
artillery,  old  and  new,  be  ordered  to  report  here  [Washington], 
excepting  the  mounted  batteries  actually  serving  in  other  depart- 
ments, and  the  minimum  number  of  companies  actually  necessary 
to  form  the  nucleus  of  the  garrisons  of  our  most  important  per- 
manent works."  These  earnest  representations  had  the  effect  to 
bring  into  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  as  field  batteries,  half  the 
regular  artillery  of  the  United  States. 

As  usual  with  that  arm,  the  service  was  by  detachment,  the 
regular  batteries  forming  the  nuclei  around  which  gathered  the 
volunteers.  This  important  principle  of  organization,  conform- 
able to  the  sound  and  settled  policy  on  which  the  regular  army  has 
been  maintained  in  time  of  peace,  was  observed  in  every  phase 
of  organization  that  the  artillery  experienced,  and  whether  as- 
signed to  brigades,  divisions,  corps,  or  armies,  and  with  or  without 
reserves.  That  portion  of  the  regular  artillery  which  was  not 
with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  served  elsewhere  in  the  field,  save 
four  companies  which  remained  in  permanent  works,  but  from 
necessity  it  was  scattered  very  sparsely  over  the  various  theatres 
of  operations ;  nevertheless,  all  except  those  mentioned  were,  at 
one  time  or  another  during  the  Civil, war,  organized  and  equip- 
ped as  either  mounted  or  horse  artillery.*  In  view  of  the  fact 
here  stated,  it  is  a  rather  curious  circumstance  that  the  official 
army  registers  issued  during  the  years  of  the  Civil  war  set  forth 
that  "  two  companies  in  each  of  the  ist,  2d,  3d,  and  4th  regiments 
of  artillery  being  equipped  as  light  artillery,  are  allowed  sixty-four 
instead  of  forty-two  privates  per  company." 

Horse  artillery  was  early  recognized  as  the  associate  of  prop- 
erly organized  cavalry.  Accordingly,  some  time  in  the  fall  of 
1861,  TidbalFs  company,  (A)  of  the  Second,  was  equipped  for  that 
service  at  Washington,  D.  C.,  forming  the  first  company  of  horse 
artillery  in  the  army  since  Bragg' s  company  was  dismounted  at 
Santa  F6  after  the  Mexican  war.  This  was  soon  followed  by  the 
similar  equipment  of  (M),  Second,  and,  March,  1862,  by  (B-L), 
Second,  (consolidated  for  want  of  men,)  and  (C),  Third  Artillery. 
These  companies  were  formed  into  a  horse  artillery  brigade  ;  and 
so  efficient  did  they  prove  that  by  the  date  of  the  battle  of  Chan- 


*  Companies  (H)  and  (K)  of  the  Second,  and  (B)  and  (D)  of  the  Third,  were 
not  at  any  time  equipped  as  field  artillery. 


ORGANISATION — FIELD    ARTILLERY    SINCE    l82I.  yf 

cellorsville  (May  2d~4th,  1863)  their  number  had  been 'doubled. 
After  this  battle  the  horse  batteries  of  that  army  were  organized 
into  two  brigades,  that  they  might  alternate  campaigning  and 
recuperating,  in  their  arduous  service  with  the  cavalry.  The 
strength  of  these  brigades  gradually  increased  in  personnel  and 
fighting  power  as  their  utility  became  manifest  and  their  manage- 
ment understood,  until,  under  Meade,  May  4th,  1864,  on  the  eve 
of  the  Wilderness,  the  First  Brigade  embraced  the  Sixth  Battery 
of  New  York  light  artillery,  (B-L),  (D),  and  (M)  of  the  Second, 
(A)  and  (C-E)  of  the  Fourth  Artillery ;  the  Second  Brigade,  (E- 
G),  (H-I),  and  (K)  of  the  First,  (A)  and  (G)  of  the  Second,  and 
(C),  (F),  and  (K)  of  the  Third  Artillery.  Of  the  twelve  batteries 
composing  the  two  brigades,  seven  were  six-gun  and  five  were 
four-gun  batteries. 

Associated  with  the  cavalry  of  other  armies  than  that  of  the 
Potomac  were  horse  batteries,  the  armaments  being  generally 
3-inch  rifle  guns,  which  were  served  with  an  enterprise,  61an,  and 
effectiveness  unsurpassed  up  to  that  time  by  the  first  artilleries 
of  the  world.  (See  Organization  of  Artillery  for  an  Active 
Army.)  Of  the  companies  equipped  for  longer  or  shorter  periods 
as  field  batteries  from  the  regular  army  during  the  Civil  war, 
about  one-third  served  as  horse  artillery. 

A  general  dismounting  of  both  regular  and  volunteer  batteries 
commenced  within  a  few  days  of  the  surrender,  May  26th,  of  the 
last  Confederate  army  in  the  trans-Mississippi.  By  General 
Orders  No.  105,  Adjutant-General's  Office,  June  2d,  1865,  com- 
manders of  military  geographical  departments  were  directed  to 
reduce  at  once  their  batteries  of  volunteers  to  the  lowest  number 
absolutely  required.  General  Orders  No.  126,  same  office,  July 
2Oth,  following,  directed  that  two  companies  of  each  of  the  regu- 
lar regiments,  to  be  selected  by  the  colonels,  should  be,  as 
previous  to  the  war,  retained  as  mounted  batteries,  while  the 
remaining  companies,  except  those  serving  west  of  the  Mississippi, 
were  dismounted.  Pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  this  order,  the 
following  were- designated  by  General  Orders  No.  139,  Adjutant- 
General's  Office,  September  28th,  1865,  as  the  field  batteries  of 
the  regular  regiments,  viz.:  (I)  and  (K)  of  the  First;  (A)  and 
(M)  of  the  Second;  (C)  and  (E)  of  the  Third;  (B)  and  (G)  of 
the  Fourth;  (F)  and  (G)  of  the  Fifth.  It  will  be  noticed  that 
the  original  field  artillery  companies  were  retained  in  the  four  old 


72      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

regiments.  Of  the  two  batteries  retained  in  each  regiment,  one 
had  for  armament  3-inch  rifles,  the  other  i2-pounder  Napoleons. 
The  personal  armament  of  the  men  were  revolvers  and  sabres  for 
chiefs  of  pieces  and  of  caissons,  sabres  for  cannoneers,  while  the 
drivers  were  unarmed. 

Though  the  term  "field  artillery"  does  not  appear  in  the  act  of 
July  29th,  1861,  legalizing  the  organization  of  the  Fifth  Artillery, 
the  personnel  of  the  battery  therein  prescribed  was,  with  slight 
modification,  that  which  had  been  fixed  upon  for  field  artillery  in 
the  authorized  tactics  of  that  arm.  This,  together  with  the  other 
fact  of  the  mounting,  equipping,  and  sending  out  as  field  artil- 
lery all  the  batteries  of  the  regiment,  does  not  leave  in  doubt  that 
Congress  intended  the  Fifth  to  be  a  field  artillery  regiment. 

Prior  to  the  organization  of  the  Fifth  there  were  authorized 
by  law  but  eight  field  artillery  companies.  The  equipment  of 
that  regiment  added  twelve  batteries  to  the  number;  and  as  the 
act  of  July  28th,  1866,  directed  that  thereafter  the  organizations 
of  the  four  old  regiments  should  be  similar  to  that  of  the  Fifth, 
the  designations  of  their  tactical  units — "companies"-— were 
thereby  changed  to  "batteries,"  each  of  which,  like  the  batter- 
ies of  the  Fifth,  was  eligible  for  equipment  as  light  artillery. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  when,  in  1874,  the  enactment  of  sec- 
tion noi  of  the  Revised  Statutes  re-established  to  a  degree  the 
laws  of  1821  and  1847  relative  to  the  selection  of  batteries  for  light 
artillery  service  by  providing  that  ' '  one  battery  in  each  regiment 
of  artillery,  to  be  designated  by  the  President,  shall  be  equipped 
as  light  artillery,  and  one  other  battery  may  be  so  designated  and 
equipped  when  the  President  may  deem  it  necessary."  Under 
the  law  as  it  exists  to-day,  therefore,  but  five  of  the  batteries  are 
required  to  be  equipped  as  light  artillery,  while  five  others  may 
or  may  not  be,  at  the  option  of  the  President,  who,  by  General 
Orders  No.  96,  of  1882,  Adjutant-General's  Office,  in  the  exercise 
of  the  discretion  here  given,  increased  the  field  batteries  to 
the  full  number  authorized.  As  previously  mentioned,  however, 
they  are  equipped  not  as  light  artillery  proper,  but  as  mounted 
batteries. 

It  is  not  known  that  the  President,  acting  under  the  require- 
ments of  the  law,  formally  announced  the  five  batteries  which 
"shall  be  equipped  as  light  artillery."  It  was  probably  thought 
to  be  unnecessary.  The  organizations  designated  under  the  act 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD    ARTILLERY    SINCE    l82I.  73 

of  1821,  with  CF)  of  the  Fifth,  were,  at  the  date  of  the  enactment 
of  the  statutes,  so  equipped,  and  have  so  continued.  But  had 
the  President,  pro  forma,  selected  certain  batteries  for  this  duty, 
instead  of  recognizing  the  continuation  of  the  existing  state  of 
affairs  as  a  full  compliance  with  the  statute,  there  was  every  rea- 
son which  sound  military  policy  and  public  spirit  could  dictaTe 
why  he  should  have  chosen  the  four  original  companies.  They 
were  the  pioneers  in  the  field  of  light  artillery  under  the  present 
regimental  organizations.  The  blaze  of  their  guns  had  shed  un- 
fading lustre  over  every  battle-field,  from  Palo  Alto  to  the  crush- 
ing of  the  last  army  of  the  Rebellion.  Nothing  could  be  more 
conducive  to  a  proper  esprit  de  corps  than  a  recognition  of  this 
fact,  for  both  officers  and  men  must  see  with  peculiar  satisfaction 
these  honored  organizations  allowed  permanently  to  retain  the 
armaments  with  which  they  had  become  veterans,  and  which 
they  had  ever  served  to  the  credit  of  the  artillery  arm  and  to 
their  country's  glory.  This  pleasure  seems  vouchsafed  to  them, 
.for  there  is  no  reasonable  doubt  but  that  the  continuation  as  field 
artillery  of  the  batteries  indicated,  subsequent  to  the  enactment 
of  the  Revised  Statutes,  fixed  on  them  the  character  of  permanent 
field  artillery  organizations,  as  contemplated  by  the  law. 

Of  the  ten  batteries  equipped  pursuant  to  General  Orders  No. 
139,  of  1865,  (I)  of  the  First,  (M)  of  the  Second,  (E)  of  the 
Third,  (G)  of  the  Fourth,  and  (G)  of  the  Fifth  were,  in  accord- 
ance with  provisions  of  General  Orders  No.  6,  of  1869,  Adjutant- 
General's  Office,  dismounted;  and  at  the  same  time  four  of  the 
five  batteries  remaining  were  ordered  to  Fort  Riley,  Kansas,  to 
form  a  school  for  field  artillery  practice  and  instruction.  (See 
Instruction.) 

The  five  batteries  retained  by  the  order  of  1869,  quoted,  re- 
mained the  field  artillery  organizations  of  the  regular  army  until 
the  number  was  increased  by  five  additional  batteries,  agreeably  to 
the  requirements  of  General  Orders  No.  96,  of  August  i5th,  1882, 
Adjutant- General's  Office.  In  the  meantime,  however,  (L)  of 
the  Second,  in  Texas,  was,  by  Special  Orders  No.  25,  of  February 
4th,  1878,  Adjutant- General's  Office,  directed  by  the  President  to 
be  temporarily  equipped  as  field  artillery,  and  so  remained  until 
it  was  transferred  from  that  military  department  pursuant  to  in- 
structions from  army  headquarters  and  Special  Orders  No.  208,  of 
October  i3th,  1880,  Department  of  Texas.  The  captain  of  (F)  of 
10 


74      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.  S.   ARMtf. 

the  Second,  which  remained  in  Texas,  having  applied  to  have  his 
battery  equipped  as  field  artillery,  the  request,  was  favorably  con- 
sidered, and  in  Special  Orders  No.  246,  of  November  iyth,  1880, 
Adjutant-General's  Office,  the  President,  in  conformity  with  sec- 
tion noi  of  the  Revised  Statutes,  directed  that  battery  to  be  tem- 
porarily so  equipped.  As  (F)  of  the  Second  was  one  of  those 
designated  by  General  Orders  No.  96,  of  1882,  before  mentioned, 
to  be  mounted  and  equipped  as  an  additional  field  battery,  its 
temporary  service  has  been  exchanged  for  one  more  permanent 
in  character.  (For  G.  O.  96,  A.  G.  O.,  1882,  see  Appendix.) 

It  will  not  escape  notice  that,  of  the  batteries  designated  in 
General  Orders  No.  96,  of  .1882,  not  one  was  of  the  additional 
companies  equipped  as  field  artillery  in  i846-'47.  While  the 
competency  of  the  President  to  select  for  this  service  from  all 
dismounted  batteries  is  not  here  denied,*  it  must  be  conceded 
that  it  would  have  been  a  particularly  appropriate  thing  had 
the  four  old  batteries  been  allowed  to  once  more  buckle  on  the 
harness  in  which,  on  the  hotly-contested  fields  of  two  wars,  at 
least  three  of  them  —  (I)  of  the  First,  (E)  of  the  Third,  and 
(G)  of  the  Fourth — had  been  greatly  distinguished.  The  regi- 
ments had  learned  to  regard  their  field  artillery  companies 
with  affectionate  pride  ;  and  it  will  be  remembered  that,  in 
1865,  when  the  selection  of  companies  to  remain  mounted  was 
left  to  colonels  of  the  artillery  regiments,  and  their  expressed 
wishes  respected,  the  original  light  companies  of  1821  and  1847 
were,  without  exception,  retained.  The  traditions  of  an  hon- 
orable arm  of  service  are  worthy  of  respect — a  fact  recognized 
•by  every  nation  in  which  the  profession  of  arms  has  been 
cherished,  and  forgetfulness  of  which  has  in  every  instance  been 
the  surest  evidence  of  military  and  political  decadence  ;  those 
who  disregard  them  stifle  the  noblest  sentiment  that  can  actuate 
the  soldier's  breast,  while  evincing  an  ignorance  of  human  nat- 
ure well  calculated  in  its  effects  to  freeze  up  the  fountains  of 


*  Whether  or  not  recent  laws  and  the  enactment  of  the  Revised  Statutes  have 
abrogated  the  llgal  rights  of  the  eight  batteries  designated  as  light  artillery 
under  the  acts  of  March  2d,  1821,  and  March  3d,  1847,  is  an  open  question.  It 
is  not  intended  here  to  enter  upon  its  legal  aspects.  Suffice  it  to  say,  there  are 
the  strongest  reasons  upon  which  to  base  an  argument  in  support  of  the  nega- 
tive view,  though  the  logic  of  orders  since  the  Civil  war  tends  to  the  affirmative 
of  the  proposition. 


ORGANIZATION FIELD    ARTILLERY    SINCE    1 82 1.  75 

true  military  spirit  by  the  chilling  blasts  of  official  indifference  or 
neglect. 

To  be  known,  it  need  not  be  repeated  here ;  but  it  will  not  be 
amiss  to  recall  that  (I)  under  Magruder,  (E)  under  Sherman, 
and  (G)  under  Drum  all  won  in  Mexico  the  plaudits  of  the  army 
and  the  country,  and,  with  (M)  of  the  Second,  did  faithful  service 
during  that  interval  of  vacillation  and  perpetual  change  interven- 
ing between  the  Mexican  war  and  the  Civil  war;  all  this  when  not 
a  single  battery  designated  in  General  Orders  No.  96,  of  1882, 
had  as  yet  been  equipped  as  field  artillery.  As  a  result,  the  old 
field  batteries  were  looked  upon  with  affectionate  regard  by  their 
respective  regiments,  each  of  which  doubtless  would  have  been  glad 
to  see  ancient  and  honorable  associations  perpetuated  by  having 
these,  preferably  to  any  others,  equipped  for  a  service  with  which 
their  careers  had  been  so  intimately  connected.  It  would  have 
tended,  therefore,  to  the  development  and  maintenance  of  proper 
professional  spirit  had  the  field  batteries  of  1847  been  selected  as 
those  to  be  rehabilitated  in  1882  ;  and  it  is  to  be  hoped,  should 
changes  be  hereafter  made,  that  their  claims — based  on  services, 
merit,  their  own  pride  and  that  of  the  artillery  arm — may  not  be 
denied  the  recognition  to  which  they  are  justly  entitled. 


76      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF  .THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 


CHAPTER  III. 

ORGANIZATION — FIELD    SERVICE. 

At  the  epoch  of  the  Revolution  (1775-'  83)  it  was  customary  to 
attach  two  field  guns  to  each  infantry  battalion,  the  rest  being  kept 
in  a  general  reserve.  General  Washington  early  and  urgently 
recommended  to  Congress  the  procurement  of  sufficient  field 
guns  from  Europe  to  supply  two  to  each  regiment  of  infantry  of 
the  continental  army.  This,  however,  was  not  a  matter  easily 
accomplished  in  the  crippled  state  of  the  finances  and  trade  of 
the  colonies,  and  the  plan  was  adopted  of  attaching  a  company 
of  artillery  with  two  or  three  guns  to  each  infantry  brigade.  The 
remainder  of  the  pieces  with  the  army  were  held  in  reserve.  Bat- 
talion guns,  i.  e.,  those  attached  to  battalions  alone,  have  never 
had  any  place  in  the  armament  of  our  regular  army. 

The  first  assignment  thus  made  was  by  General  Orders  No.  9, 
Headquarters  of  the  Army,  New  York  city,  August"  gth,  1776, 
which  directed  that  two  pieces  should  be  attached  to,  and  ma- 
noeuvre with,  each  brigade,  the  horses  and  ammunition  carts  being 
kept  at  some  convenient  place  and  for  this  special  service. 

The  following  are  the  instructions  given  the  officers  command- 
ing the  brigade  artillery  companies,  or  detachments,  by  General 
Knox  : 

"  Much  is  required  from  an  officer  of  artillery  when  on  detachment,  as  he 
hath  then  the  whole  weight  of  duty  on* his  mind.  He  must  be  careful  in  disci- 
plining and  exercising  his  men  at  least  three  times  a  day.  He  must  see  that 
they  keep  themselves  clean,  and  will  himself  set  the  example.  He  will  partic- 
ularly attend  to  the  manner  of  the  men  cooking  their  provisions,  which  ought 
always  to  be  boiled  or  roasted,  never  fried,  baked,  or  broiled,  which  modes  are 
very  unhealthy  ;  they  must  be  taught  to  use  vinegar  freely.  The  officer  must 
frequently  examine  his  ammunition  and  air  it,  view  his  pieces,  apparatus,  the 
horses  and  harness,  and  be  sure  that  everything  is  in  the  most  perfect  order  to 
move  at  the  shortest  notice  after  he  shall  receive  orders.  The  reputation  and 
promotion  of  the  officers,  and  that  of  the  corps,  will  depend  on  the  most  punc- 
tual performance  of  their  duty  in  every  point;  no  excuse  will  be  admitted  for 
any  omission.  The  orders  of  the  day  must  be  constantly  taken  by  every  officer 
commanding  a  detachment,  and  when  the  brigade  manoeuvres  the  artillery 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD    SERVICE.  77 

must  be  out  and  exercise  with  them.  The  limbers  belonging  to  the  guns  must 
not,  on  any  pretense  whatever,  be  taken  for  any  other  use,  but  always  kept  with 
them." 

These  instructions  give  sufficient  proof  of  the  intimate  rela- 
tions existing  between  the  commander  of  the   artillery  and  the  - 
various  portions  of  that  arm,  even  when  the  latter  were  detached 
from  the  main  park  and  serving  with  other  troops. 

Afterwards,  and  doubtless  for  the  reason  that  divisions  became 
reduced  until  they  were  no  larger  than  brigades  had  formerly 
been,  artillery,  as  we  learn  from  the  orders  of  the  day,  was  some- 
times attached  to  divisions;  but  these  were  exceptional  cases,  the 
rule  remaining  as  before. 

There  was  at  that  time  no  uniform  system  of  artillery  tactics 
for  the  whole  army,  nor  any  system  of  evolutions  for  the  guns 
with  their  brigade.  This  is  told  us  by  Captain  Stevens,  who,  in 
1797,  wrote  the  first  artillery  tactics  published  in  this  country, 
and  who  was  an  officer  of  Lamb's  regiment  during  the  Revolu- 
tionary war.  To  supply  the  deficiency  indicated,  this  author 
informs  us  that  General  Knox  appointed  boards  to  determine  the 
simpler  manoeuvres  of  the  pieces -with  the  troops.  Tousard, 
also,  reproduces  in  the  Artillerist's  Companion  some  of  the  evolu- 
tions performed  by  the  artillery  when  paraded  and  drilled  with 
the  infantry.  We  are  led  to  believe,  therefore,  that,  though  uni- 
formity of  practice  was  wanting,  the  manoeuvres  of  the  artillery 
were  characterized  by  sufficient  mobility  to  meet  every  demaad 
of  service. 

The  principle  of  organization  for  the  artillery  was  this  :  The 
general  of  artillery  commanded  the  whole ;  that  with  the  main 
army,  in  person ;  that  with  other  armies,  through  their  respective 
artillery  commanders.  During  the  inactive  season  all  the  guns 
and  materiel  of  each  army  were  drawn  together  into  one  park. 
When  the  campaign  opened  the  various  detachments  were  attach- 
ed to  the  brigades,  and,  for  fighting  purposes,  were  exclusively 
under  the  orders  of  the  brigade  commander.  In  disciplinary 
matters  the  authority  of  the  commander  of  the  artillery  extended 
over  these  detachments,  he  alone  having  power  to  grant  furloughs 
to  either  officers  or  men. 

During  the  war  of  1812  the  only  attempt  known  to  have  been 
made  to  systematically  apportion  the  artillery  was  that  of  General 
Izard,  made  at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign  of  1814,  and  was 


78      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

after  the  Revolutionary  method.  This  solitary  effort  was  short- 
lived, and  passed  away  without  having  been  of  any  practical  bene- 
fit. During  that  war  the  artillery  was,  as  a  rule,  scattered  with- 
out semblance  of  system. 

For  administrative  purposes,  Izard  adopted  a  plan  similar  to 
McClellan's  in  1862.  In  this  respect  he  placed  the  artillery  and 
cavalry  on  the  same  footing.  McClellan's  orders  will  be  found 
further  on  ;  Izard' s  were  promulgated  in  General  Orders  of  July 
25th,  1814,  which,  after  designating  the  several  regiments  of 
infantry  to  be  assigned  to  the  brigades  of  the  army,  directed  : 

"  The  detachments  of  artillery  and  of  light  dragoons  will  join  the  several 
brigades  as  occasion  may  render  the  measure  advisable.  When  not  so  detach- 
ed these  corps  will  be  under  the  immediate  orders  of  their  respective  command- 
ing officers,  and  report  directly  to  the  headquarters  of  the  army." 

We  thus  see  that  in  1814,  as  during  the  Revolution,  artillery 
attached  to  brigades  was  on  the  footing  of  troops  attached  for 
service  merely,  returning  to  the  main  body  at  general  headquarters, 
and  passing  again  under  the  orders  of  the  officer  commanding 
that  arm,  when  their  services  with  the  troops  were  no  longer 
necessary. 

With  the. rise  of  the  Military  Academy,  and  the  increased 
interest  in  military  affairs  manifesting  itself  when  officers  com- 
menced to  look  to  the  army  as  a  permanent  profession,  the  proper 
adjustment  of  its  parts  became  a  subject  for  study  and  reflection. 
From  this  followed  the  elaborate  and  in  some  instances  very  able 
discussions  which  grew  out  of  the  reductions  of  1815  and  1821,  in 
the  latter  of  which  Mr.  Secretary  Calhoun,  with  that  earnestness 
and  energy  of  style,  plainness  of  proposition,  and  closeness  of 
logic  for  which  his  public  papers  stand  unrivalled,  reviewed  the 
field  of  controversy,  and  for  the  first  time  formulated  those  prin- 
ciples on  which  should  rest  the  organization  and  maintenance  of 
our  regular  army. 

The  Mexican  war  enabled,  in  a  limited  degree,  application  to  be 
made  of  theoretical  knowledge  acquired  by  officers.  But  although 
the  services  of  the  arm  in  Mexico  were  brilliant,  and  brought  the 
field  artillery  especially  to  the  front  rank  in  the  combatant  arms 
of  service,  the  operations  of  that  war  were  conducted  on  too 
small  a  scale  to  enable  practical  knowledge  to  be  acquired  as  to 
the  best  organization  to  be  given  artillery  to  accompany  a  large 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD    SERVICE.  79 

army.  Not  only  this,  but  what  was  there  learned,  being  acquired 
by  experience  with  small  forces,  contracted  the  field  of  vision, 
and  to  many  officers  was  a  detriment,  by  leading  them  to  sup- 
pose the  same  principles  should  govern  in  the  distribution  of  the 
artillery  in  large  armies  like  those  of  the  Civil  war.  On  the_ 
northern  line  of  operations — General  Taylor's — the  field  batteries 
were  attached  one  to  each  brigade  of  infantry  ;  on  the  southern 
line — General  Scott's — the  artillery  wras  attached  to  divisions. 
The  strength  of  the  brigades  was  about  1200  men  present;  of 
the  divisions,  2400  men  present.  The  brigades  which  took  the 
field  in  1861,  North  and  South,  were  much  stronger  than  these 
divisions  of  the  preceding  war ;  and  this  circumstance  led  to 
the  faulty  system  of  attaching  artillery  to  brigades  in  the  first 
months  of  the  contest;  but,  with  the  large  armies  which  then  took 
the  field,  the  system  was  found  wretchedly  inadequate  for  either 
administrative  or  fighting  purposes,  and  was  speedily  abandoned. 

Many  of  the  regiments  taking  the  field  at  the  commencement 
of  the  Civil-  war  had  batteries  attached  to  them,  but  they  were 
found  to  be  practically  useless,  and  the  first  regiments  bringing 
them  out  were  also  the  last. 

When  the  Union  army  marched  to  the  first  Bull  Run  the  bat- 
teries not  belonging  to  regiments,  and  most  of  which  were  regu- 
lars, were  attached  to  brigades.  The  average  strength  of  the 
latter  was  3000  men  present.  No  attempt  was  made  to  provide 
an  artillery  reserve.  No  organization  looking  to  the  efficient 
tactical  use  of  the  arm  had  yet  been  effected.  One  of  the  bat- 
teries, borrowed  from  the  navy,  was  hauled  by  drag-ropes,  as 
were  the  guns  at  Bunker  Hill  in  1775. 

Elsewhere  than  on  the  Potomac  the  Federal  forces  distributed 
their  artillery  in  a  similar  manner.  In  August,  1861,  General 
Lyon's  army  in  Missouri  was  organized  into  brigades,  each  of 
which  had  its  battery  ;  so  likewise  with  General  Grant's  troops 
in  the  vicinity  of  Cairo,  Illinois,  in  October  of  that  year  ;  and, 
without  particularizing  farther,  it  can  be  stated  that  the  same 
remarks  are  true  with  reference  to  the  numerous  other  armies 
which  took  or  prepared  to  take  the  field  in  the  first  campaign  of 
that  war.  To  those  who  were  capable  of  learning,  a  brief  experi- 
ence was  sufficient  to  demonstrate  the  disadvantages  of  the  sys- 
tem. In  an  army  exceeding  10,000  men  it  sacrificed  that  con- 
centration which  alone  renders  artillery-fire  formidable.  It  was 


80      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

soon  found  that  brigade  commanders  either  could  not  or  would 
not  give  both  their  regiments  and  their  battery  proper  supervision  ; 
neither  did  they  better  understand  the  question  of  artillery  sup- 
plies, through  what  channels  they  came,  or  who  was  responsi- 
ble that  they  came  at  all  ;  in  one  word,  the  brigade  system,  in 
both  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  and  that  of  Northern  Virginia, 
broke  down  ;  nor  was  it  more  efficient  in  other  armies  of  any 
magnitude. 

General  McClellan  assumed  command  of  the  army  at  Wash- 
ington July  27th,  1861.  It  embraced  about  50,000  infantry,  less 
than  1000  cavalry,  and  650  artillerymen,  manning  nine  incom- 
plete batteries  aggregating  but  thirty  guns.  In  the  reorganiza- 
tion at  once  set  on  foot  the  following  principles  formed  the  basis 
for  the  organization  of  the  artillery  : 

"  1st.  The  proportion  of  artillery  should  be  in  the  ratio  of  at  least  two  and 
one-half  pieces  to  1000  men,  to  be  expanded,  if  possible,  to  three  pieces. 

U2d.  The  field  guns  should  be  restricted  to  the  systems  of  the  U.  S.  ordnance 
department  and  of  Parrott,  the  smooth-bores  (with  the  exception  of  a  few  how- 
itzers for  special  service)  to  be  exclusively  the  12-pounder  guns,  model  of  l.SfH, 
variously  called  the  gun  howitzer,  light  12-pounder,  or  the  Napoleon. 

•'3d.  Each  field  battery  to  be  composed,  if  practicable,  of  six,  and  none  to 
have  less  than  four  guns,  those  of  each  battery  to  be  of  uniform  calibre. 

"  4th.  The  field  batteries  to  be  assigned  to  divisions  and  not  to  brigades,  in 
the  proportion  of  four  to  each  division,  one  of  which  should  be  a  regular  battery, 
the  rest  volunteers;  the  captain  of  the  regulars  to  command  the  artillery  of  the 
division.  In  the  event  of  several  divisions  being  united  into  an  army  corps, 
at  least  one-half  of  the  divisional  artillery  to  be  withdrawn  from  the  divisions 
and  formed  into  a  corps  reserve.  [Note. — The  contingency  provided  for  having 
arisen,  the  corps  reserves  were  formed  as  contemplated,  when  the  army  was  on 
the  Peninsula.]  (See  Appendix.) 

"  5th.  The  reserve  artillery  of  the  whole  army  to  consist  of  one  hundred 
guns,  comprising,  besides  a  sufficient  number  of  light  mounted  batteries,  all 
the  guns  of  position,  and,  until  the  cavalry  be  massed,  all  the  horse  artillery. 

"Oth.  The  amount  of  ammunition  to  accompany  the  field  batteries  to  be  not 
less  than  four  hundred  rounds  per  gun. 

"  7th.  A  siege  train  of  fifty  pieces  to  be  provided  [subsequently  expanded  to 
one  hundred  pieces  at  Yorktown,  including  13-inch  sea-coast  mortars  and  100- 
pounder  and  200-pounder  Parrotts]. 

"  8th.  Instruction  in  theory  and  practice  of  gunnery,  as  well  as  in  the  tactics 
of  that  arm,  to  be  given  to  the  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  of  the 
volunteer  batteries,  by  the  study  of  suitable  text-books  and  by  actual  recita- 
tions in  each  division,  under  the  direction  of  the  regular  officer  commanding 
the  divisional  artillery. 

"9th.  Personal   inspections,   as  frequent  as   circumstances  will   permit,   to 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD  SERVICE.  81 

be  made  by  the  chief  of  artillery  of  the  army,  to  see  to  a  strict  observance  of 
the  establishel  organization  and  drill,  of  the  special  regulations  and  orders 
issued  from  time  to  time  under  authority  of  the  commanding  general,  to  note 
the  improvement  of  officers  and  men  of  the  volunteer  batteries, 'and  the  actual 
fitness  for  field  service  of  the  whole,  both  regulars  and  volunteers." 

These  principles  for  the  organization  of  artillery  were  proposed 
by  the  chief  of  that  arm,  and  are  worthy  of  special  notice.  At 
other  and  various  times  in  this  country  commanders  and  writers 
had  essayed  in  the  same  direction.  Still,  from  force  of  circum- 
stances, the  artillery  before  this  had  been  either  small  in  amount 
or  imperfect  in  appointments,  often  both.  And  although  books 
on  the  subject  were  not  wanting,  it  is  believed  that  the  plan  here 
proposed  by  General  Barry  was  the  first  comprehensive  scheme 
for  organizing  artillery  to  accompany  a  large  force  into  the  field 
ever  promulgated  to  the  United  States  army,  with  the  expectation 
that  it  would  be  brought  to  the  test  of  practical  experience.  It 
may  be  remarked,  however,  that  the  assignment  as  here  contem- 
plated, of  batteries  to  divisions  and  of  artillery  reserves  to  corps 
and  armies,  was  then  practiced  in  the  principal  States  of  Europe, 
though  the  army  reserves  have  been  since  abandoned.  Although 
in  some  respects  the  preceding  principles  were  departed  from  in 
actual  practice,  they  formed  the  groundwork  on  which  was  built 
the  artillery  service  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

McClellan  says  in  his  report:  "The  creation  of  an  adequate 
artillery  establishment  was  a  formidable  undertaking,  and  had  it 
not  been  that  the  country  possessed  in  the  regular  service  a  body 
of  accomplished  and  energetic  artillery  officers,  the  task  would 
almost  have  been  hopeless."  He  drew  together  all  the  regular 
batteries  he  could  lay  his  hands  on  ;  and  when  the  three  corps — 
eight  divisions — embarked  for  the  Peninsula  campaign  they  were 
accompanied  by  forty-nine  batteries  aggregating  two  hundred 
and  ninety-nine  guns,  of  which  one  hundred  were  in  the  artillery 
reserve.  Of  the  forty-nine  batteries,  twenty  were  regulars  ;  the 
latter  represented  twenty-six  batteries,  some  being  consolidated 
for  service.  Of  the  eighteen  batteries  of  the  reserve,  fourteen  were 
regulars,  of  which  five  were  formed  by  two  batteries  being  consoli- 
dated into  one.  The  First  Corps  (McDowell's),  which  did  not 
accompany  McClellan,  is  not  included  in  the  preceding. 

It  will  not  be  uninteresting  to  note  the  changes  which  the  or- 
ganization of  the  artillery  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  underwent 
ii 


82      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

at  different  periods  subsequent  to  its  establishment  upon  a  proper, 
scientific  basis — changes  which  resulted  partly  from  experience 
acquired  in  campaign  and  battle,  and  partly  from  the  caprices  of 
the  numerous  generals  who  at  various  times  commanded  that 
army. 

First  of  all,  an  increase  in  the  number  of  army  corps  caused  a 
draught  from  the  reserve  artillery  which  almost  annihilated  it. 

On  the  Peninsula,  McClellan  had  three  corps;  and  two  divis- 
ions joining  subsequently,  made  ten  divisions  altogether.  Four 
months  later,  at  Antietam,  the  army  embraced  six  corps  and  one 
cavalry  division;  total,  nineteen  divisions.  There  accompanied 
the  army  at  Antietam  sixty-two  batteries;  seven  were  in  reserve; 
fifty-five  were  distributed  to  divisions  and  to  the  Twelfth  Corps, 
the  latter  having  its  seven  batteries  organized  as  corps  artillery, 
and  not  distributed  to  divisions.  There  were  attached  to  the 
cavalry  division  four  batteries  of  horse  artillery.  Except  in  three 
divisions,  one  regular  was  associated  with  the  volunteer  batteries, 
in  accordance  with  the  original  plan.  Of  the  sixty-two  batteries, 
twenty-two  were  regulars,  five  of  the  latter  being  formed  by  unit- 
ing two  distinct  batteries,  thus  making  twenty-seven  the  number 
of  regular  organizations  represented  at  Antietam.  It  will  thus 
be  seen  that  the  creation  of  new  divisions  had  in  a  few  months 
well-nigh  absorbed  the  whole  of  that  superb  artillery  reserve 
which  took  the  field  under  McClellan  at  the  beginning  of  1862. 

At  the  close  of  the  Peninsula  campaign  General  Barry,  under 
whose  immediate  supervision  the  artillery  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  had  been  organized,  was  appointed  inspector  of  artil- 
lery, and  commander  of  that  arm  in  the  defenses  of  Washington, 
being  succeeded,  September  5th,  1862,  as  chief  of  artillery,  by 
Colonel  Henry  J.  Hunt,  late  commander  of  the  artillery  reserve. 
McClellan  remarks,  in  his  report  dated  August  4th,  1863,  con- 
cerning this  officer,  that  he  ' '  had  commanded  the  artillery  reserve 
with  marked  skill,  and  brought  to  his  duties  as  chief  of  artillery 
the  highest  qualifications.  The  services  of  this  distinguished  offi- 
cer in  reorganizing  and  refitting  the  batteries  prior  to  and  after 
the  battle  of  Antietam,  and  his  gallant  and  skillful  conduct  on  that 
field,  merit  the  highest  encomiums  in  my  power  to  bestow." 
General  Hunt  continued  in  this  position  during  the  rest  of  the 
war,  stamping  on  the  service  of  which  he  was  the  head  the  im- 
press of  a  cultivated  mind  stored  with  knowledge  of  the  uses  and 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD    SERVICE.  83 

capabilities  of  the  artillery  arm,  the  result  of  extensive  experience, 
profound  study,  and  reflection. 

At  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg  General  Burnside's  army  con- 
sisted of  six  corps,  each  of  three  divisions,  and  of  two  cavalry 
divisions.  He  had  sixty-seven  batteries,  nine  of  which  were-iri- 
reserve.  Of  the  sixty-seven,  twenty-six  were  regulars,  four  of 
them  being  composed  of  two  batteries  each,  thus  representing 
thirty  regular  organizations.  All  the  horse  artillery  belonged  to 
that  branch  of  service.  The  fifty-eight  batteries  attached  to 
troops  were  with  the  divisions,  a  number  varying  from  one  to 
four  being  with  each,  depending  on  the  arm  of  service  and  the 
strength  of  the  division.  In  the  cavalry  service  each  division 
had  one  horse  battery;  drawing  on  the  reserves  for  a  greater 
number  when  needed.  Of  the  infantry  divisions,  seven  had  two, 
three  had  three,  and  eight  had  four  batteries.  The  strength  of 
the  divisions  (effective)  was  about  5000  men;  of  the  corps,  15,000 
men.  The  batteries  were  two-thirds  six-gun,  the  rest  having 
four  guns  each. 

At  Chancellorsville  General  Hooker  had  eight  corps,  includ- 
ing one  of  cavalry,  a  total  of  twenty-three  divisions.  Of  the 
seventy-one  batteries  with  the  army,  twelve  were  in  the  reserve; 
the  rest,  except  two  attached  to  the  provost  guard,  were  arranged 
to  the  divisions.  Of  the  seventy-one  batteries,  twenty-one  were 
regulars,  representing  twenty-three  distinct  organizations;  in  the 
Eleventh  and  the  Cavalry  Corps,  half  the  artillery  was  formed  into 
a  corps  reserve.  Of  the  twenty-three  divisions,  fourteen  had  two, 
five  had  three,  and  four  had  four  batteries  attached.  The  effect- 
ive strength  of  the  divisions  averaged  about  5000  men;  of  the 
corps,  about  15,000  men;  the  average  number  of  guns,  including 
the  general  reserve,  was  three  per  1000  men. 

Down. to  this  time  the  principles  originally  adopted  as  those 
upon  which  the  artillery  should  be  organized  had  been  adhered 
to,  and  even  the  Twelfth  Corps,  which  at  Antietam  had  its  guns 
massed  under  one  commander  as  corps  artillery,  at  Chancellors- 
ville had  its  batteries  distributed  to  divisions,  in  accordance  with 
the  original  plan. 

As,  however,  regiments  had  been  compelled  to  surrender  up 
their  artillery  to  brigades,  these  in  their  turn  to  divisions,  so,  as 
experience  in  manoeuvring  and  fighting  large  armies  was  gained, 
did  it  become  manifest  that,  to  most  effectively  organize  the  arm 


84      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

for  administrative  and  fighting  purposes,  divisions  must  give  up 
their  artillery  to  army  corps.  Accordingly,  after  Chancellorsville 
this  change  was  effected,  the  batteries  of  each  corps  being  organ- 
ized into  what  was  designated  an  "artillery  brigade,"  the  com- 
mander of  which  had,  or  was  supposed  to  have,  his  own  staff, 
adjutant,  quartermaster,  commissary,  medical  officer,  &c. 

As  illustrating  the  disadvantages  under  which  artillery  officers 
often  labor  in  the  matter  of  rank,  it  may  be  noted  that  while 
these  artillery  brigades  were  considered  equal  in  importance  and 
fighting  power  to  divisions  of  infantry,  the  latter  were  commanded 
by  generals,  the  former,  as  a  rule,  were  commanded  by  captains 
or  lieutenants. 

The  number  of  batteries  in  a  brigade  varied  according  to  the 
strength  of  the  corps  to  which  it  was  attached.  Of  the  eight 
corps  at  Gettysburg,  the  first  battle  after  this  reorganization  was 
effected,  four  had  five  and  two  had  four  batteries  to  a  brigade; 
the  Sixth  Corps  brigade  had  eight  batteries;  the  Cavalry  Corps 
had  nine  of  horse  artillery,  the  latter  in  two  brigades  of  four  and 
five  batteries  respectively.  Four-fifths  of  all  the  batteries  of  the 
army  had  six  guns,  the  rest  four  guns  each.  Each  brigade  in- 
cluded at  least  one  regular  battery. 

The  advantages  to  be  derived  from  assigning  the  artillery  to 
larger  commands  were  that  the  batteries  were  better  cared  for 
and  capable  of  more  efficient  employment  on  the  field  of  battle. 
As  a  result,  fewer  guns  were  required  to  perform  the  same 
amount  of  work.  Consequently,  in  1864  the  number  of  pieces 
was  reduced  to  two  and  one-half  per  1000  men  of  other  arms, 
having  previously  been  in  the  ratio  of  three  guns  per  1000  men. 

The  Confederates  had  anticipated  us  in  this  style  of  organi- 
zation for  artillery.  Immediately  after  the  Peninsula  campaign, 
in  1862,  they  commenced  to  draw  their  batteries  together  into 
battalions,  which  embraced  from  three  to  five  batteries,  and  had 
a  complete  battalion  organization,  perfect  in  all  its  parts,  i.  <?., 
each  battalion  had  a  proper  number  of  field  officers,  with  a 
regular  staff,  the  quartermasters  and  commissaries  being  officers 
of  those  departments. 

There  is  an  error  made  by  those  who  sometimes  affect  to 
understand  the  use  and  management  of  artillery,  i.  e.,  to  con- 
sider the  battery  as  necessarily  the  unit  of  the  artillery  arm. 
This  must  mean  that  it  is  either  the  fighting  or  the  adminis- 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD    SERVICE.  85 

trative  unit  for  the  artillery,  as  the  battalion  is  for  the  infantry. 
So  far  from  this  being  the  fact,  the  reverse  is  true  in  every 
well-organized  army.  As  for  fighting  purposes,  it  is  well  known 
that  allowing  batteries  to  go  into  battle  alone  is  avoided  when 
it  can  be  done,  and  every  effort  made  to  bring  all  the  batteries 
of  the  brigade  into  action  at  the  same  time,  that  concentration 
of  fire  and  weight  of  metal  thrown  may  produce  decisive  results. 
The  battery  is  not,  therefore,  the  only  fighting  unit.  No  more 
is  it  the  sole  administrative.  In  Germany  batteries  are  assem- 
bled together  in  divisions,  each  commanded  by  a  field  officer, 
with  a  proper  staff;  and,  though  the  designations  are  different 
in  some,  the  same  is  true  in  every  other  army  in  Europe. 
These  divisions  are  made  up  of  three  or  four  batteries,  and  are 
similar  in  purpose,  essentially  so  in  organization,  with  the 
brigades  of  the  Union  .  and  the  battalions  of  the  Confederate 
artillery.  In  each  and  every  case  the  battery  ceased  to  be  the 
only  administrative  unit,  and  those  functions  were  conjointly 
assumed  by  the  brigade,  the  battalion,  or  the  division.  (Appen- 
dix A,  No.  52.) 

The  erroneous  ideas  to  which  attention  has  been  drawn  led 
to  others,  and  to  an  invidious  discrimination  against  the  artil- 
lery in  our  own  army.  Accepting  as  an  established  fact  that 
the  battery  was  the  artillery  unit,  the  conclusion  was  drawn 
that  there  was  nothing  about  the  service  of  that  arm  higher 
than  a  battery  which  could  be  legitimately  the  subject  of  com- 
mand. This  doctrine,  at  variance  alike  with  our  experience 
and  the  facts  as  they  exist  in  every  active  army  of  respectable 
proportions  in  recent  times,  was  announced  in  General  Orders 
No.  126,  of  1862,  from  the  War  Department,  which  provided 
that,  "  as  a  general  rule,  artillery  will  be  called  for  and  received 
by  batteries,  thus  rendering  the  field  and  staff  unnecessary." 
As  a  result,  when  these  batteries  were  assembled  into  brigades, 
the  field  and  staff,  here  pronounced  unnecessary,  had  to  be 
drawn  from  captains  and  subalterns,  thus  increasing  the  duties 
of  these  officers,  and  turning  over  the  artillery  brigades  to  those 
whose  rank  was  in  nowise  commensurate  with  their  commands. 
The  arrangement  was  most  unjust,  and  drove  many  of  the  first 
officers  of  the  artillery,  in  point  of  merit,  into  the  staff  or  into 
other  branches  of  service,  where  they  received  the  promotion 
they  deserved. 


86      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

The  laws  of  the  Confederacy  allowed  general  and  field  officers  at 
the  rate  of  a  brigadier-general  to  every  eighty  guns,  a  colonel  to 
every  forty,  a  lieutenant-colonel  to  every  twenty-five,  a  major  to 
every  twelve;  and  although  the  complement  under  this  rule  may 
never  have  been  appointed,  still  it  appears  from  the  records  that 
their  battalions,  made  up  of  independent  batteries,  were  always 
commanded  by  a  field  officer,  while  many  of  them  had  more  than 
one  officer  of  that  rank. 

Neither  the  brigades  of  the  Union  nor  the  battalions  of  the  Con- 
federate artillery  were  creations  authorized  by  the  legislature; 
they  sprang  out  of  the  necessities  of  war,  supplanting  the  battery 
as  the  artillery  fighting  and,  to  a  great  extent,  as  the  administra- 
tive unit,  the  progress  of  the  war  only  demonstrating  more  clearly 
their  efficiency. 

When  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  took  the  field  in  1864,  the 
number  of  corps  had  been  reduced  from  eight,  with  277  regiments, 
to  four,  with  226  regiments;  the  artillery  from  sixty-seven  to  fifty 
batteries  of  field  artillery,  with  which  were  serving  two  regiments 
and  three  battalions  of  foot  artillery,  the  latter  armed  as  infantry 
for  guards  and  escort  duty.  The  regular  batteries  which  were 
with  the  army  the  year  before  remained  with  it,  though  from  the 
reduced  number  of  men  it  was  in  several  instances  found  neces- 
sary to  unite  two  or  three  organizations  in  a  single  battery,  which, 
even  then,  in  no  instance  had  the  maximum  strength  authorized 
by  law.  To  each  corps'  artillery  brigade  there  was  attached  a 
battalion  of  foot  artillery  for  the  various  duties,  artillery  and 
other,  required  of  foot  troops.  The  two  heayy  artillery  regi- 
ments formed  part  of  the  Artillery  Reserve,  which,  May  4th,  1864, 
embraced  twenty-four  of  the  fifty  field  battery  organizations  of 
the  army. 

Soon  after  the  first  movements  of  troops  in  the  Wilderness 
campaign  (1864),  General  Grant  resolved  to  dispense  with  this 
artillery  reserve.  It  was  accordingly  ordered  back  to  Washing- 
ton. The  reason  for  this  step  was  that  the  theatre  of  operations, 
as  well  as  the  plan  of  campaign  determined  on,  did  not  permit 
the  use  of  artillery  to  advantage,  or  with  decisive  effect.  The  at- 
tack was  generally  against  breastworks  of  greater  or  less  strength, 
in  a  swampy  or  wooded  country,  where  artillery  could  only  ma- 
noeuvre with  difficulty.  Instead,  however,  of  ordering  the  guns 
to  Washington,  the  reduction  of  impedimenta  was,  upon  the  rep- 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD  SERVICE.  87 

resentations  of  the  chief  of  artillery  of  the  army,  effected  in  the 
following  manner: 

'•  HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF.  THE  POTOMAC,  May  IGth,  1864. 
11  [Special  Orders  No.  130.] 

********* 
"  2d.  Each  six-gun  battery  in  this  army,  except  the  horse  artillery  and  Taft's 
New  York  independent  battery,  will  at  once  be  reduced  to  four  guns,  retaining 
all  its  caissons.  The  surplus  ordnance  stores  and  horses  will  be  sent  to  Belle 
Plain  to-morrow,  and  turned  in  to  the  proper  departments  at  that  place.  The 
batteries  of  the  Artillery  Reserve  will  be  distributed  as  follows,  after  sending  back 
the  surplus  guns:  To  the  Second  Corps,  Major  Hazard,  with  Clarke's  (B)  First 
New  Jersey,  McKiiight's  Twelfth  New  York  independent,  and  Burton's  Eleventh 
New  York  independent.  To  the  Fifth  Corps,  Major  Fitzhughi,  with  Bigelow's 
Ninth  Massachusetts,  Hart's  Fifteenth  New  York,  Sheldon's  (B)  First  New 
York,  Barnes'  (C)  First  New  York.  To  the  Sixth  Corps,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Monroe,  Brinkle's  (E)  Fifth  United  States,  Stevens'  Fifth  Maine,  Hexamer's  (A) 
First  New  Jersey,  Ewing's  (H)  First  Ohio.  Taft's  Fifth  New  York  battery  will 
report  to-morrow  to  Major-General  Warren,  commanding  Fifth  Corps.  The 
batteries  transferred  from  the  Reserve  will  join  their  corps  to-morrow.  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel McGilvray  will  remain  in  charge  of  the  general  ammunition 
column,  with  staff  officers  attached  to  it. 

****  *  *  *** 

"  By  command  of  General  Meade. 

«S.  WILLIAMS, 
"Assistant  Adjutant- General.'1 

By  this  arrangement  the  organizations  of  all  the  batteries  were 
retained,  together  with  the  field  officers  belonging  to  the  reserve; 
a  matter  of  importance  in  an  army  where,  as  we  have  seen, 
that  class  of  officers  was  proscribed;  only  the  surplus  guns  were 
sent  away.  The  retention  of  all  the  caissons  with  the  reduced 
batteries  enabled  the  ammunition  wagon-trains  to  be  correspond- 
ingly reduced,  besides  furnishing  a  better  means  of  transport,  as 
caissons  are  acknowledged  to  be  superior  for  this  purpose  to 
wagons. 

Prior  to  the  issuing  of  the  special  order  just  quoted,  the  artil- 
lery brigade  of  the  Second  Corps  had  nine,  of  the  Fifth  Corps 
had  eight,  and  of  the  Sixth  Corps  had  eight  six-gun  batteries. 
The  Artillery  Reserve  had  six  six-gun  batteries,  besides  Taft's 
six-gun  2o-pounder  battery.  Under  the  terms  of  the  order,  there- 
fore, thirty-one  field  batteries  were  changed  from  six  to  four  guns, 
and  each  of  the  three  corps  mentioned  was -given  a  brigade  of 
twelve  batteries — forty-eight  guns. 


88      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

At  the  date  of  breaking  up  the  Artillery  Reserve  the  Horse 
Artillery  was  composed  of  twelve  batteries,  with  sixty-four  guns, 
organized  into  two  brigades.  On  the  3ist  of  May,  1864,  these 
were  reduced  to  eight  batteries,  four  guns  each,  the  whole  arranged 
to  one  brigade  for  the  Cavalry  Corps.  This  reduced  the  number 
of  guns  in  the  Horse  Artillery  by  thirty-two,  or  to  one-half  the 
original  number,  thus  making  a  total  reduction  in  the  field  artil- 
lery of  ninety-four  guns  in  that  army  before  the  campaign  had 
gotten  well  under  way.  In  each  horse  battery  one  section — two 
guns — was  i2-pounder  Napoleons,  one  3-inch  rifles. 

Most  of  the  pieces  ordered  away  when  the  Reserve  was  broken 
up  were  returned  when  the  army  arrived  before  Petersburg,  to  be 
used  as  guns  of  position  in  the  siege  operations.  Besides  these, 
there  was  a  siege  train,  which  embraced  twelve  8-inch  siege  how- 
itzers, sixty-seven  siege  mortars,  seven  sea-coast  mortars,  thirty- 
six  Coehorn  mortars,  ten  loo-pounders,  thirty-eight  3o-pounder 
Parrotts,  fourteen  4^ -inch  rifles,  and  one  3O-pounder  Brooke  rifle. 
The  artillery  operations  before  Petersburg,  from  the  arrival  of  the 
army,  June,  1864,  until  March,  1865,  when  the  final  campaign 
was  vigorously  opened,  were  almost  wholly  in  the  nature  of  the 
siege,  and,  by  Special  Orders  42,  of  1864,  Headquarters  Armies 
of  the  United  States,  were  carried  on  under  the  supervision  of 
the  chief  of  artillery  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

On  taking  the  field  in  1865  the  artillery  was  distributed  as  fol- 
lows :  The  Second  Corps  artillery  brigade  had  twelve  batteries; 
that  of  the  Sixth  Corps  nine,  and  of  the  Ninth  Corps  six  batteries. 
Four  batteries  were  in  the  Artillery  Reserve.  The  horse  batteries 
were  attached  to  the  cavalry.  The  Second,  Sixth,  and  the  Re- 
serve had  each  six  Coehorn  mortars,  this  species  of  cannon  prov- 
ing so  efficient  in  the  previous  campaign  as  to  recommend  them 
to  more  general  service. 

On  the  2Qth  of  March  the  batteries  for  field  service  were  or- 
dered to  be  reduced  to  six  for  the  Second  and  Sixth  Corps, 
and  five  for  the  Fifth  and  Ninth  Corps.  The  surplus  batteries 
were  either  left  temporarily  in  position  on  the  lines,  or  sent  to 
the  Artillery  Reserve,  which  had,  by  sheer  force  of  circumstances 
and  in  absence  of  specific  instructions,  re-established  itself  with 
nineteen  batteries,  the  supply  (artillery)  and  ammunition  trains 
of  the  army. 

This  reduction  in  the1  number  of  guns  with  the  troops  resulted 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD    SERVICE.  89 

from  a  desire  to  strip  the  army  of  all  impedimenta  not  neces- 
sary for  the  campaign  then  opening,  and  of  which  the  pursuit 
of  the  enemy  was  rightly  expected  to  be  one  of  the  main  features. 
Besides,  it  had  been  shown  that  the  large  artillery  brigades  of 
twelve  batteries  organized  when  the  Reserve  was  broken  up 
were  unwieldy;  moreover,  the  Corps,  accustomed  as  they  had 
been  from  the  beginning  to  send  broken-down  or  surplus  batter- 
ies to  the  general  artillery  reserve,  were  now  at  a  loss  for  means 
to  take  care  of  or  recuperate  them.  Then  followed  a  reaction 
in  favor  of  returning  to  the  former  practices;  the  brigades  were 
reduced  to  a  less  number  of  batteries  than  they  had  before  the 
order  of  May  i6th,  1864,  was  issued,  while  the  Artillery  Reserve 
was  re-established  with  a  larger  number  of  batteries  than  it  had 
before  that  time. 

Thus  the  organization  of  the  artillery  of  this  army  changed 
frequently  during  the  four  years  of  the  war.  An  understanding 
of  the  causes  for  these  changes  and  their  results  will  prove 
neither  uninstructive  nor  uninteresting. 

We  have  seen  that  when  the  war  began  it  was  not  unusual 
for  regiments  to  bring  their  guns  into  the  field,  after  the  prac- 
tice of  the  last  century  in  Europe;  while  the  generally  accepted 
plan  was  to  attach  a  battery  to  each  brigade  of  infantry,  then 
four  batteries  to  each  division,  and  finally  from  five  to  twelve 
batteries,  organized  as  a  brigade  and  with  a  distinct  adminis- 
trative staff,  were  attached  to  each  army  corps. 

Experience  has  everywhere  demonstrated  that  in  a  large 
army  the  smallest  tactical  unit  which  should  be  made  complete 
in  all  fighting  arms  of  service  is  one  numbering  10,000  men  at 
the  minimum.  When  large  forces  are  involved  a  less  number 
than  this  cannot  be  expected,  if  detached  for  any  purpose,  to 
effect  important  results.  When  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was 
organized,  and  prior  to  its  embarkation  for  the  Peninsula,  the 
divisions  numbered  about  10,000  men  each,  as  will  be  seen  from 
the  following  official  list  selected  at  random  from  the  returns: 
Present  for  duty — Sedgwick's,  9296;  Hooker's,  10,751;  Porter's, 
IX>335;  Couch's,  11,013;  Casey's,  10,998.  The  batteries  were 
accordingly  assigned  to  divisions;  but  the  necessity  for  a  distinct 
administrative  staff  for  the  divisional  artillery  was  not  under- 
stood, and  during  the  three  campaigns  of  the  ensuing  twelve 
12 


90      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.  S.   ARMY. 

months  those  duties  were  imposed  upon  the  corps  chiefs  of 
artillery. 

Casualties  of  service  soon  reduced  the  strength  of  the  divisions, 
which  at  Antietam  averaged  but  6190  men.  This  is  too  small 
a  force  to  be  made  an  independent  unit  in  a  large  army,  but 
the  divisional  plan  having  once  been  adopted,  it  was  not  easy 
to  effect  a  change,  even  though  the  necessity  for  it  became 
clearly  manifest.  This  difficulty  was  enhanced  by  the  frequent 
changes  of  army  commanders. 

At  Chancellorsville  the  average  strength  of  army  corps  was 
15,000  men;  of  the  divisions,  5000  men.  It  was  resolved  after  this 
battle  to  withdraw  the  batteries  from  the  latter  and  assign  them 
to  the  former,  giving  to  the  corps  artillery  what  the  divisional 
never  had,  viz.,  a  distinct  organization  with  an  administrative 
staff.  These  organizations  were  designated  ' '  artillery  brigades. ' ' 
Experience  served  only  to  multiply  proofs  of  the  efficiency  of 
the  new  system.  Each  corps  of  15,000  men  was  now  a  complete, 
compact  fighting  body,  capable  of  making  its  power  felt  with 
effect,  whether  acting  in  concert  with  other  corps  or  detached 
and  acting  independently.  In  Europe  to-day  the  same  principles 
govern  in  this  matter.  There  the  divisions,  which  as  a  rule 
number  15,000  men,  are  the  smallest  commands  to  which  distinct 
artillery  organizations  are  assigned.  In  artillery,  as  in  other 
arms,  concentration  is  favorable  to  instruction,  to  discipline,  and 
to  efficiency,  and  in  active  service  is  absolutely  necessary  to  secure 
that  weight  of  metal  which  renders  its  fire  formidable.  From  the 
time  that  artillery  was  attached  to  battalions  of  infantry  to  this 
day  the  tendency  has  been  in  that  direction,  and  it  is  always  ac- 
companied by  marked  improvement  and  economy.  In  all  active 
armies  it  has  resulted  in  substituting  the  artillery  brigade  attached 
to  a  fighting  unit  of  15,000  men  for  a  single  piece  attached  to  a 
battalion  500  strong,  with  very  great  advantages  both  of  command 
and  administration,  as  well  as  increased  efficiency  on  the  field, 
which  has  enhanced  the  importance,  relatively  to  others,  of  the 
artillery  arm  of  service. 

In  the  consolidation  of  corps  effected  by  General  Orders  No. 
115,  of  March  23d,  1864,  Adjutant- General's  Office,  no  change 
was  made  in  the  principles  of  artillery  organization.  Thereafter 
the  corps,  numbering  about  23,000  effectives*  each,  were  com- 

*The  Second,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  Corps  aggregated  69,884;  Cavalry  Corps, 
11,839;  Ninth  Corps,  18,995  effectives. 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD    SERVICE.  91 

*  posed  of  three  or  four  divisions  of  the  same  strength  as  formerly— 
five  to  six  thousand  men.  The  same  reasons  which  rendered  ar- 
tillery brigades  advisable  existed  still,  and  continued  until  the  end 
of  the  war.  The  only  changes  were  in  the  number  of  batteries 
assigned  to  these  brigades,  these  varying  from  five  at  Gettysburg- 
to  nine  and  twelve  in  the  campaign  of  1864,  and  returning  as  the 
war  progressed  to  their  original  numbers. 

The  artillery  of  this  army  was  never  in  better  condition  than  at 
the  beginning  of  the  Wilderness  campaign.  The  batteries  were 
well  equipped  both  in  personnel  and  materiel.  The  brigades  were 
commanded  by  experienced  officers,  and  associated  with  each  was 
a  battalion  of  foot  artillery  for  guard,  escort,  and  other  infantry 
duty,  besides  furnishing  drafts,  if  needed,  to  keep  the  batteries 
full.  The  Reserve  embraced  about  one-third  of  the  batteries  with 
the  army,  organized  into  brigades  of  a  size  convenient  for  manoeu- 
vre or  detached  service  with  other  troops,  and  it  was  accompanied 
by  two  regiments  of  foot  artillery  armed  as  infantry.  These  regi- 
ments furnished  parties  for  the  construction  of  works  on  the  field 
or  elsewhere,  the  fabrication  of  gabions  and  fascines,  the  building 
of  magazines,  the  preparation  and  laying  of  platforms,  and  other 
duties  of  similar  nature  requiring  special  instruction  and  practice 
to  insure  rapidity  and  perfection,  and  generally  all  those  duties 
connected  with  artillery  service  that  men  of  the  batteries  can- 
not well  be  taken  to  do,  and  which  uninstructed  infantry  had  pre- 
viously been  detailed  to  perform,  at  great  sacrifice  of  time,  labor, 
and  economy.  Its  principal  defects  were,  first,  a  want  of  general 
and  field  officers,  a  subject  to  which  attention  had  been  called  by 
the  chief  of  artillery  in  all  his  reports  of  battles;  and,  second,  of  a 
code  of  regulations  for  its  government  which  should  be  binding 
on  all  branches  of  the  service.  These  defects  injured  its  efficiency 
and  usefulness  to  the  prejudice  of  its  reputation,  caused  a  misap- 
plication of  its  powers,  and  added  to  its  cost;  but  they  were  defects 
for  which  the  artillery  itself  was  in  no  way  responsible. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  the  Artillery  Reserve  was  broken  up,  the 
artillery  brigades  given  a  larger  number  of  batteries  ;  and  al- 
though circumstances  rendered  a  return  to  former  practices  nec- 
essary before  the  campaign  closed,  thus  demonstrating-  the  neces- 
sity that  existed  for  that  Reserve,  the  excellence  in  both  a  military 
and  economic  point  of  view  of  the  artillery  brigades  was  never 
brought  in  question,  but,  on  the  contrary,  made  more  clearly 


92      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

manifest  as  the  war  progressed,  \yith  us,  evolved  out  of  the 
necessities  of  actual  service,  this  organization  was  that  adopted  by 
our  enemies  under  precisely  similar  circumstances;  it  is  that  put 
in  practice  by  the  armies  of  Europe  during  both  peace  and  war. 
.It  may  therefore  be  considered  as  that  which,  at  this  stage  of  the 
military  art  and  science,  is  best  for  the  artillery  accompanying  a 
large  army  into  the  field. 

It  does  not  follow  from  this  that  the  distribution  of  single  bat- 
teries to  brigades  may  not,  under  certain  circumstances,  be  proper, 
and  indeed  necessary.  With  a  small  force  like  that  which  fought 
under  General  Taylor  in  the  Mexican  war,  for  instance,  it  may  be 
the  only  thing  to  do;  and  what  in  an  army  like  that  of  the  Poto- 
mac would  cause  the  power  of  the  artillery  to  be  frittered  away 
in  inefficient  driblets,  the  cost  of  its  maintenance  to  be  greatly 
increased,  might,  under  the  circumstances  supposed,  have  been 
highly  advantageous.  It  was  by  overlooking  the  fact  here  brought 
to  view,  viz. ,  that  the  proper  organization  of  artillery  will  vary 
with,  among  other  things,  the  numerical  strength  of  the  army, 
which  caused  much  of  the  delay  in  putting  it  on  a  proper  footing 
when  the  Civil  war  broke  out;  and  fortunate  will  it  be  for  us  if 
the  results  of  practical  knowledge  then  acquired  do  not  pass  be- 
yond recall  forever  with  the  lives  of  those  who  then  learned  the 
proper  use  and  management  of  the  artillery  arm  in  campaign 
and  in  battle. 

Particular  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  principles  on  which 
the  artillery  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  organized,  and  the 
changes  made  in  that  organization,  for  the  reason  that  it  was  the 
most  important  army  of  the  Nation.  Its  opponent  was  the  grand 
army  of  the  Confederacy,  in  which  was  concentrated  the  bone 
and  sinew  of  the  rebellious  States,  their  warlike  resources,  or- 
ganized and  guided  by  the  highest  order  of  military  talent  at  their 
command. 

In  other  armies  than  that  of  the  Potomac,  in  their  diverse  fields 
of  action,  the  artillery  was  variously  organized,  depending  greatly 
upon  the  character  of  the  country,  the  magnitude  of  the  oper- 
ations, including  that  of  the  forces  engaged,  and  the  views  of  com- 
manding generals;  but,  except  in  some  of  the  western  armies, 
it  will  be  found,  as  a  rule,  that  as  the  war  continued,  as  the 
resources  of  the  combatants  became  compressed  essentially  into 
two  or  three  well-organized  masses,  the  tendency  was  to  with- 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD    SERVICE.  93 

draw  the  artillery  from  control  of  subordinate  commanders,  and 
place  that  arm  under  orders  only  of  generals  commanding  the 
larger  tactical  unit — divisions  and  army  corps. 

Although  reference  has  been  made  to  changes  of  artillery  or- 
ganization in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  a  more  particular 
yet  general  review  of  these  may  not  prove  uninteresting. 

August  23d,  1 86 1,  the  chief  of  artillery  of  McClellan's  army 
wrote  to  that  general : 

"To  insure  success  itxis  of  vital  importance  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
should  have  an  overwhelming  force  of  field  artillery.  To  render  this  the  most 
effective,  the  batteries  should,  as  far  as  practicable,  consist  of  regular  troops. 
With  every  disposition  to  do  their  best,  the  volunteer  artillery  do  not  possess 
the  knowledge  or  experience  requisite  for  thoroughly  efficient  service.  I  would 
therefore  recommend  that  companies  of  regular  artillery  may  be  withdrawn 
from  many  of  the  forts  on  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  sea-boards  and  ordered  to  this 
point  [Washington]  at  as  early  a  date  as  practicable,  to  be  mounted  as  field 
artillery." 

This,  seconded  by  the  influence  of  the  commanding  general, 
had  the  effect,  before  the  army  took  the  field  in  the  spring  of  1862, 
of  increasing  the  number  of  regular  batteries  in  McClellan's  army 
from  thirteen  when  this  written,  to  twenty-nine  when  the  cam- 
paign commenced.  The  expectation,  however,  of  creating  a  field 
artillery  overwhelmingly  stronger  than  that  of  the  e^nemy  was 
not  realized.  The  enemy  were  equally  alive  to  the  importance  of 
the  measure,  meeting  gun  for  gun  the  artillery  of  the  Union  army. 
Shortly  before  that  battle  the  Confederate  army  which  met  Mc- 
Clellan  at  Antietam  had  seventy-three  batteries,  to  oppose  which 
that  general  had  but  sixty-seven;  and,  although  the  data  is  not  at 
hand  by  which  an  accurate  comparison  can  be  made  of  the 
metal-throwing  powers  of  the  two  artilleries,  there  is  reason  to 
believe  that  the  total  number  of  pieces  with  each  army  was  about 
the  same.  At  Gettysburg,  General  Meade's  sixty-seven  batteries 
were  met  by  sixty-eight  of  the  Confederates.  Afterwards  the 
number  went  on  increasing  until,  when  preparing  for  the  final 
struggle  in  the  campaign  of  1865,  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 
embraced  eighty-one  batteries  in  its  various  army  corps. 

In  the  arrangement  of  this  artillery  the  same  principles  con- 
trolled as  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  in  so  far  as  to  lead  to 
forming  battalions  analogous  to  our  brigades;  but  in  other  respects 
the  practice  of  the  two  armies  was  very  different.  Just  prior 
to  the  second  Bull  Run,  August  29th~3Oth,  1862,  forty-seven 


94      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

batteries  of  General  Lee's  army  were  attached  to  brigades  and 
divisions,  while  twenty-six  were  held  in  reserve.  This  was  long 
after  brigade  artillery  had  become  a  thing  of  the  past  in  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac;  but,  as  to  the  reserve,  the  same  organization  was 
given  it  in  each  of  the  opposing  forces  at  this  time,  that  is,  it 
embraced  about  one-third  of  all  the  field  artillery. 

One  year  after,  when  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  met  that  of 
Northern  Virginia  at  Gettysburg,  the  artillery  reserve,  having  in 
the  interval  nearly  vanished,  (at  Antietam  it  embraced  but  seven, 
at  Fredericksburg  but  nine  batteries,)  was  as  large  in  the  former 
as  when  first  organized,  while  in  the  latter  it  had  entirely  disap- 
peared. At  this  time,  and  afterwards,  the  Confederate  artillery 
in  this  army  was  attached  to  divisions,  each  army  corps  having 
its  own  reserve.  Here  again  there  was  a  marked  contrast,  as 
divisional  artillery  was  unknown  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
after  Chancellorsville. 

It  is  proper  to  place  on  record  the  fact  that  the  Confederates 
were  the  pioneers  in  the  plan  of  artillery  organization  and  admin- 
istration at  this  time  universal  in  Europe.  They  were  the  first  to 
break  up  and  do  away  with  grand  army  reserves,  distributing  the 
artillery  to  divisions  and  retaining  corps  reserves  only.  Prussia 
and  Austria  followed  after  1866  and  France  after  1870;  and  al- 
though the*  details  of  both  organization  and  supply  are  more 
perfect  in  those  armies  than  was  possible  in  that  of  the  Confed- 
eracy, still  the  prominent  and  more  important  features  are.  those 
put  into  practical  execution  in  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia, 
under  General  Lee,  early  in  1863. 

In  the  west  we  find  that  General  Albert  S.  Johnson  organized 
his  army  October  28th,  1861,  in  the  same  manner  as  McClellan 
on  the  Potomac;  but  afterwards  the  Confederates  in  that  section 
had  their  artillery  almost  wholly  distributed  to  brigades — a  faulty 
system  in  a  large  army,  delivering  as  it  does  piecemeal  what 
should  be  a  powerfully  concentrated  fire — and  one  which  had  been 
abandoned  by  the  most  important  and  best  equipped  armies  on 
both  sides.  After  General  Johnson  had  given  a  proper  direction 
to  this  matter,  it  is  to  be  wondered  at  that  this  objectionable  plan 
should  have  been  resorted  to,  thus  carrying  the  army  backward 
instead  of  forward  in  organization.  Whether  or  not  General 
Beauregard's  influence  effected  this  change  is  not  known;  yet 
certain  it  is  that  his  recommendations  of  March  4th,  1862,  after 


ORGANIZATION — FIELD    SERVICE.  95 

he  joined  the  western  army,  would,  if  acted  upon  favorably,  have 
brought  about  that  result.  His  proposition,  in  brief,  was  to  as- 
sign to  "each  brigade  of  2500  men  one  battery  of  six  guns,  either 
four  smooth-bores  and  two  howitzers,  four  rifles  and  two  how- 
itzers, or  six  rifle  guns;  to  give  to  each  grand  division  [corre- 
sponding to  corps  of  Union  army]  as  large  an  artillery  reserve  as 
practicable,  and  to  attach  to  the  staff  of  the  general-in-chief  a 
chief  of  artillery. ' ' 

In  Lieutenant-General  J.  C.  Pemberton's  command — Depart- 
ment of  Mississippi  and  East  Louisiana — as  organized  in  April, 
1863,  there  is  not  discernible  any  systematic  distribution  of  the 
artillery,  although  most,  but  not  all,  of  the  brigades  had  one 
battery  attached;  some  of  the  so-called  divisions  had  artillery 
reserves,  while  others  had  not.  The  dispersed  condition  of  this 
army  may  account  for  the  want  of  system  here  manifest. 

When  General  J.  E.  Johnston  assumed  command,  after  Pem- 
berton's surrender,  he  distributed  the  batteries  to  brigades  in  all 
the  infantry  divisions,  retaining  one  battalion  of  three  batteries 
in  reserve.  The  cavalry,  numbering  three  small  divisions,  had 
but  one  battery,  as  shown  by  the  returns;  but  it  is  inferred  the 
reserve  was  to  supply  that  or  any  other  deficiency. 

At  Chickamauga,  Bragg' s  artillery  was  distributed  one  battery 
to  each  brigade,  except  in  Long-street's  corps  from  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia,  organized  as  already  indicated.  Of  the  forty- 
three  batteries  with  the  army,  excluding  the  battalion  of  six  bat- 
teries with  Longstreet's  corps  not  yet  arrived,  six  were  in  reserve. 

After  Chickamauga,  and  previous  to  the  battle  of  Chattanooga, 
November  23d  to  25th,  1863,  Bragg' s  army  was  organized  into 
corps,  and  the  artillery  then  distributed,  in  battalions  of  three 
batteries  each,  to  divisions;  seven  batteries  of  the  thirty-two  with 
the  army  constituting  a  general  reserve. 

It  will  be  seen  that  South  as  well  as  North,  when  necessity  for 
and  the  great  advantage  of  thorough  organization  became  more 
apparent,  the  artillery  was  assigned  in  the  principal  armies  to  the 
larger  commands,  the  batteries  being  arranged  in  battalions. 
This  was  an  outgrowth  of  experience  acquired  in  war,  which  sifts 
from  crude  and  ill-digested  notions  the  germs  of  good  they  con- 
tain. If  proof  were  wanting  that  the  true  military  idea  had  been 
seized  upon,  it  will  be  found  in  the  armies  of  Europe  to-day, 
where  briefer  experience  has  rendered  the  adoption  of  the  same 
principles  of  artillery  organization  for  an  active  army  universal. 


96      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

ORGANIZATION — ARTILLERY    RESERVES. 

General  Artillery  Reserves  have  formed  a  feature  of  our  active 
army  organization  at  various  times,  commencing  with  the  Revolu- 
tion; but  the  opinions  of  military  men  have  differed  regarding 
their  formation,  management,  and  utility.  The  reason  seems 
to  be  that  this,  as  the  light  artillery  brigade,  being  a  creature  of 
active  campaign,  is  not,  with  us,  thought  of  or  provided  for  in 
peace,  and  its  existence  depends  upon  the  particular  views  of  each 
army  commander,  the  magnitude  of  the  operations,  and  the  topo- 
graphical features  of  the  theatre  of  war. 

We  find  the  artillery  of  the  Revolution  was  provided,  in  a 
limited  degree,  with  this  as  with  most  other  essentials  to  a  re- 
spectable field  service.  As  early  as  August  Qth,  1776,  General 
Washington  apportioned,  in  orders,  the  artillery  of  the  army  to 
infantry  brigades,  giving  each  two  pieces,  while  the  remainder 
were  directed  to  be  kept  parked  near  headquarters,  under  the 
eye  of  the  colonel  commanding  that  arm.  In  an  estimate  dated 
January  3d,  1777,  this  latter  officer,  now  promoted  to  brigadier, 
submitted  the  following  list  of  the  ordnance  necessary  for  the  main 
army  to  take  into  the  field  the  ensuing  campaign:  For  seventeen 
infantry  brigades,  four  pieces  to  each,  total  68;  to  be  3-pounders, 
4-pounders,  and  6-pounders,  brass;  and  for  a  reserve,  two  24- 
pounders,  four  12-pounders,  four  8-inch  and  eight  5^/2  -inch  how- 
itzers, and  twenty  3-pounders,  4-pounders,  and  6-pounders,  all  of 
brass; — or,  more  than  one-third  of  all  the  guns  were  kept  direct- 
ly under  the  control  of  the  general.  That  these  pieces  could  be 
brought  up  and  put  into  action  with  effect,  the  battle  at  Monmouth 
gave  proof,  as  did  other  contests  in  which  the  arm  acted  an  honor- 
able part.  In  general  orders  congratulating  the  army  on  the 
affair  at  Monmouth,  the  commander-in-chief  remarked  that  he 
could  "with  pleasure  inform  General  Knox  and  his 'officers  that 
the  enemy  has  done  them  the  justice  to  acknowledge  that  no 
artillery  could  have  been  better  served."  Without  doubt,  how- 
ever, it  was  not  so  much  to  act  a  part  by  throwing  its  weight  at 


•      ORGANIZATION — ARTILLERY    RESERVES.  97 

vital  moments  into  the  scale  of  battle  that  the  reserve  was  expected 
to  prove  its  utility  in  those  days,  as  by  becoming  a  base  of  supply 
for  brigade  artillery,  or  a  depot  where  could  be  sent  broken-down 
guns  and  materiel  to  be  either  repaired,  or  their  places  supplied 
with  new.  The  master  mind  destined  to  teach  men  the  true  use  • 
of  an  artillery  reserve,  launched  on  the  foe  at  the  right  point 
with  the  force  of  the  thunderbolt,  had  not,  at  that  time,  received 
the  impress  of  a  first  lesson  in  the  military  art. 

Neither  the  second  war  with  Great  Britain  nor  the  operations 
in  Mexico  furnish  any  examples  of  the  use  of  artillery  in  the  man- 
ner indicated.  During  the  former,  throughout  two  of  its  three 
campaigns  the  vital  powers  of  the  army  seem  to  have  been  para- 
lyzed by  the  want  of  military  knowledge  at  the  War  Department, 
the  incompetency  of  most  of  the  officers  who  one  after  another 
were  assigned  to  command,  and  the  factious,  unpatriotic  opposi- 
tion to  the  war  on  the  part  of  one  of  the  great  political  parties. 
In  the  Mexican  war  the  forces  engaged  were  too  small  to  render 
necessary  any  artillery  reserve  for  fighting  purposes;  and,  be- 
sides, the  efficiency  of  the  horse  and  modern  field  batteries  was 
first  taught  our  commanders,  the  army  and  the  country,  in  the 
Rio  Grande  valley.  It  is  true  that  under  General  Taylor  were 
several  heavy  pieces,  i8-pounder  guns  and  24-pounder  howitzers, 
which  had  not  the  mobility  demanded  of  field  artillery;  pieces  of 
position  they  might  be  called,  but  they  in  no  sense  formed,  either 
in  fact  or  design,  an  artillery  reserve.  Under  General  Scott,  on 
the  southern  line,  the  siege  train,  equipped  by  the  Ordnance 
Department  and  manned  by  its  artificers,  would,  under  ordinary 
circumstances,  have  formed  part  of  the  reserve;  but  in  this 
instance,  as  in  the  other  mentioned,  there  was  nothing  with  the 
army  which  could  properly  be  designated  by  that  name. 

Accompanying  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  when  it  took  the  field 
in  1862,  there  appeared,  for  the  first  time  in  this  country,  an  artil- 
lery reserve  placed  upon  a  proper  footing,  to  be  used  both  for 
purposes  of  fighting  and  of  supply,  commanded  by  officers  con- 
versant with  its  functions,  and  capable  of  developing,  organizing, 
and  directing  its  powers. 

Of  the  two  hundred  and  ninety-nine  guns  which  accompanied 
McClellan's  army,  one  hundred  were  in  this  reserve,  with  calibres 
ranging  from  the  3-inch  to  the  2o-pounder  rifle.     The  first  bri- 
gade of  horse  artillery  (four  batteries)  formed  part  of  the  reserve, 
13 


98      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,  U.   S.   ARMY. 

which  embraced  eighteen  of  the  fifty-two  batteries  with  the  army. 
Its  commander  was  a  colonel,  and  aid-de-camp  to  the  command- 
ing general,  appointed  under  the  act  of  August  5th,  1861.  To 
assist  him  there  was  a  regular  staff,  though  it  was  incomplete. 

The  operations  attending  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  from  the 
Peninsula,  reforming  them  for  the  Virginia  arid  Maryland  cam- 
paigns, well-nigh  swept  the  reserve  from  existence.  The  first 
troops  landed  from  the  Peninsula  were  hurried  forward  to  the 
Army  of  Virginia,  and  no  attention  paid  to  whether  they  had  or 
had  not  their  regularly  assigned  artillery;  in  this  way  many 
of  its  batteries  were  attached  to  and  remained  with  divisions. 
New  divisions  absorbed  many  more.  When  preparing  for  the 
Antietam  campaign  it  was  found  that  some  batteries  had  lost 
more  or  less  guns,  others  were  greatly  deficient  in  men  and 
horses,  and  a  number  were  unserviceable  from  these  causes 
combined.  Batteries  were  supplied  from  the  reserve  to  the 
corps  and  divisions  deficient  in  guns,  horses  were  taken  from  the 
baggage  trains,  and  men  transferred  from  the  infantry  ;  and  by 
the  time  the  army  reached  Antietam  its  artillery  was  in  very  fair 
condition,  having  been  reorganized  on  the  march  and  in  the  in- 
tervals of  conflict.  On  this  field  the  reserve  embraced  but  seven 
of  the  sixty-two  batteries  with  the  army,  the  rest  having  disap- 
peared as  just  indicated.  The  number  of  divisions  had  increased 
from  the  eight  which  accompanied  McClellan  to  the  Peninsula,  to 
eighteen  at  Antietam,  including  the  cavalry.  These  had  all  to  be 
supplied,  and  it  could  only  be  done  by  reducing  the  number  of 
batteries  attached  to  the  old  divisions  and  to  the  artillery  reserve. 

Thus  matters  stood  at  the  battle  of  Fredericksburg,  where  but 
nine  of  the  sixty-nine  batteries  (two  with  siege  guns  being  unat- 
tached) with  the  army  constituted  the  reserve.  The  enemy  was 
on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river;  and,  in  order  to  control  his 
movements,  command  the  town  of  Fredericksburg,  cover  the 
throwing  of  the  bridges  and  the  crossing  of  the  troops,  a  power- 
ful and  well-sustained  artillery  fire  was  necessary.  To  this  end 
it  was  determined  to  temporarily  attach  to  the  artillery  reserve 
some  of  the  batteries  of  the  divisions.  This  being  done,  they 
were  grouped  into  four  artillery  divisions  for  the  work  before 
them,  two  being  made  up  of  seven,  one  of  eight,  and  one  of  nine, 
batteries.  It  may  be  remarked  that  many  of  these  were  20- 
pounders  and  4^ -inch  rifles,  thus  demonstrating,  as  was  done  on 


ORGANIZATION — ARTILLERY    RESERVES.  99 

many  other  occasions,  the  advisability  of  carrying  heavy  guns  of 
position  with  every  army  in  the  field. 

Prior  to  this  battle  General  Burnside  contemplated  breaking  up 
the  artillery  reserve,  distributing  its  batteries  to  divisions  of  in- 
fantry and  cavalry,  half  of  which  had  but  two  batteries  each;  but 
the  experience  there  acquired  not  only  put  an  end  to  this,  but 
brought  out  in  stronger  light  than  ever  before  the  necessity  of 
the  commanding  general  retaining  a  respectable  mass  of  artillery 
in  his  own  hand  to  meet  the  possible  exigencies  of  the  conflict. 

One  of  the  specious  arguments  in  favor  of  breaking  up  the 
reserve  was,  that  if  artillery  en  masse  were  needed,  it  could  be 
obtained  when  the  occasion  arose  by  withdrawing  batteries  from 
troops.  This  theory  was  put  to  a  practical  test  when,  as  men- 
tioned, it  became  necessary  to  temporarily  increase  the  reserve, 
while  covering  the  army  during  its  passage  of  the  river  in  face  of 
the  enemy.  The  theory  signally  failed;  many  division  command- 
ers, although  the  guns  were  to  be  restored  as  the  troops  crossed, 
protested  against  their  being  taken  for  this  short  time,  and  de- 
clared they  would  not  be  responsible  for  the  consequences.  The 
batteries  were,  however,  restored  to  the  divisions,  as  had  been 
stipulated  they  should  be,  and,  as  a  result,  eleven  of  the  nine- 
teen which  debouched  into  the  town  were  jammed  together  in  the 
streets,  idle  spectators  of  the  fight,  obstructing  the  movements  of 
other  troops,  and  in  many  instances  returning  to  the  north  bank 
without  having  fired  a  shot.  The  logic  of  this  circumstance  was 
to  negative  propositions  for  placing  more  artillery  at  the  disposal 
of  subordinate  commanders  when  they  could  not  use  what  they 
already  had,  yet  were  willing  to  make  its  temporary  withdrawal 
a  cause  of  embarrassment  to  the  commanding  general. 

At  Chancellorsville  twelve  of  the  seventy-one  batteries  were 
in  the  reserve,  and  among-  them  were  several  siege  batteries, 
which  proved  very  efficient.  The  mismanagement  here  of  the 
artillery,  a  fact  for  which  the  arm  itself  was  not  responsible,  led  to 
a  return  to  first  principles,  and  an  augmentation  of  the  reserve, 
which  at  Gettysburg,  two  months  later,  embraced  twenty-two  of 
the  sixty-seven  batteries  present  on  the  field — the  proportion  to 
the  whole  artillery  that  it  bore  when  McClellan  started  for  the 
Peninsula.  But  things  did  not  stop  here ;  the  consolidation  of 
March  23d,  1864,  threw  still  other  batteries  into  the  reserve,  and 
when  the  army  moved — May  4th,  1864 — on  the  Wilderness  cam- 


100      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

paign,  that  organization  embraced  twenty-four  of  the  fifty  light 
batteries  with  the  army,  together  with  two  regiments  of  foot  artil- 
lery armed  as  infantry.  This  was  by  far  the  most  complete  organ- 
ization the  general  artillery  reserve  ever  had,  and  it  was  that  to 
immediately  precede  its  dissolution.  The  twenty-four  batteries 
were  arranged  to  brigades  of  six  batteries  each,  fully  appointed 
and  well  commanded,  while  the  foot  artillery  served  as  escorts, 
guards,  skilled  workmen  for  the  various  duties  devolving  on  that 
species  of  troops,  and  supplied  on  requisition  details  to  keep  the 
batteries  full.  But  the  campaign  just  opening  was  in  a  country 
with  few  and  bad  roads;  it  was  therefore  desirable  to  reduce  to 
the  utmost  practicable  limit  the  impedimenta;  the  fighting  was  in 
places  where  artillery  could  only  with  difficulty  be  manoeuvred, 
or,  rather,  could  not  be  manoeuvred  at  all,  and  it  was  resolved  to 
send  all  surplus  guns  back  to  Washington.  The  details  of  this 
reduction  are  given  elsewhere.  It  suffices  here  to  remark  that 
its  disappearance  was  short-lived,  as,  during  the  summer,  it  was 
partially  resuscitated  with  as  many  as  eleven  batteries  at  one  time; 
that  the  morning  report  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  March  3ist, 
1865,  shows  the  artillery  reserve  contained  35  officers,  1127  en- 
listed men,  47  guns,  and  some  mortars;  that  on  the  6th  of  April 
a  brigadier-general  was  assigned  to  its  command,  and  that  before 
the  brief  campaign  ended  it  embraced  nineteen  of  the  forty-two 
batteries  actually  with  that  army. 

As  with  other  parts  of  the  combatant  arms,  the  most  important 
service  of  the  reserve  was  by  hard  blows  to  help  beat  the  enemy, 
and  this,  early  in  its  history,  it  did  at  Malvern  Hill,  where 
every  gun  was  employed,  and  with  such  effect  that  it  confessedly 
saved  the  army  from  serious  disaster.  At  Antietam,  Fredericks- 
burg,  and  Gettysburg  every  battery  present  with  the  army  was 
sent  into  action,  and  always  at  critical  moments.  The  belief 
which,  with  many  other  erroneous  ideas,  prevailed  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war,  that  a  reserve  was  to  be  kept  out  of  the  battle, 
was,  not  figuratively  speaking  but  in  fact,  effectually  exploded  by 
its  shells  at  Malvern  Hill,  and  its  subsequent  services  in  action 
sustained  the  reputation  it  there  earned.  If  a  particular  point  was 
to  be  defended  as  the  key  to  the  position,  its  guns  were  placed 
there;  when,  as  we  have  seen  was  the  case  at  Fredericksburg, 
bridges  were  to  be  thrown  and  the  army  crossed  in  presence  of 
the  enemy,  it  was  the  reserve  artillery,  augmented  by  batteries 


ORGANIZATION — ARTILLERY    RESERVES.  IOI 

withdrawn  if  necessary  from  the  troops,  which  covered  the  peril- 
ous undertaking.  These  facts  set  at  rest  the  suspicion  that  this 
mass  of  artillery  was,  merely  because  of  its  designation,  to  play 
a  secondary  part  on  the  field  of  battle — a  suspicion  founded  on 
ignorance  of  the  functions  of  the  various  parts  of  every  army- 
organized  upon  sound  military  principles,  and  of  which  the  first 
in  our  service  was  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  under  McClellan.  • 

Batteries  attached  to  divisions  and  corps  losing  their  efficiency, 
either  from  the  want  of  men  or  materiel,  the  incompetency  of  their 
officers,  or  other  casualties  of  service,  were  at  once1  replaced  from 
•the  reserve,  thus  keeping  the  army  corps  fully  effective,  and  giv- 
ing the  broken-down  batteries  the  necessary  opportunity  and 
supervision  to  restore  them.  In  this  way  was  maintained  the 
efficiency  of  the  artillery  of  the  whole  army;  but  its  utility  as  a 
centre  of  supply  for  this  purpose  was  apparently  never  appreciated 
by  the  army  itself  until  after  May  i6th,  1864,  when  its  batteries, 
with  a  diminished  number  of  guns,  were  distributed  to  army 
corps.  When,  from  the  natural  accidents  of  service,  after  this, 
batteries  became  run  down  in  men  or  materiel,  there  was  no  sat- 
isfactory way  for  the  corps  to  take  care  of  them;  they  were 
accordingly  sent  to  the  army  ammunition  train,  which  was  all  that 
was  left  of  the  old  reserve,  to  recuperate  and  be  refitted.  Thus 
this  train  became  the  nucleus  around  which  a  new  reserve  grew 
up,  without  special  orders,  and  merely  from  the  force  of  circum- 
stances; it  lacked,  however,  the  well  established  administrative 
machinery  of  its  predecessor,  which  led  to  delays  in  the  perform- 
ance of  duties  assigned  it;  but  for  this  it  was  not  responsible. 

From  its  earliest  organization  the  reserve  was  accompanied  by 
an  ammunition  train,  which  was  conspicuously  useful  on  numerous 
occasions.  At  Malvern  Hill  its  one  hundred  wagons  supplied 
the  guns  engaged  after  (as  was  the  case  in  many  instances)  their 
ammunition  chests  were  emptied.  The  division  trains  had  been 
mixed  up  with  the  baggage  wagons,  and  sent  away  with  them. 
Had  it  not  been  for  this  ammunition  column  many  of  the  batteries 
would  have  been  idle  during  a  great  part  of  the  battle. 

Though  not  to  such  a  degree,  the  same  trouble  existed  at  An- 
tietam,  there  being  a  great  deficiency  in  the  divisions  of  certain 
kinds  of  ammunition,  which  this  column  supplied.  At  Gettysburg 
the  Third  Corps  left  all  its  artillery  ammunition  behind,  the  Sec- 


102      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.  S.  ARMY. 

ond  Corps  half  its  trains,  and  many  others  were,  from  similar  or 
other  causes,  deficient  in  this  essential  item. 

There  had  been  formed  while  preparing  for  this  campaign,  and 
attached  to  the  reserve,  a  special  ammunition  column  containing 
twenty  rounds  per  gun  for  every  gun  in  the  army  over  and  above 
the  number  (two  hundred  and  fifty  rounds  per  gun)  fixed  by 
orders  as  the  campaign  supply.  From  this  source  was  mainly 
drawn  ammunition  to  meet  the  deficiencies  mentioned,  the  disas- 
trous consequences  of  which  were  in  this  manner  luckily  provided 
against.* 

There  were  expended  in  the  three  days  of  this  battle  32,781 
rounds,  averaging  over  100  rounds  per  gun.  Of  this  number 
many  were  lost  by  explosions  or  other  accidents  to  limbers  and 
caissons.  The  supply,  as  just  seen,  was  270  rounds  per  gun; 
hence  there  was  sufficient  left  to  fill 'the  chests  and  enable  the 
army  to  fight  another  battle.  There  was  for  a  short  time,  during 
the  progress  of  the  fight,  a  fear  that  the  ammunition  would  give 
out,  caused  by  the  large  demands  made  by  commanders  who  had 
left  their  trains,  or  part  of  them,  behind.  It  was  in  this  emer- 
gency that  the  special  ammunition  column  supplied  every  requi- 
sition made  upon  it. 

When  the  general  reserve  was  broken  up,  in  May,  1864,  it  was 
this  column  which  was  ordered  to  be  retained,  with  a  battalion  of 
foot  artillery,  armed  as  infantry,  for  escort.  Several  Coehorn  mor- 
tars— a  species  of  cannon  proving  so  useful  during  the  progress 
of  the  campaign  as  to  cause  the  number  to  be  afterwards  increas- 
ed— were  also  retained  with  it.  These  formed  the  groundwork 
on  which,  as  has  been  mentioned,  a  new  artillery  reserve  grew  up 
to  vindicate  the  principle  of  this  organization  in  a  large  army. 

The  establishment,  fitting  out,  and  maintenance  of  ammunition 
columns  was  a  part  of  the  duties  of  the  reserve  to  which  no  glory 
attached.  In  time  of  peace,  particularly,  very  little  attention  is 


*  This  special  ammunition  train  was  organized  by  Brigadier-General  Henry 
J.  Hunt,  chief  of  artillery  of  the  army,  upon  his  own  motion,  and  without  spe- 
cial orders  to  that  effect.  Upon  his  requesting  it,  the  quartermaster  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  furnished  the  wagons.  General  Meade  knew  nothing 
about  it  until  some  time  afterwards.  The  intelligent  foresight  evinced  in  the 
formation  of  this  train  becomes  apparent  when  we  contemplate  the  situation 
at  Gettysburg,  where,  owing  to  the  fact  that  much  ammunition  with  some  of 
the  commands  was  left  behind  in  the  hurry  to  arrive  on  the  field,  its  absence 
might  have  led  to  serious  embarrassment,  not  to  say  disastrous  results. 


ORGANIZATION — ARTILLERY    RESERVES.  103 

given  to  these  matters  in  our  army;  in  war  the  machinery  for  their 
adjustment  is  complicated;  yet  they  are  of  the  first  importance. 
In  Europe  this  is  not  only  well  understood,  but  the  practice  is  in 
accordance  therewith,  the  arrangements  for  supplying  ammunition 
to  a  battery  being  as  clearly  defined  as  is  the  organization  of  tin* 
battery  itself.  Under  control  of  the  artillery  arm,  through  the 
ammunition  columns  and  depots,  there  extends  an  unbroken  chain 
of  supply  connecting  the  batteries  in  line  of  battle  with  the  arse- 
nals in  their  rear.  With  us,  requisitions  for  ammunition  have  first 
to  be  submitted  to  one  department,  and,  when  obtained,  turned 
over  to  another  for  transportation  to  the  front.  All  ammunition 
should  be  transported  in  caissons,  in  charge  of  properly  organized 
companies,  and  not,  as  with  us,  in  ordinary  army  wagons.  It 
was  to  attain  this  desirable  end,  at  least  partially,  that  all  caissons 
were  retained  in  May,  1864,  when  many  of  the  reserve  guns 
were  sent  to  the  rear.  The  chief  of  artillery  with  the  army  should 
have  charge  of  these  columns,  the  immediate  commanders  of 
which  should  be  officers  selected  from  that  arm.  In  this  way 
only  can  supplies  under  all  circumstances,  on  the  field  of  battle  as 
elsewhere,  be  certainly  provided  when  wanted. 

In  the  Union  armies  other  than  that  of  the  Potomac  there  was 
not  the  completeness  of  organization  inaugurated  by  McClellan; 
hence  in  few  of  them  %is  there  found  any  trace  of  an  artillery  re- 
serve. In  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  such  an  organization  was  not 
deemed  necessary  by  either  Buell  or  Rosecrans;  but  General 
Thomas,  who  relieved  the  latter  October  igth,  1863,  distributed 
eighteen  of  his  batteries  to  divisions,  while  a  general  reserve 
embraced  twelve  more,  including  the  six  regular  batteries  with 
that  army. 

In  the  Confederate  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  there  was,  as 
early  as  the  Peninsula  campaign,  a  large  artillery  reserve.  It 
does  not  seem,  however,  to  have  well  answered  its  purpose,  as 
we  are  informed  by  one  of  the  first  artillery  authorities  of  their 
service  that  this  body,  ' '  not  being  in  intimate  relation  with  the 
infantry,  which  always  develops  the  situation,  and  being  invari- 
ably put  on  the  march  either  behind  the  infantry  commands  or  on 
some  road  to  itself,  was  never  promptly  available  on  an  emer- 
gency. Indeed,  if  the  history  of  the  general  reserve  artillery 
during  its  entire  existence  be  investigated,  it  will  be  found  that, 
although  excellent  in  material  and  comparatively  so  in  equip- 


104      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,   U.  S.   ARMY. 

ment,  the  service  that  it  rendered  was  greatly  disproportionate  to 
its  strength."  It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  therefore,  that  in 
February,  1863,  all  the  reserve,  except  two  battalions  aggregating 
six  batteries,  were  assigned  to  corps,  and  that  when  a  new  corps 
was  formed  in  June  of  that  year  these  two  battalions  were  taken 
away  and  the  general  reserve  broken  up,  never  to  reappear.  Each 
army  corps  had  its  own  train  to  which  disabled  guns  were  sent, 
from  which  spare  parts  were  supplied,  and  which  thus  acted  for 
the  corps  the  part  that-  the  general  reserve  train  is  supposed  to 
perform  for  all  the  corps  of  the  army. 

The  similarity  of  artillery  organization  adopted  by  the  Confed- 
erates at  this  time  to  that  now  practiced  in  Europe  maybe  judged 
of  by  the  following:  At  Gettysburg,  each  division  of  General  Lee's 
army  had  attached  to  it  an  artillery  battalion  of  three  or  four  bat- 
teries, while  two  battalions  formed  the  corps  reserve;  in  the  Ger- 
man army,  each  division  of  infantry  has  a  division  of  artillery 
of  three  or  four  batteries,  and  the  corps  artillery  (called  corps 
reserve  with  us)  embraces  two  divisions  of  three  batteries  each; 
in  the  English  army,  each  infantry  division  has  attached  three 
batteries,  and  the  corps  artillery  embraces  five  batteries;  the  same 
principles  govern  in  Austria  and  Italy;  and  in  all  these  armies,  as 
in  that  of  Northern  Virginia,  there  is  no  general  artillery  reserve. 

It  must  not  be  accepted  from  what  precedes  that  the  artillery 
organization  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  was  more  in  con- 
sonance with  advanced  military  ideas  than  was  that  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  Judged  only  by  the  present  organization  of 
European  armies,  this  might  be  conceded;  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
there  are  reasons  disassociated  from  any  army,  and  based  on  gen- 
eral principles,  for  maintaining  a  general  artillery  reserve. 

The  extended  fronts  of  modern  lines  of  battle  render  rapid  con- 
centration at  a  decisive  point,  when  the  enemy  has  shown  his  hand, 
the  natural  method  of  attack.  "After  a  defensive  army  has  de- 
veloped its  strength,  and  the  weak  parts  of  its  line  have  been  as- 
certained, a  powerful  reserve  artillery  will  have  little  difficulty  in 
bringing  about  a  preponderating  cross  or  enfilade  fire  upon  an 
exposed  flank  already  engaged  in  front,  or  upon  one  or  more 
points  of  a  defensive  line,  that  will  inevitably  cause  disaster. ' '  The 
only  certain  way  to  have  artillery  ready  when  wanted,  as  here 
described,  is  to  have  it  massed  under  the  direct  control  of  the 
commanding  general.  Division  and  corps  commanders  view  with 


ORGANIZATION— ARTILLERY   RESERVES.  165 

alarm  any  attempts  to  take  from  them  their  batteries  in  time  of 
action — witness  Fredericksburg  ! — while  to  the  practical  impos- 
sibility of  withdrawing  artillery  from  the  corps,  and  bringing  it  to 
bear  upon  the  decisive  point  of  attack,  was  attributed  by  some  of 
the  ablest  generals  of  the  Confederacy  the  failure  of  PickeU's" 
charge  at  Gettysburg. 

From  the  success  attending  the  employment  of  the  German 
artillery  in  the  war  of  1870-' 71,  it  seems  to  be  a  widely  accepted 
principle  that  the  entire  artillery  of  the  main  body  ought  to  be 
kept  at  the  head  of  the  columns  and  brought  up  at  the  very  com- 
mencement of  an  attack,  when  all  the  guns  should  go  at  once  into 
action — the  objects  to  be  attained  being  to  prevent  the  enemy  de- 
stroying the  artillery  in  detail  as  it  forms,  and  also  by  numbers 
and  concentration  of  fire  to  obtain  ascendency  of  the  latter  as 
quickly  as  possible. 

It  is  very  desirable  that  these  objects  be  attained;  but  it  is  not 
admitted  that  this  is  the  only  proper  method,  nor  must  we  lose 
sight  of  other  important  duties  of  the  artillery  arm.  Nothing  is 
more  fallacious  than  to  suppose  that,  a  certain  tactical  principle 
having  been  practiced  successfully,  it  must  needs  prove  equally  so 
under  all  other  circumstances;  and  the  brilliant  movements  of  the 
artillery  in  that  war  are  not  likely  to  prove  an  exception  when 
attempted  against  a  formidable  and  enterprising  foe.* 

Bringing  from  column  into  line  to  the  front  the  large  mass  of 
artillery  takes  time,  and  the  mass  extends  over  considerable 
ground,  where  it  is  but  very  inadequately  protected  until  the 
infantry  in  rear  arrives;  thus  a  fearless  and  energetic  enemy  is 
given  an  opportunity  of  which  he  would  not  be  slow  to  avail 
himself.  When  the  other  troops  arrive  the  very  length  of  line  oc- 
cupied by  the  artillery  may  seriously  impede  their  deployment, 
and  cause  them  to  mask  the  guns  while  doing  so.  It  offers  from  the 
first  a  conspicuous  object  for  the  concentrated  fire  of  the  enemy; 
essays  what  must  always  be  considered  the  hazardous  experiment 
of  leaving  the  general  empty-handed  to  meet  the  critical  phases 
of  battle;  and  even  though  it  be  possible,  when  an  emergency 

*  What  might  not  the  French  have  accomplished  had  they,  at  10  o'clock  A. 
M.,  September  1st,  1870,  energetically  attacked  the  poorly  supported  mass  of 
guns,  with  the  defile  'of  St.  Albert  at  its  back,  on  the  fatal  field  of  Sedan  1 
The  desperate  valor  of  Ducrot's  last  effort  with  the  cavalry  came  four  hours 
too  late ! 

H 


106      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.   ARMY. 

arises,  to  take  from  corps  and  divisions  to  supply  new  demands 
elsewhere  in  action,  it  would  at  best  be  using  troops  partially 
exhausted,  while  those  from  a  general  reserve  would  be  fresher 
for  their  work.  It  is  one  of  the  first  tactical  principles  in  the 
use  of  the  arm  that  artillery  should  avail  itself  of  accidents  of  the 
ground,  adding  by  the  position  taken  up  to  the  effectiveness  of 
its  fire.  If  it  be  massed  regardless  of  this  principle,  much  of  its 
power  will  be  sacrificed. 

In  every  carefully  selected  line  of  battle  there  will  be  positions 
of  importance — key  points — the  successful  defense  of,  or  attack  on, 
which  will  decide  the  conflict.  These  should  be  both  attacked 
and  defended  by  heavier  guns,  which  in  every  well-appointed  re- 
serve forms  part  of  its  armament.  When  bridges  have  to  be 
thrown  or  rivers  otherwise  crossed  in  face  of  the  enemy,  these 
guns,  even  if  they  cannot  properly  be  attached  to  troops,  will  be 
found,  if  not  indispensable,  at  least  greatly  to  facilitate  the  difficult 
operation. 

Let,  then,  corps  and  division  artillery  come  into  action  with 
their  respective  commands,  and  a  reserve,  under  the  direct  control 
of  the  commanding  general,  be  kept  free  to  act  at  his  bidding  at 
the  supreme  moment  of  the  battle.* 

Napoleon  first  taught  the  tactical  use  and  power  of  this  organ- 
ization. Having  developed  the  strength  and  position  of  his  ad- 
versary, he  brought  up  at  the  right  time  and  place  the  artillery 
reserve  .to  sweep  everything  before  it,  preparatory  to  advancing 
a  strong  column  to  penetrate  and  roll  up  the  enemy's  line.  These 
tactics  were  little  practiced  during  the  Civil  war,  the  nearest  ap- 
proach to  it  being  the  Confederate  attack  of  July  3d  at  Gettys- 
burg; but  this  was  lacking  in  the  elements  which  made  Napoleon's 
tactics  formidable,  viz.,  a  sweeping  of  the  ground  at  which  the 
assault  was  to  be  made  by  a  powerful  and  sustained  fire  from 
fresh  masses  of -artillery  held  in  reserve  for  this  very  purpose. 

Rapidity  and  precision  of  modern  fire  render  future  success- 
ful attacks  in  column  improbable;  but  the  extended  line  in  which 
the  column  is  now  deployed  will  offer  opportunities  for  decisive 
results  if  promptly  taken  advantage  of,  and  artillery  must  be  at 

*  At  the  battle  of  Gravelotte,  Prince  Frederic  Charles,  commanding  the  Sec- 
ond Army,  held  the  corps  artillery  of  the  Third  Army  Corps  directly  under  his 
orders  as  an  artillery  reserve. 


ORGANIZATION — ARTILLERY    RESERVES.  icy 

hand  to  do  the  work.  This  can  certainly  be  depended  upon  only 
when  held  at  the  commander's  disposal. 

In  the  United  States  there  is  another  than  the  purely  tactical 
reason  here  given  for  the  organization  of  an  artillery  reserve  in  a 
large  army  like  that  of  the  Potomac.  It  arises  from  considerations 
affecting  the  composition  of  such  armies.  From  necessity  they 
are  composed  of  volunteers,  with  a  little  leaven  from  the  regular 
army  to  set  an  example  in  discipline  and  in  methods  of  adminis- 
tration. A  reserve  in  such  an  army,  under  an  efficient  officer,  will 
be  an  absolutely  necessary  source  whence  supplies  may  be  drawn, 
including  replenished  and  properly-equipped  batteries,  to  take  the 
places  of  those  that  have  been  run  down  and  knocked  to  pieces. 
It  is  also  necessary  in  such  an  army  that  the  commanding  general 
should  have  at  his  bidding  and  immediately  under  his  control  a 
powerful  weapon,  such  as  this  is,  to  throw  upon  the  vital  point 
when  the  latter  is  developed,  either  to  pave  the  way  for  piercing 
the  enemy's  line,  or  to  repel  his  onslaught. 

If  we  are  to  abandon  well-established  principles  and  adopt  the 
practices,  at  present  in  high  repute,  of  certain  military  nations, 
without  considering  the  different  circumstances  under  which  our 
armies  are  raised  and  take  the  field,  it  is  difficult  to  indicate  at 
what  point  in  the  model  system  we  should  commence  to  copy. 
If  it  be  not  at  the  fountain-head — the  plan  for  recruitment,  by 
which  each  man  is  compelled  to  take  his  turn  with  the  colors — the 
result  may  not  be  the  same  with  us  as  with  those  who  lay  the  foun- 
dation for  success  in  that  true  principle  of  democracy — universal 
service  in  the  ranks  of  the  army. 


IO8      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.   ARMY. 


CHAPTER  V. 

ADMINISTRATION. 

From  the  organization  of  the  colonial  forces,  in  1775,  the  ar- 
tillery took  and  maintained  an  advanced  position.  Numerous 
artillery  companies,  formed  in  the  principal  cities,  and  invariably 
composed  of  the  first  young  men  of  the  community,  gave  re- 
spectability to  the  arm,  prestige  to  its  service,  and  a  personnel 
far  above  the  average  in  character,  intelligence,  and  professional 
attainments.  The  question  of  the  relative  rank  of  its  officers  with 
those  of  the  infantry  and  cavalry  had  been  fought  over  in  England, 
and  decided,  in  1751,  in  favor  of  the  artillery.  Since  then  the 
superior  scientific  knowledge  of  its  commissioned  personnel  in 
the  mother  country  had  raised  that  arm  still  higher  in  its  own 
and  in  the  estimation  of  others;  while  in  the  colonies,  due  to 
causes  just  mentioned,  it  was  regarded  as  a  more  elevated  branch 
of  service  than  any  except  the  engineers.  There  was  no  aristoc- 
racy. The  high-born  commissioned  gentlemen  of  the  English 
infantry  and  cavalry,  whose  deeds  of  bravery  lent  honor  to  the 
troops  they  led,  and  gave  eclat  to  those  services,  were  not  to  be 
found  among  the  forces  assembled  to  oppose  them,  where,  as 
regards  birth,  all,  in  theory  at  least,  stood  on  the  same  plane,  and 
where,  therefore,  other  things  being  equal,  the  better  education  of 
the  artillery  officers  not  unnaturally  raised  that  branch  of  service 
in  public  esteem.  Colonel  Gridley,  commander  of  the  first  artil- 
lery regiment,  was  the  most  accomplished  and  experienced  artil- 
lerist and  engineer  in  the  colonies,  and,  though  too  old  for  the 
duty,  his  selection  in  the  first  instance  evinces  the  belief  which 
prevailed — that  to  be  a  competent  artillery  officer  required  both 
attainments  and  acknowledged  ability. 

The  provisions  of  Articles  XLVIII  and  XLIX  of  War,  adopted 
by  the  continental  Congress  June  3oth,  1775,  strengthens  this 
general  view  of  the  subject.  It  was  declared  by  the  former  that 
"all  officers,  conductors,  gunners,  matrosses,  drivers,  or  any  other 
persons  whatsoever  receiving  pay  or  hire  in  the  service  of  the 
continental  artillery,  shall  be  governed  by  the  aforesaid  rules  and 


ADMINISTRATION.  lOQ 

articles,  and  shall  be  subject  to  be  tried  by  courts-martial,  in  like 
manner  with  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  continental  troops;" 
and  by  the  latter,  that  "for  differences  arising  amongst  them- 
selves, or  in  matters  relating  solely  to  their  own  corps,  the  courts- 
martial  may  be  composed  of  their  own  officers;  but  where~a 
sufficient  number  of  such  officers  cannot  be  assembled,  or  in  mat- 
ters wherein  other  corps  are  interested,  the  officers  of  artillery 
shall  sit  in  courts-martial  with  the  officers  of  the  other  corps." 
This  language  might  leave  in  doubt  whether  officers  of  artillery 
were  considered  too  good,  or  not  quite  good  enough,  to  sit  on 
courts-martial  with  those  of  other  corps.  When  made  part  of 
the  English  code,  whence  they  were  transcribed  bodily  into  our 
own,  they  were  intended  to  establish  that  officers  of  artillery  were 
as  good  as  those  of  other  arms — a  fact  which  the  infantry  and 
cavalry  had  strenuously  denied.  The  origin  and  significance  of 
the  law  was,  however,  when  adopted  by  the  continental  Congress, 
either  misunderstood  or  lost  sight  of,  and  an  interpretation  given 
it  the  reverse  of  what  was  originally  intended — the  artillery  was 
placed  a  little  above  the  others.  The  air  of  superiority  thereby 
engendered  was  no  doubt  disagreeable.  To  curb  their  pride  and 
let  them  know  their  true  position,  Congress,  in  the  revised  Arti- 
cles of  War  adopted  September  3Oth,  1776,  provided  that,  when 
sitting  on  courts-martial  with  those  of  other  corps,  officers  of  the 
artillery  should  take  "rank  according  to  the  dates  of  their  re- 
spective commissions,  and  no  otherwise" 

That  the  artillery  was  not  unconscious  of  its  position  there 
is  abundant  evidence.  The  fact  crops  out  in  the  correspondence 
of  the  times,  particularly  of  its  own  members,  and  was  encouraged 
in  various  ways  by  the  Revolutionary  Government.  When  the 
provincial  Congress  of  New  York  authorized  Captain  (afterwards 
Colonel)  Lamb  to  raise  a  company  of  artillery,  and  then  resolved 
to  attach  the  company  to  McDougall's  regiment,  the  sturdy  cap- 
tain objected  "that  it  placed  the  artillery  on  a  level  with  the  in- 
fantry— a  practice  unprecedented  in  any  service,"  and  thereupon 
tendered  his  resignation.  This  was  not  accepted,  but,  instead, 
the  obnoxious  resolution  was  repealed.  In  his  estimates  Colonel 
Pickering,  when  quartermaster-general,  inserted  the  items  forage 
and  horses  for  captains  of  artillery,  who,  at  least  until  1782,  were 
mounted  at  Government  expense — a  consideration  shown  these 
officers,  the  quartermaster-general  remarked,  based  not  on  law, 


110      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

but  on  unbroken  custom,  which  he  was  not  at  liberty  to  disre- 
gard. 

The  pay  of  the  artillery,  established  by  Congress,  was  better 
than  that  of  either  the  infantry  or  cavalry.  The  first  adjustment 
of  the  pay  of  the  army  provided,  among  other  things:  Per  month, 
captain  of  infantry,  $20;  of  artillery,  $26^ ; — lieutenant  of  infantry, 
$13^5;  of  artillery,  $18^; — sergeant  of  infantry,  $8;  of  artillery, 
$8^; — private  of  infantry,  $6^i;  of  artillery  (matross),  $6f.  When, 
May  2yth,  1778,  the  different  arms  of  service  were  first  uniformly 
organized,,  the  pay  of  certain  officers  was  established  as  follows: 
Per  month,  colonel  of  artillery,  $100;  of  cavalry,  $93^;  of  infan- 
try, $75; — major  of  artillery,  $62^;  of  cavalry,  $60;  of  infantry, 
$50; — a  surgeon  of  artillery,  $75;  of  cavalry  and  infantry,  each 
$60. 

A  superiority  claimed  by  the  members  of  a  particular  branch  of 
service,  and  recognized  by  Congress,  could  not  have  been  main- 
tained without  something  of  solid  merit  to  rest  upon.  The  foun- 
dation consisted  in  (i)  a  department  controlled  by  a  single  direct- 
ing mind,  intelligent,  fertile  in  resources,  imbued  with  a  love  of 
the  special  duties  of  the  arm;  (2)  excellent  subordinate  officers, 
any  one  of  whom  was  known  to  be  equal  to  the  performance  of 
any  duty  the  exigencies  of  service  might  require.  There  was, 
besides,  even  among  the  best  informed  people,  a  very  general 
ignorance  of  the  art  and  science  of  artillery,  which  no  doubt  added 
to  the  seeming  importance  of  those  versed  in  what  was  generally 
considered  occult.  Referring  to  the  arrival  of  a  captain  of  artil- 
lery with  his  company  en  route  to  join  in  Montgomery's  invasion 
of  Canada,  Schuyler  wrote  to  the  commander-in-chief :  ' '  I  am  glad 
he  has  arrived,  as  there  was  not  in  this  whole  department  a  single 
person  who  understood  the  business. ' ' 

Regarding  the  qualifications  of  the  personnel,  Knox  wrote : 
' '  No  officer  should  be  appointed  to  the  artillery  who  does  not 
possess  a  proper  knowledge  of  the  mathematics  and  other  nec- 
essary abilities  for  the  nature  of  the  service."  Not  only  were 
they  able  to  point  and  fire  guns,  but — down  at  least  to  captains, 
inclusive — they  were  conversant  with  the  laboratory  arts,  knew 
enough  of  engineering  to  build  a  work  adapted  to  the  site,  and 
place  the  guns  therein  advantageously  for  defense. 

Early  in  the  war  the  necessity  of  procuring,  fpr  the  service  of 
the  colonies,  scientific  engineers  was  made  manifest,  and  many 


ADMINISTRATION.  Ill 

there  were  who,  ignorant  of  the  capacity  of  our  own  artillery 
officers,  imagined  it  would  be  necessary  to  secure,  as  well,  officers 
of  experience  in  that  department.  To  this  end,  Mr.  Silas  Deane, 
the  agent  of  the  colonies  at  Paris,  entered  into  negotiations  with 
several  artillerists  of  the  French  army.  Benjamin  Franklin,  before" 
leaving  this  country  as  one  of  the  commissioners  at  that  capital, 
had  also  entered  into  correspondence  on  the  subject.  On  June 
loth,  1776,  Barbue  Dubourg  wrote  the  distinguished  patriot: 

"  Many  military  men  agree  in  thinking  that  the  colonies  have  more  need  of 
artillerymen  than  of  engineers.  This  is  particularly  so  with  the  most  capable 
judge  in  Europe,  the  Count  De  St.  Germain.  Mr.  De  Gribeauval,  lieutenant-gen- 
eral of  the  King's  armies  and  director-general  of  artillery,  thinks  you  ought  to 
have  three  officers  of  that  arm :  one  to  be  chief,  and  set  the  whole  going,  one 
to  direct  in  the  northern  and  one  in  the  southern  colonies.  For  chief  he  has 
fixed  his  eye,  with  St.  Germain,  upon  Mr.  Du  Coudray,  whose  talents  in  Corsica 
raised  him  over  one  hundred  and  eighty  seniors." 

Upon  these  flattering  recommendations  Du  Coudray  was  ac- 
cordingly employed  to  collect  the  cannon,  ammunition,  arms,  and 
clothing  purchased  by  the  colonies  pending  the  settlement  of  the 
terms  on  which  he  could  enter  their  service.  (See  Appendix  B 
[i].)  The  arrival  of  this  gentleman  with  a  retinue  of  officers  on 
the  2Oth  of  April,  1777,  produced  an  explosion  in  the  army  which 
threatened  serious  consequences,  several  of  the  first  officers,  in- 
cluding Knox,  Sullivan,  and  Greene,  protesting  to  the  President 
against  the  confirmation  of  the  Deane- Coudray  compact  in  such 
vigorous  language  that  Congress  voted  their  letters  to  be  an  in- 
fringement on  the  liberties  of  the  people,  as  tending  to  influence 
the  decisions  of  that  body,  and  called  upon  the  offenders  to 
apologize  for  so  "singular  an  impropriety."  This  was  not  done, 
however;  the  pressure  brought  to  bear  was  too  strong  for  Con- 
gress to  resist,  and  the  compact  was  disapproved,  on  the  ground 
that  Mr.  Deane  had  exceeded  his  authority.  It  was  at  this  time 
that  General  Washington,  writing  to  the  President  of  Congress, 
spoke  of  Knox  as  "  one  of  the  most  valuable  officers  in  the  service, 
a  man  of  great  military  reading,  sound  judgment,  and  clear  con- 
ceptions, and  who,  combating  almost  innumerable  difficulties  in 
the  department  he  fills,  has  placed  the  artillery  upon  a  footing 
that  does  him  the  greatest  honor. ' '  From  this  time  on  there  was 
no  attempt  made  to  supplant  the  commander  of  the  artillery  in 
the  position  which,  according  to  the  highest  authority  in  the  land, 


112      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  tJ.  S.  ARMY. 

he  was  so  eminently  qualified  to  fill,  or  to  disturb  by  foreign  in- 
fluences the  working's  of  a  department  which,  at  that  time  and 
afterwards,  met  every  demand  of  service  promptly  and  efficiently. 
The  administration  of  artillery  affairs  will,  for  convenience  of 
arrangement  and  clearness  of  thought,  be  considered  under  the  fol- 
lowing heads:  (i)  Instruction.  (2)  Duties:  (A)  technical;  (B)  as  an 
arm  of  service.  (3)  Duties  of  the  chief  of  artillery  in  the  field. 


INSTRUCTION. 

Aside  from  the  experience  acquired  in  war,  this  may  be  con- 
sidered under  three  heads:  First,  Instruction  at  Posts;  second, 
Instruction  at  Schools;  and  third,  Practice- Firing.  The  first  is 
both  (A)  practical,  and  (B)  theoretical.  The  second  embraces  (c) 
schools  for  foot  artillery,  and  (D)  the  field  batteries. 

INSTRUCTION   AT    POSTS:    (A)    PRACTICAL. 

During  the  Revolutionary  war  the  experience  of  the  field 
supplied  that  practical  instruction  which  enabled  the  artillery  to 
come  to  the  front  rank  in  the  army.  Aside,  however,  from  the 
mere  duties  of  the  gunner — pointing  and  firing  the  piece — the 
commander  of  that  arm  and  many  of  his  officers  improved  every 
opportunity  to  elevate  their  branch  of  service  by  both  experiment 
and  research,  all  conducted  with  a  view  to  rendering  themselves 
and  those  under  their  command  more  efficient  in  the  field.  Until 
February,  1778,  the  commander  of  the  artillery  had  charge  of  the 
procuring  all  arms  and  stores,  i.  e. ,  warlike  materiel.  In  this  ser- 
vice he  employed  many  civilians,  some  companies  of  artificers,  and 
such  artillery  officers  as  were  available  and  whose  services  could 
be  thus  utilized  to  advantage.  Although  nothing  elaborate  was 
attempted  in  those  primitive  times,  the  experience  of  all  kinds 
gained  by  artillery  officers  was  such  as  to  make  them  thoroughly 
efficient  in  their  specialty. 

Although  the  establishment  (1778)  of  the  department  of  com- 
missary-general of  military  stores  took  from  the  artillery  the  man- 
ufacture of  materiel  and  the  charge  of  the  arsenals,  the  necessity 
for  schooling  of  this  kind  for  officers  of  that  arm  was  fully  ap- 
preciated; and  accordingly,  the  next  year,  February  i3th,  1779,  it 
was  resolved  by  Congress  ' '  that,  when  it  shall  be  thought  neces- 
sary, the  commanding  officer  of  artillery  shall  send  officers  of  ar- 


INSTRUCTION   AT   POSTS:    PRACTICAL.  11^ 

tillery  to  visit  the  laboratories,  foundries,  and  manufactories,  to 
the  intent  that  they  may  thereby  gain  an  insight  into  the  mechanical 
branches  of  their  profession.  And  such  number  of  artillery  officers 
as,  in  the  opinion  of  the  commanding  officer  of  artillery,  with  the 
concurrence  of  the  commander-in-chief,  can  be  spared  from  their 
duties  in  the  field,  shall,  at  every  convenient  season,  be  stationed  at 
all  or  any  of  the  principal  laboratories,  to  be  instructed  in  the  labora- 
tory art,  that  a  knowledge  thereof  may  be  disseminated  through 
the  corps."  The  same  resolution  of  Congress  provided  for  a  sur- 
veyor of  ordnance,  to  be  taken  from  the  colonels  of  artillery.  This 
officer  was  really  an  inspector  of  artillery  manufactories  and  ma- 
teriel, and  the  creation  of  this  office  again  brought  these  matters 
under  the  surveillance  of  the  commander  of  that  arm,  who  was 
thus  in  fact,  though  not  in  name,  made  chief  of  artillery  technical 
affairs. 

From  this  time  on,  the  manufacture,  inspection,  and  acceptance 
of  artillery  materiel  were  duties  performed  by  artillery  and  ord- 
nance officers  acting  jointly;  the  manufacture,  however,  being 
almost  exclusively  intrusted  to  the  latter,  under  instructions  pre- 
scribed by  General  Knox.  It  is  deserving  of  notice  and  remem- 
brance that,  in  the  midst  of  campaigns,  many  artillery  officers  of 
the  Revolution  not  only  practiced  their  profession  in  the  field, 
but  in  the  inclement  seasons  supplemented  the  knowledge  there 
acquired  by  researches  in  the  laboratory  and  workshop.  In  this 
way  practice  and  theory  went  hand  in  hand.  The  result  was  that 
no  branch  of  the  army  stood  so  high,  professionally,  at  the  end  of 
that  war  as  did  the  artillery. 

From  the  close  of  the  Revolution  until  the  end  of  the  eighteenth 
century  the  artillery  did  little  else  than  infantry  duty.  It  was 
armed  as  infantry  even  when  manning  the  small  field  pieces  which 
were  taken  into  the  Indian  country.  What  technical  duties  it 
was  called  upon  to  perform  in  this  interval,  the  writer  has  not 
been  able  to  determine.  It  is  presumed,  however,  that  they  were 
limited  to  making  or  repairing  carriages.  Certainly  the  require- 
ments of  the  service  were  very  meagre,  and  all  artillery  supplies 
were  obtained,  by  contract,  under  the  direct  orders  either  of  the 
Secretary  of  War,  or  of  the  Treasury  Department.  If  artillery 
officers  had  anything  to  do  with  the  matter,  it  was  doubtless  to 
act  as  inspectors,  the  necessity  for  which,  in  order  that  uniformity 
might  be  introduced,  was  so  generally  recognized,  that,  when  the 
15 


114      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

army  was  augmented  in  anticipation  of  war  with  France,  in  1798, 
an  inspector  of  artillery  for  the  army  was  authorized — to  be  taken 
from  the  artillery  arm.  He  was  the  legitimate  successor  to  the 
surveyor  of  ordnance  of  1779,  although  Congress  had  defined  the 
duties  of  the  latter  but  not  those  of  the  inspector,  which  were  left 
to  be  regulated  by  the  War  Department.  Colonel  Louis  Tousard, 
commanding  the  Second  Regiment  of  artillerists  and  engineers,  was, 
April  i4th,  1801,  appointed  inspector  of  artillery,  his  commission 
dating  back  to  May  26th,  1800,  when,  it  is  presumed,  he  formally 
assumed  the  function  of  the  office,  although  prior  even  to  this 
date  he  had  acted  as  inspector,  as  appears  from  his  work,  The 
Artillerist's  Companion.  His  duties  were:  (i)  to  take  an  inven- 
tory of  all  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores,  note  where  kept,  and  see 
that  they  were  properly  cared  for;  (2)  inspect  all  artillery  materiel 
after  manufacture;  (3)  devise  models  for  all  such  materiel,  and 
allow  no  deviation  therefrom  in  construction.  Scarcely  had  Col- 
onel Tousard  assumed  the  direction  of  affairs  when  the  reduction 
of  the  army,  March  i6th,  1802,  retired  him  from  active  service. 
Although  it  was  questioned  by  some  of  the  best  authorities  whether 
that  act  abolished  the  office  of  inspector  of  artillery,  it  was  held  by 
the  War  Department  that  it  did. 

The  law  reducing  and  reorganizing  the  army  provided  eight 
artificers  to  each  artillery  company,  whereas  there  were  only  four 
each  of  sergeants  and  corporals;  moreover,  the  pay  of  each  artificer 
was  $10  per  month,  the  same  as  that  of  a  cadet  and  more  than  a 
sergeant-major.  The  object  of  this  apparently  singular  provision 
was  to  convert  each  artillery  post  into  a  small  arsenal,  where 
would  be  manufactured  all  the  gun  carriages  and  other  artillery 
materiel  required  in  service,  except  the  guns  and  projectiles;  hence 
the  proportionately  great  number  of  mechanics  and  their  com- 
paratively very  high  pay.  These  mechanics  continued  in  service 
until  the  reorganization  of  March  3Oth,  1814,  although  in  the 
meantime  the  ordnance  department  had  assumed  their  functions 
as  constructors  of  artillery  mat6riel. 

It  must  not  be  presumed  for  a  moment  that  the  services  per- 
formed by  these  artificers  were  merely  nominal.  This  was  far  from 
being  the  case.  The  records  of  the  War  Department  covering 
this  period  are,  to  a  great  extent,  preserved;  and  they  evince  that 
at  all  the  posts  garrisoned  by  artillery,  either  in  the  interior  or 
on  the  sea-board,  the  manufacture  of  materiel  of  all  kinds,  except 


INSTRUCTION   AT   POSTS:    PRACTICAL.  115 

that  of  the  foundry,  was  very  generally  carried  on,  particularly 
under  the  business-like  administration  of  Secretary  Dearborn. 
Although  this  enabled  officers  to  acquire  valuable  practical  ex- 
perience, it  of  necessity  led  to  great  diversity  in  constructing  the 
same  articles,  as  Colonel  Burbeck  had  never,  like  Tousard,  been 
authorized  and  directed  to  prepare  working  models  and  then  to 
see  that  they  were  adhered  to. 

With  the  organization  of  the  ordnance  department  the  labor 
devolving  on  the  artillerists,  and  for  performing  which  the  artifi- 
cers had  been  provided,  was  transferred  to  that  department,  one 
of  the  duties  of  the  commissary-general  of  ordnance  being  ' '  to 
direct  the  construction  of  all  carriages,  and  every  apparatus  for 
ordnance,  for  garrison  and  field  service,  and  all  ammunition 
wagons,  pontons,  and  travelling  forges."  The  artificers  were 
indeed  retained  until  the  reducing  act  of  March  3oth,  1814,  but 
their  occupation  was  gone,  and  the  officers  were  deprived  of  the 
practical  experience  secured  them  by  the  law  of  1802. 

From  1802  until  May  i4th,  1812,  when  the  ordnance  depart- 
ment was  organized,  artillery  officers  had  in  charge,  as  part  of 
their  practical  duties,  the  manufacture  of  whatsoever  materiel  the 
service  required  at  their  various  stations.  The  colonel  of  the 
regiment  of  artillerists  was  the  principal,  though  by  no  means  the 
only,  inspector  of  artillery,  having  in  that  capacity  succeeded  to  the 
duties  formerly  devolving  on  Colonel  Tousard. 

From  the  date  of  the  establishment  of  this  department  until 
1821,  when  it  was  merged  in  the  artillery,  the  practical  duties  of  the 
latter  were  confined,  as  at  present,  to  taking  care  of  and  manoeu- 
vring their  guns  on  the  field  or  elsewhere,  and  to  drills  at  their 
posts.  It  was  made  the  business  of  the  inspectors-general  of  the 
army,  among  other  things,  to  report  half-yearly  the  progress 
made  by  each  regiment  or  corps  in  military  discipline  in  general, 
and  particularly  in  knowledge  of  the  evolutions  prescribed  for  the 
practice  of  the  troops — whether  the  officers  knew  their  duties,  and 
were  able  and  willing  to  perform  them.  There  was  during  this 
time  no  uniform  system  of  artillery  materiel.  The  text-books 
authorized  were  meagre  in  detail;  so  it  is  fair  to  infer  that  the 
course  of  practical  instruction  for  the  artillery,  from  the  end  of  the 
war  of  1812  until  the  reorganization  of  1821,  was  very  limited. 

It  was  the  wish  of  Secretary  Calhoun  to  place  the  artillery  in 
this  country  on  something  like  the  same  plane  it  occupied  in 


Il6      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.   ARMY. 

Europe.  To  this  end,  under  his  supervision,  the  ordnance  de- 
partment was  merged  in  the  artillery  at  the  reorganization  men- 
tioned. This  was  maintained  until  the  partial  re-establishment 
of  that  department  in  1832,  and  its  final  resuscitation  as  a  staff 
corps  of  the  army  in  1838;  for,  although  under  the  provisions  of 
the  act  of  1832  lieutenants  of  artillery  alone  were  eligible  for 
detached  service  with  the  ordnance,  it  was  not  the  practice  after 
1838  to  detail  them  on  that  service.  In  the  meantime  other  in- 
fluences had  been  brought  to  bear  in  the  matter  of  artillery  instruc- 
tion. The  school  of  practice  at  Fortress  Monroe,  to  which  refer- 
ence will  hereafter  be  made,  was  one.  Lieutenant  Daniel  Tyler 
of  the  artillery  had,  in  1829,  secured  complete  drawings  of  the 
French  stock-trail  system  of  gun  carriage,  limber,  caisson,  &c. 
In  1830  several  were  constructed,  and  that  series  of  experiments 
begun  which  resulted  in  the  adoption  of  the  system  of  artillery 
substantially  as  it  exists  to-day. 

From  the  date  of  breaking  up  the  artillery  school  of  practice, 
in  1836,  at  the  beginning  of  the  Seminole  war,  down  to  the  Mexi- 
can war,  practical  instruction  was  confined,  of  necessity,  to  drills 
with  various  kinds  of  old-fashioned  artillery  with  which,  in  limited 
quantities,  the  army  was  supplied.  But  there  was  inaugurated 
during  this  period  a  system  of  instruction  which,  for  practical 
benefits,  were  it  properly  carried  out,  could  not  be  surpassed. 
Reference  is  here  made  to  artillery  target  practice,  first  in  our 
service  enjoined  and  regulated  by  General  Orders  No.  21,  series 
of  1842,  Adjutant-General's  Office.  The  provisions  of  this  order 
will  be  found  embraced  in  paragraphs  72  to  85,  inclusive,  Regula- 
tions of  1847,  and,  with  slight  modifications,  paragraphs  57  to  70, 
Regulations  of  1863.  Article  XXXVII,  of  Regulations  of  1881, 
contains  the  rules  of  artillery  practice  originally  adopted  in  1842, 
with  all  subsequent  modifications.  However  slight  may  have 
been  the  facilities  for  this  practice,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that 
the  institution  of  the  system  of  firing  at  targets  was  most  impor- 
tant. The  practical  value  of  the  experience  thus  acquired,  if  the 
firing  be  conducted  properly,  can  scarcely  be  overestimated;  and 
it  may  be  looked  upon  as  second  to  no  other  means  of  acquiring 
valuable  knowledge  now  open  to  the  artillery  arm. 

At  the  date  of  the  Mexican  war  the  new  system  of  field  ar- 
tillery, based  upon  the  researches  of  Lieutenant  Tyler,  before 
mentioned,  supplemented  by  those  of  numerous  artillery  and  ord- 


INSTRUCTION    AT   POSTS:    PRACTICAL.  Iiy 

nance  boards,  had  become  familiar  to  the  army.  The  labors  of 
that  officer,  of  these  boards,  and  of  the  distinguished  head  of  the 
ordnance  department,  Colonel  Bomford,  resulted  in  supplying, 
also,  about  the  same  time,  new  siege  and  sea-coast  armaments. 
In  1851  tactics  for  mountain  and  heavy  artillery  were  also  supplied 
the  service,  so  that  the  ten  years  from  1850  to  1860  were  more 
favorable  for  practical  instruction  of  artillery  at  posts  than  any 
previous  equal  interval  had  been.  More  attention  was  directed 
to  the  subject  by  the  authorities  than  before,  and  the  re-establish- 
ment of  the  artillery  school  of  practice  in  1857  was  an  encour- 
aging step.  This  was  followed  May  Qth,  1859,  by  the  promul- 
gation of  General  Orders  No.  10,  Adjutant-General's  Office, 
directing  the  establishment  of  a  more  complete  and  systematic 
course  of  practical  and  theoretical  instruction.  It  failed  of  any 
useful  purpose,  for  the  reason  that  thereby  the  artillery  was  scat- 
tered over  the  interior  of  the  continent,  and,  as  a  result,  experience 
obtained  under  the  newly- inaugurated  system  was  of  little  value. 
The  scattering  of  the  arm,  the  field  batteries  especially,  was  par- 
ticularly unfortunate;  nor  did  more  practical  good  result  to  those 
companies  serving  as  infantry  at  posts  which,  by  the  order,  were 
organized  as  artillery  schools  of  instruction.  One  provision  of  this 
order,  however,  deserves  particular  notice;  and  if  ever  any  system 
of  instruction  is  to  be  made  of  value,  it  will  be  by  enforcing  its  re- 
quirements. The  feature  here  referred  to  was  the  appointment  of 
inspectors  of  artillery,  whose  duties  were,  under  the  direction  of 
the  general-in-chief,  to  inspect  periodically  (at  least  once  a  year,) 
the  artillery  within  the  geographical  limits  assigned  them.  The 
inspection  embraced  a  thorough  examination  into  the  proficiency 
of  every  company  officer  in  the  practice  as  well  as  theory  of  the 
arm,  and  the  result  was  reported  through  regular  channels  to  the 
adjutant-general  of  the  army.  Another  feature  of  the  system  of 
instruction  provided  for  an  annual  change  between  the  companies 
on  the  sea- coast  and  those  stationed  at  the  field  artillery  schools, 
one-third  of  the  whole  changing  yearly.  Whether  or  not  this 
could  have  been  carried  into  practical  execution  is  not  known,  but 
it  is  doubtful;  the  Civil  war,  however,  put  an  end  to  the  scheme. 

After  the  war,  in  1866,  one  of  the  first  duties  performed  by  the 
permanent  artillery  board  convened  by  General  Orders  No.  16, 
Adjutant- General's  Office,  March  i2th  of  that  year,  was  to  submit 
one  project  for  the  re-establishment  for  the  second  time  of  the  ar- 


Il8      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

tillery  school  of  practice  at  Fortress  Monroe,  and  another  for  in- 
struction at  the  various  posts  occupied  by  the  artillery.  The 
result  will  be  considered  when  treating-  of  theoretical  instruction. 
For  the  present  it  suffices  to  state  that  General  Orders  No.  10, 
of  1859,  was>  so  far  as  field  artillery  was  concerned,  partially 
revived,  not,  however,  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  perma- 
nent artillery  board.  It  is,  for  all  practical  purposes,  that  which 
governs  in  the  artillery  to-day.  It  has  been  shown  to  be  wanting 
in  nearly  every  feature  which  would  render  it  efficient  as  a  course 
of  practical  instruction  for  that  arm  of  service. 

INSTRUCTION   AT    POSTS:    (B)    THEORETICAL. 

If  we  except  the  study  of  tactics  required  of  all  arms,  there 
does  not  appear  to  have  been  any  course  of  theoretical  instruction 
prescribed  for  the  artillery  previous  to  that  promulgated  in  Gen- 
eral Orders  No.  10,  of  1859.  Efforts,  though  feeble  in  their  nat- 
ure, had  before  been  made  to  keep  up  an  appearance  of  instruc- 
tion ;  but  in  this  order,  for  the  first  time,  was  there  a  course  of 
studies  prescribed.  A  consideration  of  those  paragraphs  affecting 
the  field  artillery  will  for  the  present  be  deferred,  and  only  those 
referring  to  the  foot  artillery  will  now  be  noticed. 

For  this  branch  the  order  provided :  ' '  At  each  artillery  station 
there  will  be  established  a  thorough  system  of  instruction,  theo- 
retical and  practical,  in  the  more  essential  elements  of  the  artil- 
lery service.  At  the  fortifications  it  will  necessarily  be  confined, 
for  most  part,  to  heavy  artillery;  but  in  every  case  it  will  be  car- 
ried to  all  the  duties  of  the  arm  which  the  means  at  hand  will 
permit,  including  those  of  the  laboratory. ' ' 

The  following  named  text-books  were  designated:  (i)  Instruction 
for  Field  Artillery;  (2)  Instruction  for  Heavy  Artillery;  (3)  Ord- 
nance Manual;  (4)  Aide  Me"moire  d'Artillerie. 

Recitations  were  to  be  had  twice  a  week,  work  in  laboratory 
one  day  per  week,  the  whole  under  supervision  of  the  command- 
ing officer,  either  directly  or  through  some  officer  designated  by 
him.  No  account  was  rendered  by  commanding  officers  of  the 
nature  and  extent  of  recitations.  The  only  reports  called  for  were 
those  of  the  artillery  inspectors. 

It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  any  project  for  instruction  in  any 
part  of  the  army  will  be  perfect  at  first;  the  aim  of  those  having 
these  matters  in  charge  is  to  have  them  grow  in  excellence.  It  is 


INST RUCTION    AT    POSTS:    THEORETICAL.  1 1C) 

presumed  that  the  present  system  would  have  been  no  exception 
to  this  rule,  but,  as  previously  mentioned,  the  breaking  out  of  the 
Civil  war  suspended  its  operation  during  several  years.  When  it 
reappeared,  in  1866,  there  were  some  modifications  in  the  original 
plan.  Instead  of  the  commanding  officer  of  each  post  being  the" 
instructor,  this  duty  was  transferred  to  the  commanders  of  batter- 
ies, supervised  in  each  regiment  by  the  colonel,  who  was  directed 
to  require  quarterly  reports  to  be  made  by  battery  commanders 
of  (i)  means  of  instruction  at  posts;  (2)  progress  and  kind  of  in- 
struction given;  (3)  numbers  and  dates  of  drills,  exercises,  and 
recitations — the  colonels  to  forward  abstracts  of  these  reports  di- 
rect to  the  headquarters  of  the  army.  The  text-books  prescribed 
were:  (i)  Parts  I  and  II,  Instruction  Field  Artillery;  (2)  Heavy 
Artillery  Tactics ;  (3)  Gibbon's  Artillerist's  Manual;  (4)  Roberts' 
Hand-book  of  Artillery;  (5)  The  Ordnance  Manual.  The  hand- 
book was  intended  for  the  use  of  non-commissioned  officers  and 
enlisted  men;  and  it  is  worthy  of  remark  that  the  order  in  question 
(General  Orders  No.  67,  of  1866)  was  the  first  to  provide  a 
theoretical  course  for  the  rank  and  file  of  the  regular  artillery, 
their  instruction,  in  all  preceding  orders  covering  the  subject- 
matter,  having  only  in  general  terms  been  enjoined  upon  their 
officers.  It  was  intended  by  the  board  which  submitted  projects 
for  the  artillery  school  at  Fortress  Monroe,  and  for  instruction  at 
posts,  that  the  former  should  be  supplementary  to  the  latter,  and 
that  the  two  should  be  so  arranged  as  to  insure  the  progress  of 
officers  at  posts  equally  as  at  the  artillery  school.  It  was  not  con- 
templated that  the  prescribed  course  of  instruction  at  the  former 
would  remain  in  force  longer  than  two  years,  when  it  was  expected 
that  a  revised  course  would  be  adopted,  thus  maintaining  the 
studies  of  artillery  officers  at  posts  abreast  with  the  progress  of 
the  age.  No  attempt  has  been  made  to  carry  this  plan  into  exe- 
cution. The  course  of  study  has  been  changed  very  little  since 
1866. 

In  1876  the  new  field  artillery  tactics  were  substituted  for  Parts 
I  and  II  of  the  old,  and  in  1880  Tidball's  Manual  of  Heavy  Artil- 
lery was  prescribed  as  a  text-book  for  artillery  troops  garrisoning 
the  sea-coast  forts.  It  may  be  objected  to  these  books — our  field 
artillery  tactics — Tidball's,  Gibbon's,  the  Ordnance  Manuals,  and 
Roberts'  Hand-book — that  they  treat  in  great  measure  of  anti- 
quated materiel;  and  while  this  is  true  as  regards  some  of  them, 


120      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

it  is  also  true  that  a  thorough  study  of  these  books  would  give 
the  best  artillerist  many  practical  hints  ;  but,  with  any  text-books 
that  could  be  devised,  it  is  doubtful  if  the  present  system  of  in- 
struction is  capable  of  accomplishing  anything  of  great  value. 
The  method  contemplated  in  1859,  to  insure  an  execution  of  the 
orders  of  the  War  Department,  was  to  have  inspectors,  officers 
of  rank  in  the  artillery,  visit  the  posts  and  personally  examine 
into  the  proficiency  of  every  company  officer.  The  plan  adopted 
in  1866  to  secure  the  same  object,  and  which  still  governs,  was 
a  system  of  paper  inspections •,  i.  e.,  quarterly  reports  of  instruc- 
tion and  progress.  The  former  of  these  two  plans,  if  intrusted 
to  competent  inspectors,  sustained  as  they  should  be,  was  capable 
of  accomplishing  something  creditable.  The  latter  has  not  been, 
nor  will  it  ever  be,  of  great  practical  utility.  What  is  needed  to 
give  vitality  to  the  subject  of  instruction  at  posts  is,  first,  a  course 
of  study  which  keeps  the  officers  up  with  the  improvements  of 
the  times;  second,  that  artillery  inspectors  visit  and  examine,  find 
out  and  report  upon  the  practical  and  theoretical  knowledge  of 
every  officer.  One  active  and  capable  inspector  would  have  done 
the  artillery  more  good,  and  have  given  the  authorities  a  juster 
insight  into  the  condition  of  the  materiel  and  the  acquirements  of 
the  personnel,  than  all  the  quarterly  reports  that  have  ever  been 
written. 

INSTRUCTION  :    (c)    SCHOOLS    FOR    FOOT   ARTILLERY. 

The  establishment  of  artillery  schools  was  first  suggested,  in 
our  service,  in  a  letter  written  by  Colonel  Henry  Knox,  Septem- 
ber 27th,  1776,  to  a  congressional  committee  at  the  time  visiting 
army  headquarters.  Among  other  recommendations  having  in" 
view  the  efficiency  of  the  arm  of  which  he  was  the  head,  was  the 
following:  "As  officers  can  never  act  with  confidence  until  they  are 
masters  of  their  profession,  an  academy  established  upon  a  liberal 
plan  would  be  of  the  utmost  service  to  the  continent,  where  the 
whole  theory  and  practice  of  fortification  and  gunnery  should  be 
taught;  to  be  nearly  the  same  as  that  at  Woolwich,  making- 
allowance  for  the  difference  of  circumstances — a  place  to  which 
our  enemies  are  indebted  for  the  superiority  of  their  artillery  to  all 
who  have  opposed  them."  Although  the  academy  was  not  estab- 
lished during  that  war,  proof  is  here  given  that  early  in  the  life- 
time of  the  artillery  in  this  country  the  necessity  for  study  by  an 
officer  of  that  arm  was  recognized,  and,  in  providing  that  officers 


INSTRUCTION:    FOOT   ARTILLERY   SCHOOLS.  121 

should  visit  laboratories,  workshops,  and  arsenals,  when  they 
could  be  spared  from  other  duties,  an  important  movement  was 
made  in  the  interests  of  efficiency.  In  the  midst  of  campaigns, 
when  experience  was  every  year  impressing  deeply  on  the  mind 
those  invaluable  lessons  which  unaided  theory  in  vain  essays  to 
teach,  officers  of  artillery  were  never  allowed  to  forget  that  the 
profoundest  knowledge  is  acquired  by  learning  first  the  theory 
and  then  practicing  the  details  of  their  profession. 

Attaching  cadets  to  the  regiment  of  artillerists  and  engineers 
in  1794  was  doubtless  the  first  attempt  to  establish  anything 
like  a  course  of  instruction  for  that  arm ;  but  it  is  generally  ad- 
mitted to  have  been  a  very  imperfect  scheme,  and  productive  of 
no  practical  benefit,  except  to  demonstrate  the  inherent  weakness 
of  a  travelling  military  academy,  or  one  without  a  thoroughly  com- 
plete organization.  Referring  to  this  subject,  the  Secretary  of 
War,  in  letter  dated  June  28th,  1798,  said :  ' '  It  was  supposed  that 
these  cadets  would  form  a  nursery  from  which  qualified  officers 
might  be  drawn  to  fill  vacancies;  but  it  must  occur  that,  without 
proper  masters  to  teach  them  the  sciences  necessary  to  the 
engineers  and  artillerists,  this  nursery  can  produce  no  valuable 
plants."  It  is  not  intended  here  to  trace  the  origin  of  our  military 
academy.  That  has  been  done  by  others.  It  suffices  to  say  that 
the  provisions  of  law  authorizing  the  appointment  of  cadets  con- 
tinued to  be  practically  as  unsatisfactory  in  results  as  at  the  time 
mentioned  by  Secretary  McHenry,  until  the  corps  of  engineers, 
constituting  a  military  academy,  was  organized  in  1802,  and  had 
placed  at  its  head  that  accomplished  scholar  and  soldier,  Colonel 
Jonathan  Williams.  Not  even  the  talents  and  address  of  Colonel 
Williams  could,  however,  speedily  put  the  school  on  a  respect- 
able and  satisfactory  footing,  and  it  was  not  until  after  the  war  of 
1812,  when  cadets  were  appointed,  not  in  the  artillery  and  engi- 
neers alone,  but  in  all  branches  of  service,  and  attached  to  the 
academy  for  instruction,  that  the  latter  was  started  on  its  distin- 
guished career  as  a  preliminary  military  and  scientific  institution. 

It  was  soon  discovered  that  it  did  not  suffice  that  cadets  pass 
through  the  course  at  West  Point;  it  was  found  that  they  were 
then  only  prepared  to  begin  in  earnest  the  practical  duties  of  their 
profession.  The  advantages  of  concentration,  to  insure  uniformity 
of  instruction  and  a  higher  degree  of  discipline  among  the  troops, 
were  also  speedily  recognized.  These  two  considerations  were 
16 


122       HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

mainly  instrumental  in  causing  to  be  established  at  Fortress  Mon- 
roe a  practical  school  for  artillery.  This  was  effected  by  Orders 
No.  1 8,  dated  Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  April  5th, 
1824,  which  directed  that  eleven  companies  of  artillery  should  be 
stationed  at  that  fortress,  the  whole  to  constitute  a  "  corps  for 
instruction,"  the  companies  to  be  detached  from  the  several  regi- 
ments. A  colonel  was  placed  in  command.  He  was  assisted  by 
a  lieutenant-colonel  and  a  major,  one  director  and  one  assistant 
director  of  artillery,  one  instructor  and  one  assistant  instructor  of 
mathematics.  These  officers  formed  the  staff  of  the  school.  Con- 
cerning this  institution,  the  general-in-chief  remarked,  in  1825, 
one  year  after  its  establishment: 

"As  a  remedy  for  the  evil  resulting  from  its  dispersed  condition,  the  artillery 
arm  has,  in  the  school  of  practice  at  Fortress  Monroe,  a  most  favorable  earnest 
of  the  advantages  that  may  be  expected  from  concentration.  Among  the  nu- 
merous benefits  to  be  derived  from  the  institution,  there  appears  to  me  none  more 
important  than  those  to  be  reaped  by  the  graduates  of  the  military  academy,  in  the 
incipient  formation  of  their  ideas  and  character  with  reference  to  the  practical 
duties  of  their  profession.  Our  commissioned  ranks  are  periodically  recruited 
from  this  source — young  men  of  high  moral  worth  and  scientific  attainment ;  and 
sanguine  hopes  have  been  entertained  that  on  this  fundamental  source  of  ex- 
cellence a  military  establishment  would  be  formed  for  the  Nation  to  which  it 
might  look  with  confidence  and  pride  for  those  attributes  on  which,  in  a  future 
exigency,  its  glory  and  perhaps  its  safety  might  depend.  It  seems  to  be,  how- 
ever, almost  in  vain  that  military  education  should  be  fostered,  if  it  terminate 
with  the  course  of  studies  at  West  Point;  and  a  school  of  practice  has  been 
anxiously  looked  for  as  a  supplemental  institution,  in  which  the  theoretic  in- 
struction of  the  academic  graduate  might  be  applied  with  good  effect  to  the 
practical  duties  and  relations  of  the  military  service." 

In  accordance  with  these  views,  the  cadets  assigned  to  the 
artillery  were,  after  the  organization  of  the  school,  sent  to  that 
institution  for  a  practical  course  before  joining  their  regiments. 
In  this  view  of  the  subject  the  West  Point  education  was  consid- 
ered in  its  true  light,  viz. ,  as  a  preparatory  course  of  training •, 
fitting  those  who  had  enjoyed  its  benejits  for  beginning,  under 
favorable  auspices,  the  practical  life  they  would  be  called  upon  to 
pursue  in  the  army.  To  educate  a  man  in  four  years  is  an  im- 
possibility. To  give  him  in  that  time  \^^  foundation  for  an  educa- 
tion is  entirely  feasible.  That  is  what  West  Point  then  did  and 
continues  to  do.  Hence  the  necessity  that  existed  and  always 
will  exist  for  supplemental  courses  of  instruction,  both  practical 


INSTRUCTION:    FOOT    ARTILLERY    SCHOOLS.  123 

and  theoretical ;  for  the  science  and  art  of  war  are  progressive, 
essentially  practical,  and  he  who  is  content  to  stand  still  will  fall 
rapidly  to  the  rear  out  of  sight.  Special  schools  are  as  necessary 
for  our  officers,  61eves  of  West  Point,  as  is  sea  service  to  the 
graduate  of  the  naval  academy,  or  law  and  medical  practice  to 
the  graduates  of  our  colleges  who  adopt  those  professions.  None 
of  these  schools  give  young  men,  however  great  their  aptitude  or 
talents,  a  practical  knowledge  of  professions  evolved  from  centu- 
ries of  experience  and  study  of  details.  There  is  no  royal  road 
to  learning  for  the  practical  artillerist.  He  must  have  instruction 
in  his  specialty;  and,  for  foot  artillery,  this  can,  perhaps,  best  be 
given  in  our  service  at  a  single  school,  where  the  necessary  mate'- 
riel  can  be  collected,  expenditures  economized,  and  the  course 
made  complete,  and  thorough.  If,  when  thus  established  and 
made  efficient,  the  studies  and  practice  at  this  school  be  brought 
into  harmony  with  the  instruction  which  officers  receive  at  posts, 
the  whole  being  supervised  by  an  adequate  inspectorship,  the 
hope  can  be  rationally  indulged  that  the  artillery  arm  may,  in  so 
far  as  its  disjointed  organization  will  permit,  enter  upon  a  career 
of  professional  efficiency  honorable  to  itself  and  reflecting  credit 
upon  the  country. 

These  seem  to  have  been  the  views  of  Mr.  Calhoun  and  his 
successors  in  the  War  Department,  under  whose  fostering  care 
the  school  of  practice,  amidst  many  difficulties,  continued  in 
some,  although  not  full,  degree  to  meet  the  expectations  of  its 
friends.  In  his  report  of  December  ist,  1825,  Secretary  Barbour 
said  :  ' '  The  good  effects  resulting  from  the  establishment  of  the 
school  of  practice  at  Fortress  Monroe  are  daily  developed  in  the 
increasing  improvement  of  the  artillery  corps,  that  important  arm 
of  the  public  force." 

It  was  the  custom  to  change  the  companies  annually — a  prac- 
tice to-day  happily  abandoned,  as  the  attendant  expense  very 
greatly  prejudiced  the  interests  of  the  school,  which,  as  soon  as 
established,  in  1824,  became  the  favorite  experimental  ground 
upon  which  were  tested  the  guns,  carriages,  and  other  artillery 
materiel  before  they  were  either  discarded  or  issued  to  troops. 
Boards  for  the  purpose  of  advising  the  Secretary  of  War  on  artil- 
lery matters  were  assembled  at  the  school,  which  was  intended  to 
be  a  headquarters  whence  would  emanate  well-digested  opinions, 
based  on  actual  experience,  concerning  artillery  matters. 


124      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.    ARMY. 

It  would  seem,  however,  that  eleven  companies  were  more  than 
could  be  accommodated  at  the  fortress.  Mr.  Calhoun's  desire  to 
form  a  ' '  perfect  regiment ' '  thereat  was  never  realized.  Although 
there  were  plenty  of  troops,  the  amount  of  materiel  available  for 
practice  was  small,  and,  contrary  to  the  hopes  of  its  founders,  no 
horse  artillery  was  organized  there,  though  the  grounds  for  ma- 
noeuvring that  arm  were  provided. 

The  death  of  General  Brown,  commanding  the  army,  an  event 
which  took  place  February  24th,  1828,  deprived  the  school  of  its 
steadfast  friend  and  advocate.  His  successor,  Major- General 
Alexander  Macomb,  though  an  old  artillery  officer,  was  of  opin- 
ion that  the  institution  could  best  accomplish  its  purpose  by 
giving  up  some  of  its  companies  for  duty  at  ordinary  artillery 
posts.  Accordingly,  by  Order  No.  58,  Adjutant-General's  Office, 
1828,  the  number  of  companies  was  reduced  to  six,  all  from  one 
regiment  (the  First),  and  a  stop  was  put  to  the  plan  of  rotating 
the  various  companies  as  set  on  foot  by  Mr.  Calhoun.  The  new 
arrangement  was  not  intended  to  interfere  with  the  school  of 
practice,  and  graduates  of  the  military  academy,  when  assigned 
to  the  artillery  arm,  were  directed  to  repair  there  as  usual.  It 
was  also  provided  that  either  companies  or  officers  found  deficient, 
when  inspected,  should  be  sent  to  the  school  of  practice,  with 
a  view  to  their  instruction  and  improvement.  Referring  to  this 
change,  the  general-in-chief  remarked:  "It  may  be  proper  to 
state,  in  regard  to  this  institution,  that  the  want  of  means  has  pre- 
vented its  establishment  to  a  full  extent  upon  the  plan  originally 
contemplated.  It  is  believed,  however,  that,  as  at  present  ar- 
ranged, it  may  be  made  instrumental  in  diffusing  throughout  the 
artillery  the  practical  knowledge  necessary  to  the  efficiency  of 
that  arm."  We  were  at  this  time  on  the  eve  of  an  important 
revolution  in  artillery  materiel;  knowledge  of  the  stock-trail  sys- 
tem of  carriages  was  being  put  in  possession  of  the  Government, 
but  many  years  passed  before  its  adoption,  and,  in  the  meantime, 
circumstances  had  operated  to  break  up  the  school  of  practice. 
In  1831  eleven  companies  were  stationed  at  the  school;  in  1832, 
six  companies,  Indian  and  other  troubles  having  removed  the 
rest;  in  1833,  nine;  in  1834,  nine;  in  1835,  four  companies,  at 
which  time  the  Seminole  disturbances  in  Florida  caused  all  the 
troops  to  be  transferred  to  that  theatre  of  hostilities.  Fortress 
Monroe  then  became  an  experimental  ground  for  the  ordnance 


INSTRUCTION:    FOOT    ARTILLERY    SCHOOLS.  125 

department,  and  so  remained  until  the  reorganization  of  the 
school  of  practice,  which  was  brought  about  in  the  following 
manner : 

In  1855  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis,  Secretary  of  War,  writing  to  the 
chairman  of  the  Senate  Military  Committee,  said:  "Much  may 
be  effected  for  the  improvement  of  the  artillery  by  the  estab- 
lishment of  schools  of  instruction,  causing  all  the  companies  to 
pass  periodically  through  the  course,  remaining  for  a  term  of, 
say,  two  years."  This  was  followed  by  General  Orders  No.  9, 
Headquarters  of  the  Army,  October  3Oth,  1856,  directing  that 
(M)  of  the  Second,  (C)  of  the  Third,  (G)  of  the  Fourth,  and  (I)  of 
the  First  Regiment  should  be  thereafter  designated  as  garrison, 
sea-coast,  and  siege  artillery;  that  they  should  be  concentrated 
at  Fortress  Monroe,  Virginia,  and  form  a  school  of  practice  for 
service  with  heavy  guns.  These  companies,  which  had  previously 
been  equipped  as  field  artillery,  and  were  legally  light  artillery 
companies,  were  accordingly  brought  together,  and  by  General 
Orders  No.  15,  Headquarters  of  the  Army,  December  29th,  1857, 
Brevet  Lieutenant- Colonel  Harvey  Brown,  Second  Artillery,  was 
instructed  to  proceed  to  organize  the  school,  submitting  to  the 
general-in-chief  a  code  of  regulations  and  plan  of  instruction. 

The  code  of  regulations  and  the  plan  of  instruction  ordered  to 
be  submitted,  as  just  indicated,  were  published  in  General  Orders 
No.  5,  Adjutant-General's  Office,  May  i8th,  1858.  The  school 
was  very  much  on  the  plan  adopted  in  -1824,  except  the  number  of 
companies  was  fixed  at  eight — two  from  each  regiment.  The 
course  extended  over  two  years,  one  company  from  each  regi- 
ment being  relieved  annually.  The  companies  were  given  their 
complement  of  officers.  Graduates  of  the  military  academy  as- 
signed to  the  artillery  were,  as  in  1824,  to  serve  one  year  at  this 
school  before  joining  their  companies.  The  instruction  was  quite 
complete,  embracing,  so  far  as  practicable,  the  whole  range  of 
studies  and  practice  which  go  to  make  up  the  education  of  an 
artillery  officer.  Provision  was  also  made  for  the  examination  in 
their  duties  of  the  non-commissioned  officers.  The  official  des- 
ignation was  "  The  Artillery  School."  There  is  every  reason  to 
suppose  that  the  institution,  started  under  circumstances  so  much 
more  favorable  than  those  surrounding  it  in  1824,  would  have 
been  productive  of  much  good  to  the  artillery  arm,  had  not  the 
breaking  out  of  the  Civil  war  put  an  end  to  its  existence  before 


126      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,  U.  S.   ARMY. 

the  first  companies  selected  had  completed  the  prescribed  two 
years'  course  of  instruction. 

That  feature  of  the  code  of  regulations  which  required  graduates 
of  the  military  academy  to  serve  at  Fortress  Monroe  before  join- 
ing their  companies  is  considered  to  have  been  a  mistake,  though 
sanctioned  by  previous  practices. 

Young  graduates  of  West  Point  need  practice  more  than  any- 
thing else.  They  possess  already  the  groundwork  of  a  thorough 
professional  education,  but  it  is  nearly  all  theoretical.  Let  them, 
after  completing  their  academic  course,  first  join  their  respective 
commands,  where  they  will  mingle  with  •  the  army  such  as  it 
is  in  every-day  life,  and  not  such  as  is  found  at  schools  of  any 
kind.  Here  the  observant  young  officer  will  have  leisure  to  think 
over  what  he  has  learned,  to  compare  the  theory  of  the  school- 
room with  the  practice  he  sees  around  him,  and  draw  therefrom 
many  useful  conclusions.  He  will  soon  find  that  there  are  many 
things  of  first  importance  in  the  management  of  military  affairs 
which  he  learned  nothing  of  in  his  four  years'  course,  yet  a 
knowledge  of  them  is  indispensable  to  the  officer  who  is  to  com- 
mand troops.  Instead,  therefore,  of  crowding  the  heads  of  young 
graduates  with  more  theories,  when  they  have  not  been  able  to 
digest  those  already  learned,  let  them  go  first  to  their  stations, 
and  mingle  with  the  arm  with  which  they  are  to  be  thenceforth 
identified,  and  acquire  some  practical  knowledge  of  army  life  as 
it  really  is.  Having  done  this  they  will  be  much  better  prepared 
to  appreciate  the  true  value  and  importance  of  what  is  taught  at 
any  well-organized  school  of  practice. 

One  of  the  first  things  to  be  attended  to  after  the  Civil  war  was 
to  reorganize  the  school  upon  the  old  site.  There  then  arose  a 
practical  difficulty  in  devising  any  course  of  study  to  be  pursued 
by  all  artillery  lieutenants,  resulting  from  the  diverse  attainments 
of  these  officers,  some  of  whom  were  from  civil  life,  some  from  the 
military  academy,  and  others  promoted  during  the  war  from  the 
ranks  of  the  army. 

In  order  that  all  lieutenants  should  have  opportunity  to  prepare 
themselves,  it  was  proposed  that  there  should  be  established  at 
the  various  posts  instruction  batteries  for  the  foot  artillery,  similar 
to  those  already  existing  in  each  regiment  for  field  artillery;  the 
captains  and  the  non-commissioned  officers  of  the  foot  instruction 


INSTRUCTION:  FOOT  ARTILLERY  SCHOOLS.  127 

batteries  to  be  permanent,  the  lieutenants  and  privates  to  be  as- 
signed temporarily. 

At  the  school  of  practice  it  was  proposed  to  adopt  different 
courses  of  study  to  meet  the  acquirements  of  the  various  classes 
of  officers.  For  those  requiring  it,  there  was  to  be  a  course  in 
the  common  branches  of  an  English  education,  embracing  so  much 
mathematics  and  natural  philosophy  as  would  enable  those  pur- 
suing it  to  comprehend  in  a  very  general  way  the  principles  on 
which  their  ordinary  practical  duties  depended.  It  was  not 
thought  just  to  require  more  than  this  of  officers  promoted  for  . 
field  service  in  inferior  grades.  For  all  graduates  of  the  military 
academy  a  higher  standard  was  prescribed.  The  distinction  here 
made  was  based  on*  the  principle  that  in  peace  the  only  claims  to 
commissions  should  be  knowledge  and  education;  in  war,  courage 
and  conduct.  Each  and  every  one  was  made  to  render  an  ac- 
count of  his  stewardship,  depending  upon  his  opportunities  and 
previous  educational  facilities. 

The  correctness  of  the  foregoing  principles,  which  were  formu- 
lated by  the  permanent  artillery  board;  the  advantages  arising  from 
the  establishment  of  foot-battery  schools  of  instruction;  the  fairness 
of  the  proposition  that  each  should  be  held  to  a  standard  high  in 
proportion  to  the  advantages  he  has  enjoyed,  the  benefits,  in  an 
educational  point  of  view,  he  has  been  the  recipient  of  from  the 
Government, — all  seem  manifest;  and  they  were  partially  adopted 
in  the  scheme  for  instruction  at  posts  and  that  for  the  school  of 
practice,  soon  after  promulgated.  The  salient  points  of  the  former 
have  been  given  when  treating  of  that  subject,  (p.  119,  ante;)  the 
latter  was  provided  in  General  Orders  No.  99,  Adjutant- General's 
Office,  November  i3th,  1867,  and,  with  slight  modifications,  con- 
tinues in  force.  The  number  of  batteries  stationed  at  the  school 
for  purposes  of  instruction  was  five — one  from  each  artillery  regi- 
ment. It  was  provided,  also,  that  brevet  second  lieutenants 
assigned  to  the  artillery  arm  should  serve  one  year  before  being 
sent  to  their  proper  batteries,  (an  objectionable  feature,  already 
remarked  upon,)  and  such  number  of  young  and  intelligent  re- 
cruits, for  the  foot  batteries,  as  would  keep  the  five  instruction 
batteries  full.  The  course  was  similar  in  scope  to  that  adopted 
in  1858. 

There  was  this  marked  difference  between  the  former  and  pres- 
ent schemes,  so  far  as  the  instruction  batteries  were  concerned, 
viz. :  formerly  their  stay  was  temporary,  now  it  is  permanent. 


128      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,   U.  S.   ARMY. 

Both  Mr.  Calhoun  and  Mr.  Davis  favored  passing  all  artillery 
companies  in  rotation  through  the  school.  Which  is  the  better 
plan  may  be  an  open  question;  permanent  instruction  batteries 
are  at  present  in  favor,  and  there  is  no  doubt  but  that  the  expense 
attending  constant  removals  was  a  serious  difficulty  which  has 
been  overcome  by  keeping  the  batteries  permanently  at  the 
school. 

Sending  intelligent  recruits  to  the  school  of  practice  for  an  ad- 
vanced course  of  instruction  has  proved  scarcely  more  than  a 
visionary  scheme,  of  little  practical  benefit  except  to  the  permanent 
school  batteries,  whose  ranks  the  recruits  have  served  to  keep 
full;  to  the  service  at  large  it  has  been  of  no  real  benefit.  For 
commissioned  officers,  however,  the  school  has  proved  to  be  of 
the  greatest  service.  Facilities  for  study  and  practice  combined  are 
here  offered,  to  be  found  nowhere  else  in  this  country.  The  course 
in  artillery  is  kept  up  with  the  progress  of  the  age — the  practical  as 
nearly  so  as  the  materiel  now  provided  by  the  proper  department 
will  permit;  and,  although  opinions  differ  as  to  the  wisdom  of  cer- 
tain branches  pursued  and  the  methods  of  instruction,  no  unpreju- 
diced person  acquainted  with  the  work  it  has  done  and  is  doing 
will  fail  to  acknowledge  that  the  school  has  been,  and  now  gives 
promise  of  being,  highly  beneficial  to  the  artillery  arm.  It  is  the 
only  institution  maintained  by  the  Government  which  serves  in 
any  manner  to  unite  the  artillery.  Scattered  as  the  latter  is  in 
this  country,  without  a  head  to  direct  its  affairs,  with  no  bond 
of  union  connecting  the  batteries  with  the  headquarters  even  of 
their  respective  regiments,  it  is  a  fortunate  circumstance  that  For- 
tress Monroe  brings  the  latter  together  at  one  point,  where  an 
effort  is  made  to  impress  on  the  minds  of  all  subalterns  of  artillery 
the  fact,  that  only  by  moving  forward  can  they  tread  the  path- 
way leading  to  professional  honor. 

Circumstances,  however,  are  such  as  to  prevent  this  school 
attaining  fully  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  instituted  and  is 
maintained.  As  recently  announced  by  the  authorities,  its  ob- 
jects are  to  secure  (i)  professional  advancement,  and  (2)  unity  of 
method  in  the  artillery  arm  of  service. 

Nothing  could  bring  out  in  bolder  relief  the  inadequate  system 
of  instruction,  either  throughout  the  artillery  arm  or  at  this 
school,  than  the  fact  that,  although  the  first  object  of  the  latter 
is  advancement,  still  there  have  been  found  here  in  the  same  class, 


INSTRUCTION:  FOOT  ARTILLERY  SCHOOLS.  129 

pursuing  the  same  studies,  the  eleve  of  West  Point,  fresh  from  the 
academy,  and  the  graduate  of  twenty  years'  experience,  including 
that  of  a  four  years'  war.  Certainly  no  such  spectacle  as  this, 
where  men  of  middle  age  and  striplings  are  placed  and  main- 
tained on  the  same  footing,  can  be  found  at  any  other  military" 
school  in  any  land.  If  such  an  union  be  proper,  it  requires  no 
professional  eye  to  discern  either  that  there  has  not  been  much 
progress  as  a  result  of  those  twenty  years'  experience,  or  that 
the  course  at  the  school  is  illy  adapted  to  its  pupils. 

It  is  one  of  the  cardinal  principles  of  our  military  system  that, 
though  our  army  be  very  small,  its  officers  are  trained  and  effi- 
cient, the  small  force  thus  forming  a  perfectly- appointed  nucleus, 
capable  of  ready  expansion  into  a  large  and  effective  army  in  time 
of  national  danger.  If  this  premise,  upon  which  are  based  all 
arguments  in  favor  of  our  present  army  organization,  be  not 
false,  then  the  joining  together  of  youth  and  age  in  the  same 
course  of  study  is  unwise.  Nor  does  the  incongruity  stop  here: 
the  graduate  of  the  artillery  school  returns  to  the  institution  years 
hence,  and  again  finds  his  classmate  to  be  a  youth  fresh  from  col- 
lege or  the  military  academy. 

It  is  very  true  that,  were  the  course  of  study  and  practice  at 
posts  of  the  artillery  what  it  should  be,  but  what  it  is  not  and 
never  will  be  without  a  progressive  system,  enforced  by  an  effi- 
cient inspectorship,  there  would  be  no  excuse  for  this  state  of 
affairs.  But  this  would  not  wholly  mend  the  difficulty. 

To  insure  the  attainment  of  what  is  said  to  be  the  first  object 
of  the  school  of  practice — advancement  in  professional  knowledge 
—the  course  should  be^  differently  arranged.  Provision  should 
be  made  for  an  advanced  class  of  pupils — officers  who  are  com- 
petent to  pass  a  prescribed  examination,  which  should  be  a  pre- 
requisite to  entering  the  class.  This  is  the  common  practice  in 
other  countries.  Ambitious  officers  would  keep  up  their  studies, 
with  the  hope  and  reasonable  expectation  of  having  their  ac- 
quirements recognized.  The  examinations  should  be  rigid,  both 
preliminary  and  those  subsequent  to  admission. 

This  is  done  in  the  department  of  artillery  studies  at  Woolwich, 
England,  which,  it  is  said,  has  accomplished  more  than  all  other 
influences  combined  to  raise  the  intellectual  standard  of  the  artil- 
lery of  that  country.  The  same  remarks  are  true  with  regard  to 
the  higher  artillery  and  engineer  course  in  Austria  and  Germany, 


130      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

the  Michael  artillery  academy  of  Russia,  and  similar  schools  in 
other  States  of  Europe. 

Another  step  in  the  same  direction  would  be  the  introduction 
of  the  study  of  modern  languages  ;  if  possible,  both  French  and 
German ;  certainly  the  former.  No  one  who  compares  the  cur- 
riculum of  this  school  with  that  of  similar  institutions  in  Europe 
but  will  remark  upon  the  absence  of  all  attention  to  languages  in 
the  former,  and  contrast  it  with  the  reverse  practice  in  the  latter. 
Education  can  in  no  way  be  made  a  more  powerful  agent  to 
efficiency  with  the  average  artillery  officer  than  by  giving  him  a 
ready  translating  knowledge  of  the  French  language.  It  is  not 
meant  that  he  be  merely  able  to  stumble  through  his  sentences, 
guessing  at  half  of  them ;  on  the  contrary,  that  he  be  able  to 
convert  French  into  English,  and  vice  versa,  with  accuracy  and 
facility.  It  gives  him  command,  either  directly  or  indirectly,  of 
the  best  military  literature  of  the  world.  The  sooner  this  fact  is 
recognized,  and  a  practice  inaugurated  in  accordance  therewith, 
the  better  will  it  be  for  the  school,  the  officers  who  go  there,  and 
the  artillery  arm.  Let  room  be  made  for  this  most  important 
and  practically  useful  addition  to  the  course.  It  may  interfere 
with  the  convenience  of  individuals ;  it  is  not,  however  for  the 
personal  interest  of  any  one,  but  for  the  benefit  of  an  honorable 
arm  of  the  public  service,  that  this  school  exists,  and  the  practice 
should  be  in  accordance  with  this  idea. 

Too  much  importance  is  not  here  attached  to  the  mere  fact  that 
in  other  countries  advanced  courses  of  study  are  given  officers 
possessing  certain  qualifications,  without  at  the  same  time  con- 
sidering the  appropriateness  and  feasibility  of  inaugurating  the 
same  thing  in  our  own  school.  No  greater  mistake  can  be  made 
than  to  blindly  follow  the  example  of  others  without  considering 
whether  it  is  or  is  not  suitable  or  proper  in  our  case.  It  is  grasp- 
ing form  without  considering  the  more  important  matter — sub- 
stance. Remembering  and  giving  due  weight  to  this,  it  yet 
appears  plain  that. providing  such  a  course  as  has  been  indicated, 
for  selected  pupils  at  the  artillery  school,  is  not  only  in  keeping 
with  the  practice  of  other  nations,  but,  under  existing  circum- 
stances, is  advisable  here.  Indeed  it  seems  the  only  means  by 
which  that  school  can  be  made  to  meet  the  first  object  for  which 
it  was  instituted. 

The  second  object  is  also  imperfectly  attained;  but  this  is  no 


INSTRUCTION:    FOOT   ARTILLERY    SCHOOLS.  13! 

reproach  to,  or  fault  of,  the  school.  Unity  of  method  throughout 
the  artillery  cannot  be  secured  when,  in  the  case  of  at  least  two- 
thirds  of  the  officers,  instruction  in  that  particular  method  begins 
and  ends  with  the  school  of  practice.  There  are  at  Fortress 
Monroe  appliances  for  mechanical  manoeuvres  and  experiment 
to  be  found  on  a  plan  equally  elaborate  at  no  other  one  place 
garrisoned  by  artillery  troops.  This  fact,  of  itself,  would  make 
it  difficult  to  extend  and  make  uniform  the  methods  of  instruction 
there  pursued.  But  even  in  those  matters  wherein  there  might 
exist  the  desired  uniformity  there  is  no  efficient  outside  effort 
made  to  secure  it.  Were  there  a  well-digested  plan  of  instruc- 
tion, progressing  at  equal  pace  with  science  and  the  mechanic 
arts, — or,  if  this  be  impracticable,  then  a  scheme  adopted  which 
would  at  least  insure  the  use,  to  the  utmost  practicable  extent, 
of  all  mechanical  appliances  pertaining  to  artillery  materiel  act- 
ually supplied  to  each  post, — then  not  only  would  it  appear 
proper,  but  it  would  be  entirely  feasible  to  make  the  methods 
of  the  school  uniform  in  all  parts  of  the  artillery  service. 

The  objects  of  the  school  are  theoretically  correct,  and  in  any 
other  of  the  great  nations  of  the  earth  would  be  practically  so. 
That  it  does  not  insure  the  progress  of  artillery  subalterns  to  a 
degree  that  is  possible,  is  partially  due,  as  has  been  pointed  out, 
to  a  course  of  studies  which,  in  some  important  particulars,  does 
not  rise  to  the  plane  of  mediocrity;  but  that  it  fails  so  generally 
to  make  itself  practically  what  it  is  theoretically,  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  rest  of  the  foot  artillery  is  not  organized  and  oper- 
ated in  unison  with,  but  far  below,  the  artillery  school  standard; 
therefore  the  results  of  its  workings  are  to  a  great  extent  dissi- 
pated. 

Practically  speaking,  it  is  an  institution  where,  unless  prevented 
by  political  influence  or  official  favoritism,  young  officers  entering 
the  artillery  receive  a  combined  theoretical  and  practical  knowl- 
edge of  their  branch  of  service,  and  to  which  they  periodically 
return  to  brush  away  from  their  intellectual  horizon  the  gathering 
shadows  which  threaten  to  obscure  the  vision  when  they  pass 
beyond  its  threshold  into  a  world  of  professional  twilight  or 
darkness. 

Let  not  these  remarks  be  interpreted  as  an  attempt  to  dispar- 
age the  school,  but  the  reverse.  Aside  from  the  field  batteries,  it 
is  the  one  great  and  good  feature  of  the  artillery  in  the  important 


132      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.  S.  ARMY. 

matter  of  instruction,  theoretical  and  practical.  It  is  properly 
regarded  as  the  conservator  of  professional  knowledge  and  tradi- 
tions ;  the  good  it  does  extends  with  impaired  yet  strongly  felt, 
invigorating,  and  genial  influence  to  the  extremities  of  the  dis- 
jointed body  of  the  artillery  arm,  separated  as  the  latter  is  into  sixty 
batteries,  with  scarcely  any  bond  of  union  between  them.  Such 
an  institution  deserves  to  be  nurtured  and  sustained  by  the  strong 
arm  of  authority  and  of  law.  It  must  be  cherished  for  the  good 
that  is  in  it,  while  its  faults,  if  any  appear,  should  be  corrected 
as  they  become  manifest.  Situated  as  the  artillery  is  in  this  coun- 
try, it  is  of  the  first  importance  that  its  one  common  school  of 
practical  instruction  be  built  up  by  the  united  efforts  of  the  artil- 
lery itself  and  of  the  Government,  for  the  credit  of  each  of  which 
it  is  maintained,  and  whose  interests  it  subserves. 

INSTRUCTION    AT    SCHOOLS:    (D)    FIELD    BATTERIES. 

Soon  after  the  mounting  of  a  company  as  field  artillery  in  each 
regiment,  in  pursuance  of  the  general  plan  of  instruction  formu- 
lated by  Mr.  Calhoun  in  1821,  it  was  decided  to  make  those 
companies  schools  for  artillery  subalterns.  The  system  was  in- 
itiated by  General  Orders  No.  46,  of  1841,  Adjutant- General's 
Office,  which' provided  that  the  lieutenants  of  the  four  artillery 
regiments  should  be  passed  through  the  schools  of  horse  artillery 
in  such  manner  that  no  lieutenant  should  serve  therein  for  a 
longer  period  than  one  year.  From  this  rule  could  be  excepted 
lieutenants  who  were  actually  in  command  of  companies,  staff 
lieutenants,  and  such  others  as,  from  accidental  causes,  might 
be  unable  to  ride.  At  this  time  there  were  ten  companies  in  each 
regiment  of  artillery;  consequently  it  took  ten  years  at  least  for 
all  eligible  officers  to  pass  through  this  course,  which,  being  found 
too  short  to  impart  the  information  desired,  was  shortly  after- 
wards lengthened  to  two  years. 

When  lieutenants  were  first  thus  assigned  to  the  field  artillery 
companies,  the  armament  of  each  embraced  six  guns.  This  num- 
ber, however,  was  cut  down  to  four  by  Special  Orders  No.  96,  of 
1842,  Adjutant- General's  Office,  the  other  two  pieces  being  stored 
for  use  when  required.  To  make  the  instruction  company  re- 
spectably large  in  personnel,  General  Orders  No.  42,  of  1842, 
Adjutant-General's  Office,  directed  that,  in  each  regiment,  another 
should  be  associated  with  the  field  artillery  company.  The  four 


INSTRUCTION:    FIELD    BATTERIES.  133 

selected  were  (I)  of  the  First,  (F)  of  the  Second,  (F)  of  the  Third, 
and  (K)  of  the  Fourth.  Each  of  the  selected  companies  remained 
in  charge  of  its  own  officers.  In  respect,  however,  to  exercises 
and  manoeuvres  as  field  artillery,  the  care  of  batteries,  horses, 
harness  and  stables,  the  duties  of  the  two  companies  were  blend- 
ed, and  equalized,  under  the  orders  of  the  senior  officer.  This 
plan  failed;  as,  to  use  the  language  of  one  who  was  at  that  time 
an  active  field  artillery  officer,  "it  was  a  question  of  constant 
annoyance  to  every  one  concerned  where  were  to  begin,  where 
to  end,  and  what  really  were  the  appropriate  duties  of  the  foot 
companies  which  were  thus  made  yoke-fellows  to  the  field  artil- 
lery." 

The  practice  of  having  the  lieutenants  remain  only  one  year 
with  the  field  companies  was  found  inconvenient,  besides  being 
detrimental  to  service  by  keeping  the  officers  constantly  changing 
stations.  The  evil  was  attempted  to  be  ameliorated  by  General 
Orders  No.  33,  of  1844,  Adjutant- General's  Office,  which  made 
the  first  lieutenants  permanent,  as  they  were  in  the  foot  artillery; 
only  the  second  and  brevet  second  lieutenants,  of  whom  together 
there  were  two  with  each  field  company,  being  relieved  annually. 
The  first  lieutenants  thus  assigned  were  selected  by  the  colonels 
of  the  respective  regiments.  Although  this  order  broke  up  the 
field  artillery  schools  to  a  great  extent,  it  furnished  these  compa- 
nies when  they  went  to  Mexico,  in  1846,  trained  and  specially 
competent  first  lieutenants;  which  fact  without  doubt  had  its 
influence  in  enabling  the  field  companies  to  make  their  distin- 
guished records  in  that  war. 

Following  the  cessation  of  hostilities  with  Mexico,  numerous 
changes  were  made  in  the  equipment  of  the  field  artillery  com- 
panies; but,  early  in  1849,  (April  2ist  and  May  I2th,)  all  were 
ordered  to  be  supplied  with  their  proper  arm.  Then  came  (Gen- 
eral Orders  No.  14,  August  24,  1849,  Headquarters  of  the  Army,) 
those  rules  for  the  detail  of  subalterns  for  field  artillery  service 
which  are  embodied,  in  substance,  in  the  'Army  Regulations 
of  the  present  day.  The  tour  of  duty  was  fixed  at  two  years. 
Those  who  could  be  excepted  from  the  rule  were  lieutenants  in 
command  of  companies  whose  captains  were  indefinitely  absent, 
adjutants,  quartermasters,  and  those  physically  unable  to  ride. 
The  number  of  subalterns  was  established  at  two  first  and  one 
second  lieutenant  with  each  company,  the  first  lieutenants  being 


134      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

relieved  in  alternate  years; — this  to  secure  constantly  with  each 
company  at  least  one  instructed  subaltern.  The  rute  here  estab- 
lished, reaffirmed  by  Special  Orders  No.  141,  of  1870,  Adjutant- 
General's  Office,  continues  essentially  that  by  which  lieutenants 
are  at  present  detailed  for  this  duty. 

The  caprices  of  those  in  authority,  particularly  of  the  various 
Secretaries  of  War,  during  the  following  years  rendered  the  field 
artillery  companies  extremely  uncertain  schools  of  practice.  This 
will  appear  when  we  examine  the  records  between  the  close 
of  the  Mexican  and  the  beginning  of  the  Civil  war.  During 
that  period  (K)  of  the  First  Regiment  was  the  only  company 
which  was  not  dismounted;  it  was  given  a  field  artillery  equipment 
after  its  return  from  Mexico,  and  has  kept  it  unmolested.  Of 
the  others,  (A)  of  the  Second,  (C)  of  the  Third,  and  (B)  of  the 
Fourth  were,  in  the  interval  mentioned,  each  dismounted  and  re- 
mounted once;  (I)  of  the  First  and  (E)  of  the  Third  were  dismount- 
ed twice  and  remounted  twice;  (G)  of  the  Fourth  was  dismounted 
three  times  and  remounted  twice;  while  (M)  of  the  Second  was  dis- 
mounted three  times  and  remounted  as  often  in  the  same  interval. 
In  fact,  although  from  1849  to  1851  eight  companies  were  author- 
ized, but  seven  were  actually  equipped  as  field  artillery ;  and  on 
March  3ist,  1851,  in  a  paroxysm  of  economy,  the  number,  in 
violation  of  the  law  of  March  2d,  1821,  was  cut  down  to  two — 
(K)  of  the  First  and  (C)  of  the  Third  Regiment;  but  the  Secre- 
tary, having  apparently  awakened  to  the  illegality  of  his  action, 
remounted,  September,  1852,  one  company  in  each  of  the  other 
two  regiments.  Three  companies  were  remounted  in  May,  1853, 
but  the  Secretary  of  War  stationed  them  on  the  Indian  frontier, 
and,  as  a  result,  in  three  years  the  number  of  mounted  companies 
w.as  again  reduced  to  four. 

Immediately  upon  the  assumption  of  the  duties  of  his  office  by 
Secretary  Floyd,  the  question  of  remounting  the  field  companies 
came  up  for  consideration.  General  Scott  approved  the  measure, 
and,  to  secure  the  carrying  out  of  a  more  elaborate  system  of  in- 
struction, he  suggested  they  be  stationed  in  pairs  at  posts  particu- 
larly well  adapted  to  the  purpose.  This  was  the  attempted  be- 
ginning of  the  plan  of  field  artillery  posts  for  batteries  of  that 
arm  exclusively — a  plan  upon  which  the  school  at  Fort  Riley, 
Kansas,  was  organized  in  1869,  and  of  which  more  will  be  said 
hereafter. 


INSTRUCTION:    FIELD    BATTERIES.  135 

But  General  Scott  was  not  able  to  carry  out  his  views.  It  is 
true  that  by  April,  1858,  when  Mr.  Floyd  had  been  Secretary  of 
War  one  year,  three  of  the  dismounted  field  artillery  companies 
were  again  properly  equipped;  but  the  Mormon  disturbances  in 
Utah  had  scattered  them  at  different  points  en  route  to  that 
territory.  After  their  services  were  no  longer  needed  there,  far 
Irom  concentrating  them,  they  were,  as  has  been  mentioned,  by 
General  Orders  No.  10,  of  1859,  Adjutant-General's  Office,  dis- 
tributed over  the  western  country,  with  the  object  of  putting  into 
execution  an  elaborate  but,  as  it  proved,  a  visionary  scheme  of 
artillery  instruction  which  embraced  both  foot  and  field  artillery, 
and,  for  the  latter,  it  was  substantially  as  follows:  The  companies 
were  stationed,  (C)  of  the  Third  at  Vancouver,  Washington  Terri- 
tory; (E)  of  the  Third  at  Fort  Ridgely,  Minnesota;  (K)  of  the 
First  at  Fort  Clark,  Texas;  (I)  of  the  First  and  (A)  of  the  Second 
at  Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas;  (B)  of  the  Fourth  at  Camp  Floyd, 
Utah;  and  (U)  of  the  Second  at  Fort  Brown,  Texas.  (G)  of  the 
Fourth  was  not  then  mounted.  In  every  instance  from  three  to 
five  companies  of  foot  artillery  were  stationed  at  the  same  post 
with  a  field  company,  and  all  the  officers  at  the  post,  each  in  his 
proper  sphere,  either  commanded  or  exercised  with  the  field  ar- 
tillery in  accordance  with  the  following  rule:  On  Fridays,  Satur- 
days, and  Sundays  the  officers  of  the  field  company  exclusively 
served  with  it.  During  the  remaining  days  of  the  week  lieutenants 
for  that  company  were  furnished  by  a  roster  which  embraced  every 
subaltern  at  the  post.  During  four  days  out  of  every  twenty- 
eight,  namely,  on  a  Monday,  Tuesday,  Wednesday,  and  Thurs- 
day, the  company  was  commanded  by  a  captain  of  one  of  the 
foot  artillery  companies.  If  the  field  artillery  captain  was  senior 
to  the  foot  captain,  he  superintended  the  field  artillery  drill  of  the 
latter. 

The  time  during  which  it  was  attempted  to  put  in  practice  the 
provisions  of  this  order  was  not  long,  it  is  true,  but  sufficiently 
so  to  demonstrate  its  impracticability.  The  primary  defect  was 
of  the  same  general  nature  as  that  which  rendered  abortive  the 
attempt  to  combine  companies  in  1844  for  the  performance  of  field 
artillery  duties,  viz.,  the  mixing  up  of  commands,  placing  the  field 
artillery  company  under  command  of  another  captain  than  its 
own,  and,  finally,  the  impossibility  of  so  adjusting  the  complex 
machine  as  to  determine  what  were  the  precise  functions  of  its 


136      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE  ARTILLERY,  U.  S.   ARMY. 

parts.  It  was  attempted  to  obviate  the  difficulties  by  supple- 
mentary orders  from  the  War  Department,  but  to  no  purpose; 
the  whole  plan,  after  a  few  attempts  to  make  it  a  working  real- 
ity, was  in  a  fair  way  to  pass  by  common  consent  into  contempt 
and  oblivion.  Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  when  the  precipitation 
of  the  Civil  war  swept  the  artillery  officers  into  a  more  improving 
and  attractive  school  of  instruction. 

While  the  field  artillery  companies  had,  from  their  first  organ- 
ization in  our  army,  been  looked  upon  as  schools  of  instruction 
for  the  subalterns,  their  captains  were  always  considered  as  per- 
manent until  very  recent  times.  By  General  Orders  No.  96,  of 
1882,  Adjutant-General's  Office,  the  tour  of  service  of  captains 
with  light  or  mounted  batteries  was  fixed  at  three  years,*  that  of 
lieutenants  remaining  as  before — two  years.  To  avoid  complaints 
of  injustice  and  to  insure  uniformity  of  instruction,  the  captains 
are  detailed  by  roster,  the  senior  eligible  for  detail  being  desig- 
nated first. 

This  practice  can  only  be  regarded  as  an  experiment.  Whether 
it  will  be  for  the  best  interests  of  the  service,  time  must  determine. 
The  traditions  and  experience  of  the  arm  lead  to  contrary  antici- 
pations. The  old  field  artillery  companies  were  organized  and  for 
years  nurtured  under  the  eyes  of  selected  officers — captains  and 
lieutenants — who  brought  them,  spite  of  many  discouraging  cir- 
cumstances, to  a  high  state  of  excellence.  The  proud  records  of 
these  companies  in  the  first  war  succeeding  their  organization  was 
then  attributed  to  the  fact  that  they  fought  under  their  veteran 
commanders,  even  the  first  lieutenants  being  then  permanently 
attached.  'The  loss  of  prestige  of  these  batteries  during  the 
Civil  war  is  to  be  attributed,  in  large  degree,  to  the  fact  that 
their  old  officers  were  absent ;  the  batteries  were  often  command- 
ed by  inexperienced  lieutenants  who  changed  frequently.  If  the 
principle  of  having  captains  rotate  be  for  the  good  of  the  artillery, 
it  will  prove  itself  so  ;  and  this  is  the  standard  by  which  it  will  be 
judged. 

*  Changed  by  recent  orders  to  FOUR  years  for  captains,  (General  Orders  No. 
86,  of  1884,  Headquarters  of  the  Army.)  This  is  a  long  step  in  the  right 
direction.  It  only  remains  now  to  complete  the  good  work  by  selecting  the 
most  capable  captains,  and  either  give  them  command  of  the  field  batteries 
permanently,  or  for  a  lengthened  period,  say  six  years. 


INSTRUCTION:    FIELD  ARTILLERY    POSTS.  137 

If,  indeed,  it  be  true  that  this  is  the  only  means  by  which  favor- 
itism can  be  prevented,  it  may  be  conceded  to  be  a  wise  measure; 
but  if  there  be  not  in  the  military  system  sufficient  virtue  to  pre- 
vent such  a  state  of  affairs  being  brought  about,  it  may  well  be 
questioned  if  the  distinguished  career  of  the  field  artillery  be  not 
a  thing  of  the  past. 

In  most  European  armies  the  field  artillery — mounted  and 
horse — is  entirely  separate  from  the  foot  or  fortress  artillery, 
promotion  being  distinct  in  the  two  services.  In  the  English 
army  there  is  an  exception,  all  the  artillery  belonging,  theoretic- 
ally at  least,  to  one  regiment ;  but  it  is  in  fact  a  corps,  as  that 
term  is  used  in  the  United  States  service — not  a  regiment.  Offi- 
cers for  the  horse  batteries  are  selected  for  their  special  qualifica- 
tions— a  principle  which  has  brought  that  arm  to  the  first  rank* 
in  European  artilleries.  When  our  field  artillery  companies  were 
first  mounted  the  same  rule  was  followed  here;  and  as  a  result,  al- 
though laboring  under  disadvantages,  (infantry  pay,  the  lukewarm 
aid  of  doubting  friends,  and  the  hostility  of  enemies,)  the  field  artil- 
lery demonstrated  during  the  Mexican  war  the  superiority  of  the 
system  of  selection  by  which  its  officers  were  appointed.  It  cannot 
be  denied,  however,  that  it  opens  the  door  to  favoritism,  than 
which  nothing  more  quickly  breaks  down*  military  spirit,  and  that 
in  some  instances  this  operates  to  the  detriment  of  the  service 
both  at  home  and  abroad;  but  whether 'the  detail  of  captains  for 
a  brief  tour  is  destined  to  improve  matters,  may  well  be  questioned. 
It  cannot  be  claimed,  nor  will  it  be  conceded,  until  an  experience 
yet  to  be  acquired  has  demonstrated  its  wisdom. 

FIELD   ARTILLERY    POSTS   AS   SCHOOLS    OF    INSTRUCTION. 

By  General  Orders  No.  6,  Headquarters  of  the  Army,  Adjutant- 
General' s  Office,  February  i8th,  1869,  four  of  the  field  artillery 
batteries  were,  in  pursuance  of  a  projet  of  the  Secretary  of  War, 
assembled  at  Fort  Leavenworth  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  a 
field  artillery  school  something  similar  to  that  recommended  by 
General  Scott  in  1857.  The  post  fixed  upon  was  Fort  Riley, 
Kansas,  whither  the  batteries  were  accordingly  sent,  to  remain, 
however,  as  it  proved,  for  two  years  only,  being  by  General  Or- 
ders No.  17,  of  1871,  Adjutant- General's  Office,  returned  to  their 
respective  regiments. 
18 


138      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.   ARMY. 

Judged  alone  by  the  brief  term  of  its  existence,  the  school  was 
a  failure.  Yet  the  objects  to  be  attained  and  which  led  to  its 
organization  were  excellent.  Much  good  must  accrue  to  the 
artillery  arm  and  to  the  service  generally  by  such  a  school  as  this 
was  intended  to  be,  placed  and  maintained  upon  a  proper  footing. 

Its  failure  resulted  not  from  any  defect  in  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  the  establishment,  but  from  other  causes.  Some  of  the 
objects  for  which  the  school  was  organized  were:  (i)  To  introduce 
into  the  field  artillery  uniformity  of  practice  in  all  that  pertained 
to  instruction  and  manoeuvre.  (2)  By  a  well-established  system 
of  competitive  drills  and  firings  to  weed  out  everything  which 
was  not  of  practical  utility,  and  at  the  same  time  develop  and 
suggest  improvements  in  the  guns  and  projectiles,  that  by  timely 
advances  they  should  keep  pace  with  improvements  in  small-arms. 
(3)  To  study  the  horse  and  to  determine  the  best  classes  and 
breeds  for  the  light  artillery  service.  (4)  To  serve  as  a  school  of 
practical  instruction  for  officers,  where  would  be  taught  not  only 
the  duties  of  the  battery  as  an  artillery  unit,  but  also  those  of 
the  artillery  brigade,  that  administrative  and  fighting  body  which 
has  superseded  the  battery  for  war  purposes,  not  only  in  our 
own  experience,  but  in  the  practice  of  every  nation  of  continental 
Europe.  (5)  To  enable  officers  to  acquire  a  knowledge  of  the 
mounted  service  required  for  siege  and  mountain  artillery,  parks 
and  convoys;  the  course  at  Fortress  Monroe  not  admitting  of 
this  instruction  being  given. 

The  utility  of  a  school  of  this  character,  and  its  importance  to 
the  artillery,  can  scarcely  be  overestimated.  If  it  be  desirable  to 
maintain  the  field  batteries,  it  should  be  on  the  footing  of  highest 
attainable  efficiency  consistent  with  a  proper  economy.  This  the 
field  artillery  school  would  have  rendered  possible  had  it  been 
supported  as  it  deserved,  and  as  would  have  been  the  case  had  it 
remained  under  the  management  of  its  projector,  Major-General 
Schofield.  Before  systematic  organization  could  be  effected, 
however,  the  troops  were  diverted  from  their  proper  duties  to 
serve  as  cavalry  on  the  frontier;  the  men  were  taken  as  teamsters; 
the  horses  (draught),  not  intended  for  this  kind  of  service,  were 
broken  down;  finally,  the  commandant  was  kept  away  indefinitely 
at  a  time  when  his  presence  with  the  command  was  indispensable 
to  insure  a  proper  beginning  for  the  institution.  In  a  word,  the 


INSTRUCTION:    FIELD   ARTILLERY    POSTS.  139 

field  artillery  school  was  strangled  in  its  infancy.  That  which, 
if  properly  nurtured,  gave  promise  of  fair  proportions,  bringing 
strength,  symmetry,  and  a  high  order  of  excellence  to  the  field 
artillery,  was  cast  to  one  side,  to  be  even  now  almost  forgotten, 
without  an  intelligent  effort  being  made  to  develop  what  there 
was  good  in  it. 

If  the  improvement  of  this  branch  of  service  be  an  object 
worthy  the  solicitude  of  the  Government,  it  is  eminently  proper 
and  desirable  that  the  batteries  be  assembled  at  schools  of  instruc- 
tion similar  to  that  contemplated  at  Fort  Riley,  Kansas.  Aside 
from  the  salutary  results  following  honorable  emulation  when 
troops  serve  in  large,  well-organized  commands  under  the  eye  of 
a  capable  and  impartial  commander,  there  are  other  reasons  which 
make  such  schools  desirable  for  the  field  artillery.  It  is,  as  com- 
pared with  other  troops,  expensive  to  organize  and  maintain.  In 
all  armies,  therefore,  no  more  is  kept  equipped  during  peace  than 
proper  economy  justifies;  but  what  portion  soever  of  the  military 
establishment  this  may  be,  sound  reason,  justice  to  the  Govern- 
ment which  bears  the  expense,  and  true  military  policy  all  demand 
that  it  be  kept  in  a  high  state  of  efficiency.  With  competent 
commanders,  a  step  towards  the  attainment  of  this  desirable  end 
will  be  the  arranging  of  the  batteries  into  artillery  brigades. 
This  is  the  organization  in  which  they  will  fight  in  a  great  war; 
it  was  adopted  by  both  belligerents  during  the  Rebellion,  and 
has  the  sanction  and  practice  of  all  civilized  nations.  In  Janu- 
ary, 1 86 1,  the  field  batteries,  under  a  false  idea  of  instruction, 
were  scattered  as  they  are  now.  By  the  end  of  that  year,  when 
war  had  wrought  its  practical  changes,  they  were  grouped  to- 
gether in  brigades  of  four  batteries  each. 

The  desirability  of  assimilating  our  peace  organization  to  that 
of  actual  war,  as  nearly  as  practicable,  seems  self-evident.  More 
particularly  is  this  true  when  increased  efficiency  of  administra- 
tion and  economy  of  both  money  and  materiel  are  thereby  insur- 
ed. Remember  the  favorite  article  of  our  military  creed,  that, 
though  our  army  be  small,  it  is  commanded  from  top  to  bottom 
by  well-trained  officers.  If  it  be  intended  to  make  this  a  reality 
rather  than  an  empty  boast,  it  will,  for  the  light  artillery,  be  most 
surely  attained  through  the  instrumentality  of  the  schools  in 
question.  The  assignment  by  recent  orders  of  captains  to  the 
command  of  batteries  for  a  limited  period  of  years  has  but  added 


140      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

cogency  to  the  reasons  before  existing  for  assembling  them  into 
brigades  under  energetic  field  officers.* 

In  other  armies,  the  objects  here  sought  to  be  attained  by  the 
proposed  field  artillery  schools  are  in  various  ways  secured  to 
that  branch  of  service.  So  far  as  is  known,  however,  there  is  not 
in  Europe  a  single  school  of  practice  equal  in  scope  to  that  pro- 
jected at  Fort  Riley.  In  Germany  the  artillery  brigade  is  the 
administrative  unit  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war,  having  in  this 
respect  supplanted  the  battery.  There  is  at  Berlin  a  gunnery 
school,  to  which  officers  and  men  are  sent  by  detail  annually  from 
the  field  batteries,  horse  and  foot.  The  course  has  for  its  object 
to  teach  the  use  of  different  kinds  of  guns,  wagons,  ammunition, 
fuses,  and  the  tactics  of  artillery  under  all  the  circumstances  of 
actual  war. 

England  has  her  gunnery  school  at  Shoeburyness,  the  object 
being  essentially  the  same  as  in  Germany.  Batteries  attend  this 
school  in  rotation,  as  was  the  case  with  us  formerly  at  Fortress 
Monroe. 

Austria  has  similar  institutions,  and  at  Vienna  there  is  the  cen- 
tral artillery  riding  school,  the  object  being  to  secure  uniformity 
in  riding,  in  stable  management,  the  government  of  unruly  horses, 
and  the  training  of  riding-masters  for  the  artillery. 

The  same  remarks  are  true  with  reference  to  the  other  countries 
of  Europe  ;  each  puts  forth,  in  one  way  or  another,  every  energy 
to  improve  this  branch  of  the  service.  Their  annual  practice 
firing  is  in  every  way  worthy  of  imitation ;  at  known  and  un- 
known distances ;  with  good,  bad,  and  indifferent  ammunition ; 


*  Since  the  foregoing  was  written,  it  is  observed  that  the  correctness  of  the 
views  here  expressed  on  the  general  subject  of  field  artillery  schools  are  con- 
firmed by  Major-General  Hancock  in  his  annual  report  of  1883. 

After  observing  that  the  four  field  batteries  of  his  geographical  division 
were  stationed,  one  at  Washington  Barracks,  District  of  Columbia,  one  at  Little 
Rock  Barracks,  Arkansas,  another  at  Fort  Adams,  Rhode  Island,  and  the  fourth 
at  Fort  Hamilton, New  York  Harbor,  the  general  proceeds  :  "I  take  occasion  to 
reiterate  what  I  have  heretofore  said,  that  I  do  not  think  the  light  batteries  are 
fulfilling  a  useful  purpose  as  at  present  located.  A  light  artillery  school  under 
one  of  our  best  artillery  field  officers,  where  all,  or  at  least  four  or  five,  of  the 
light  batteries  could  be  concentrated,  would,  in  my  judgment,  best  fulfill  the 
object  of  their  organization.  Scattered  as  they  are  at  present,  and  associated 
with  foot  troops,  and  required  often  to  perform  kindred  duties,  the  specialty  of 
their  arm  is  apt  to  be  lost  sight  of." 


PRACTICE    FIRING.  14! 

battle  and  all  other  firing  likely  to  be  of  use  is  practiced,  competi- 
tion between  the  batteries  engaged  being  the  soul  of  the  exercise. 
Afterwards,  careful  notes,  covering  every  important  fact  elicited, 
are  worked  up  and  given  to  the  army  for  the  information  and 
benefit  of  all  concerned. 

Much  has  recently  been  said  and  written  in  this  country  on 
the  subject  of  target  practice  with  small-arms.  It  is  of  the  first 
importance ;  and  no  one  who  has  labored  honestly  in  this  field, 
has  seen  the  gradual  improvement  of  the  men,  has  remarked  the 
feeling  of  conscious  power  manifesting  itself  as  they  learned  the 
capabilities  in  their  own  hands  of  the  weapons  they  carry,  can  for 
one  moment  doubt  that  this  practice  vastly  increases  the  effective- 
ness of  our  infantry. 

Every  argument  that  can  be  advanced  in  favor  of  small-arm 
target  practice  and  battle  firing  (skirmish  infantry  target  practice 
is  that,)  proves  still  more  strongly  the  necessity  that  exists  for 
artillery  target  and  battle  practice.  In  Europe  artillery  firing 
receives  much  more  careful  and  conscientious  attention  than  does 
small-arm  firing  in  this  country ;  there  is  more  system  about  it ; 
the  actual  results,  \hefacts,  are  more  guardedly  determined  on  the 
spot;  and  nothing  is  left  undone  to  turn  them  to  the  greatest  pos- 
sible advantage  of  the  artillery  arm.  In  the  United  States  the 
reverse  of  this  is  true ;  but  it  should  not  and  need  not  be ;  and 
the  proposed  field  artillery  schools,  similar  to  that  organized  at 
Fort  Riley,  would  afford,  among  other  things,  the  means  of 
supplying  our  deficiencies  in  this  particular. 

PRACTICE   FIRING   FOR   ARTILLERY. 

Rules  and  regulations  governing  this  useful  branch  of  artillery 
instruction  were  first  promulgated  in  War  Department  Orders  No. 
21,  April  ist,  1842.  They  provided  in  brief  for  fixed  batteries: 
(i)  That  a  post  record-book  be  kept,  wherein  for  each  mounted 
gun  there  should  be  placed  all  data  as  to  calibre,  weight,  material 
of  gun,  the  carriage,  and  the  field  of  fire.  (2)  That  all  the 
surrounding  country  and  waterways  be  reconnoitred  and  thor- 
oughly studied.  (3)  That  every  material  fact  as  to  the  charac- 
ter of  shot  thrown,  and  its  flight,  be  noted  in  the  record-book. 
(4)  Each  company  with  a  fixed  battery  was  annually  allowed  one 
hundred  cartridges,  with  seventy-five  shot  or  shell.  (5)  Com- 
panies equipped  as  field  artillery  were  allowed  annually  two 


142      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

hundred  blank  cartridges  and  one-third  that  number  of  shot  or 
shell.  (6)  All  commanders  were  directed  to  keep  registers  of 
their  practice,  so  that  not  a  shot  should  be  thrown  for  instruc- 
tion without  distinct  objects;  such  as  range,  accuracy  of  fire, 
number  of  ricochets,  bursting  time  for  shells,  &c.  (7)  Full  re- 
ports of  results  were  to  be  sent  to  the  adjutant-general  for  the 
information  of  the  War  Department  and  of  the  general-in-chief. 
The  general  objects  to  be  attained  by  this  practice  were  to  impart 
to  officers  and  men  knowledge  of  the  ready  and  effective  use  of 
batteries,  to  preserve  on  record  for  their  benefit  the  more  impor- 
tant results,  and  to  ascertain  the  condition  of  both  guns  and  car- 
riages. These  rules  first  appeared  as  part  of  the  Army  Regula- 
tions in  1847.  In  the  edition  of  the  Regulations  promulgated  in 
1857  they  remained  almost  unchanged,  except  that  the  general- 
in-chief  was  not  given  the  results  of  the  practice,  th,ey  being 
worked  up  for  the  information  of  the  War  Department  only;  and 
the  allowance  of  ammunition  for  a  field  artillery  company  was 
changed  to  five  hundred  blank  cartridges  and  one-third  that 
number  of  shot  or  shell  annually.  These  allowances  were  cut 
down  in  the  Regulations  of  i86i-'63,  the  field  batteries  being 
deprived  altogether  of  either  shot  or  shell  for  target  practice,  and 
blank  cartridges  given  in  such  quantities  as  were  necessary  for 
instruction  and  drill.  There  was  not  allowed,  therefore,  by  Army 
Regulations,  during  the  Civil  war,  a  single  shot  for  experimen- 
tal or  target  practice,  to  the  fifty-six  batteries  of  regular  field 
artillery  which  during  that  contest  were  equipped  and  served 
with  the  various  armies. 

Paragraph  III,  General  Orders  No.  67,  of  1866,  changed  the 
annual  allowance,  for  each  artillery  company  serving  by  itself  at  a 
post  with  a  fixed  battery,  to  fifty  cartridges  and  twelve  projectiles 
for  sea-coast  guns,  with  twenty  projectiles  for  calibres  below  100- 
pounders;  while,  for  each  additional  artillery  company,  there  was 
given  one-half  this  number;  all  the  cartridges  and  projectiles 
being  equally  divided  among  the  companies  firing.  This  was 
reducing  the  practice  firing  to  about  one-third  what  it  was  in 
1842,  when  the  system  was  inaugurated. 

At  no  time  subsequent  to  1861,  until  the  promulgation  of  Gen- 
eral Orders  No.  83,  of  1867,  Adjutant-General's  Office,  were  the 
field  batteries  authorized  to  expend  projectiles  for  practice;  but 
by  that  order  each  was  allowed  twenty-five  rounds,  which,  for 


PRACTICE   FIRING.  143 

smooth-bores,  were  one-half  shell  or  case  shot,  one-quarter  solid 
shot,  and  one-quarter  canister;  for  rifle  guns,  (with  which  half  the 
field  batteries  were  equipped,)  three-quarters  were  shell  or  case 
shot  and  one-quarter  canister;  while  for  instruction  and  drill  pur- 
poses as  many  blank  cartridges  and  friction  primers  were  author- 
ized as  the  battery  and  post  commanders  deemed  necessary.  The 
allowance  to  a  battery  at  permanent  works  was  also  changed 
again  by  this  order,  each  being  given  twenty-five  blank  cartridges, 
with  twelve  projectiles  for  calibres  above  and  twenty  for  those 
below  8-inch,  and  the  necessary  blank  cartridges;  for  each  addi- 
tional battery  serving  at  a  post,  one-half  this  number,  the  whole 
number  being  equally  divided  among  the  batteries  firing;  besides, 
there  were  allowed  annually  not  exceeding  two  hundred  friction 
primers  to  each  battery  for  drill  purposes.  The  condition  was 
added,  that  the  ammunition  should  be  taken  from  the  serviceable 
yet  longest  on  hand  at  the  post. 

General  Orders  No.  14,  Adjutant-General's  Office,  series  of 
1876,  promulgated  existing  orders  relating  to  artillery  target  prac- 
tice, with  the  following  additional  instruction: 

"  Commanding  officers  of  forts  and  light  batteries  will  transmit  direct  to  the 
adjutant-general,  for  the  chief  of  ordnance,  on  forms  to  be  supplied  by  the 
ordnance  department,  reports  of  each  and  every  shot  fired  from  field,  siege,  or 
sea-coast  guns  and  mortars.  Each  gun  should  have  its  recorded  history.  Every 
shot  fired  should  be  recorded  and  reported,  with  all  the  circumstances  and 
incidents  attending  it.  It  is  of  the  greatest  importance  that  the  whole  number 
and  character  of  rounds  to  which  a  gun  has  been  subjected  in  practice  be  at 
all  times  known." 

The  official  who  comes  prominently  into  view  here  is  the  chief 
of  ordnance,  placed  thus  in  the  position  of  chief  of  artillery  of  the 
army,  a  role  never  before  openly  assumed.  The  next  year  (1877), 
upon  his  recommendation,  the  above  order  was  modified,  omit- 
ting an  enumeration  of  the  character  of  ammunition  to  be  used  by 
field  batteries,  and  providing  that  reports  of  each  and  every  shot 
fired,  not  only  in  target  practice,  but  in  actual  service  against  the 
enemy,  should  be  tabulated  for  the  information  of  the  chief  of 
ordnance;  thus  adding  strength  to  the  functions  he  had  assumed 
as  head  of  the  artillery  arm  of  service — chief  of  the  artillery  staff. 

When  the  practice  firing  of  artillery  was  begun,  in  1842, 
reports  were  made  for  the  information  of  the  general-in-chief ; 


144      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

but  in  1857  ne  dropped  out  of  sight,  and  his  place  has  at  last 
been  assumed  by  the  head  of  a  non-combatant  bureau. 

It  may  not  be  uninteresting,  in  this  connection,  to  recall  the 
position  in  which  the  new  head  of  the  artillery  and  his  department 
posed  at  this  time  before  Congress  and  the  public  outside  of  the 
army. 

In  a  printed  argument  to  demonstrate  the  impolicy  of  reuniting 
the  artillery  and  ordnance,  the  new  chief  of  artillery  remarked : 

"It  [ordnance  department]  is  not  the  staff  of  the  artillery  in  any  sense;  its 
duties  are  defined  by  law,  and  consist  in  providing,  preserving,  distributing,  and 
accounting  for  every  description  of  artillery,  small-arras,  and  all  the  munitions 
of  war  which  may  be  required  by  the  fortresses  of  the  country,  the  armies  in 
the  field,  and  for  the  whole  body  of  the  militia  of  the  Union.  The  functions  of 
the  ordnance  department  will  thus  be  seen  to  be  entirely  distinct  from  those 
of  the  line  of  the  army  in  any  of  its  branches ;  its  duties  would  remain  the  same 
whether  the  peace  establishment  be  large  or  small,  or  be  entirely  abolished." 

Where,  may  we  ask,  in  the  organic  or  any  subsequent  act, 
defining  the  duties  of  this  department,  is  there  any  warrant  for 
this  assumption,  by  its  chief,  of  the  supervision  of  the  artillery  in  a 
matter  which  belongs  essentially  to  that  arm  alone?  If,  indeed, 
it  be  found  that  these  duties  defined  by  law  circumscribe  its  proper 
sphere  of  action,  and  the  nature  of  things  requires  that  the  chief 
of  ordnance  should  assume  charge  of  one  of  the  most  important 
duties  of  the  artillery  arm — collating  the  results  of  its  target  prac- 
tice— it  is  time  to  consider  seriously  the  question  thus  forced  upon 
us,  viz. :  Is  not,  after  all,  the  uniting  of  the  present  ordnance  and 
artillery  under  one  head  the  natural  and  proper  plan  of  organi- 
zation ?  Here  is  a  department  which,  when  the  question  of  merg- 
ing is  raised,  loudly  proclaims  that  it  is  in  no  sense  artillery  staff, 
and  yet  it  seeks  to  assume  those  duties  and  is  now  actually  per- 
forming them.  Not  only  has  this  been  done  in  the  matter  of 
target  practice  and  other  firing,  even  to  the  extent  of  every  shot 
used  in  actual  service  against  the  enemy,  but,  upon  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  new  chief  of  artillery  staff,  artillery  officers  have 
been  excluded  from  councils  which  decided  upon  the  armament 
of  the  forts  they  were  to  defend,  and  their  proper  duties  in  this 
respect  assumed  by  the  officers  of  that  new  staff.  The  absurdity 
of  depriving  artillery  officers  of  a  voice  (which  should  be  a  pre- 
ponderating one)  in  determining  what  proportions  of  guns  of  the 
various  calibres  should  be  used  in  defending  our  forts,  is  appar- 


PRACTICE   FIRING.  145 

ent.*  Yet  this  is  what  the  new  chief  of  artillery  staff  recommended 
and  had  the  address  to  secure  being  done.  The  regulations  of  the 
army  require  that  commanders  of  fortified  places  shall  consult 
their  senior  officers  of  artillery,  who  keep  journals,  in  which,  in 
case  of  investment,  every  circumstance  of  importance  is  entered. 
In  this,  and  in  the  duties  of  the  siege,  the  artillery  is  intimately 
associated  with  the  engineers.  The  commandant  of  the  former 
submits  to  the  commanding  general  his  views  as  to  everything 
affecting  the  artillery,  and  advises  the  general  throughout  as  to 
the  employment  of  his  arm.  Still  this  is  the  officer  who,  under 
the  dispensation  of  the  new  artillery  staff,  is  to  be  ignored  when 
the  armaments  of  the  forts  are  being  determined  upon,  and  his 
place  at  the  council  filled  by  a  non-combatant,  ' '  whose  services 
have  no  immediate  connection  with  the  line  of  the  army,  who  is 
separated  from  that  body,  and  given  up  to  a  study  of  the  exact 
sciences  and  mechanical  philosophy"  ! 

The  records  show  that  in  1879,  after  the  ordnance  department 
had  thus  assumed  the  duties  of  artillery  staff,  there  were  fired  at 
targets  by  the  troops  of  that  arm,  exclusive  of  those  at  Fortress 
Monroe,  ten  lo-inch  Rodman,  eighteen  lo-inch  siege  mortar,  one 
hundred  and  fifty-five  8-inch  siege  mortar,  seventeen  8 -inch  how- 
itzer, seventy  4^ -inch  siege  rifle,  fourteen  12-pounder  smooth- 
bore, three  hundred  and  eighty-three  3-inch  rifle,  and  three  thou- 

*  The  recent  attempt,  through  the  provisions  of  a  fortification  bill,  to 
organize  a  board,  advisory  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  for  the  determination  of 
all  questions  relating  to  the  fortification  and  armament  of  our  most  important 
sea-boards,  without  having  an  artillery  officer  thereon,  is  another  of  those  efforts 
to  push  bureauocracy  to  the  front  at  the  expense  of  the  fighting  arms  of  service 
and  of  the  public  weal,  and  one  to  which  Members  of  Congress  unwittingly,  it 
is  believed,  lent  themselves. 

Why  any  should  be  selected  for  this  duty  who,  during  the  four  years'  war 
for  national  existence,  never  heard  a  hostile  shot  fired,  while  artillery  officers 
who  faced  the  enemy  on  every  battle-field,  and  will  do  it  again  if  the  coast  be 
attacked,  are  ignored,  is  one  of  those  questions  that  cannot  be  answered. 

Why  those  who  will  command  the  sea-coast  works  in  case  of  invasion,  upon 
whom  will  devolve  the  duty  of  upholding  the  honor  of  the  flag  and  the  country, 
should  not  have  a  voice  in  this  advisory  board,  is  not  apparent;  but  the  short- 
sightedness of  that  policy  which  would  exclude  from  its  councils  the  very  offi- 
cers who  ultimately  have  more  responsibility  in  the  premises  than  any  others, 
or  all  others  combined,  is  apparent  enough. 

Fortunately  for  the  security  and  honor  of  the  United  States,  Congress  prompt- 
ly relegated  to  the  oblivion  it  deserved  this  endeavor  to  hold  up  to  contempt  the 


146      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

sand  Catling  projectiles.  No  attempt  is  made  by  the  artillery  staff 
to  turn  the  results  of  target  practice  to  the  advantage  of  that  arm, 
or  of  the  army  at  large.  The  tabulated  statements  are  filed  away 
for  the  information  of  the  chief  of  ordnance  and  nobody  else.  The 
general-in-chief  knows  nothing  of  them,  or  at  least  he  has  disap- 
peared from  view  in  this  connection.  No  opportunity  is  given 
different  commands  to  compare  results;  and,  except  in  the  low- 
est grades  of  duties,  those  of  the  gunner,  it  would  be  difficult 
to  point  out  in  what  manner  the  artillery  is  benefited  by  this 
annual  expenditure  of  ammunition.  While  large  sums  are  being 
expended  in  target  practice  with  the  infantry  weapon,  prizes  and 
honors  being  showered  upon  the  successful  contestants,  the  artil- 
lery is  left  to  languish  under  the  withering  influence  of  official 
neglect. 

It  is  not  so  in  any  of  the  other  first-class  nations,  for  in  every  other 
the  efficiency  of  the  infantry  and  artillery,  in  fighting  power,  ad- 
vances with  equal  pace.  There  is  no  feature  of  their  army  organi- 
zation more  complete  than  the  firing  schools,  for  the  practical 
benefit  of  officers  and  men;  and  in  the  artillery,  in  addition,  to  test 


capacity,  intelligence,  and  professional  attainments  of  the  officers  of  that  par- 
ticular arm  of  service,  upon  which  has  heretofore,  and  will  hereafter,  devolve 
the  defense  of  the  maritime  frontier,  while  favoring  those  who  are  "invincible 
in  peace,  invisible  in  war."  [Tortification  Bill,  section  2,  Majority  Report, 
House  of  Representatives,  first  session,  Forty-eighth  Congress.] 

Paragraph  1023,  Revised  Regulations  of  1881,  (No.  490,  of  1863,)  directs  that 
the  senior  officer  of  engineers,  of  ordnance,  and  the  departments  of  the  general 
staff  serving  at  the  chief  headquarters  in  the  field,  shall  transmit  to  the  bureau 
of  his  department  at  Washington,  at  the  close  of  the  campaign,  and  .at  such 
other  times  as  the  commander  in  the  field  may  approve,  a  full  report  of  the 
operations  of  his  department,  and  whatever  information  to  improve  its  service 
he  may  be  able  to  furnish. 

The  artillery  is  excluded  here.  Hence,  neither  during  the  Civil  war,  before 
that,  nor  since,  have  commanders  of  artillery  had  any  means  of  placing  needed 
information  before  any  authority  whatever,  let  alone  the  War  Department. 
This  being  ignored,  has  proved  a  heavy  and  grievous  load  for  the  artillery  to 
bear.  Thus  this  most  complicated  of  all  arms  has  been  left,  in  the  field,  to  its 
own  devices.  As  artillery  it  has  never  had  any  standing  at  the  War  Depart- 
ment. The  head  of  a  bureau  non-combatant  in  war,  in  peace  fiercely  combat- 
ant, acts  as  chief  of  the  artillery  arm,  but  without,  of  course,  knowing  any- 
thing of  its  needs  in  campaign.  This  is  but  another  reason  why  the  ordnance 
and  artillery  should  be  either  united  under  a  single  head,  or  the  arm  given  a 
chief  of  its  own  to  represent  it  at  the  War  Department  councils. 


PRACTICE    FIRING.  147 

the  guns,  carriages,  caissons,  and  ammunition,  in  order  that  the 
theoretical  knowledge  acquired  from  books  may  be  made  com- 
plete by  practice,  skill  acquired,  without  which  the  lessons  of  the 
school-room  are  of  secondary  importance,  and  to  some  officers 
a  positive  detriment.  The  annual  allowance,  for  each  battery  is 
from  three  to  five  hundred  rounds  of  ammunition,  good,  bad,  and 
indifferent  in  quality,  depending  upon  the  particular  lessons  to  be 
taught.  Every  effort  is  made  by  competition  and  otherwise  to 
excite  the  deepest  interest  in  the  practice,  and  when  completed  to 
turn  its  results,  carefully  noted,  to  the  greatest  advantage  of  the 
artillery  arm. 

With  us  the  practice  is  the  reverse  of  this.  The  allowance 
of  ammunition  is  insufficient,  and,  being  selected  from  ' '  service- 
able yet  longest  on  hand,"  is  generally  wretchedly  inferior  in 
quality.  As  illustrating  what  can  be  done  with  this  kind  of  ammu- 
nition, the  firing  does,  perhaps,  very  well;  but  to  show  the  actual 
power  of  our  artillery,  under  favorable  circumstances,  it  is  of  no 
value  whatever.  The  truth  of  these  statements,  their  exact  accord 
with  the  facts  as  regards  quality  of  ammunition,  is  abundantly 
borne  out  by  the  marginal  remarks  on  the  tabulated  records  from 
the  various  posts.  Neither  have  the  officers  of  the  new  artillery 
staff,  separated  as  they  are  from  the  line  of  the  army,  absorbed  in 
study  of  the  exact  sciences,  given  up  to  philosophical  reflections, 
time  nor  inclination  to  withdraw  themselves  from  these  congenial 
pursuits  to  work  out  practical  deductions  from  the  results  of  our 
annual  artillery  practice.  The  artillery  officers  with  troops  have 
not  the  records,  hence  they  cannot  do  it;  and,  as  a  result,  no  at- 
tempt is  made  to  follow  up  to  its  logical  consequences  the  informa- 
tion acquired,  thus  defeating,  in  great  measure,  the  objects  for 
which  the  target  practice  of  the  artillery  arm  is  authorized. 


148       HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

ADMINISTRATION — DUTIES :    TECHNICAL. 

The  Artillery  Branch  of  Service  has  to  a  degree,  at  some  times 
more  than  others,  been  intrusted  with  those  technical  duties  of 
the  laboratory,  the  workshop,  and  the  arsenal  which  in  other 
countries  are  considered  as  appertaining  to  the  peculiar  functions 
of  that  arm,  but  at  present,  with  us,  are  assigned  to  the  ordnance 
department. 

Knox  was  the  active  agent,  under  the  orders  of  the  commander- 
in-chief,  for  devising  ways  and  means  for  manufacturing  or  other- 
wise securing,  within  the  colonies,  munitions  of  war,  particularly 
cannon  and  small-arms,  with  powder  and  projectiles.  He  wished, 
in  regard  to  technical  matters  at  least,  to  establish  our  own  upon 
the  plan  of  the  Royal  Artillery  of  England,  himself  occupying 
the  position  of  master-general  of  ordnance.  He  was  never  able, 
however,  to  fully  carry  that  point,  although  himself  practically 
performing  the  duties,  not  only  of  the  master-general  but  of  his 
board  of  ordnance  as  well,  in  addition  to  those  appertaining  to 
commander  of  the  artillery  arm.  This  state  of  affairs  was  inter- 
rupted for  one  year  only,  while  the  plan  on  which  the  department 
of  commissary-general  of  military  stores  was  being  tested.  The 
commander  of  artillery,  except  during-  that  year,  determined  upon 
the  models  for  guns  and  carriages,  and  the  kinds  and  quantities  of 
warlike  stores  to  be  supplied.  Although  many  cannon  of  various 
sizes  and  kinds  of  metal  were  procured  abroad,  no  carriages,  tum- 
brils, ammunition  wagons,  or  other  wheeled  artillery  vehicles 
were  purchased;  all  were  manufactured  in  the  colonies. 

In  general  terms  it  may  be  stated  that  the  commander  of  the 
artillery  controlled  everybody  and  everything  connected  with  that 
branch  of  service,  both  personnel  and  materiel.  He  did  not 
make  contracts  for  supplies;  that,  Congress  reserved  the  right  to 
do,  and  generally  through  its  cannon  committee,  the  board  of 
war  and  ordnance,  or  the  finance  department.  To  the  board 
of  war  and  ordnance,  appointed  June  I2th,  1776,  was  given  by 
Congress  the  duty  of  keeping  account  of  all  artillery,  arms,  and 


DUTIES:  TECHNICAL.  149 

warlike  stores,  and  preserving  such  portion  as  might  not  be  in  use. 
The  next  year  these  duties  were  extended  to  embrace  the  build- 
ing and  management  of  laboratories,  arsenals,  foundries,  and  mag- 
azines, thus  relieving  Knox  of  a  burden  which  force  of  circum^ 
stances  had  placed  upon  him  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  war. 

The  facts  attending  the  establishment  of  the  department  of  the 
commissary-general  of  military  stores,  from  their  direct  bearing 
upon  the  technical  affairs  of  the  artillery  at  this  time,  should  be 
understood,  and  will  be  narrated. 

Soon  after  assuming  command  at  Boston,  in  1775,  General 
Washington  recommended  to  Congress  the  appointment  of  a 
commissary  of  artillery.  This  appointment  he  was  authorized  to 
make,  at  a  salary  of  $30  per  month — more  than  a  captain  of  that 
arm.  The  office,  purely  civil,  was  first  filled  by  Mr.  Ezekiel 
Cheever;  and,  in  the  orders  assigning  him  to  duty,  the  com- 
mander of  artillery  was  instructed  to  place  all  ordnance  stores, 
not  in  the  hands  of  troops,  in  charge  of  the  commissary,  who  was 
to  see  them  properly  taken  care  of,  and  who  was  in  fact  made 
storekeeper  for  artillery  materiel.  The  number  of  persons  thus 
employed  increased  as  the  war  progressed;  and  one  of  the  rec- 
ommendations of  the  commander  of  the  artillery  for  the  improve- 
ment of  that  arm,  made  to  a  congressional  committee  September 
27th,  1776,  was  that,  besides  the  commissaries,  there  should  be 
appointed  deputies — capable,  active  men — conductors,  and  clerks, 
at  the  discretion  of  the  commander-in-chief. 

-  To  meet  still  further  that  officer's  views,  General  Washington 
diverted  from  its  original  purpose  one  of  the  battalions  of  artillery 
the  organization  of  which  was  set  on  foot  pursuant  to  authority 
vested  in  him  December  i2th,  1776,  and  formed  it  into  an  artificer- 
regiment  (so  called),  for  labor  in  the  same  field  of  non-combatant 
duties  with  the  commissaries,  clerks,  and  conductors.  (Organi- 
zation, p.  7.)  This  was  the  germ  of  the  department  of  commis- 
sary-general of  military  stores,  or  the  ordnance  department  of  the 
Revolution.  January  i6th,  1777,  Benjamin  Flower,  of  Philadel- 
phia, was  appointed  lieutenant-colonel  commandant  of  this  artil- 
lery artificer-regiment,  with  the  additional  office  of  commissary- 
general  of  military  stores.  The  regiment  was  recruited  from 
mechanics  alone — wheelwrights,  blacksmiths,  and  laboratory  men 
—who  never,  as  soldiers,  took  the  field  or  fired  a  gun.  The 
colonel  was  a  capable  business  man;  his  subordinate  officers  were 


150      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

supposed  to  be  master-workmen.  The  organization,  though  styled 
regiment,  was  never  so  in  fact;  it  had  no  staff;  its  major  was  a 
carpenter;  the  officers  of  five  companies  of  the  regiment  were 
commissioned,  while  those  of  five  other  companies  were  not. 
One  company  was  engaged  to  serve  as  mechanics  for  the  artil- 
lery in  the  field;  all  the  rest  were  employed  at  the  laboratories 
and  arsenals. 

When  the  Conway  cabal  was  at  its  height,  in  the  winter  of 
1777— '78,  several  of  its  members  were  placed  on  the  new  board  of 
war  and  ordnance,  ostensibly  presided  over  by  Gates,  but  really 
by  Mifflin.  The  faction  opposed  to  General  Washington  con- 
trolled its  councils,  and,  that  the  commander-in-chief  might  be 
struck  a  blow  which  at  the  same  time  would  cement  and  add  to 
the  power  of  the  board  of  war,  it  was  determined  to  reorganize 
the  staff  departments,  place  them  under  orders  of  that  body  almost 
exclusively,  and  withdraw  them  to  a  corresponding  degree  from 
control  of  the  commander  of  the  army.  The  quartermaster's 
department  was  overhauled;  the  inspector's  department  created, 
and  Conway,  against  Washington's  well-known,  publicly  express- 
ed wishes,  and  with  the  increased  rank  of  major-general,  placed 
at  its  head;  but  so  ill-timed  were  these  and  many  other  measures 
undertaken  professedly  to  reform  the  public  service,  that  they 
scarcely  excited  notice,  and  soon  passed  into  oblivion.  It  was 
at  this  time  that,  having  received  the  recommendation  of  the 
board  of  war,  the  department  in  question — really  the  department 
of  technical  artillery — was  placed  upon  a  more  elaborate  footing, 
and  the  control  of  its  officers  regulated  in  accordance  with  the 
principle  before  indicated.  In  pursuance  of  this  plan  Congress, 
February,  1778 — 

"  Resolved,  That  there  shall  be  one  commissary-general  of  military  stores, 
whose  business  it  shall  be  to  receive  and  deliver  all  arms,  ammunition,  and 
accoutrements  of  every  species  and  denomination ;  to  provide  and  contract  for 
all  such  articles  as  may  be  wanted  in  this  department,  according  to  the  direction 
he  shall  receive  from  the  board  of  war  and  ordnance ;  to  receive  and  collect 
returns  from  all  the  different  States  where  there  are  any  continental  arms  and 
stores,  draw  them  into  one  general  return,  and,  on  the  first  day  of  every  month, 
deliver  one  to  the  board  of  war  and  ordnance.  *  *  * 

"All  continental  armorers  shall  be  under  the  direction  of  the  board  of  war 
and  ordnance  and  of  the  commissary-general  of  military  stores ;  the  armorers 
to  receive  from  the  said  commissary  all  arms  to  be  repaired,  make  returns  of  the 
state  of  repairs  when  demanded,  and  deliver  the  arms,  when  repaired,  into  his 
store.  *  *  * 


DUTIES:  TECHNICAL.  151 

"That  there  be  as  many  deputies,  assistants,  commissaries,  deputy  commis- 
saries, conductors,  and  clerks  as  the  exigency  of  the  service  shall  require,  to 
be  appointed  by  the  board  of  war  and  ordnance.  *  *  * 

"  That  for  the  future  no  rank  be  annexed  to  the  officers  of  this  department 
except  they  belong  to  the  regiment  of  artillery-artificers,  and  then  their  rat^k 
only  to  take  place  as  officers  of  that  corps ;  the  pay  also  which  they  receive  as 
officers  of  that  regiment  to  be  included  in  the  pay  herein  settled  for  the  officers 
of  the  commissary-general's  department.  *  *  * 

"All  the  artillery-artificers  that  are  or  may  be  employed  at  any  armories,  labo- 
ratories, foundries,  or  military  magazines,  (those  employed  with  the  army  in  the 
field  excepted,)  shall  be  under  the  immediate  direction  and  subject  to  the  orders 
and  command  of  the  commissary-general,  or  the  officer  directed  by  him  to  take 
charge  of  the  same.  *  *  * 

"The  board  of  war  and  ordnance  shall  transmit  from  time  to  time,  as  the 
service  shall  render  necessary,  transcripts  from  all  returns  received  from  the 
commissary-general  of  military  stores;  also  accounts  of  all  ordnance  and  stores 
under  their  care,  or  belonging  to  the  United  States,  and  the  places  where  the 
same  are  deposited,  to  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States, 
in  order  that  he  shall  make  such  requisitions  for  supplies  for  the  army  under 
his  immediate  command,  or  for  the  separate  departments,  as  he  shall  think 
proper.  *  *  * 

"The  commanding  officer  of  artillery  for  the  time  being,  in  the  grand  army, 
with  the  chief  engineer,  commissary  of  artillery,  and  eldest  colonel  of  artillery 
in  camp,  or  such  of  them  as  are  present  with  the  army,  shall  be  a  subordinate 
board  of  ordnance,  under  the  direction  of  the  commander-in-chief  or  the  board 
of  war  and  ordnance,  for  transacting  all  business  of  the  ordnance  department 
necessary  to  be  done  in  the  field,  and  to  have  the  care  of  all  ordnance  and  stores 
in  camp ;  and  in  case  of  sudden  exigency  the  commissary-general  of  military 
stores  shall  be  obliged  to  obey  their  directions  as  to  any  supplies  wanted  by  the 
army  out  of  the  stores  not  in  camp  ;  and  the  said  board  shall  correspond  with 
and  report  their  proceedings  to  the  board  of  war  and  ordnance,  from  whom  they 
are  to  receive  any  necessary  assistance." 

Colonel  Flower  was  confirmed  in  the  position  of  commissary- 
general  of  military  stores,  with  rations  and  pay  dating  back  to 
July  i6th,  1776,  when  he  had  been  appointed  commissary  of  the 
Flying  Camp  in  New  Jersey.  He  was  authorized  to  augment 
the  number  and  strength  of  the  companies  of  the  regiment  of 
artificers,  the  enlisted  force  of  which  received  every  bounty  and 
more  pay  than  the  artillery,  while  the  officers  received  equal  pay 
with  those  of  the  same  grade  in  that  arm. 

The  establishment  of  this  department  was  important  in  its  bear- 
ing upon  the  administrative  affairs  of  the  artillery,  inasmuch  as  it 
materially  curtailed  the  powers  of  the  commander  of  that  arm  in 
the  management  of  technical  matters.  For  the  artillery-artificers 


152      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

it  proved  important  also  ;  the  clause  confining  the  scope  of  their 
military  rank  to  the  narrow  limits  of  their  own  corps  placed  them 
in  a  mortifying  position  when  brought  into  contact  with  the  rest 
of  the  army.  They  fought  hard  against  this  interpretation  being 
given  the  resolution,  but  to  no  purpose;  a  no  less  authority  than 
Colonel  Pickering,  at  the  time  a  member  of  the  board  of  war  and 
ordnance,  declaring  that  it  was  the  intention  to  confine  the  opera- 
tion of  the  rank  of  these  artificer  officers  to  the  limits  of  their  regi- 
ment ;  and  as  this  decision  was  concurred  in  by  the  Secretary  at 
War  and  the  agent  for  army  accounts,  the  commutation  of  half- 
pay  for  life,  given  after  the  war  to  other  continental  officers,  was 
denied  those  of  the  artillery-artificers.  The  commissary  of  mili- 
tary stores  department,  including  that  regiment,  was  considered 
to  be  a  civil  branch  of  the  Government,  and  the  only  reason  for 
allowing  the  officers  of  the  latter  organization  military  rank  at  all 
was  to  enable  them  to  sit  on  courts-martial  to  try  members  of 
their  own  corps,  and  for  general  purposes  of  interior  discipline. 

The  career  of  the  new  department  was  neither  long  nor  pros- 
perous. This  was  due,  first,  to  the  fact  that  the  power  of  the 
particular  board  of  war  and  ordnance  which  brought  it  into 
existence  was  but  transitory;  second,  it  withdrew  from  the  com- 
mander of  the  artillery  authority  which  he  had  previously  exer- 
cised, and  which  experience  was  every  day  demonstrating  he 
should  retain,  viz.,  a  deciding  voice  in  determining  all  questions 
that  arose  concerning  artillery  materiel ;  third,  by  far  the  larger, 
more  intelligent  and  (excepting  the  head  of  the  department)  influen- 
tial members  among  its  officials  and  employe's  were  civilians,  the 
military  rank  of  the  artificers,  though  limited,  being  still  sufficient 
to  beget  rivalries,  jealousies,  and  disputes  which  brought  to  a 
stand-still  the  government  workshops. 

In  so  far  as  the  new  order  of  things  affected  the  armies  in  the 
field,  we  may  best  judge  of  their  workings  by  the  following  ex- 
tract from  a  letter  written  to  the  commander-in-chief  by  General 
Knox,  and  dated  artillery  park,  Valley  Forge,  June  i5th,  1778: 

"  I  feel  myself  so  embarrassed  in  the  duties  of  my  department  by  the  regula- 
tions of  the  llth  February  that  I  send  changes  for  consideration  of  Congress. 
I  am  in  the  awkward  situation  of  having  none  of  the  powers  appertaining  to 
the  rank  of  commanding  officer  of  artillery ;  I  am  expected  to  do  things,  and 
have  no  means  of  doing  them.  In  all  considerable  armies  in  Europe  a  general 
officer  has  command  and  direction  of  the  artillery  and  the  preparation  of  every- 


DUTIES:  TECHNICAL.  153 

thing  relating  to  the  ordnance  department  in  all  its  details.  He  is  allowed  as 
assistants  commissaries,  clerks,  conductors,  founders,  and  artificers,  all  under 
his  immediate  control.  In  the  British  service  the  muster-master-general  of 
ordnance  or  the  cbmmander-in-chief  of  the  artillery  has  a  board  of  ordnance  ; 
he  presides ;  and  this  regulates  everything  pertaining  to  the  artillery.  This_ 
board  consists  of  the  surveyor-general  of  the  artillery,  clerk  of  the  ordnance, 
storekeeper,  and  clerk  of  the  deliveries.  There  cannot  be  pointed  out  one  in- 
stance where  the  commissaries  or  clerks  are  independent  of  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  artillery,  as  provided  in  these  regulations.  It  is  necessary  that 
the  head  of  a  department  should  have  the  direction  of  all  its  parts.  By  these 
regulations  .the  commanding  officer  of  artillery  has  no  power  to  give  the  dimen- 
sions or  construction  of  any  carriages  or  cannon,  however  erroneous  they  may 
be ;  nor  directions  for  making  port-fires,  fuses,  or  other  matters  in  which  the 
reputation  of  his  corps  is  intimately  concerned." 

The  difficulties  pointed  out  led  to  great  inconvenience  in  the 
campaign  of  1778,  and  a  committee  of  Congress  examined  into 
the  subject,  heard  all  parties  interested,  and  then  recommended 
such  modifications  as  amounted  in  effect  to  abolishing  the  depart- 
ment of  commissary-general  of  military  stores,  in  so  far  as  the  duties 
of  its  head  were  inimical  to  the  rights,  privileges,  and  powers  of  the 
commander  of  the  artillery,  as  pointed  out  by  Knox.  The  changes 
made  had  the  sanction  and  recommendation  of  that  officer,  as  well 
as  of  the  commander-in-chief.  They  went  into  effect  just  one  year 
after  the  department  was  'organized,  when  Congress,  February 
1 8th,  1779— 

"  Resolved,  That  the  commanding  officer  of  artillery  of  the  United  States  for 
the  time  being  shall,  under  the  general  orders  and  concurrence  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief, arrange  and  direct  all  business  of  the  ordnance  department 
necessary  to  be  done  in  the  field.  The  ordnance,  arms,  and  military  stores  in 
the  fixed  magazines  to  be  drawn  out  only  by  the  orders  of  the  board  of  war 
and  ordnance,  unless,  in  the  course  of  the  service,  circumstances  should  occur 
in  which  the  procuring  such  orders  from  the  board  would,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
commander-in-chief  and  commanding  officer  of  artillery,  occasion  improper 
delays;  and  in  such  cases  the  commanding  officer  of  artillery  shall  have  "power 
to  draw  from  the  nearest  magazines  the  supplies  wanted  for  the  army  ;  and  the 
different  commissaries  and  directors  of  the  magazines  and  laboratories  shall,  in 
such  cases,  immediately  obey  the  orders  of  the  commanding  officer  of  artillery, 
informing  the  board  of  war  and  ordnance  of  the  same.  And,  that  the  comman- 
der-in-chief and  commanding  officer  of  artillery  may  know,  in  such  cases,  where 
to  send  for  necessary  supplies,  the  board  of  war  and  ordnance  shall  cause 
monthly  returns  of  all  ordnance,  arms,  and  military  stores  at  the  magazines  in 
the  United  States  to  be  made  to  the  commander-in-chief,  who  will  communi- 
cate to  the  commanding  officer  of  artillery  the  whole  or  any  part  of  them,  as  he 
shall  judge  the  good  of  the  service  requires.  And  as  it  may  frequently  happen 
20 


154      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.  S.  ARMY. 

that  parts  of  the  army  may  be  detached  to  such  distances  as  to  render  their 
obtaining  supplies,  in  the  circumstances  above  mentioned,  by  the  immediate 
orders  of  the  commander-in-chief  and  commanding  officer  of  artillery,  incon- 
venient, in  such  cases  the  commander-in-chief  and  commanding  officer  of  artil- 
lery shall  give  to  the  commanding  officers  of  the  detachment,  and  of  the  artillery 
annexed  to  it,  proper  directions  for  furnishing  the  detachment  with  the  neces- 
sary supplies  of  ordnance,  arms,  and  military  stores;  and  the  orders  of  the  said 
commanding  officers  of  the  detachment,  and  of  the  artillery  annexed  to  it, 
given  pursuant  to  the  said  directions,  shall  be  obeyed  by  the  commissaries 
and  directors  at  the  magazines  and  laboratories  as  if  given  immediately  by 
the  commander-in-chief  and  commanding  officer  of  artillery  of  the  United 
States.  *  *  *  " 

This  was  the  first  point  gained  under  the  new  regulations,  and 
greatly  increased  the  mobility  of  the  army  by  placing  the  ord- 
nance, arms,  and  military  supplies  at  the  command  of  the  general 
of  artillery  or  his  subordinates.  But  this  was  not  sufficient ;  a 
competent  machinery  was  necessary  to  conduct  the  commissary 
duties  with  the  army  itself,  and  to  meet  this  requirement  Congress 
created  a  new  department  for  this  special  service  by  providing — 

"That  there  shall  be  a  field  commissary  of  military  stores,  to  be  appointed 
by  the  board  of  war  and  ordnance,  who  shall  receive  and  issue  all  ordnance, 
arms,  and  military  stores  in  the  field,  pursuant  to  the  orders  of  the  commander- 
in-chief  and  commanding  officer  of  artillery ;  all  orders  for  this  purpose  from 
the  commander-in-chief  to  be  directed  to  the  commanding  officer  of  artillery. 
The  field  commissary  shall  have  so  many  conductors,  deputies  and  clerks,  to  be 
likewise  appointed  by  the  board  of  war  and  ordnance,  as,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
board,  the  commander-in-chief,  and  the  commanding  officer  of  artillery,  the 
service  shall  from  time  to  time  require." 

And,  to  show  what  relation  this  new  department  should  bear 
to  the  rest  of  the  army  and  the  established  commissary  depart- 
ment, paragraph  5  (ibid.)  proceeded :  "The  field  commissary  of 
military  stores,  his  deputies,  conductors  and  clerks,  shall  be  inde- 
pendent of  the  commissary-general  of  military  stores;"  and  they 
were  instructed  to  make  monthly  returns  of  stores  received,  is- 
sued and  remaining  on  hand,  from  which  a  consolidated  return 
was  to  be  made,  and  a  copy  sent  by  the  field  commissary  to  the 
board  of  war  and  ordnance,  one  to  the  commander-in-chief,  one 
to  the  commander  of  artillery,  and  a  fourth  to  the  commissary- 
general  of  military  stores. 

The  duty  of  submitting  estimates  for  ordnance,  arms,  and 
military  stores  necessary  for  the  use  of  the  army  was  imposed 
upon  the  commanding  officer  of  artillery.  That  the  materiel 


DUTIES:  TECHNICAL.  155 

should  have  that  intelligent  supervision  which  the  good  of  the 
service  required,  and  that  the  experience  of  the  war  might  not 
be  lost,  it  was  further  provided— 

"That,  whenever  the  said  commanding  officer  of  artillery  shall  judge  any 
particular  directions  necessary  for,  or  alterations  and  improvements  to  be 
made  in,  the  construction  or  preparation  of  ordnance,  arms,  and  military 
stores  of  any  kind,  he  shall  communicate  the  same  to  the  board  of  war  and 
ordnance  for  their  consideration,  who  shall  thereupon  give  such  orders  to  the 
artificers  and  laboratory  men  as  they  shall  judge  the  good  of  the  service  re- 
quires." 

While  the  provisions  quoted  gave  the  commander  of  artillery 
control  of  all  ordnance,  arms,  and  military  stores  already  manu- 
factured, made  the  field  commissary  his  subordinate,  and  gave 
the  suggesting  of  improvements  into  his  hands  as  his  peculiar 
prerogative,  it  yet  remained  to  bring  the  whole  field  of  technical 
artillery  under  his  supervision.  To  accomplish  this,  and  thus 
make  the  commander  of  artillery  what  the  name  implies  in  all  its 
plenitude,  paragraph  10  provided — 

"That  there  shall  be  one  surveyor  of  ordnance,  to  be  appointed  annually 
from  the  colonels,  the  appointment  to  be  made  by  the  board  of  war  and  ord- 
nance, until  Congress  shall  direct  otherwise.  The  officer  thus  appointed  shall 
retain  his  rank  in  the  artillery  and  all  the  benefits  arising  from  it ;  but  during 
the  time  of  his  surveyorship  he  shall  not,  except  in  extraordinary  cases  or  when 
called  tor  by  the  commander-in-chief,  perform  any  duty  in  the  line.  His  duty 
as  surveyor  shall  be  to  examine  into  the  construction,  qualities,  and  condition 
of  all  cannon,  carriages,  arms,  and  materials  for  and  preparation  of  every  spe- 
cies of  warlike  stores,  and  to  visit  all  the  different  arsenals,  foundries,  laborato- 
ries, and  workshops  belonging  to  the  ordnance  department  of  the  United  States, 
carefully  noting  every  error  and  defect  he  shall  discover,  which,  with  a  general 
state  of  the  department,  he  shall  report  immediately  to  the  board  of  war  and 
ordnance,  as  well  as  the  commanding  officer  of  artillery,  with  his  ideas  of  any 
alterations  or  improvements  proper  to  be  made  thereon.  He  shall  also  examine 
all  ordnance  and  military  stores  in  the  field,  and  report  the  state  of  them  to 
the  commanding  officer  of  artillery  and  the  board  of  war  and  ordnance;  and, 
for  the  purposes  aforesaid,  the  commissaries  of  military  stores,  as  well  in  the 
field  as  elsewhere,  shall  make  returns  to  the  said  surveyor,  and  shall  expose  to 
his  view  all  the  ordnance,  arms,  stores,  and  materials  for  the  ordnance  depart- 
ment in  their  custody." 

In  one  word,  everything  and  everybody  connected  with  the 
department  of  ordnance,  in  the  field,  at  the  laboratories,  foundries, 
arsenals,  or  wherever  they  might  be,  were  brought  through  this 
inspectorship,  inquisitorial  in  its  powers,  to  the  attention,  whether 


156      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,  U.   S.   ARMY. 

with  good  or  bad  report,  of  the  commander  of  artillery  of  the 
United  States.  The  practical  effect  of  this  was  what  Congress 
intended  it  should  be,  and  that  officer  was  restored  to  his  position, 
in  fact  as  well  as  in  name,  of  commander  of  the  artillery  arm.  The 
pay  of  the  commander  of  artillery  was  increased  $75,  that  of  the 
surveyor  $70  per  month,  as  compensation  for  the  duties  imposed, 
and  subordinate  officers  of  the  new  department  received  an  in- 
crease in  proportion  to  their  pay  in  the  line. 

Colonel  John  Lamb  was,  March  6th,  1779,  appointed  to  the 
office  of  surveyor.  He  had  from  early  in  life  devoted  much  time 
and  study  to  obtaining  a  knowledge  of  the  technical  features  of 
the  artillery,  while  a  wide  experience  in  the  field,  in  the  several 
grades  of  captain,  major  and  colonel,  had  thoroughly  informed 
him  of  the  details  of  actual  service,  its  needs  and  defects,  and  sug- 
gested means  for  overcoming  them. 

The  office  of  field  commissary  was  conferred  upon  Mr.  Samuel 
Hodgdon,  a  civilian  commissary  of  the  ordnance  department. 
This  gentleman,  whose  superior  as  a  man  of  business  the  Revolu- 
tionary war  did  not  produce,  had  first  been  appointed  commissary 
by  General  Knox,  February  ist,  1777,  and  had  served  in  that  ca- 
pacity, principally  in  the  northern  department,  with  Major  Stevens' 
artillery  battalion,  under  Schuyler  and  Gates.  The  establishment 
of  his  department,  the  personnel  of  which  were  devoid  of  military 
rank,  was  a  most  difficult  matter;  but  he  grappled  with  the  task 
and  was  successful.  His  character  was  known  and  appreciated. 
When  Colonel  Flower  died  (April  28th,  1781,)  he  was  appointed 
commissary-general  of  military  stores,  the  duties  of  which  office, 
together  with  those  of  field  commissary,  he  performed  until  the 
end  of  the  war.* 

With  such  assistants  as  Lamb  and  Hodgdon  it  may  be  supposed 
that  Knox  found  his  labors  greatly  facilitated.  The  appointment 

*Mr.  Hodgdon  also  performed  the  duties  of  assistant  quartermaster  for  the 
State  of  Pennsylvania,  under  Pickering.  During  President  Washington's  ad- 
ministration he  was  quartermaster-general  of  the  army.  He  filled  these  positions 
with  conspicuous  ability;  and  notwithstanding  a  congressional  committee  held 
him  partially  responsible  for  St.  Glair's  defeat,  December  4th,  1791,  public  con- 
fidence in  his  great  business  capacity  was  not  in  the  least  impaired.  When 
General  Washington  was  called  to  the  head  of  the  army  in  1*798,  Mr.  Hodgdon 
was  again  drawn  into  the  service  as  superintendent  of  military  supplies  and 
confidential  adviser  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 


DUTIES:  TECHNICAL.  157 

of  the  surveyor,  however,  led  directly  and  rather  abruptly  to  the 
disintegration  of  the  ordnance  department  proper.  The  attention 
of  that  functionary  was  first  directed  to  the  extensive  laboratory  at 
Springfield,  Massachusetts,  where,  due  to  misunderstandings  be- 
tween the  civil  and  the  military  branches  of  the  service,  the  costly 
plant  was  turning  out  few  products,  and  they  inferior  in  quality. 
At  the  same  time  Governor  Reed,  of  Pennsylvania,  reported  prac- 
tically the  same  state  of  affairs  existing  at  the  Carlisle  arsenal. 
Concerning  this  the  governor  remarked:  "The  iron-work  of  the 
carriages  was  most  villainously  done.  I  could  run  my  hands 
into  the  joints  and  cracks  in  the  wood-work,  and  one  i8-pounder 
carriage  that  I  saw  broke  down  under  the  first  fire." 

The  reports  of  the  surveyor  having  been  adverse  to  the  man- 
agement at  these  and  other  places,  Congress,  on  August  I2th, 
1780,  razeed  the  department,  retaining  only  Colonel  Flower,  one 
deputy,  and  one  commissary  each  at  Springfield,  Carlisle,  and 
the  Virginia  laboratory,  and  two  or  three  at  places  of  minor 
importance.  Except  the  chief,  all  the  principal  officers  were  now 
civilians.  Each  company  of  artillery-artificers  was  reduced  to 
one  officer  and  forty  enlisted  men.  Lieutenant-Colonel  David 
Mason,  of  Knox's  original  regiment,  detached  for  ordnance  duty 
as  early  as  1776;  Mr.  Ezekiel  Cheever,  the  first  commissary  of  mil- 
itary stores  in  the  army;  Major  Eayres,  of  the  artillery  artificer- 
regiment,  with  the  subalterns,  almost  to  a  man,  were  discharged; 
and  although  several  captains  of  that  regiment  were  retained  as 
superintendents  of  harness-makers,  carpenters,  wheelwrights,  ar- 
morers, smiths,  &c.,  they  were,  with  scarcely  an  exception,  placed 
under  the  orders  of  civilian  commissaries.  The  next  blow  was 
struck  by  the  resolve  of  Congress  of  March  29th,  1781,  which 
discharged  all  the  artillery-artificers  except  two  companies.  The 
death  of  Colonel  Flower,  and  his  succession  by  Mr.  Hodgdon, 
placed  now,  as  had  formerly  been  done  by  the  resolution  of  Con- 
gress of  February,  1778,  the  affairs  of  the  ordnance  department, 
both  in  the  field  and  elsewhere,  under  the  immediate  supervision 
of  a  single  head;  but  circumstances  were  changed,  and  the  whole 
was  entirely  under  the  superior  control  of  the  commander  of 
artillery,  by  virtue  either  of  original  powers  conferred  by  Con- 
gress, or  powers  assumed  with  the  acquiescence  of  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  and  the  board  of  war  and  ordnance.  This  ap- 


158      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

pears  from  Mr.  Hodgdon's  correspondence,  covering  the  minute 
details  of  artillery  technical  affairs  at  this  period. 

It  only  remained  to  take  from  it  what  little  of  permanency  was 
left,  even  in  appearance,  that  the  ordnance  department,  as  such, 
should  cease  to  exist.  This  was  accomplished  by  resolution  of 
Congress  of  July  24th,  1782,  which  removed  every  semblance  of 
stability,  by  authorizing  the  Secretary  at  War  to  appoint  from 
time  to  time  a  commissary  of  military  stores,  and,  if  agreeable  to 
them,  to  select  as  many  officers  of  the  army  to  act  in  that 
department  as  the  exigencies  of  service  required.  Mr.  Hodgdon, 
in  a  letter  to  Captain  Irish,  of  the  artillery-artificers,  concerning 
this  resolution,  said:  "The  department  is  annihilated.  I  am 
retained  as  commissary  of  military  stores.  The  Secretary  retains 
you  as  deputy,  with  one  assistant,  one  conductor,  and  one  director 
in  the  laboratory. ' ' 

Thus  terminated  the  department  of  commissary -general  of 
military  stores,  or  the  ordnance  department  of  the  Revolution. 
Springing  from  the  inevitable  necessities  of  active  service,  it  was 
so  unfortunate  as  to  receive  a  distinct  organization  under  the 
blighting  influence  of  a  faction  in  the  army  and  in  Congress, 
which,  seeking  to  render  the  department  independent  of  the 
commander-in-chief  and  the  general  of  artillery,  rendered  its 
successful  operation  impossible;  for  the  wheels  of  its  machinery, 
when  the  army  took  the  field,  either  dragged  heavily  or  stood 
still.  The  rapidly-developed  defects  caused  the  organization  of 
a  field  commissary  department,  independent  of  the  first.  There- 
after it  was  practically  nothing  more  than  a  supply  corps  made 
up  of  mechanics,  mostly  civilians,  whose  work  was  supervised 
by  the  general  of  artillery.  When  the  army  was  disbanded,  in 
1783,  Mr.  Hodgdon,  with  several  assistants,  was  temporarily 
retained  in  service.  He  acted  as  agent  for  the  Secretary  at  War, 
whose  duty  it  was  to  preserve  all  military  supplies,  and  was  finally 
discharged  July  20th,  1785. 

Under  resolve  of  Congress,  September,  1782,  the  field  com- 
missary department  was  readjusted  to  meet  the  needs  of  an  army 
upon  the  eve  of  peace.  The  appointment  of  the  personnel  there- 
after devolved  upon  the  commanders  of  artillery  in  the  main  and 
southern  armies,  acting  with  the  approval  of  their  respective 
commanding  generals.  Its  existence  officially  terminated  when, 


DUTIES:  TECHNICAL.  159 

pursuant  to  the  proclamation  of  October  i8th,  the  army  was  dis- 
solved November  3d,  1783. 

The  arrangement  of  a  peace  establishment  was  a  matter  of  no 
little  difficulty,  although  one  to  which  Congress  early  addressed 
itself,  by  appointing  a  committee,  of  which  Colonel  Hamilton 
was  the  active  member,  to  consult  with  the  commander-in-chief. 
Among  all  the  responses  to  General  Washington's  request  to  be 
furnished  with  the  views  of  officers,  that  of  General  Du  Portail, 
of  the  engineers,  was  perhaps  most  pertinent  to  the  subject  now 
being  considered.  His  counsels  derived  additional  weight  from 
the  fact  that  he  was  acquainted  not  only  with  the  experience 
and  practice  of  European  armies,  but  also  of  our  own.  He  ad- 
vised uniting  the  artillery  and  engineers,  dividing  the  frontier 
into  sections,  placing  artillery  and  engineer  affairs  in  each  section 
under  an  officer  of  rank,  while  over  all  would  be  placed  a  com- 
mandant and  director-general  of  artillery  and  fortification  for  the 
United  States.  To  the  director-general  subordinate  officers  of 
the  department  of  artillery  and  engineers  were  to  be  accountable, 
he  to  be  their  commander  and  the  head  of  administrative  affairs, 
through  whom  would  be  transmitted  all  orders  of  Congress  or 
the  Secretary  at  War  affecting  the  corps.  It  was  absolutely  nec- 
essary, Du  Portail  significantly  remarked,  to  have  such  an  officer, 
in  order  that  the  important  branch— the  administrative — should 
be  governed  by  constant  principles;  for  inconvenience,  prejudi- 
cial to  the  public  interests  alone,  would  follow  from  having  several 
heads  to  the  department,  each  independent  of  the  others. 

This  argument  was  conclusive  with  Mr.  Hamilton's  committee, 
which  recommended  the  adoption,  in  the  proposed  military  peace 
establishment,  of  the  principles  here  announced  ;  but  the  unsettled 
and  imbecile  Government  was  incapable  of  doing  anything  calcu- 
lated to  secure  its  perpetuity,  and  the  report  of  the  committee  was 
never  heard  from  after  being  submitted  to  Congress. 

In  the  meantime  General  Knox,  retained  in  service  temporarily 
when  the  army  was  disbanded  to  take  care  of  the  interests  of  the 
Government  in  the  resulting  disorder,  wrote  the  following  letter  to 
General  Washington,  in  which  was  first  suggested  the  advisability 
of  making  the  Secretary  at  War  commander  of  the  peace  army, 
whatever  that  might  prove  to  be,  and  adding  to  his  duties  those 
of  master-general  of  ordnance.  He  said: 


160      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

"I  have  had  it  in  contemplation  for  a  long  time  past  to  mention  to  your 
excellency  the  idea  of  a  master-general  of  ordnance.  I  beg  leave  at  the 
same  time  to  rejmark  that,  although  my  expectations  and  wishes  are  for 
private  life,  yet  if  any  office  should  be  formed  upon  the  broad  scale  of 
national  policy,  I  might,  if  thought  worthy,  find  it  convenient  to  give  it 
my  zealous  assistance." 

General  Washington  replied: 

"  I  have  conversed  with  several  Members  of  Congress  upon  the  propriety, 
in  time  of  peace,  of  uniting  the  offices  of  Secretary  at  War  and  master- 
general  of  ordnance  in  one  person,  and  letting  him  have  command  of  the 
troops  on  the  peace  establishment,  not  as  an  appendage  of  right — for  that, 
I  think,  would  be  wrong — but  by  separate  appointment  at  the  discretion  of 
Congress.  If  done,  it  will  make  a  handsome  appointment.  My  wishes  to 
serve  you  in  it  you  need  not  doubt." 

Congressional  action  was  such  as  to  meet  these  views  favorably, 
and  was  probably  the  result  of  General  Washington's  recommen- 
dations, made  pursuant  to  the  arrangement  here  entered  into;  for 
although,  when  Secretary  at  War  Lincoln  resigned,  it  was  not 
expected  that  his  place  would  be  filled,  this  idea  was  abandoned, 
and,  by  resolution  of  May  2Qth,  1784,  the  proper  committee  was 
directed  to  revise  the  institution  of  the  War  Office,  while  on  the 
2yth  of  January  following  an  ordinance  was  passed  to  ascertain 
the  powers  and  duties  of  the  incumbent.  Knox  was,  March  8th, 
1785,  chosen  Secretary  at  War;  his  functions  were  substantially 
those  of  the  old  Secretary,  but  in  addition  he  was  directed  to  deter- 
mine ' '  the  arrangement,  destination,  and  operation  of  such  troops 
as  are  or  may  be  in  service,  subject  to  the  orders  of  Congress,  or 
the  Committee  of  the  States  in  the  recess  of  Congress."  This 
made  him  commander  of  the  forces,  and,  subject  to  the  limita- 
tions indicated,  he  exercised  that  authority  until  the  installation 
of  the  first  President  under  the  Constitution. 

In  technical  artillery  matters  the  powers  of  the  new  Secretary 
were  to  a  degree  more  limited  than  those  of  his  predecessor,  who 
had  been  intrusted  with  the  building  and  management  of  laborato- 
ries, arsenals,  foundries,  and  magazines;  but  this  resulted  from  the 
circumstance  that  for  several  years  after  the  war  no  attempts  were 
made  at  manufacturing  new  materiel,  the  old  stock  alone  being 
drawn  upon  for  the  limited  demands  of  service.  It  was  made  the 
duty  of  the  Secretary  at  War  to  see  the  materiel  properly  stored 
and  taken  care  of,  to  insure  which  being  done  the  law  provided 
that  he  should,  at  least  once  a  year,  visit  all  the  magazines  and 


DUTIES:  TECHNICAL.  161 

deposits  of  public  stores,  reporting  to  Congress  their  condition, 
with  the  measures  taken  for  their  preservation.  But  the  expecta- 
tion that  he  would  personally  inspect  these,  widely- separated 
depositories  proved  to  be  an  absurd  impossibility,  incompatible 
with  a  proper  performance  of  his  functions  at  the  seat  of  Govern- 
ment, and  by  force  of  circumstances  the  inspector's  duties  were 
devolved  on  subordinates. 

The  inauguration  of  the  first  President  transferred  the  com- 
mand of  the  army  from  the  Secretary  of  War.  In  the  adminis- 
tration of  artillery  affairs,  however,  the  functions  of  the  Secretary 
remained  practically  as  before.  He  was  responsible  for  materiel, 
and,  at  the  option  of  the  President,  gave  orders  to  the  artillery, 
with  other  troops. 

This  was  possible  in  the  quiet  immediately  succeeding  the 
Revolution;  but  the  first  symptoms  of  serious  national  trouble 
called  for  increased  administrative  facilities.  Accordingly,  when, 
in  1794,  our  relations  with  England  assumed  a  threatening  as- 
pect, leading  to  the  initiating  of  a  plan  for  the  fortification  of  the 
sea-board,  the  raising  of  a  corps  of  artillerists  and  engineers,  and 
the  providing  what  was  deemed  a  large  amount  of  cannon  and 
warlike  stores,  the  Secretary  of  War  was  given,  by  act  of  April 
2d,  1794,  an  assistant  in  the  person  of  the  superintendent  of  mili- 
tary stores. 

This  officer's  duty  was  to  keep  account  of  warlike  materiel, 
quartermaster  and  other  stores  appertaining  to  the  War  Depart- 
ment. Practically,  however,  accountability  for  public  property 
was  but  very  imperfectly  insured.  It  was  not  at  first  considered 
possible  to  devise  any  system  by  which  company  commanders 
could  be  held  responsible  for  property  in  their  possession,  and 
as  late  .as  March,  1800,  the  superintendent  of  military  stores 
reported  that  there  was  no  one  whose  business  it  was  to  make 
returns  for  the  ordnance  in  the  hands  of  the  regiments.  This 
difficulty  was  attempted  to  be  met  by  General  Orders  issued  from 
the  Adjutant-General's  Office,  War  Department,  March  i7th, 
1800,  wherein  were  promulgated  regulations  for  making  returns 
of  ordnance  and  other  property.  By  subsequent  orders  the 
military  and  assistant  military  agents  provided  for  in  the  peace 
organization  of  March  i6th,  1802,  were  directed,  together  with 
all  post  commanders  to  whom  were  issued  military  and  quarter- 
21 


l62       HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,  U.  S.   ARMY. 

master  stores,  to  render  an  account  of  them  to  the  superintendent 
of  military  stores,  the  agents  quarterly  and  the  post  commanders 
semi-annually.  Although,  no  doubt,  the  surveillance  of  the  super- 
intendent prevented  waste  and  loss,  the  inadequacy  of  the  system 
of  responsibility  may  be  judged  from  the  circumstance  that,  in 
1809,  in  response  to  a  direct  inquiry  of  the  Secretary  of  War, 
the  superintendent  replied  that  there  was  no  system  in  force  which 
enabled  him  to  know  where  the  Government  property  was  located, 
or  what  stores  were  in  existence,  as  military  agents  and  post 
commanders  exercised  their  volition  about  making  returns  for 
property  in  their  possession. 

To  those  acquainted  with  military  affairs,  no  statement  other 
than  this  is  necessary  to  prove  the  utter  and  entire  absence  of  any 
proper  system  of  administration.  It  was  a  fitting  prelude  to  the 
enormous  losses  and  misdirection  of  supplies  which  marked  the 
movements  of  the  small  armies  of  the  war  of  1812,  and  caused 
commanders  to  cast  a  hundred  anxious  glances  to  the  rear  where 
they  cast  one  towards  the  enemy. 

The  office  of  purveyor  of  public  supplies,  created  by  act  of 
February  23d,  1795,  was  another  of  those  attempts  to  improve 
army  administrative  affairs  which  followed  when  the  people,  rudely 
awakened  from  the  dream  of  universal  and  everlasting  peace  which 
followed  the  Revolution,  were  preparing  by  force  of  arms,  under 
the  vivifying  influence  of  the  constitutional  Government,  to  assume 
and  maintain  an  honorable  position  among  the  nations  of  the 
world.  The  duty  of  the  office  was  to  procure  all  arms,  military 
and  naval  stores,  or  other  articles  of  supply  requisite  for  the  serv- 
ice of  the  United  States.  At  first  the  purveyor  was  an  officer 
of  the  Treasury  Department  only;  but  by  act  of  July  i6th,  1798, 
when  preparations  were  making  for  war  with  France,  the  con- 
tracting for  and  purchase  of  supplies  for  the  army  was  placed  in 
the  hands  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  the  purveyor  made  subject 
to  his  orders,  thus  becoming,  at  least  to  this  extent,  an  officer  of 
the  War  Department. 

But  it  did  not  suffice  that  the  purveyor  should  purchase,  and 
the  superintendent  of  military  supplies  should  take  care  of,  artil- 
lery materiel ;  it  was  found  necessary  to  have  an  officer  act  in  an 
intermediate  capacity,  to  examine  into  the  quality  of  purchases 
before  acceptance  by  the  Government.  In  a  letter  dated  June 
28th,  1798,  Secretary  McHenry  remarked: 


DUTIES:   TECHNICAL.  163 

"It  is  with  infinite  regret  the  Secretary  is  obliged  to  mention  that  the 
ordnance  of  our  country  is  by  no  means  in  a  position  to  command  respect. 
Part  of  it  was  collected  during  a  season  of  difficulty  and  necessity,  from 
different  countries,  and  consequently  many  of  the  guns  are  essentially  de- 
fective, and  those  of  the  same  class  differ  in  weight,  length,  and  calibre.  The 
variance  in  these  particulars  occasions  much  trouble  and  inconvenience,  in 
providing  appropriate  ammunition,  stores,  apparatus,  carriages,  besides  sub- 
jecting the  military  service  to  injurious  delays,  and  the  fatal  consequences 
which  might  result  from  ammunition  and  implements  being  supplied  which, 
in  time  of  need,  will  be  found  not  adapted  to  the  piece.  As  there  is  no 
established  standard,  it  has  also  happened,  from  a  defect  of  knowledge  in 
our  founders,  or  some  other  cause,  that  most  of  the  cannon  that  have  been 
cast  within  or  on  account  of  the  United  States  are  defective  in  very  essen- 
tial points,  and  exhibit  varieties  in  those  cast  at  the  same  furnace,  and  of 
the  same  class,  with  those  procured  from  abroad. 

"It  is  important  that  some  arrangement  should  be  immediately  adopted, 
calculated  to  give  efficacy  to  a  proper  system  and  correct  these  evils.  It  is 
not  enough  that  the  President  determine  upon  the  size,  weight,  dimensions, 
and  calibres  of  the  different  kinds  of  cannon,  either  to  be  made  or  imported 
into  the  United  States,  for  their  use,  unless  an  inspector  of  artillery  can  be 
appointed  to  see  that  all  regulations  appertaining  to  the  ordnance  department 
be  executed  and  observed  with  exactitude." 

Moved  by  these  just  considerations,  Congress,  in  the  bill  then 
pending  for  the  augmentation  of  the  army,  and  which  became  law 
July  i6th,  1798,  made  the  appointment  of  an  inspector  of  artillery 
obligatory;  and,  to  insure  technical  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the 
person  so  designated,  provided  that  he  should  be  taken  from  the 
line  of  artillerists  and  engineers. 

Concerning  a  fit  character  for  this  office,  PresidentAdams  wrote 
to  Inspector-General  Hamilton,  who  had  urged  the  appointment 
of  Major  Louis  de  Tousard,  that,  while  recognizing  the  profes- 
sional qualifications  of  this  gentleman,  he  hesitated  to  make 
him  inspector  of  artillery,  as  there  was  such  a  deep-seated  dis- 
trust of  French  officers  on  the  part  of  the  people  that  he  expect- 
ed much  trouble.  .  It  must  be  confessed  that  the  President, 
by  promptly  dismissing  La  Rochefontaine,  colonel  of  the  corps 
of  artillerists  and  engineers,  and  placing  the  other  obnoxious 
officers  under  a  ban,  adopted  rather  energetic  measures  to  quiet 
popular  apprehension;  but,  as  to  Tousard,  suspicion  was  speed- 
ily and  very  justly  allayed.  He  was  soon  after  informally  put 
upon  this  duty,  and  May  26th,  1800,  appointed  lieutenant- 
colonel  commandant  of  the  Second  Regiment  of  artillerists  and 


164      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.   ARMY. 

engineers,  with  the  additional  formal  appointment  of  inspector  of 
artillery  for  the  United  States.  The  duties  of  the  office  were 
defined  by  the  Secretary  of  War  in  general  terms  to  be — 

"  First,  to  take  an  inventory  of  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores  now  on 
hand,  and  see  that  all  are  placed  where  they  will  be  properly  taken  care  of; 
.second,  to  inspect  all  ordnance  and  articles  of  artillery  materiel,  making 
report  to  the  superintendent  of  military  stores:  third,  to  prepare  and  fur- 
nish contractors  and  others  proper  models  for  gun  carriages  and  other 
articles  of  artillery  whenever  necessary,  and  to  see  that  no  subaltern  officer 
makes  any  artillery  machine  which  is  not  of  the  model  adopted ;  fourth, 
to  provide  lists  and  models  of  all  necessary  utensils  and  apparatus  for 
artillery  at  the  several  laboratories,  &c." 

The  administration  of  artillery  affairs  from  this  time  down  to 
1812  may  be  summed  up  as  follows:  The  technical;  the  Secretary 
of  War  contracted  for  supplies ;  the  purveyor  purchased  those  not 
procured  by  contract  through  the  Secretary;  the  inspector  fur- 
nished models,  and  saw  that  they  were  strictly  complied  with, 
while  the  superintendent  of  military  supplies  received  and  stored, 
for  distribution  on  requisitions,  what  was  accepted  by  the  inspec- 
tor; and  as  no  rigid  system  of  returns  was  observed,  or  indeed 
deemed  practicable,  an  attempt  was  made  to  protect  the  interests 
of  the  Government  by  making  it  the  duty  of  the  superintendent  to 
cut  down  all  estimates  for  supplies  to  the  lowest  limits  compatible 
with  public  requirements,  and  of  these  requirements  he  was  made 
the  judge.  Regarding  military  subordination,  the  regiment  of 
artillerists,  in  common  with  the  rest  of  the  army,  was,  in  a  general 
way,  under  the  orders  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  who  therefore 
could  be  said  to  administer  affairs  affecting  the  artillery,  both 
technical  and  personnel. 

The  reorganizing  act  of  March  i6th,  1802,  was  construed  to 
abolish  the  office  of  inspector  of  artillery.  Subsequent  to  the 
passage  of  this  act,  and  prior  to  the  organization  of  the  ordnance 
department  in  1812,  the  colonel  of  the  regiment  of  artillerists  gen- 
erally performed  the  duties  of  inspector,  and  was  the  principal 
assistant  to  the  Secretary  on  technical  artillery  matters ;  in  his  cus- 
tody were  preserved  models  for  guns,  carriages,  and  machines. 
Those  seeking  information  on  which  could  be  based  estimates 
for  the  manufacture  or  supply  of  materiel  were  invariably  referred 
by  the  Secretary  to  the  colonel  of  the  artillerists  for  details;  and 
in  June,  1812,  after  the  department  had  been  authorized  by  law, 
Secretary  Eustis  wrote  that  officer,  then  in  command  of  the  artil- 


DUTIES:  TECHNICAL.  165 

lery  in  New  York  Harbor:  "Until  the  ordnance  department  shall 
be  in  operation,  you  will,  as  far  as  your  other  duties  may  permit, 
continue  to  superintend  the  preparations  making  therein."  Of 
these  duties  he  was  finally  relieved  by  the  commissary-general  of 
ordnance  a  few  weeks  later.  Thus  passed  from  the  control  of  the 
senior  officer  of  artillery  the  functions  of  inspector  or  supervisor 
of  the  technical  affairs  of  that  arm. 

It  thus  appears  that,  from  the  termination  of  the  Revolutionary 
war  down  to  the  appointment  of  the  commissary-general  of  ord- 
nance, in  1812,  the  Secretary  of  War  exercised  a  very  close  per- 
sonal control  of  technical  artillery  matters,  and  there  is  no  reason 
to  suppose  that  his  course  would  have  changed  had  not  the  war 
of  1812  given  him  other  things  to  think  about,  and  demonstrated 
the  necessity  for  intrusting  minor  affairs  to  subordinates.  The 
fact  cited  may  have  been  due  to  the  imposition  upon  the  Secre- 
tary, under  the  Confederation,  of  the  duties  of  master-general  of 
ordnance;  and  although,  prior  to  1800,  the  President  himself  was 
supposed  to  prescribe  models  for  cannon  and  other  materiel,  while 
at  that  date  this  authority  was  transferred  to  the  inspector  of  artil- 
lery, still,  the  official  correspondence  covering  the  period  from 
1785  to  1812  shows,  apparently,  that  not  a  carriage  was  made, 
not  a  gun  cast,  not  a  single  new  feature  affecting  artillery — men 
or  materiel — carried  into.execution,  but  that  the  Secretary  of  War 
discussed  the  measure,  raised  objections,  suggested  improvements, 
and  in  fine  gave  as  much  attention  to  the  matter  as  though  he 
were  chief  of  the  artillery  alone. 

This  was  particularly  so  under  Secretaries  Knox  and  Dearborn, 
both  of  whom  were,  from  experience,  competent  judges;  and  al- 
though under  the  former  little  new  materiel  was  manufactured, 
and  that  of  old  style,  this  was  not  the  case  with  the  latter,  under 
whose  administration  the  Gribeauval  carriage  was  brought  to  the 
point  of  being  first  introduced  into  our  service,  a  new  and  excel- 
lent system  of  iron  field  giuis  successfully  manufactured,  thereby 
greatly  increasing  the  mobility  of  the  field  artillery.  These,  with 
the  equipping  of  the  first  horse  battery,  in  1808,  mark  what 
should  have  been  an  important  epoch  in  the  history  of  the  United 
States  artillery.  That  no  adequate  results  followed  these  intelli- 
gent exertions  was  no  fault  of  Secretary  Dearborn,  and  but  par- 
tially so  of  the  arm  itself,  many  of  whose  officers  were  among  the 
ablest  and  most  cultured  in  service.  It  followed  from  lack  of  a 


l66      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.  S.   ARMY. 

competent  head  to  the  artillery — a  man  who  could  recognize  an 
improvement  when  demonstrated  to  be  such — capable  of  using 
the  good  material  of  the  personnel  to  raise  it  to  its  true  position 
as  a  scientific  arm ;  from  changes  in  the  head  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment, one  tearing  down  what  the  other  built  up;  from  the  deplet- 
ed state  of  the  treasury  and  what  proved  to  be  false  notions  of 
economy;  lastly,  from  the  fatal  sense  of  immunity  from  war  into 
which  the  Government  had  lapsed  while  the  reverberation  of  the 
Leopard^ s  guns  yet  echoed  along  the  shores  of  the  Atlantic  ;  and 
although  the  new  system  of  field  artillery  proved  its  superiority 
over  its  predecessor  in  a  second  struggle  with  Great  Britain, 
neither  it  nor  the  light  artillery  fully  met,  owing  to  the  causes 
mentioned,  the  anticipations  of  their  projector. 

As  to  the  aclual  professional  acquirements  of  the  artillery  at 
this  time,  (1802-1812,)  it  may  be  safely  asserted  that  the  mass 
of  its  officers  knew  little  or  nothing  of  the  higher  duties  of  the  pro- 
fession. Combining,  in  1794,  the  artillerists  and  engineers  had 
not  been  productive  of  the  happy  consequences  hoped  for  by 
Mr.  Hamilton's  committee  and  General  Du  Portail.  Both  La 
Rochefontaine  and  Tousard,  of  that  arm,  were  capable  scientific 
officers,  but  attention  was  then  turned  to  the  engineering  rather 
than  to  the  artillery  duties  of  the  corps;  while  the  former  occupied 
the  time  of  the  best  educated  officers,  the  latter  were  turned  over 
to  contractors  and  foundrymen.  Artillery  officers  did  not,  there 
is  reason  to  believe,  come  in  contact  with  practical  technical 
duties,  from  1794  to  1800,  to  a  degree  that  would  in  the  least 
benefit  them. 

The  embarrassment  caused  by  the  Frenchmen  when  war 
with  France  was  imminent  was  a  sufficient  reason  for  gradual- 
ly eliminating  them,  which  process,  commenced  in  1798,  was 
rendered  complete  by  the  reorganizing  act  of  1802.  But,  while 
the  country  was  thus  reassured,  the  artillery  was  injured  in 
having  withdrawn  from  its  ranks  its  most  accomplished  mem- 
bers. Nor  was  this  all :  that  reorganizing  acl:  took  from  the  arm 
its  only  American  officer,  above  the  rank  of  captain,  who  was 
known  to  be  possessed  of  great  abilities  and  scientific  attain- 
ments, and  placed  him  at  the  head  of  the  new  engineer  corps ; 
while,  as  colonel  of  the  regiment  of  artillerists,  was  retained  a 
respectably  practical  soldier,  with  some  knowledge  of  simpler 
technical  affairs,  but  disqualified  by  habit  and  education  for  the 


DUTIES  I    TECHNICAL.  167 

position  of  chief  of  a  scientific  corps.  Here  was  made  a  mistake 
from  which  the  arm  has  never  recovered.  That  was  the  time  at 
which  a  right  direction  might  have  been  given  affairs ;  but,  being 
allowed  to  pass  unimproved,  through  incapacity,  the  organization  _ 
of  a  technical  artillery,  under  capable  management  if  possible,  was 
a  logical  and  inevitable  consequence  so  soon  as  either  efficient  re- 
adjustment of  the  army  was  determined  on,  or  the  accumulating 
responsibilities  of  war  rendered  it  impracticable  for  the  Secretary 
to  devote  a  large  part  of  his  time  to  personal  supervision  of  artil- 
lery affairs. 

Intelligent  soldiers,  who  knew  what  the  deficiencies  of  service 
were,  had  pointed  out  the  necessity  for  reform  of  some  kind.  In 
the  fall  of  1811  a  board  of  officers,  embracing  General  Ganse- 
voort,  Colonel  Williams,  and  others  first  in  merit  in  the  army, 
submitted  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  among  other  recommenda- 
tions for  the  improvement  of  the  military  establishment,  the  fol- 
lowing for  the  artillery  :  First,  the  adoption  of  a  uniform  system 
of  tactics  ;  second,  reviving  the  office  and  powers  of  inspector  of 
artillery;  third,  the  appointment  of  an  artillery  board,  upon  which 
should  rest  responsibility  for  determining  models,  proportions,  and 
metal  of  cannon  of  all  kinds,  in  order  that  system  should  be 
established  in  that  department,  where,  at  the  time,  nothing  was 
definitely  determined  in  regard  to  these  important  matters. 

Colonel  Izard,  of  the  Second  Regiment  of  artillery,  (being 
raised,)  likewise  addressed  the  Secretary  upon  the  same  subject, 
urging  that  active  measures  be  taken  for  the  amelioration  of  the 
condition  of  that  arm,  the  same  in  substance  but  more  elaborate 
in  detail  than  that  of  Du  Portail  thirty  years  before.  Concerning 
the  professional  status  of  the  artillery  at  the  time  (1812),  this 
officer,  who  was  perhaps  the  best  informed  in  that  branch  of 
service,  remarked: 

"The  various  corps  denominated  artillery  have  been  such  for  many  years  in 
the  United  kStates  only  in  name.  The  pecuniary  advantages  which  accompany 
the  exertions  of  American  youth  in  other  liberal  professions  have  necessarily 
deviated  their  attention  from  the  studies  which  are  indispensable  for  the  exer- 
cise of  the  scientific  branches  of  the  military  duty,  and  which  require  long 
and  serious  instruction.  It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  therefore,  that  the  officers 
of  the  United  States  artillery,  with  but  few  exceptions,  are  only  acquainted 
with  details  of  service  which  are  common  to  every  description  of  soldiers. 
With  us,  contrary  to  the  practice  in  Europe,  it  sometimes  happens  that  officers  attain 
to  the  highest  ranks  in  the  army,  of  corps  that  are  entirely  scientific,  without  being 


1 68      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

acquainted  with  the  elements  which  are  necessary  for  the  execution  of  the  duties  of  a 
subaltern.  How  all-important  for  the  public  it  is  to  have  a  remedy  for  the  evil, 
is  proved  by  the  difficulties  in  procuring  those  qualified  to  take  the  higher 
commands  in  the  artillery  and  engineer  corps  at  the  present  crisis." 

The  crisis  mentioned  precipitated  what  events  had  predeter- 
mined; the  technical  artillery  was  given  into  the  hands  of  those 
competent  to  perform  its  duties;  the  ordnance  department  was 
organized  under  an  able,  accomplished  scholar  and  officer;  while 
to  the  regiments  were  left  the  glorious  to  be  sure,  yet  restricted, 
duties  of  the  field,  to  perform  which,  however,  most  efficiently 
and  economically,  required  the  technical  knowledge  of  the  new 
department,  supplemented  by  the  practical  experience  of  the  old. 
Thus,  as  a  result  of  the  selection  of  improper  personnel  in  1802, 
was  the  artillery,  contrary  to  the  practice  of  all  other  armies, 
separated  ten  years  later  into  two  parts,  each  in  itself  imperfect, 
yet  which,  properly  united,  make  up  a  complete  and  symmetrical 
whole. 

This  continued  until  March  2d,  1821,  when,  in  the  reduction 
and  rearrangement  of  the  army,  the  ordnance  department  was 
merged  in  the  artillery  and  technical  duties  restored  to  that  arm. 
The  reorganizing  act  provided  that  to  each  of  the  four  artillery 
regiments  should  be  appointed  one  supernumerary  captain,  while 
the  President  was  given  authority  to  select  from  the  artillery  the 
other  necessary  officers  for  ordnance  duty. 

These  were  subject,  in  the  execution  of  their  special  duties,  to 
the  orders  of  the  War  Department  only;  but  when  companies  or 
detachments  of  artillery  were  stationed  at  arsenals,  the  comman- 
dants of  the  latter  were  responsible  to  regimental  and  department 
commanders  for  the  regular  returns  and  reports.  In  so  far  as 
discipline  was  concerned,  officers  on  ordnance  duty  were  on  the 
same  footing  as  others;  and  being,  in  technical  matters,  exclu- 
sively under  the  orders  of  the  War  Department,  questions  of 
responsibility  to  seniors  were  happily  adjusted.  On  the  one 
hand,  they  had  constantly  before  their  eyes  the  fact  that  they 
were  part  of  the  army  and  amenable  to  military  law;  on  the 
other,  that,  in  the  performance  of  the  duties  to  which  they  were 
assigned,  they  were  not  subject  to  interference  except  by  order 
of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

To  insure  perfect  working  of  the  new  department,  a  special 
inspectorship  was  deemed  advisable.  With  this  end  in  view,  one 


DUTIES:  TECHNICAL.  169 

of  the  regular  inspectors-general  was  at  first  assigned  to  the  artil- 
lery arm  alone.  As  to  the  personnel,  his  duties,  besides  those 
defined  by  general  regulations,  embraced  reports  upon  the  char- 
acter, capability,  and  usefulness  of  the  several  officers  and  agents 
connected  with  the  artillery,  as  well  as  the  condition  of  the  posts 
and  troops  under  their  command.  Regarding  technical  affairs,  he 
was  instructed  to  direct  his  attention  to  the  various  depots  of 
stores,  arsenals,  foundries,  and  manufactories  of  arms;  the  mode 
of  fabrication  of  the  materiel  of  the  army,  its  quantity  and  quality. 
When,  afterwards,  the  order  assigning  this  officer  to  duty  in  the 
artillery  was  revoked,  and  the  inspectors-general  directed  to 
alternate  in  their  inspections  without  regard  *to  arm  of  service,  it 
was  deemed  necessary  to  have  a  special  inspector  for  the  techni- 
cal branch  at  least.  Accordingly,  a  field  officer  of  artillery, 
assisted  by  a  subaltern,  was  appointed  to  subject  to  proof  and 
critical  examination  all  cannon,  shot,  shells,  &c.,  at  the  several 
foundries,  and  which  were  intended  for  the  army  and  the  militia 
of  the  United  States. 

The  school  of  practice  at  Fortress  Monroe  was  intended  by 
Secretary  Calhoun  to  add  to  the  general  efficiency,  and,  with  a 
proper  organization  of  the  artillery,  would  no  doubt  have  proved 
to  be  a  powerful  auxiliary  to  that  desirable  end;  but  it  is  not 
questioned  that  this  school,  like  all  else  appertaining  to  the  arm, 
suffered  from  want  of  a  central  administrative  bureau,  and,  in  con- 
sequence, but  imperfectly  attained  the  object  for  which  it  was 
instituted. 

Merging  the  ordnance  in  the  artillery  was  done  upon  the  rec- 
ommendation of  Secretary  Calhoun,  whose  clear  and  logical  mind 
grasped  the  whole  subject  of  the  military  establishment  in  all  its 
details,  and,  in  the  duties  to  be  performed,  assigned  to  each  its 
proper  part.  In  a  report  communicated  to  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, dated  December  2oth,  1820,  there  appeared  as  his 
reason  for  the  measure  the  opinion  that,  ' '  by  uniting  the  three 
corps  of  the  ordnance,  light  artillery,  and  artillery  in  one,  ap- 
pointing one  general  staff  at  the  head  of  it,  and  making  its  officers 
pass  in  rotation  through  the  three  services,  the  organization  of 
the  army  would  be  rendered  more  simple  and  the  instruction  of 
the  officers  much  more  complete." 

As  the  most  important  step  towards  putting  these  views  into 
practice,  the  Secretary  proposed,  first  of  all,  that  there  be  ap- 

22 


170      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.    ARMY. 

pointed  for  the  new  corps  a  lieutenant-colonel  commandant,  with 
a  staff  and  administrative  machinery  competent  to  give  efficiency 
to  the  system.  But  it  was  a  time  of  reduction  as  well  as  of  reor- 
ganization; officers  who  had  devoted  their  best  years  to  the 
service  of  their  country  were  being  razeed  in  rank  or  turned  out 
to  begin  life  anew ;  the  struggle  for  place  that  ensued  was  natural. 
Nor  was  the  legislature  insensible  to  the  claims  of  worthy  vet- 
erans; personal  considerations  not  unfrequently  took  precedence 
of  public  interests;  the  artillery  arm,  under  the  color  of  reform, 
was  again,  as  in  1802,  sacrificed  to  make  place  for  individuals. 
Instead  of  being  united  in  one  compact  whole,  as  proposed,  it  was 
arranged  to  four  distinct  regiments,  without  a  bond  of  union 
between  them.  Amidst  the  disordered  body  stood  the  technical 
artillery — in  it,  but  not  of  it. 

The  scheme  as  attempted  was  a  failure;  it  lacked  every  ele- 
ment of  strength,  while  its  weaknesses  were  conspicuous  and 
fundamental.  First  of  all  was  the  omission  to  place  a  capable,  en- 
ergetic commandant,  with  a  competent  staff,  at  the  head  of  affairs. 
This  was  a  vital  defect.  Nothing  in  our  experience  since  the 
foundation  of  the  Government  is  more  clearly  established  than 
the  fact  that,  unless  there  be  a  single  directing  mind  to  set  and 
maintain  in  harmonious  working  its  delicate  and  complex  parts, 
no  department  of  the  public  service  can  long  survive  the  strains 
incident  to  practical  and  successful  operation.  The  artillery  of 
1821  proved  no  exception  to  this  rule. 

But  this  was  not  all.  The  regulations  established  by  the  War 
Department  restricted,  with  three  or  four  exceptions,  the  tours 
of  artillery  officers  on  ordnance  duty  to  one  year,  a  time  entirely 
inadequate  to  render  their  services  of  any  substantial  benefit  to 
either  themselves  or  the  department.  Nothing  could  have  struck 
a  deadlier  blow  at  efficiency  than  this  rule  of  short  details.  It  is 
very  generally  believed  that  four  years  is  the  least  time  that  offi- 
cers detached  should  serve  on  this  or  any  other  scientific  duty.  The 
first  year  is  devoted  to  obtaining  knowledge  elementary  in  char- 
acter, while,  with  faithful  public  servants,  every  additional  year 
adds,  in  greater  or  less  degree,  to  the  value  of  a  good  officer  in 
his  specialty.  Under  the  rule  adopted,  no  sooner  had  an  officer 
become  somewhat  at  home  in  his  new  avocation  than  he  was 
taken  away,  and  his  place  filled  by  a  new-comer,  who  must,  like 


DUTIES:  TECHNICAL.  171 

his  predecessor,  spend  all  his  time  becoming  familiar  with  mere 
rudiments. 

To  the  foregoing  there  must  be  added,  as  one  of  the  main 
elements  of  weakness,  the  seeds  of  dissatisfaction,  germinating  in 
intrigue,  sown  when  the  ordnance  department  was  merged,  with- 
out being  absorbed,  in  the  artillery.  The  principal  officers  of  that 
department  who  were  retained  under  the  new  regime  were  placed 
permanently  at  the  head  of  artillery  technical  affairs;  but  the 
merging  process  had  cut  off  their  individual  prospects  of  promo- 
tion. It  were  better  for  them  that  the  newly-organized  artillery 
fail  in  its  mission ;  return  to  former  practices  would  be  to  their 
advantage;  and  however  much  they  may  have  labored,  if  at  all, 
to  build  up  and  sustain  the  honor  of  the  corps  into  which  they 
were  transferred,  their  efforts  in  this  direction  are  not  of  record; 
while  their  schemes  for  its  dismemberment  commenced  so  soon 
as  Mr.  Calhoun,  the  reputed  although  not  the  real  author  of  the 
merging  plan,  (as  actually  carried  out,)  had  left  his  seat  in  the 
War  Office.  No  effort  of  theirs  was  spared  to  demonstrate  the 
defects  of  the  existing  system;  every  argument  that  ingenuity 
could  devise  to  compass  the  cherished  object  in  view  was  pressed 
upon  Congress  with  a  persistency  which,  had  the  same  abilities, 
zeal,  and  industry  been  directed  to  making  the  ordnance  depart- 
ment inside  the  artillery  a  success,  might,  spite  of  adverse  sur- 
roundings, have  partially  redeemed  the  name  of  the  arm  to  which 
they  belonged  and  which  name  they  trailed  in  the  dust.  Unfor- 
tunately, the  condition  of  the  artillery,  the  result  of  errors  of  organ- 
ization and  administration  which  have  been  pointed  out,  reinforced 
and  made  more  apparent  by  professional  apathy  on  the  part  of  its 
own  disaffected  members,  furnished  a  basis  for  the  arguments  of 
the  latter;  it  fell  a  prey  to  the  weaknesses,  inherent  or  acquired, 
of  the  system,  and  to  the  parasitic  attacks  of  those  who,  residing 
at  the  seat  of  Government,  had  the  advantage  of  personal  contact 
with  Congress,  while  the  body  of  the  arm,  scattered  in  regiments 
to  the  four  winds,  without  a  head  to  champion  its  cause  or  pre- 
sent the  true  reasons  for  the  existing  state  of  affairs,  was  compelled 
to  submit  to  dismemberment,  through  inability  to  act  in  its  own 
defense. 

That  the  promotion  to  higher  grades  of  those  interested  was  a 
consideration  of  the  first  moment  with  them,  without  which  the 
much-sought-for  separation  was  neither  acceptable  to  nor  deemed 


172      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

advisable  by  them,  the  voluminous  papers  on  the  subject  with 
which  for  six  years  Congress  was  deluged  give  abundant  proof. 
Each  was  accompanied  by  a  carefully-prepared  plan  to  increase 
the  rank  of  those  who,  by  virtue  of  their  positions,  might  expect 
to  be  benefited. 

Protestations  of  virtue  and  disinterestedness  in  the  public' serv- 
ice are  legitimate  objects  for  suspicion  when  invariably  coupled 
with  conditions  for  securing  personal  advancement. 

Let  not  injustice  be  done  the  memory  of  Mr.  Calhoun  by  sup- 
posing that  a  department  such  as  the  reorganized  artillery  of  1821 
was  his  work;  far  from  it.  His  propositions  contemplated  re- 
uniting, in  a  well-proportioned,  efficient  corps,  under  the  control 
of  one  mind,  the  two  parts  of  what  ought  to  be,  and  in  other 
armies  is,  a  single  service.  The  organization  actually  given  pos- 
sessed, with  many  of  its  own,  every  weakness,  without  a  single 
element  of  strength,  appertaining  to  the  well-considered,  admirable 
plan  of  the  distinguished  Secretary.* 

*  Notwithstanding  our  melancholy  experience  from  1821  to  1832,  the  Con- 
federate authorities,  to  whom  the  history  of  those  times  was  familiar,  evidently 
did  not,  in  1861,  deem  the  union  of  the  artillery  and  ordnance  incompatible 
with  a  proper  efficiency,  but  the  reverse.  They  adopted  the  merging  plan  of 
1821,  in  form  at  least. 

The  Confederate  army  regulations  prescribed  that  "  the  senior  officer  of  artil- 
lery on  ordnance  duty  is,  under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  charged 
with  the  superintendence  and  administration  of  the  ordnance  bureau ; "  while 
for  field  service  it  was  provided  that  the  senior  officer  of  artillery  on  ordnance 
duty  attached  to  an  army  should  have  charge  and  direction  of  the  depots  of 
ordnance  for  the  supply  of  such  army.  He  was  to  correspond  with  the  chief 
of  artillery  through  the  adjutant-general  of  that  army. 

The  ordnance  officers  of  the  Confederacy,  from  Brigadier-General  Gorgas, 
chief  of  the  bureau,  down,  were  artillery  officers  on  ordnance  duty.  The  de- 
partment embraced  an  ordnance  bureau  proper,  with  its  officers  in  the  field, 
at  the  arsenals  and  depots,  of  a  nitre  and  mining  bureau ;  and  a  bureau  of  for- 
eign supplies. 

It  is  stated  by  those  familiar  with  the  facts  that  the  workings  of  this  depart- 
ment were  eminently  successful ;  that  its  history,  while  illustrating  the  diffi- 
culties which  lay  in  the  way  of  supplying  large  armies  under  adverse  circum- 
stances, demonstrates  at  the  same  time  that  energy  and  skill,  intelligently 
directed,  can  surmount  every  obstacle. 

Had  the  same  earnest  zeal  in  the  public  service  characterized  the  efforts  of 
those  who  had  immediate  charge  of  the  department  from  1821  to  1832,  the 
result  of  the  merging  experiment,  which  failed  so  disastrously  of  beneficial 
effects,  might  and  probably  would  have  been  different. 


DUTIES:    TECHNICAL.  173 

Since  the  reorganization  of  1832  technical  artillery  affairs  have, 
under  the  law,  been  confided  to  the  ordnance  department,  then 
rehabilitated.  The  act  of  February  8th,  1815,  which  the  resus- 
citating act  of  April  5th,  1832,  revived,  had  been  enacted  under_ 
the  auspices  of  the  first  and,  perhaps,  the  greatest  of  its  chiefs, 
Colonel  Decius  Wadsworth ;  and  it  is  a  model  for  the  concise  and 
clear  manner  in  which  the  duties  of  a  department  may  be  defined. 

Those  who  labored  for  the  severance  of  the  technical  from  the 
combatant  artillery,  so  nearly  as  political  favoritism  would  permit, 
now  had  their  reward  in  the  promotion  they  had  sought.  Fortu- 
nately for  the  stability  of  their  plans  there  was  placed  at  the  head 
of  the  department  an  officer  of  ability,  education,  and  long  expe- 
rience in  the  duties  which  now  chiefly  were  intrusted  to  his 
supervision.  The  principal  assistants  were  gentlemen  of  attain- 
ments, while  among  the  junior  ranks  were  some  of  the  most 
approved  officers  whose  names  have  adorned  the  rolls  of  the 
army — men  whose  untiring  efforts  to  place  upon  a  firm  footing, 
elevate  to  and  maintain  at  a  high  standard  their  branch  of  service, 
challenge  the  admiration  of  all  who  are  familiar  therewith,  or  the 
circumstances  under  which  they  were  rendered.  Their  devotion 
to  duty  has  not  been  surpassed  in  the  history  of  the  military  pro- 
fession in  this  country ;  nor  do  the  members  of  that  profession 
themselves  generally  know  either  the  character  of  their  unobtru- 
sive labors,  or  the  full  value  of  the  results  flowing  therefrom. 

The  personnel  of  the  department  has  continued  to  be  of  a  high 
order  of  merit.  Sweeping  at  first  from  other  departments  and 
from  the  line  of  the  army  some  of  the  brightest  intellects,  it  has  * 
since  that  time  attempted,  as  a  rule,  to  recruit  the  commissioned 
ranks  from  among  those  graduates  of  the  military  academy  stand- 
ing first  in  scientific  and  scholastic  attainments;  while  in  these  and 
other  respects  those  appointees  from  other  sources,  which  a  broad 
and  wise  policy  has  admitted,  stand  second  to  none. 

From  the  beginning,  the  department  possessed  elements  of 
strength  which  the  artillery,  except"  during  the  Revolution,  has 
lacked,  viz. ,  an  organization  compact  and  homogeneous  from  top 
to  bottom,  under  the  direction  of  a  chief,  aided  by  a  central  sys- 
tem of  administration,  thus  rendering  unity  of  purpose  and  action 
easy  and  practicable.  Moreover,  it  offered  opportunity  to  place 
and  maintain  the  best,  ablest,  and  most  valued  officers  in  posi- 
tions where  their  powers  and  services  could  be  fully  utilized, 


174      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

while  the  indifferent  and  incapable  were  allowed  to  sink  out  of 
sight. 

The  department  inherited  much  of  solid  worth  from  the  artillery, 
and  was  further  fortunate  in  having  early  extended  to  its  members, 
by  intelligent  and  energetic  Secretaries  of  War,  unusual  facilities 
for  obtaining  valuable  professional  information  abroad. 

The  technical  artillery  had,  in  1830,  been  placed  in  possession 
of  all  data  pertaining  to,  and  had  commenced  the  manufacture  of, 
the  new  French  English-modified  style  of  carriages;  that  which 
soon  became  and  has  remained  the  one  feature  common  to  all  field 
and  siege  artilleries  of  civilized  armies.  This  was  of  the  first  im- 
portance to  any  scheme  for  a  reorganized  artillery  materiel. 
There  were  also  available  and  ready,  to  the  hand  of  him  who 
would  use  them,  the  results  of  deliberations  of  boards  of  artillery 
and  ordnance  officers  convened  to  investigate  the  condition  of  the 
armaments  of  the  country  and  report  plans  for  their  improvement, 
at  various  times  from  1818  to  1838.  A  commission  was  sent  to 
Europe  by  Mr.  Poinsett,  who,  with  a  true  genius  for  military 
affairs,  which  took  in  at  a  glance,  as  it  were,  the  requirements  of 
his  department,  and  pointed  out  what  was  the  one  thing  necessary 
to  give  breadth  of  thought  and  exact  information  to  those  officers 
particularly  and  directly  intrusted  with  the  delicate,  responsible 
task  of  devising  and  elaborating  a  comprehensive  scheme  for  a 
national  armament.  The  knowledge  acquired  by  the  commission 
was  of  great  value,  not  only  in  a  limited  technical  sense  within 
the  department,  but  to  the  rest  of  the  army  and  to  the  public, 
which  were  thus  informed  as  to  what  was  transpiring  elsewhere 
in  these  important  matters. 

Such  were  the  materials  from  which,  under  the  management 
and  inventive  genius  of  Colonel  Bomford,  aided  by  the  indus- 
try and  intelligent  perseverance  of  Major  Baker,  Captains  Mor- 
decai,  Huger  and  others,  his  assistants,  there  was  evolved  the  first 
complete  system  of  artillery  materiel  adopted  in  the  service  of  the 
United  States. 

How  well  the  department,  in  its  entire  work,  has  met  the  views 
and  fulfilled  the  prophecies  of  those  who  advocated  its  establish- 
ment, the  army  and  the  country  will  judge ;  it  is  foreign  to  the 
purpose  to  here  enter  that  field  of  controversy.  It  suffices  to  re- 
mark that  at  the  epoch  of  the  breaking  out  of  the  Civil  war  the 
United  States  smooth-bore  system  of  ordnance  was  not  surpassed 


DUTIES  :    TECHNICAL.  175 

in  excellence  by  any  other.  That  its  rifle  system  is  far  behind 
others  is  not  due  to  lack  either  of  ability  or  knowledge  of  details 
on  the  part  of  the  personnel,  but  to  inadequate  appropriations, 
without  which  improvements  cannot  be  either  worked  out  or  prac- 
tically tested  ;  to  the  fact  that,  while  adding  to  its  strength  politic- 
ally by  making  it  a  compact  unit  both  in  offense  and  defense,  the 
exclusiveness  of  the  organization  has  a  tendency  to  narrow  the 
minds  of  its  members,  to  lead  them  to  follow  unduly  their  own 
fancies  to  the  exclusion  of  other  and  better  things  originating 
elsewhere,  to  render  them  mere  theorists  after  all,  through  the 
impossibility  of  their  knowing  from  experience  either  the  strong 
points  or  the  weaknesses  of  their  own  handiwork,  and  to  cause 
them  to  look  with  suspicion  and  misgivings  upon  the  suggestions 
of  those  who,  from  knowledge  acquired  in  the  field  of  practical 
service,  are  alone  capable  of  judging  of  the  real  merits  and  demer- 
its of  artillery  or  other  warlike  materiel. 

The  duties  of  the  department  ' '  are  defined  by  law>  and  con- 
sist in  providing,  preserving,  distributing,  and  accounting  for  every 
description  of  artillery,  small-arms,  and  all  the  munitions  of  war 
which  may  be  required  by  the  fortresses  of  the  country,  the  armies 
in  the  field,  and  for  the  whole  body  of  the  militia  of  the  Union, 
including  the  general  principles  of  construction,  the  details  of 
models  and  forms  of  all  military  weapons."  It  was  expected  and 
intended,  when  its  duties  were  assigned,  that  the  construction  and 
inspection  of  all  cannon,  carriages,  implements,  apparatus  for  ord- 
nance, wagons  and  forges,  the  inspection  and  proving  of  powder, 
and  the  preparation  of  all  kinds  of  ammunition  and  ordnance 
stores,  would  be  carried  on  by  that  department.  The  anticipa- 
tion has  in  large  degree,  though  not  entirely,  been  realized.  The 
department  points  to  its  Wadsworth,  Bomford,  Mordecai,  Rod- 
man, and  others  since  their  day,  who  have  stood  and  now  stand 
in  the  front  rank  of  scientific  investigators ;  but  isolation,  self- 
imposed  withdrawal  from  contact  with  mankind,  must  have  to  no 
small  extent  a  benumbing  effect  on  the  intellectual  vigor  of  any 
department  if  its  members  give  way  to  this  habit,  while  inventive 
minds  elsewhere  will  not  remain  idle.  Of  recent  years  Congress 
has  taken  from  the  department  much  that  was  originally  its  pre- 
rogative, by  providing  that  mixed  boards  of  officers,  and  some- 
times its  own  committees,  should  examine  into  the  merits  of  all 
improvements  and  inventions  presented  touching  the  particular 


176      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

part  of  the  armament  under  consideration,  whether  coming  from 
the  small  world  inside  or  the  large  world  outside  the  ordnance 
department.  In  the  list  of  improvements  and  inventions  accepted 
by  those  boards  and  committees  which  have  been  known  to  pos- 
sess most  knowledge  of  the  subject-matter  of  their  deliberations, 
those  emanating  from  the  ordnance  bureau  are  conspicuous  by 
their  absence. 

Why  these  boards  and  committees  are  deemed  necessary  when 
they  so  seriously  affect  the  prestige  of  the  department  by  taking 
from  it  the  most  important  of  those  '  *  duties  defined  by  law, ' '  is 
known,  perhaps,  only  to  the  legislature. 

It  is  worthy  of  remark  that,  although  organized  for  purely  tech- 
nical duties,  the  department  accepts  with  reluctance  the  role  of 
artisans,  overseers,  and  manufacturers,  which  their  predecessors, 
the  artillery -artificers  of  the  Revolution,  were,  and  which  the 
' '  duties  defined  by  law ' '  make  them.  Efforts  to  escape  from  this 
position  have  been  strenuous,  long  sustained,  and  have  become 
of  interest  to  the  combatant  artillery  for  the  reason  that  they  have 
invariably  resulted  in  trenching  upon  its  rights,  privileges,  and 
duties.  Seeking  the  privilege  of  manning  the  siege  train,  the 
howitzer  and  rocket  battery,  by  ordnance  mechanics  during  the 
Mexican  war,  while  regular  artillery  marched  as  infantry;  organ- 
izing an  ordnance  department  in  the  field  during  the  Civil  war, 
although  the  laws  of  April  5th,  1832,  and  July  lyth,  1862,  con- 
fided that  duty  to  artillery  officers;  recommending  that  boards  to 
determine  the  nature  of  fortress  armaments  be  organized  to  exclude 
artillery  officers,  while  the  proper  functions  of  the  latter  in  the 
premises  are  assumed  by  themselves;  recommending  that  the 
results  of  all  artillery  firing,  both  in  peace  and  war,  be  tabulated 
and  sent  to  the  chief  of  ordnance,  who  thereby  becomes,  to  this 
extent,  chief  of  artillery, — all  these  things  the  department  has 
done,  thus  usurping  the  functions  of  the  regimental  artillery,  and 
making  itself  what  it  insists  that  it  is  not,  yet  which  at  the  same 
time  its  assumed  and  eagerly  grasped-after  duties  make  it — artil- 
lery staff. 

The  disposition  here  manifested  to  encroach  upon  the  long 
established  rights  of  the  regiments  is  not,  perhaps,  to  be  wondered 
at;  but  it  cannot  be  indulged  without  the  utter  annihilation  of  the 
latter  and  sweeping  away  the  last  pretext  for  opposing  the  reunit- 
ing, under  a  proper  organization,  of  the  technical  and  combatant 


DUTIES:    TECHNICAL.  tjj 

branches  of  the  artillery  arm.  To  gentlemen  reared  in  a  school 
where  to  seek  and  fight  the  enemy  is  instilled  into  youth  as  the 
highest  honor  to  which  the  soldier  can  aspire,  this  being  cut  off 
from  all  hope  of  appearing  on  the  field  is  not  agreeable  in  practice, 
however  it  may  appear  in  theory,  even  though  accompanied  by 
increased  rank  and  pay.  They  cannot  indulge  the  pleasing  re- 
flection of  having  alleviated  the  sufferings  of  their  fellow-men 
cherished  by  the  medical,  nor  that  spiritual  self-approbation  for 
duty  done  which  buoys  up  their  chaplain  non-combatant  associ- 
ates. As  a  consequence  they  yearn  apparently  to  escape  from  a 
disagreeable  situation,  supplementing  their  duties  defined  by  law 
by  others  not  defined,  yet  more  soldierly  in  their  nature;  and  as 
the  functions  of  artillery  as  a  special  arm  of  service  naturally  and 
properly  appertain  to  artillery  staff,  they  are  selected.  The  de- 
partment thereby  gains  an  eclat  which  under  the  law  it  cannot 
have.  In  the  absence  of  a  chief  of  artillery  at  the  seat  of  Govern- 
ment to  protect  the  interests  of  the  arm,  this  usurpation  is  all  the 
more  easily  effected. 

When  the  proposition  is  made  to  unite  under  efficient  manage- 
ment the  two  parts  of  the  artillery,  it  is  earnestly  protested  by 
some — with  what  candor  can  now  be  judged — that  the  ordnance 
department  is  wholly  absorbed  in  duties  defined  by  law,  the  proper 
execution  of  which  requires  the  combined  talent,  industry,  and 
business  capacity  of  all  its  members.  No  sooner  is  the  danger 
passed  than  new  inroads  are  made  on  the  regimental  artillery. 
How  long  the  latter  can  sustain  this  undermining  process,  if  con- 
tinued, it  is  impossible  to  determine;  its  extinction  as  a  separate 
arm,  however,  will  be  the  inevitable  result,  while  its  prescriptive 
rights  and  duties  pass  to  the  artillery  staff. 

That  the  two  corps  should  be  separate  is  unnatural;  and  if  con- 
vincing proof  of  this  were  wanting,  it  is  furnished  in  the  continued 
assumption  by  the  ordnance  of  the  duties  pertaining  to  the  other 
branch  of  service. 

This  state  of  affairs  will  continue,  the  interests  of  individuals 
rather  than  those  of  the  Government  be  served,  until  Congress,  with 
an  eye  single  to  the  public  good,  builds  up  a  reorganized  artillery 
service,  line  and  staff  together,  with  a  chief  and  a  central  adminis- 
trative bureau  similar  to  that  of  the  ordnance  department  to-day, 
and  in  which  the  most  meritorious  of  that  department  and  of  the 
artillery  regiments  will  be  absorbed. 
23 


178      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

The  re-establishment  of  the  ordnance  left  as  before  the  four  reg- 
iments of  line  artillery  without  aught  to  unite  them.  The  want 
of  a  head  to  the  corps  was  felt  now  even  more  than  ever,  and  the 
absence  of  regulations  denning  its  duties,  rights  and  privileges, 
particularly  in  active  service,  binding  upon  all  branches,  has 
operated  to  the  prejudice  of  its  reputation,  the  misdirection  of  its 
powers,  the  usurpation  of  its  special  functions  by  non-combatants, 
and  has  resulted  in  an  increased  expense  attending  its  management 
both  in  peace  and  war.  There  has  not  been  wholly  wanting,  on 
the  part  of  the  artillery,  either  appreciation  of,  or  disposition  to 
remedy,  the  difficulties  indicated;  but  the  method  whereby  relief 
could  best  be  obtained  has  not  always  been  clear,  or,  when  known, 
has  not  been  practicable.  Efforts  in  the  right  direction  have  been 
in  the  nature  rather  of  isolated  attempts  than  of  systematic  labors, 
upon  a  well-considered  plan,  looking  to  the  amelioration  of  the 
public  service. 

The  superior  administrative  control  of  the  two  branches  of  the 
artillery  remained  the  same,  after  their  re-separation,  that  it  was 
previous  to  that  event,  i.  e. ,  the  technical  under  the  War  Depart- 
ment only,  while  the  combatant  was  under  the  immediate  orders 
of  the  general-in-chief,  in  regard  not  only  to  personnel,  but  the 
management  of  its  interior  affairs.  The  regiments  have  always 
been  the  military  branch  of  the  artillery  department,  forming  part 
of  the  army  proper,  under  the  military  commander.  It  was  so  dur- 
ing the  Revolution;  the  periods,  intermittent  in  character,  during 
which  General  Wilkinson  commanded  the  army;  under  General 
Brown  and  his  successors  after  1821.  The  only  apparent  excep- 
tion to  this  was  placing,  when  it  was  first  organized,  the  command 
and  administrative  affairs  of  the  artillery  school  of  practice  in  1824 
under  the  control  of  the  War  Department.  The  reason  doubtless 
was  that  Mr.  Calhoun  wished  personally  to  supervise  measures 
adopted  for  carrying  into  successful  operation  this  experimental 
school,  from  which,  under  proper  management,  results  highly 
beneficial  to  the  service  were  anticipated;  but  whatever  may  have 
been  the  cause  of  the  deviation  in  this  instance  from  the  general 
rule,  it  continued  in  operation  but  a  short  time,  as  by  orders  of 
January  26th,  1826,  the  troops  composing  that  school  were  placed 
under  the  command  of  the  general-in-chief  of  the  army.  Order 
No.  58,  Adjutant- General's  Office,  that  year,  authorized  the  com- 
manding officer  of  the  .eastern  department  to  exercise  the  same 


DUTIES:   TECHNICAL.  179 

military  control  over  these  troops  as  over  others  within  the  geo- 
graphical limits  of  his  command;  while  to  the  general-in-chief  was 
reserved  the  exclusive  right,  under  the  War  Department,  to  make 
regulations  for  the  post  as  a  school  of  instruction  and  practice. 
Stated  reports  and  returns  were,  therefore,  made  to  the  depart- 
ment commander.  Upon  this  basis  the  school  was  re-established 
in  1857,  while  the  reorganization  of  1867  placed  all  pertaining  to 
the  institution  under  the  orders  of  the  general  of  the  army,  subject 
of  course  to  that  general  supervision  exercised  by  the  Secretary  of 
War  over  all  branches  of  the  service.  This  is  the  status,  as  it 
should  be,  of  the  administrative  affairs  of  the  school  at  present. 

In  the  regular  artillery,  the  prerogatives  of  colonels  in  their 
own  regiments,  either  of  administration  or  command,  are  very 
limited.  They  do  not  control  a  battery  beyond  the  particular 
posts  at  which  they  are  serving,  and  it  not  unfrequently  happens 
that  captains  command  a  larger  portion  of  the  regiment  than  the 
colonels  themselves.  Information  as  to  the  personnel  is  obtained 
from  monthly  returns  of  the  batteries  sent  to  regimental  head- 
quarters, which  set  forth  the  strength  of  each,  with  the  changes 
since  the  last  return;  while  quarterly  reports  make  known  the 
instruction  received  by  officers,  commissioned  and  non-commis- 
sioned, and  the  state  of  the  battery  funds.  The  authority  of  the 
colonel  is  exhausted  when  he  has  required  these  returns  and 
reports  to  be  made  out  as  prescribed  by  orders;  he  cannot,  even 
in  the  important  (if  properly  attended  to)  matter  of  instruction, 
take  one  step  with  a  view  to  making  personal  inspection  beyond 
the  limits  of  his  own  post.  The  regiment  of  twelve  batteries,  two 
of  which  at  this  time  are  equipped  and  serving  as  field  artillery,  is 
scattered  over  one  or  more  military  geographical  departments, 
embracing  several  States,  the  field  officers  frequently  at  garrisons 
of  a  single  battery,  while  their  juniors  have  commands  larger  than 
this.  The  colonel  may,  and  often  does,  know  but  little  of  the 
mental,  moral,  or  physical  qualifications  of  his  officers  through  per- 
sonal contact,  nor  they  anything  of  him — a  circumstance  which 
operates  to  the  detriment  of  all,  who  are  thus  deprived  of  those 
advantages  ever  flowing  from  an  interchange  of  ideas  between 
intelligent  professional  gentlemen,  and  that  confidence  resulting 
from  a  thorough  knowledge  of  those  upon  whom,  as  coadjutors, 
reliance  must  be  placed  in  times  of  danger. 

The  unfavorable  conditions  here  mentioned  are  not  of  recent 


180      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.   S.  ARMY. 

growth,  but  are  those  under  which,  in  all  its  mutations  of  organi- 
zation, the  artillery  has  labored  from  the  beginning.  Regiments 
have  never  been  kept  together.  In  Revolutionary  times,  aside 
from  the  companies  attached  to  brigades  and  those  making  up 
the  reserve  at  general  headquarters,  many  were  scattered  at 
various  posts  and  forts,  particularly  along  the  Hudson  River;  but 
in  those  times,  unlike  the  present,  artillery  officers  of  rank,  except 
those  with  the  army  in  the  field,  exercised  command  over  large 
districts,  embracing  numerous  detached  portions  of  their  own 
arm  of  service. 

With  the  artillery,  as  with  other  portions  of  the  army,  concen- 
tration in  peace  is  conducive  to  discipline,  economy,  and  general 
efficiency.  The  evils  of  dissemination,  often  a  necessary  incident 
of  service,  have  been  recognized,  and  measures  have  been  taken, 
in  a  degree  at  least,  to  counteract  them;  as,  witness  the  artillery 
school  of  practice  of  1824;  the  camp  of  instruction  at  Trenton  in 
1839;  the  re-establishment  of  the  former  in  1857,  and  again,  after 
the  Civil  war,  ten  years  later;  the  elaborate  scheme  for  practical 
and  theoretical  instruction  combined,  promulgated  in  General 
Orders  No.  10,  of  1859;  and,  finally,  the  Fort  Riley  light  battery 
school  of  1869.  Of  these,  the  school  of  practice  at  Fortress 
Monroe  alone  remains.  The  field  batteries  are  isolated  from  one 
another,  and,  as  schools  of  practical  instruction,  their  utility  re- 
duced to  a  minimum;  the  war  battalion  formation,  in  which  alone 
that  arm  now  manoeuvres  with  a  large  army,  being  entirely 
ignored,  and  officers  but  partially,  and  that  in  a  an  indifferent 
manner,  taught  the  duties  they  will  be  called  upon  to  perform 
during  the  first  week  of  active  campaign. 

The  tendency  of  late  has  been  towards  an  abandonment  of  small 
posts  and  a  concentration  of  batteries,  and  is  in  the  right  direc- 
tion; but,  if  artillery  is  to  be  such  except  in  name,  these  points  of 
concentration  must  be  supplied  with  the  guns  and  other  materiel 
to  enable  the  troops  to  practice  their  specialty.  To  do  otherwise 
is  to  neglect  the  obvious  import  of  one  of  the  most  important 
lessons  that  recent  wars* have  taught  the  arm,  viz.,  that  untrained 
artillerymen  are  incapable  of  rendering  formidable  in  attack  or 
defense  the  refined  and  complicated  machinery  they  are  required 
to  use,  and  knowledge  of  which  cannot  be  acquired  by  even  long 
practice  at  the  manual  unless  accompanied  by  study  of  the  powers 
and  capabilities  of  modern  armaments,  and  of  their  proper  use 


DUTIES  :    TECHNICAL.  l8l 

in  active  service.  It  is  true  that  but  few  of  our  artillery  troops 
have  an  opportunity  to  exercise  with  modern  guns;  but  practice 
with  those  at  hand,  if  accompanied  by  a  wise  course  of  instruc- 
tion, could  not  but  prove  of  great  utility  in  preventing  professional 
stagnation  and  decay.  If  a  system  of  inspection  were  established, 
each  colonel  for  his  regiment,  a  degree  of  knowledge,  theoretical 
and  practical,  commensurate  with  the  facilities  offered  at  each 
post,  could  be  required  of  officers,  and  which  to  some  degree  would 
keep  them  abreast  with  the  progress  of  the  age.  To  station  them 
where  there  is  no  artillery,  or  by  an  indifferent  system  of  admin- 
istration make  the  use  of  what  they  have  a  matter  of  accident, 
depending  upon  the  caprice  of  garrison  commanders,  is,  particu- 
larly if  our  sea-coast  forts  are  to  be  defended,  a  fitting  prelude  to 
the  necessary  embarrassment,  confusion,  and  possible  defeat,  with 
its  attending  disasters,  that  must  inevitably  follow. 

The  service  of  heavy  artillery,  under  modern  conditions,  is 
eminently  the  field  of  practical  scientific  labor  for  that  arm;  but 
here  labor  alone  will  lead  to  excellence  or  skill,  either  of  which 
can  only  be  acquired  through  devotion  to  duty  and  long-sustained, 
intelligent  use  of  every  means  at  the  command  of  its  members. 
The  truth  of  this  will  be  demonstrated  should  this  country  be 
brought  face  to  face  with  an  enemy  deserving  to  be  called 
formidable. 

Except  for  conduct  in  war,  let  appointments  to  the  artillery  in 
time  of  peace  be  made  only  from  those  graduates  of  the  military 
academy  recommended  by  the  academic  board;  in  case  of  other 
graduates  and  appointees  from  the  ranks  and  from  civil  life,  only 
after  having  passed  an  examination  pronounced  satisfactory,  and 
before  a  board  drawn  from  the  staff  of  the  artillery  school.  Let 
captains  and  lieutenants  be  divided  into  two  classes:  first,  those 
who  have  been  commissioned  for  conduct  in  the  field  in  war;  sec- 
ond, all  other  appointees;  and,  as  in  the  ordnance,  the  medical 
department,  and  the  engineers,  make  examination  a  condition 
precedent  to  promotion  up  to  the  grade  of  field  officer;  the  char- 
acter of  examination  to  vary  for  the  classes,  but  to  be  the  same 
for  members  of  each  class;  that  every  individual,  no  matter 
whence  he  conies,  may  be  justly,  equitably,  yet  firmly  called  to 
account,  the  fact  kept  ever  present  to  his  mind  that  to  hold  a  com- 
mission sufficeth  not;  to  retain,  he  must  be  prepared  to  prove 


l82      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

that  he  is  worthy  of  it;  if  he  cannot  do  this,  he  must,  as  he  de- 
serves, cease  to  be  an  officer. 

In  addition  to  these  measures,  taken  to  insure  a  solid  foundation 
in  excellence  for  the  commissioned  personnel,  let  the  batteries  be 
grouped  together  at  posts,  three,  four,  or  a  greater  number  at 
each,  under  their  field  officers,  where  the  best  armaments  fur- 
nished by  the  Government  are  now  or  may  be  made  available  for 
their  use;  make  the  colonels  responsible  for  the  discipline  and 
efficiency  as  artillerists  of  their  regiments;  subject  the  colonels 
themselves  to  a  surveillance  which  regards  not  persons,  but  keeps 
in  view  the  good  of  the  public  service  only,  and  the  artillery  will 
enter  upon  a  career  marked  by  a  higher  tone  and  an  increased 
professional  knowledge  on  the  part  of  its  officers,  who  will  better 
be  prepared  to  vindicate  a  claim  to  being  capable  defenders  of 
their  country's  honor. 

To  render  this  or  any  other  plan  for  the  amelioration  of  the 
artillery  permanently  effective ;  to  make  it  a  living  reality  instead 
of  an  inert  theory;  to  cause  to  flow  therefrom  advantages  lasting  in 
nature  and  beneficial  to  a  degree  proportioned  to  the  time,  trouble, 
and  expense  involved,  will  require  that  the  arm  be  given  what  it 
has  not  now,  and  yet  the  want  of  which  is  admitted  by  all  familiar 
with  its  history  to  be  its  principal  organic  defect — a  chief. 

There  is  every  reason  for  this  ;  and  if  proof  irrefragable  were 
needed  it  is  found  in  the  fact  that,  while  the  artillery  struggles 
along  without  one  in  time  of  peace,  no  sooner  does  war  arise,  re- 
quiring the  resources  of  the  Nation  to  be  put  forth  with  power  and 
organized  with  intelligence,  than  each  division,  corps,  and  army 
in  the  field  is  given  an  officer  acting  in  that  capacity. 

The  artillery  of  the  Revolution  was  organized  to  more  success- 
fully meet  the  special  requirements  of  its  service  in  war  than  it 
has  been  since.  Disregarding  the  first  year  of  that  struggle,  in 
which  experience  was  teaching  the  novices — from  commander-in- 
chief  down — the  rudiments  of  a  newly-practiced  art,  it  is  to  be 
remarked  that  the  defeat  of  Long  Island  and  the  retreat  through 
New  Jersey  placed  before  the  eyes  of  all,  in  no  uncertain  light,  the 
unwelcome  truth  that  the  only  hope  of  successful  revolution  rested 
on  the  ability  of  Congress  to  raise  and  maintain  what,  in  contra- 
distinction to  militia  and  short-service  men,  was  styled  a  regular 
army.  The  efforts  put  forth  to  accomplish  this  are  familiar  mat- 
ters of  history.  Before  the  end  of  the  year  1776  one  hundred  and 


DUTIES:  TECHNICAL.  183 

four  infantry  regiments,  three  thousand  light  horse,  a  corps  of 
engineers,  and  four  regiments  of  artillery  were  authorized  by  Con- 
gress, to  form  the  regular  establishment. 

Artillery  affairs  were  then  fortunately  given  a  proper  direction 
by  appointing  a  young  and  active  colonel,  Henry  Knox,  to  be 
brigadier-general  and  commander  of  that  arm.  He  was  assigned 
a  staff  proper  to  his  rank,  and  gradually  gathered  around  him  an 
adjutant-general,  inspector,  aids-de-camp  and  clerks,  wherewith 
to  keep  the  administrative  machinery  in  order.  The  companies 
were  scattered,  it  is  true,  (for  only  in  the  most  highly-wrought 
organizations  of  modern  times  are  artillery  regiments  kept  to- 
gether;) but  there  was  one  head  to  supervise  them  all,  attend  to 
their  wants,  supply  deficiencies,  keep  up  the  character  of  materiel, 
and  cultivate  a  proper  esprit  de  corps,  thus  making  the  artillery 
service  one  its  members  were  proud  of,  and  which  challenged  the 
approbation  of  General  Washington,  the  army,  and  the  Congress. 
It  would  seem,  too,  that  whether  the  subject-matter  for  delibera- 
tion were  to  determine  a  plan  of  campaign,  the  supplying  the 
army  either  from  home  or  from  abroad,  or  its  reorganization,  the 
commander  of  the  artillery  was  ever  present  at  the  council  board. 
It  needs  no  detailed  statement  of  services  rendered  to  evince  that 
a  proper  commander,  so  circumstanced,  must  from  necessity  have 
exerted  a  potent  influence  for  the  well-being  and  honor  of  his 
corps.  Of  the  opinion  entertained  of  it  at  headquarters  we  may 
judge  by  the  following  observations  of  the  commander-in-chief  to 
a  Member  of  Congress  in  1777:  "The  department  of  artillery, 
presided  over  by  General  Knox,  has  been  placed,  notwithstanding 
innumerable  difficulties,  upon  a  footing  that  does  its  commander 
the  greatest  honor. ' '  While  the  Marquis  de  Lafayette,  adverting 
to  the  same  subject,  remarked  that  "the  progress  of  the  artillery 
during  the  Revolution  was  regarded  by  all  conversant  with  the 
facts  as  one  of  the  wonders  of  that  interesting  period. ' '  And  from 
among  testimonials  to  the  efficiency  of  the  personnel  in  action, 
covering  the  whole  period  of  the  war,  may  be  here  recorded  that 
of  Charles  Lee  at  Monmouth  :  "The  behavior  of  the  whole  army, 
both  men  and  officers,  was  so  equally  good,  it  would  be  unjust  to 
make  discriminations ;  but  I  can  with  difficulty  refrain  from  pay- 
ing compliments  to  the  artillery,  from  General  Knox  and  Colonel 
Oswald*  down  to  the  very  drivers."  And  of  Chastellux  at  York- 

*  Lieutenant-colonel  Second  Regiment  of  artillery. 


184      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

town  :  ' '  The'guns  were  always  well  served,  and  while  the  enemy 
marvelled  at  the  exact  fire  of  the  French,  we  marvelled  no  less  at 
the  extraordinary  progress  of  the  American  artillery,  at  the  capac- 
ity and  instruction  of  its  officers." 

It  cannot  be  supposed,  however,  that  the  abilities,  professional 
attainments,  or  knowledge  of  affairs  of  any  one  man  could  have 
brought  about  such  results  in  those  times  of  revolution.  The 
general  of  artillery  was  fortunate  in  not  being  left  alone  to  essay 
the  task  of  placing  and  maintaining  upon  a  sound  basis  the  arm 
he  had  the  honor  to  command.  In  the  field  officers,  the  captains, 
and  to  a  great  extent  the  lieutenants,  he  possessed  assistants 
whose  efforts  alone  made  that  possible;  they  understood  the  science 
and  practice  of  their  profession  sufficiently  well  to  meet  every 
demand  of  service;  and  without  their  intelligent  aid  the  chief 
could  never  have  raised  the  corps,  or  the  services  it  rendered, 
above  the  level  of  mediocrity. 

From  the  date  (February  26th,  1795)  of  the  appointment  of  La 
Rochefontaine  to  be  lieutenant-colonel  commandant  of  the  corps 
of  artillerists  and  engineers,  until  1798,  was  a  period  in  which, 
jointly  with  the  engineers,  the  artillery  had  a  chief;  but  it  was  not 
a  time  when,  for  the  latter,  anything  of  practical  value  was  being 
done.  The  lieutenant-colonel  commandant,  a  professional  engi- 
neer, was  busily  occupied  personally  on  the  sea-coast  fortifications 
then  being  built,  after  a  crude  fashion,  along  the  Atlantic.  The 
execution  of  a  design  to  garrison  the  new  works  on  the  coast 
with  this  corps  had  passed  no  farther  than  its  incipient  stages;  a 
large  part  was  on  the  frontier  against  the  Indians,  and  neither 
time  nor  circumstances  had  permitted  anything  of  importance  to 
be  done  before  La  Rochefontaine  was  dismissed  the  service.  As 
previously  mentioned,  a  regiment  of  artillerists  and  engineers  was 
organized  in  1798  as  the  Second,  and  the  corps  of  1794  was  styled 
the  First  Regiment.  Both  remained  a  part  of  the  military  estab- 
lishment until  1802;  but  the  lieutenant-colonel  commandant  of 
neither  regiment  commanded  the  whole,  so  that,  as  chief  of  artil- 
lerists and  engineers,  La  Rochefontaine  had  no  successor. 

At  this  time  (1798)  the  late  commander-in-chief,  General  Wash- 
ington, with  the  title  of  lieutenant-general,  was  again  placed  at  the 
head  of  the  army.  Except  the  French,  who  were  not,  under  the 
circumstances,  to  be  trusted,  there  were,  as  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Revolution,  no  active,  well-qualified  officers  of  artillery  or  engi- 


DUTIES:  TECHNICAL.  185 

neers  in  service.  General  Washington,  however,  appreciated  the 
necessity  for  having  at  least  a  capable  head  to  each  of  these  de- 
partments, and,  as  there  was  no  one  at  home  available,  he  looked 
to  Europe,  as  before,  for  educated  and  scientific  officers  to  fill  the- 
positions.  Of  the  advisability  of  the  measure,  and  of  the  circum- 
stances rendering  it  necessary,  the  Secretary  of  War  made  the  fol- 
lowing statement  in  a  communication  to  Congress  dated  December 
24th,  1798: 

"It  is  deeply  to  be  lamented  that  a  very  precious  period  of  leisure  was  not 
improved  towards  forming  among  ourselves  engineers  and  artillerists ;  and  that, 
owing  to  this  neglect,  we  are  in  danger  of  being  overtaken  by  war  without  a 
competent  number  of  characters  of  these  descriptions.  To  form  them  suddenly 
is  impracticable ;  much  previous  study  and  experiment  are  essential.  If  possi- 
ble to  avoid  it,  war  ought  not  to  find  us  unprovided.  It  is  considered  advisable 
to  introduce,  from  abroad,  at  least  one  distinguished  officer  of  engineers  and 
one  of  artillery." 

Clearing  away  the  war-cloud  that  had  threatened  made  unnec- 
essary a  completion  of  the  measure;  the  foreign  officers  were  not 
engaged;  but  that  a  head  to  each  of  these  branches  of  service 
was  deemed  absolutely  necessary  by  General  Washington  and 
his  contemporaries,  there  is  here  abundant  proof;  as  usual,  when 
earnest  work  was  to  be  done,  principles  asserted  themselves. 

The  reorganizations  of  1802  and  1821,  with  their  influence  on 
the  artillery  arm,  have  been  adverted  to.  Notice  of  them  here  is 
unnecessary,  further  than  to  remark  that  the  former  failed  princi- 
pally, not  through  want  of  a  chief,  but  from  the  inability  of  the 
person  who  vL  Dually  occupied  that  position  to  rise  to  the  necessi- 
ties of  the  occasion;  the  latter  was  a  melancholy  instance  of  the 
impotency  of  any  organization  springing  from  considerations  of 
expediency  rather  than  those  affecting  the  public  service,  and 
based  on  makeshifts  instead  of  on  sound  military  principles. 

Of  the  intermediate  arrangement  of  March  3oth,  1814,  nothing 
need  be  said,  except  that  it  was  imbecile  to  a  degree  unrivalled — 
a  grasping  after  form,  while  ignoring,  through  incompetency  to 
comprehend  it,  the  soul  of  a  certain  proposed  plan  of  organiza- 
tion. The  artillery  corps  of  1814,  made  up  of  fragmental  battal- 
ions, with  nothing  to  unite  them,  passed  away  after  a  painful  ex- 
istence of  seven  years,  sinking,  even  in  memory,  out  of  sight  into 
deserved  oblivion. 

That  there  should  be  at  the  seat  of  Government  a  centre  of 
administration  for  the  artillery  is  a  fact  that  has  not  passed  unno- 
24 


186      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

ticed.  Among  other  measures  proposed  by  friends  of  the  service, 
Mr.  Shields,  in  March,  1852,  from  the  Senate  Military  Commit- 
tee, introduced  a  bill  for  supplying  the  deficiency.  (For  report 
accompanying  bill,  see  Appendix  B  [2].) 

The  effort  then  failed.  As  a  result,  the  batteries,  scattered  soon 
after  over  the  western  territories  in  futherance  of  an  utterly  chi- 
merical idea,  were  not  at  hand  when  needed  at  the  beginning 
of  the  Civil  war.  No  sooner  was  this  war  precipitated  than  the 
practices  of  peace  were  instantly  abandoned.  Every  army  was 
given  a  chief  of  artillery,  and  for  the  armies  covering  the  national 
capital  an  inspector  was  appointed,  with  the  rank  of  brigadier- 
general.*  In  war  even  more  than  in  peace  the  absence  of  a  chief 
at  Washington  was  deplored  as  a  misfortune  operating  in  every 
way  to  the  prejudice  of  that  arm  and  of  the  service. 

With  the  hope  that  the  experience  of  this  eventful  period,  to 
acquire  which  had  cost  so  much,  might  not  be  lost,  but  turned  to 
advantage  in  after  years,  the  permanent  artillery  board  (Appen- 
dix B  [3])  was  in  1866  organized  by  the  lieutenant-general  com- 
manding the  army.  The  subject  of  instruction  received,  among 
other  things,  the  serious  and  earnest  consideration  of  the  board 
during  its  brief,  active  life;  but,  in  the  absence  of  the  general  ol 
the  army,  in  the  fall  of  1866,  it  was  adjourned,  never  to  be  reas- 
sembled. This  was  the  last  attempt  to  give  the  artillery  a  perma- 

*"  Special  Orders  No.  210. — Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  August 
28th,  1862. —  ***!!.  Brigadier-General  William  F.  Barry,  U.  S.  volun- 
teers, is  assigned  to  duty  as  acting  inspector  of  artillery,  and  will  report  to  the 
chief  of  ordnance."  *  *  * 

"Special  Orders  No.  242. — Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington,  Septem- 
ber 15th,  1862.—  *  *  *  III.  Brigadier-General  W.  F.  Barry,  U.  S.  volun- 
teers, inspector  of  artillery,  his  assistant  and  staff,  are  assigned  to  duty  in  the 
city  of  Washington,  D.  C.,  to  date  from  the  1st  instant.';  *  *  * 

This  officer  occupied  an  anomalous  position.  He  belonged  neither  to  the 
artillery  nor  the  ordnance,  but  in  a  degree  to  both.  The  necessity  for  such  a 
functionary  was  one  of  many  evidences,  ever  recurring  both  in  peace  and  war, 
of  the  inadequacy  of  either  the  ordnance  department  or  the  artillery  arm  as 
now  organized  to  fully  act  a  part  as  an  important  branch  of  the  military  serv- 
ice. Proof  here  exists  that  the  former  called  to  its  assistance  one  of  the  most 
experienced  and  capable  artillery  officers  for  the  performance  of  those  duties  of 
inspector  connected  with  artillery  materiel  equipping  for  the  field,  which  "  the 
functions  of  its  own  officers,  entirely  distinct  from  those  of  the  line  of  the 
army  in  any  of  its  branches,  involving  a  familiar  acquaintance  with  the  exact 


DUTIES:  TECHNICAL.  187 

ttent  representative  at  the  War  Department  competent  to  advise 
on  its  affairs. 

The  remedy  for  this  evil  will  be  applied  when  the  efficiency  of 
that  branch  of  the  public  service  becomes  a  subject  for  earnest- 
remedial  action  in  either  the  councils  of  the  War  Department  or 
the  halls  of  Congress,  and  may  be  applied,  with  various  degrees 
of  efficacy,  in  the  following  ways : 

(A)  Consolidating  into  a  new  corps  of  artillery,  and  under  such 
restrictions  in  personnel  as  will  insure  efficiency,  the  present  regi- 
ments and  the  ordnance  department. 

(B)  Giving  the  present  regiments  a  chief,  with  a  competent  staff, 
as  contemplated  by  Mr.  Shields.     (Appendix  B  [2].) 

(c)  Detailing  an  officer  to  act  as  chief,  at  the  War  Department, 
from  among  the  present  personnel  of  the  artillery  arm. 

If  placing  the  service  on  an  enduring  basis,  rather  than  the  con- 
venience of  individuals,  be  an  object  worthy  the  solicitude  and 
corrective  power  of  Government,  the  relative  merits  of  these 
plans  is  that  of  the  order  in  which  they  are  enumerated.  To 
strike  at  the  root  of  existing  evils  and  effect  an  adjustment  as 
permanent  as  the  present  methods  of  organizing  armies,  (A)  should 
be  chosen;  but  it  must  be  as  indicated  heretofore,  for  otherwise 
would  only  be  repeated  the  disastrous  experiences  that  have 
always  attended  such  attempts.  While  not  so  thorough  in  its 

sciences  and  with  mechanical  philosophy,"  and  not  extending  to  any  of  the 
practical  duties  of  armies  in  campaign,  had  rendered  them  incompetent  to  per- 
form. On  the  other  hand,  here  was  the  spectacle  presented  of  an  artillery  arm 
impotent  to  discharge  its  obvious  and  legitimate  duties  except  under  the  sur- 
veillance of  a  department  made  up  of  manufacturers  and  theorists,  scientific 
and  philosophical  students,  who,  if  they  kept  their  places  assigned  by  law,  could 
by  no  possibility  ever  hear  a  hostile  shot  fired. 

The  inspector  of  artillery  had  charge  of  all  the  artillery  connected  with  the 
defenses  of  Washington  and  all  the  field  batteries  at  Camp  Barry,  which  were 
constantly  being  changed,  dismounted,  remounted,  &c.,  as  they  came  from  and 
went  forward  to  the  armies. 

He  was  responsible  for  the  condition  of  these  transient  artillery  commands, 
regular  and  volunteer,  while  at  Camp  Barry  and  when  starting  for  the  front. 
They  were  inspected  under  his  supervision,  and  all  questions  relating  to  the 
fitting  out  of  artillery  for  the  lines  were  supposed  to  be  referred  to  him  for 
decision. 

He  had  a  regular  post  system.  Morning  reports  were  daily  submitted  and 
consolidated  at  his  office. 


l88      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

operations  as  (A),  the  second  (B)  will  give  that  desideratum  first 
of  all  in  importance — unity  of  purpose  and  method  in  the  conduct 
of  artillery  affairs — and  is  preferable  to  (c)  in  that  the  chief  would 
be  permanent. 

Though  least  desirable,  and  having  within  itself  fewer  facilities 
for  improving  the  condition  of  the  artillery,  (c)  could  not  but 
redound  to  the  great  advantage  of  that  arm,  and  has  the  recom- 
mendation, if  facility  of  execution  be  counted  a  merit,  that  a  War 
Department  order  is  all  that  is  needed  to  put  it  into  operation, 
while  both  (A)  and  (B)  will  require  an  act  of  Congress. 

Without  enumerating  the  duties  of  chief  of  artillery  under  (A), 
it  suffices  to  state  that  they  would  extend  the  authority  of  the 
chief  of  ordnance  and  make  him  as  well  commander  of  the  artillery. 
The  following  are  some  duties  the  chief  of  artillery  would  very 
properly  be  called  upon  to  perform  under  (B)  and  (c): 

(1)  Principal  adviser  to  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  general 
of  the  army  on  all  artillery  matters. 

(2)  President  ex  officio  of  the  permanent  artillery  board  consti- 
tuted by  General  Order  No.  6,  of  1866,  before  mentioned,  and 
which  has  never  been  dissolved ;  also  of  such  boards  as  that  as- 
sembled by  General  Order  No.  39,  of  1881,  "  to  consider  the  recent 
changes  in  guns,  harness,  and  equipments  for  light  batteries." 

(3)  To  see  that  the  armaments  of  the  forts  are  properly  re- 
paired and  kept  in  good  order,  causing  for  this  purpose  careful 
inspections  to  be  made  of  all  ordnance,   stores,   carriages,  and 
ammunition  in  the  forts  once  a  year,  or  oftener  if  necessary. 

(4)  Ascertain  the  degree  to  which  instruction  has  been  carried 
on  in  every  battery  or  artillery  command;  whether  it  has  been 
given  in  accordance  with  the  prescribed  text-books  or  existing 
orders. 

(5)  To  ascertain  what  appliances  for  practical  instruction  are  at 
the  artillery  posts,  to  have  these  appliances  distributed,  and  to  see 
that  every  use  is  made  of  them  for  imparting  practical  knowledge' 
to  the  commands. 

(6)  To  visit  the  artillery  school  at  Fortress  Monroe  and  the 
field  battery  schools  which  should  be  established  for  the  general 
purposes  indicated  in  (4),  and  to  see  further  that  they  are  fully 
meeting  the  end  for  which  they  are  organized. 


DUTIES:  AS  AN  ARM  OF  SERVICE. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

ADMINISTRATION — DUTIES  :    AS   AN    ARM    OF   SERVICE. 

The  artillery  of  the  Revolutionary  army  was  early  in  its  history 
officially  assigned  a  place  (which  the  arm  has  retained)  in  what 
was  technically  known  as  ' '  the  line,' '  *  /.  e. ,  that  portion  of  the 
armed  force  destined  to  take  position  in  line  of  battle,  and  the  func- 
tions of  which  were  strictly  military.  The  resolution  of  Congress 
(February,  1779)  readjusting  artillery  and  ordnance  affairs,  for 
instance,  provided  that  the  commanding  officer  of  artillery  of  the 
United  States  should  be  allowed  $75  per  month  extra  for  his  serv- 
ices as  head  of  the  ordnance  department  in  the  field,  while  the 
commanding  officer  of  artillery  in  any  detachment  should  have  a 
proportional  allowance  in  addition  to  his  pay  in  the  line.  In  the 
resolution  of  September  25th,  1780,  establishing  the  inspector's 
department,  it  was  provided:  "There  shall  be  one  inspector  to 
the  corps  of  artillery,  to  be  taken,  when  the  service  will  admit, 
from  the  colonels  or  lieutenant-colonels,  who  shall  be  allowed,  in 
addition  to  his  pay,  $7^4  per  month  and  forage  for  three  horses, 
including  what  he  is  entitled  to  in  the  line  of  the  army;"  while 
in  the  reorganization  of  the  following  month  was  the  provision 
that  the  four  artillery  regiments,  among  others,  should  be  retain- 

*It  is  not  overlooked  that  military  men  may  criticise  the  arrangement  of  the 
artillery  to  the  line  of  the  army.  It  properly  belongs  to  the  special  arms  of 
service.  In  well-organized  armies,  where  the  artillery  is  assigned  its  natural 
function — the  combined  duties  of  our  ordnance  department  and  artillery  regi- 
ments— there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  classifying  it  as  a  special  arm  of  service 
only.  It  suffices  to  state  the  fact  that  in  this  country,  from  1775  to  this  time, 
the  artillery  has  always,  by  the  laws,  been  assigned  to  the  line.  It  is  not  in- 
tended here  to  enter  into  a  discussion  of  the  propriety,  or  the  reverse,  of  the 
arrangement;  nor  attempt  to  revise  our  military  nomenclature,  the  unsatisfac- 
tory condition  of  which  is  pointed  out  in  various  other  places  in  this  work. 
The  artillery  will,  therefore,  be  here  considered  as  of  the  line,  as  it  conforms  to 
facts,  however  repugnant  it  may  be  to  the  rules  of  a  strict  technical  language. 
It  will  also  be  necessary  in  some  instances  to  refer  to  it  as  a  special  arm  of 
service.  To  belong  to  the  line,  and  at  the  same  time  be  a  special  arm,  is  a 
contradiction  in  terms;  but  this  contradiction  exists,  unfortunately,  in  the 
position  of  the  artillery  in  our  military  establishment. 


1QO      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE  ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

ed,  the  States  selecting  from  the  line  of  the  army  a  proper  num- 
ber of  officers.  The  artillery  officers  arranged  to  these  regiments 
were  all  selected  from  among  those  commissioned  in  that  arm. 

In  the  mother  country  this  was  not  so.  There  the  artillery  was 
regarded,  not  as  part  of  the  line,  but,  with  the  engineers,  as  a  spe- 
cial arm.  In  fact,  however,  the  sphere  of  duty  of  artillery  officers 
in  our  own  was  as  circumscribed  as  in  the  British  service.  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Carrington  was  indeed  made  quartermaster  of 
Greene's  army  in  the  south,  and  Knox,  after  his  promotion  to 
major-general,  was  given  command  of  the  post  and  environs  of 
West  Point,  then  regarded  as  the  key  to  the  country;  but  these 
were  the  most  conspicuous,  if  not  the  only,  assignments  of  artillery 
officers  to  important  duties  disconnected  from  their  immediate 
profession.  The  rule  was  to  confine  them  to  those  duties,  either 
as  commanders  of  artillery  in  the  field,  or  in  the  various  military 
geographical  departments. 

The  nature  of  the  duty  it  was  called  upon  to  perform  rendered 
it  necessary  that  the  artillery  should  serve  in  detachments,  only 
the  rarest  occurrences  bringing  all  the  companies  of  any  regiment 
together,  even  in  winter  quarters.  The  armies  in  the  field,  the 
various  posts  and  forts  to  be  garrisoned,  required  the  active  serv- 
ices of  every  trained  artilleryman,  and  as  a  result  the  arm  was  al- 
most exclusively  confined  to  its  special  duties.  As  to  personal 
arms,  the  officers  carried  swords,  while,  theoretically  at  least,  the 
rank  and  file  carried  fusees  or  muskets,  after  the  prevailing  fash- 
ion in  Europe  at  the  time.  When  Captain  Lamb,  advancing 
against  the  gates  of  Quebec,  found  it  impracticable  to  drag  his 
guns,  they  were  left  by  the  road,  and  the  company  moved  on  to 
the  assault  with  fusees  alone.  When  Procter's  artillery  regiment 
(the  Fourth  regulars)  was  organized  it  was  supplied  with  small- 
arms,  belts,  and  cartridge-boxes.  The  resolution  of  Congress 
authorizing  Harrison's  regiment  (First  regular  artillery)  explic- 
itly directed  that  it  should  be  armed  with  muskets  and  bayonets. 

In  actual  service  small-arms  proved  to  be  an  incumbrance,  be- 
ing always  in  the  way;  and  Captain  Stevens,  in  his  pioneer  work 
on  artillery  tactics,  published  in  1797,  asserts  with  a  confidence 
based  on  long  experience  that  small-arms  were  found  to  answer 
no  useful  purpose  whatever,  except  to  mount  guard.  It  would 
seem  that  this  or  some  other  cogent  reason  led  to  their  partial 
disuse  with  the  artillery,  if  we  may  judge  from  the  following  ex- 


DUTIES:  AS  AN  ARM  OF  SERVICE.  191 

hibit,  taken  from  General  Knox's  returns  :  "Harrison's  regiment, 
72  muskets,  44  bayonets ;  Lamb's  regiment,  90  muskets,  36  bay- 
onets ;  Crane's  regiment,  84  muskets,  31  bayonets  ;  Proctor's  reg- 
iment, 77  muskets,  72  bayonets."  These  doubtless  represent  the 
number  of  small-arms  retained  for  guard  duty,  the  remainder  of 
the  original  quantity  received  having  been  turned  in  for  issue  to 
other  troops.  The  artillerymen  had  apparently  determined  to 
make  their  guns  defend  themselves. 

In  the  period  immediately  following  the  disbanding  of  the  Rev- 
olutionary army  the  whole  of  the  small  force  kept  in  service  was 
employed  against  the  Indians  in  the  Northwest  Territory.  All, 
both  infantry  and  artillery,  were  armed  in  the  same  manner,  and 
performed  substantially,  if  not  identically,  the  same  kind  of  serv- 
ice, with  the  sole  difference  that  there  was  imposed  on  the  latter 
the  additional  duty  of  serving  the  guns  in  the  forts  and  those 
taken  against  the  hostiles. 

The  threatened  war  with  Great  Britain  growing  out  of  unsettled 
boundaries,  and  the  attacks  of  that  power  on  American  commerce, 
opened  up  in  1794  a  new  field  for  the  service  of  artillery,  viz.,  the 
defense  of  the  sea-coast.  The  possibility  that  such  use  might 
have  to  be  made  of  some  portion  of  the  national  forces  seems  to 
have  received  but  little  attention ;  and  it  is  a  singular  fact  that,  in 
all  the  various  plans  for  the  organization  of  a  peace  establishment 
submitted  to  Congress  by  prominent  officers  at  the  close  of  the 
war,  not  one  had  seriously  considered  the  subject  of  the  defense 
of  the  maritime  frontier  ;  nor  was  the  elaborate  report  of  the  con- 
gressional committee  on  the  same  subject,  written  by  Colonel  Ham- 
ilton, less  open  to  criticism.  This  apparent  obliviousness  to  the 
existence  of  a  very  vulnerable  point  in  the  national  armor  resulted 
doubtless  from  the  circumstance  that  the  whole  attention  of  the 
Government  had  been  directed,  during  the  Revolution,  to  defeat- 
ing the  enemy's  forces  in  the  field,  thus  leaving  the  coast  to  be 
defended  by  the  States  whose  territory  was  threatened.  From 
necessity  it  followed  that  they  were  scarcely  defended  at  all. 

The  prospect,  however,  of  war  with  our  old  and  powerful  naval 
foe,  and  the  growing  commercial  importance  of  the  harbors  on  the 
Atlantic,  determined  Congress  to  take  measures  for  the  safety 
of  the  coast.  Accordingly,  in  March,  1794,  the  act  was  passed 
providing  for  fortifying  twenty  of  what  were  considered  the 
most  important  points  between  Portland,  Maine,  and  St.  Mary's, 


IQ2      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,  U.   S.   ARMY. 

Georgia;  and,  to  serve  as  at  least  a  partial  armament,  the  purchase 
was  authorized  of  one  hundred  each  of  32-pounder  and  24-pounder 
cannon,  their  carriages,  implements,  and  other  necessary  materiel. 
To  construct  these  fortifications  and  to  defend  them  required  both 
engineers  and  artillerists,  of  which,  at  that  time,  we  had  neither; 
for  the  battalion  of  artillery,  equipped  as  infantry  and  in  the  In- 
dian country,  could  scarcely  be  considered  as  artillerists  in  any 
proper  sense,  and  of  engineers  there  had  been  none  since  the 
Revolution.  Such  were  the  considerations  which  led  to  the 
passage  of  the  act  of  May  gth,  1794,  authorizing  the  raising  of  a 
corps  of  artillerists  and  engineers,  into  which  the  then  existing 
battalion  of  artillery  should  be  incorporated.  The  President  was 
authorized  to  have  such  portions  of  the  corps  serve  in  the  field,  on 
the  frontiers,  or  in  the  fortifications  on  the  sea-coast,  as  he  deemed 
consistent  with  public  interests.  The  reorganization  of  1802 
permanently  severed  the  engineers  from  their  yoke-fellows,  the 
artillerists. 

Meantime  the  gathering  war-clouds  had  been  dissipated.  Jay's 
treaty  and  Wayne's  victory  over  the  Miamis  had  deferred  the 
conflict  with  Great  Britain,  while  the  ascendency  of  Napoleon  had 
restored  amicable  relations  with  France.  The  artillerists  and 
engineers  were  not  called  upon  to  measure  strength  with  the 
enemy;  but  attention  had  been  pointedly  drawn  to  the  necessity 
that  existed  for  troops  skilled  in  the  practice  of  sea-coast  arma- 
ments and  capable  of  defending  permanent  works.  The  principle, 
which  has  not  since  been  entirely  lost  sight  of  or  undervalued, 
had  been  initiated  of  assigning  this  as  the  legitimate,  proper,  and 
important  duty  of  a  portion  of  the  regular  military  establishment. 

The  splendor  which  attached  to  the  service  of  horse  artillery  in 
Europe  was  not  without  its  effect  in  this  country.  Tousard,  who 
was  personally  familiar  with  the  circumstances  attending  its 
adoption  by  Frederick  the  Second,  its  subsequent  brilliant  career 
under  that  great  master  of  the  art  of  war  and  the  greater  Napo- 
leon, prevailed  on  Secretary  McHenry  to  warmly  advocate  its 
introduction  into  our  army.  This  the  Secretary  did  in  a  com- 
munication to  the  President  bearing  date  January  5th,  1800,  and 
by  the  latter  transmitted  to  Congress.  Together  with  a  statement 
of  the  military  necessities  of  the  country  generally,  a  scheme  for 
the  reorganization  of  the  army  and  the  establishment  of  military 
academies,  the  letter  contained  a  brief  and  spirited  review  of  the 


DUTIES:  AS  AN  ARM  oP  SERVICE.  193 

services  of  horse  artillery  abroad,  while  the  advisability  of  its  adop- 
tion as  a  part  of  our  military  force  was  urged  with  that  earnest 
eloquence  and  felicity  of  expression  which  characterized  Mr.  Mc- 
Henry '  s  writings.  Nothing  was  done  at  that  time.  It  was  reservecL 
for  the  rival  (politically)  administration  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  eight 
years  later,  under  the  advice  of  the  veteran  soldier,  Secretary 
Dearborn,  to  prevail  on  Congress  to  lend  legislative  sanction  to 
the  raising  of  the  first  light  artillery  regiment  of  the  United  States 
army.  It  was,  indeed,  a  crude  attempt  at  legislation.  No  horses 
were  provided,  neither  increased  pay  nor  allowances  to  officers 
or  men.  To  belong  to  this  regiment  was  an  expensive  luxury; 
yet  the  service  was  in  high  favor  with  the  first  young  men  of  the 
country,  and  the  personnel,  when  the  companies  were  first  raised, 
was  superior  to  that  of  any  other  regiment.  Active  measures 
were  at  once  taken  to  practically  test  the  new  style  of  troops,  in 
which  both  the  Secretary  and  Mr.  Jefferson  took  great  interest. 
Although  the  act  authorizing  the  light  artillery  was  passed  in 
April,  the  celebration  of  the  thirty-second  anniversary  of  our 
National  Independence,  three  months  later,  was  signalized  by  the 
parade  though  the  streets  of  the  Capital  of  the  first  completely 
equipped  so-called  horse-artillery  company. 

Though  it  was  intended  to  mount  the  whole  regiment,  this  was 
the  only  company  so  equipped  prior  to  the  war  of  1812;  the  others 
were  armed  as  infantry.  The  experience  of  this  company  was  as 
brief  as  its  position  was  unique;  the  succeeding  administration, 
as  before  mentioned,  for  economical  reasons,  sold  the  horses,  stored 
the  guns,  and  reduced  the  horse  artillery  to  the  same  footing  with 
the  other  companies. 

Such  was  the  state  of  affairs  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  of  1812, 
which  precipitated  the  inevitable  second  war  with  Great  Britain. 
The  light  artillery,  raised  amidst  a  flourish  of  trumpets,  was  car- 
rying muskets;  some  of  its  companies  had  disappeared  even, 
through  consolidation  or  other  natural  causes.  The  old  artiller- 
ists of  the  1802  regiment,  scattered  in  small  detachments  along 
the  frontier  from  Maine  to  New  Orleans  and  Mackinac,  were 
never  during  the  war  concentrated ;  its  members,  as  had  been 
the  usual  practice  with  the  artillery  since  the  Revolution,  served 
the  pieces  of  ordnance  wherever  they  might  be  stationed,  and  in 
addition,  when  occasion  required,  fought  as  infantry;  most  of  its 
25 


IQ4      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

field  and  many  of  its  line  officers  were  detached  as  district  com- 
manders, adjutants-general,  or  staff  officers  of  other  departments. 

As  artillery  proper,  the  services  of  the  Second  and  Third  regi- 
ments, organized  pursuant  to  act  of  January  nth,  1812,  were 
very  unsatisfactory.  At  first  Colonel  Izard,  of  the  Second,  fully 
expected  that  his  regiment  would  be  equipped  as  field  artillery. 
Writing  to  the  War  Department  in  October,  1812,  he  remarked  : 
"The  work  I  have  on  hand  at  Philadelphia,  besides  my  duties 
as  recruiting  officer  for  this  district,  is  important ;  a  small  train 
of  artillery,  consisting  of  6-pounders  and  howitzers,  has  been 
preparing  under  my  direction,  and  will  be  complete  in  a  few 
weeks;"  while  one  month  later  he  informed  the  department 
that  "a  train  of  sixteen  pieces  of  field  artillery,  with  Wurst  caissons, 
[used  in  some  parts  of  Europe  with  horse  artillery,]  implements, 
and  harness  complete,  will  be  ready  very  soon.  I  hope  the  whole 
will  be  in  a  state  to  march  in  a  fortnight.  Of  the  two  parts  of 
companies  here,  a  detachment  might  be  formed  to  escort  them  to 
the  north.  The  officers  are  all  anxious  to  proceed;  the  pieces 
might  be  distributed  to  the  companies  on  the  frontier,  and  the 
whole  compose  the  germ  of  a  battalion  of  artillery."  Izard' s 
ambition,  however,  to  have  his  regiment  properly  equipped  was 
but  partially  realized.  Two  companies,  under  Captains  Towson 
and  Baker,  left  Philadelphia  in  September,  1812,  for  Dearborn's 
army ;  these  and  several  other  captains  of  the  regiment,  Archer, 
Hindman,  Biddle,  and  others,  were  wholly  identified  with  the  field 
artillery  in  that  quarter  during  the  war.  But  the  companies  of 
the  regiment  were  never  concentrated ;  and,  while  most  were  em- 
ployed in  their  special  duties  in  the  field,  some  of  them  served  in 
garrison  on  the  South  Atlantic  coast,  particularly  in  the  forts  of 
Charleston  Harbor,  South  Carolina. 

The  Third  Regiment,  under  Colonel  Alexander  Macomb,  served 
wholly  on  the  New- York  frontier,  and  principally  as  infantry;  al- 
though the  following,  selected  from  many  orders  bearing  on  the 
subject,  show  that  in  some  instances  it  performed  the  duties  of 
artillery: 

"SACKETT'S  HARBOR,  N.  Y.,  February  20th,  1813. 

"  Captain  Crane,  Third  Regiment,  is  placed  in  charge  of  the  ordnance  de- 
partment of  this  command.  He  and  his  company  will  do  nothing  but  exercise 
their  pieces,  take  charge  of  the  elaboratory,  and  mount  guard  over  the  guns  at 
the  magazines  and  the  batteries." 


DUTIES:  AS  AN  ARM  OF  SERVICE.  195 

While  in  April  following  it  was  announced  from  the  same  head- 
quarters : 

"  To  enable  the  commanding  officer  of  the  artillery  brigade  (Colonel  Macomb) 
to  practice  his  men  in  the  art  of  gunnery,  and  give  him  an  opportunity  to  in- 
struct them  in  the  other  parts  of  their  duty,  that  brigade  will  be  exempt  from" 
detail  until  further  orders,  except  guards  necessary  for  the  brigade  and  forts. 
The  pieces  will  be  properly  manned,  and  worked  until  the  men  are  perfect." 

The  intention  of  the  War  Department,  when  the  war  became  a 
foregone  conclusion,  was  to  equip  the  light  artillery  regiment  as 
horse  artillery.  Although  companies  were  serving  with  muskets, 
orders  were  given  in  May,  1812,  to  provide  swords  and  pistols  for 
the  whole  regiment.  In  February,  1812,  instructions  were  issued 
from  the  War  Department  to  incorporate  the  two  light  companies 
at  New  Orleans,  and  the  detachment  en  route  to  join  them,  with 
the  companies  of  the  First  Regiment  of  artillery  at  that  city. 
General  Hampton  was  directed  to  send  the  light  artillery  offi- 
cers of  the  incorporated  companies  to  report  to  the  adjutant  and 
inspector-general  at  Washington.  It  will  not  be  amiss  to  note 
that  some  of  the  companies  of  the  First  artillery,  thus  recruited, 
were  themselves  equipped  and  served  as  field  artillery.  General 
Wilkinson,  who  succeeded  Hampton,  reported  to  the  Secretary 
of  War,  in  March,  1813:  "I  have  here  [New  Orleans]  a  charming 
light  train  of  thirty  brass  pieces,  with  harness  and  implements. 
Our  field  artillery,  to  be  useful,  must  be  horsed  for  rapid  move- 
ments, and  will  require  at  least  one  hundred  and  twenty  horses 
broken,  trained  and  disciplined,  which  I  have  ordered  to  be  pur- 
chased. ' '  To  this  Captain  Woolstonecraft,  of  the  First  artillery, 
adds  his  testimony  in  a  report  to  the  inspector  at  New  Orleans,  in 
May,  1814,  that  his  company  had  helped  take  care  of  these  horses, 
which,  with  the  field  pieces,  he  had  exercised  during  fine  weather 
as  light  artillery. 

Colonel  Porter  being  temporarily  engaged  on  artillery  duties 
elsewhere,  the  task  of  preparing  the  light  artillery  regiment  for 
the  field  devolved  on  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fenwick,  who  was  at 
the  seat  of  Government.  In  June,  1812,  Captains  Gibson  and 
Mclntosh,  under  Fenwick,  marched  from  their  rendezvous  at  Lan- 
caster, Pennsylvania,  for  Albany,  New  York.  Each  company  was 
full ;  each  was  completely  equipped  as  horse  artillery,  with  four 
guns,  their  caissons,  and  the  necessary  baggage  wagons.  These 
officers  went  to  the  front  with  all  the  ardor  of  men  proud  of  the 


196      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,  U.   S.  ARMY. 

arm  to  which  they  belonged  The  appointments,  in  every 
respect,  of  their  companies  were  such  as  to  inspire  them  and  the 
authorities  with  confidence. 

That  no  results  commensurate  with  this  elaborate  preparation 
followed,  cannot  be  laid  at  the  door  of  the  light  artillery  compa- 
nies themselves,  as  they  were,  by  superior  authority,  disintegrated 
before  they  reached  the  enemy;  but  rather  must  responsibility 
rest  upon  those  generals  who  had  no  knowledge  of  the  proper 
use  of  the  arm,  who  had  no  chiefs  of  artillery  to  assign  a  proper 
place  to  that  branch  of  the  combatant  forces,  husband  its  resources, 
direct  its  energies,  and  develop  its  fighting  powers.  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Fenwick  was,  it  is  true,  sent  forward  at  once  from  Albany 
to  General  Van  Rensselaer  with  part  of  Gibson's  company  and  a 
supply  of  ordnance,  but  only  in  time  to  be  wounded  and  taken 
prisoner  at  Queenstown.  Colonel  Porter,  of  the  same  regiment, 
was  dispatched  to  take  Fenwick' s  place  as  commander  of  all  the 
artillery  on  the  New  York  frontier,  and  an  effort  was  made 
to  place  an  efficient  light  artillery  at  his  command;  but,  from 
the  first,  the  embarrassments  attending  the  procurement  of  the 
essential  article  of  forage  even  were  such  as  to  neutralize  every 
exertion  put  forth  to  make  the  horse  artillery  formidable.  The 
inadequacy  of  the  staff  supply  department  was  nowhere  else  felt 
more  than  by  this  species  of  troops,  who  no  sooner  reached  the 
vicinity  of  the  enemy  than  they  had  to  scatter  to  keep  from 
starving. 

Writing,  October  2ist,  1812,  to  General  Van  Rensselaer' s  suc- 
cessor, Dearborn  said:  "A  fine  company  of  light  artillery,  all 
mounted,  will  follow ,  Colonel  Porter  to  the  front  as  rapidly  as 
possible  to  replace  those  lost  at  Queenstown.  On  their  arrival 
it  will,  I  presume,  be  expedient  to  send  the  greatest  number  of 
the  horses  back  to  some  place  where  forage  may  be  conveniently 
obtained."  One  week  later  he  continued  :  "Colonel  Porter  left 
this  place  [Greenbush,  opposite  Albany]  on  the  24th  instant  with 
one  hundred  light  artillerists,  all  mounted,  and  well  appointed  in 
every  respect." 

Meanwhile,  every  company  of  Porter's  regiment  that  could  be 
spared  from  their  old  stations  were  concentrated  at  Greenbush. 
Major  Eustis,  of  that  regiment,  equipped  three  of  these  as  horse 
artillery,  and  took  two  of  them  to  Plattsburg  with  him.  It  will 
thus  be  seen  that  within  six  months  of  the  time  war  was  declared 


DUTIES:  AS  AN  ARM  OF  SERVICE.  197 

—June  1 8th,  1812 — at  least  half  of  the  light  artillery  had  been 
equipped  with  their  appropriate  armament.  These  companies 
were  speedily  followed  by  the  others,  either  as  field  or  horse 
artillery. 

No  service  is  of  record  commensurate  with  these  preparations. 
The  light  artillery  seldom  manoeuvred  as  such,  and  then  in  drib- 
lets, in  face  of  the  enemy.  No  action  like  that  which  signalized 
Ringgold's  horse  battery  in  its  first  battle  at  Palo  Alto  distin- 
guished the  career  of  that  arm  during  the  war  of  1812. 

If  it  be  asked  why  this  was  so,  the  answer  can  be  easily  given. 
Disregarding  the  miserable  fiascos  on  the  northern  frontier  in 
1812,  disgraceful  to  the  American  arms,  humiliating  to  every 
patriot,  filling  with  shame  and  indignation  the  breast  of  every 
soldier,  and  involving  in  dishonor  alike  all  branches  of  the  mili- 
tary service,  there  were  particular  and  sufficient  reasons  why 
the  light  artillery  disappointed  the  expectations  of  its  own  offi- 
cers, its  friends  in  the  service,  and  the  Government.  First  of  all 
came  Mr.  McHenry's  erroneous  theory  of  having  the  light  artil- 
lery horsed  in  time  of  war  only,  and  which,  since  Peter's  com- 
pany had  been  dismounted  in  1809,  had  been  strictly  put  in 
practice.  Its  effect  could  not  but  prove  disastrous,  and  especially 
so  at  that  time,  when  light  artillery  was  a  new  institution,  an 
experiment,  in  this  country.  None  of  the  officers  of  the  regiment 
knew  from  experience  in  war  anything  about  it.  Except  Gibson, 
who  had  been  Peter's  subaltern,  every  captain,  when  his  own 
was  fitted  out  in  1812,  saw,  for  the  first  time  in  his  life,  perhaps, 
a  properly  equipped  company  of  light  artillery.  Several  of  the 
companies  were  also  composed  of  raw  recruits. 

These  were  unquestionably  drawbacks,  but  they  were  neither 
all  nor  the  greatest.  Before  he  reached  the  frontier,  Captain  Gib- 
son wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War  that  his  company  had  been 
broken  up,  many  of  his  horses  taken  from  him,  and  his  command 
well  nigh  annihilated.  He  adds:  "It  is  very  discouraging  to 
me  to  raise  a  company,  have  the  labor  and  expense  of  mounting 
it,  and  then  have  it  treated  in  this  manner.' '  No  sooner  were 
they  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  where  they  felt  they  could  be 
of  some  service,  than  the  distinctive  feature  of  the  arm — the 
horses — was  taken  from  all  the  light  artillery.  It  was  said  to  be 
a  case  of  necessity.  Van  Rensselaer,  as  early  as  September, 
1812,  complained  of  the  difficulties  attending  the  feeding  of  the 


198      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

flying  artillery  horses.  The  quartermaster  was  directed  in  gen- 
eral orders  to  furnish  forage  regularly,  but  it  was  in  vain;  and 
against  the  earnest  protests  of  Colonel  Fenwick  his  light  artillery 
was  not  only  unhorsed,  but  disarmed.  The  wretched  straits  to 
which  the  army  was  reduced  for  means  of  subsistence  paralyzed 
every  effort  to  render  the  corps  efficient. 

When  General  Wilkinson,  in  1813,  assumed  command  in  the 
north,  he  wished  very  much  to  rehabilitate  the  light  artillery 
regiment,  and  with  this  end  in  view  he,  while  in  Washington  en 
route  to  the  Niagara  frontier,  requested  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
"  authority  to  equip  the  whole  of  the  horse  artillery,  as  contem- 
plated by  law,  because  the  arm  will  be  found  all-important  in 
every  combat  which  may  ensue."  The  Secretary  (Armstrong) 
replied  :  "The*  dragoons  and  light  artillery  corps  shall  be  made 
efficient ;  horses  may  be  bought  for  both ;  average  price  not  to 
exceed  $120  each."  The  records  fail  to  show  that  the  project  here 
authorized  was  put  into  execution.  The  general,  like  his  prede- 
cessors, found  that  to  properly  organize  his  army  on  the  eve  of 
a  campaign  was  impossible.  To  meet  the  popular  demand  and 
the  expectations  of  the  administration,  he  must  win  victories  with 
the  material  in  hand,  and  that,  too,  without  delay.  Some  horses 
were  purchased,  but  they  were  of  no  service  practically;  as,  in  the 
attempted  descent  on  Montreal,  the  troops,  the  guns  and  artillery 
materiel  moved  in  boats,  separated  from  the  horses,  which  were 
driven  across  the  country;  thus  rendering  it  necessary,  when  light 
artillery  was  needed  on  several  occasions,  to  dismount  dragoons, 
that  the  necessary  teams  could  be  procured  to  drag  the  pieces. 

Nor  were  the  fortunes  of  the  regiment  more  propitious  in  other 
fields  of  action.  When  Izard  assumed  command  at  Plattsburg, 
in  May,  1814,  he  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War  that  the  three 
companies  of  light  artillery  at  that  post  had  but  one  officer  each, 
and  altogether  had  but  forty  horses,  scarcely  enough  to  haul  their 
guns  and  ammunition.  The  Secretary  replied  :  ' '  The  light  artil- 
lery with  you  will  do  the  duty  of  heavy  artillery,  and  need  not  be 
mounted.  I  need  not  tell  you  the  reason  for  mounting  light  artil- 
lery. With  us  this  reason  does  not  and  will  not  exist  until  we 
have  masses  of  cavalry  with  whom  they  can  co-operate,  and  until 
our  champ  de  bataille  is  an  open  and  level  plain."  In  pursuance 
of  these  views  General  Izard,  July  ist,  1814,  issued  the  following 
general  order:  "It  is  the  pleasure  of  the  President  that  the  regi- 


DUTIES:  AS  AN  ARM  OF  SERVICE.  199 

ment  of  light  artillery  shall  serve  as  field  artillery  on  this  frontier. 
The  commanding  officer  of  that  corps  will,  in  consequence,  make 
returns  for  their  equipment  with  small-arms  and  accoutrements, 
and  cause  them  to  be  duly  instructed  in  the  manual  exercise  anxL 
infantry  manoeuvres,  which  are  indispensable  for  their  service  in 
the  field." 

In  some  instances,  however,  the  shifting  fortunes  of  the  war 
were  more  favorable ;  for  instance,  at  Sackett's  Harbor,  in  June, 
1814,  the  commanding  general  directed  "that  all  horses  hereto- 
fore attached  to  the  artillery  of  this  command  will,  until  further 
orders,  remain  under  the  orders  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Mitchell, 
who  will  cause  such  numbers  as  he  may  deem  proper  to  be  placed 
under  Captain  Melvin,  of  the  light  artillery,  the  whole  to  be  kept 
and  trained  for  light  artillery  purposes  ;  and  all  the  artillery  will 
be  exercised  at  their  guns  every  day,  either  in  their  batteries  or 
in  the  field,  from  reveille  until  an  hour  after  sunrise." 

Although  some  of  the  companies,  acting  in  detachments,  still 
occasionally  performed  the  duties  of  horse  artillery  in  small  ex- 
peditions and  other  light  duty,  this  service  was  but  temporary 
and  unimportant;  its  prestige  as  a  strong  auxiliary  arm  had  grad- 
ually disappeared;  yet,  spite  of  every  discouraging  circumstance, 
the  excellent  material  of  which  the  regiment  was  composed  asserted 
itself  on  all  occasions.  The  inspector-general  of  the  northern  army 
remarked  in  his  report  dated  December  31  st,  1814:  "The  light 
artillery  regiment  had  just  got  together  when  General  Izard  left. 
Colonel  Fenwick  and  Major  Eustis  are  with  it.  It  surpasses  any 
regiment  in  this  army  in  discipline  and  evolutions."  But  every 
distinctive  feature  appertaining  to  the  light  artillery  service  faded 
away  with  the  campaign  of  1814,  at  the  end  of  which  nearly  if 
not  all  the  companies  were  equipped  as  infantry. 

Thus  terminated  the  service  in  its  proper  sphere  of  the  light 
artillery  regiment  of  1808,  of  which  much  was  expected,  yet  which, 
in  its  special  functions  as  horse  artillery,  accomplished  little.  Its 
successor,  the  field  artillery  of  the  present  regiments,  has  been 
more  fortunate;  this,  because  circumstances,  adverse  though  they 
have  been,  are  more  favorable  with  the  latter;  for  in  intelligence, 
professional  pride,  and  zeal  in  their  calling,  the  pioneer  light 
artillery  has  not  been  surpassed  by  any  corps  of  the  United  States 
army. 

If  we  scrutinize  the  instructions  of  the  Secretaries  of  War — 


200    HISTORICAL  SKETCH  OF  THE  ARTILLERY,  u.  s.  ARMY. 

Eustis,  Armstrong,  and  Monroe — who  at  various  times  controlled 
affairs  during  the  war  of  1812,  examine  their  orders  and  those 
of  the  general  officers,  we  find  among  the  mass  but  a  single 
systematic,  properly-founded  plan  proposed  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  artillery  during  either  peace  or  war.  Turning  to 
what  existed,  it  is  seen  that  this  arm,  which,  to  be  efficient  in  the 
field  of  active  service,  at  least,  requires  careful  organization,  had 
none  save  that  given  by  accident.  The  proposed  system  referred 
to  originated  with  General  Izard,  and  embraced  a  thorough  reor- 
ganization, which  would  have  united  the  present  duties  of  the 
engineers,  the  artillery,  and  the  ordnance  in  a  single  department, 
with  an  efficient  personnel,  and  would  have  resulted,  had  it  been 
adopted,  in  a  vast  saving  of  money  to  the  Government,  together 
with  a  more  complete  and  efficient  service.  (Appendix  A,  [29].) 

In  active  service  Izard  seems  to  have  been  the  only  general 
officer  who  understood  the  functions  and  proper  distribution  of 
the  arm;  his  order  assigning  one  company  to  each  brigade,  while 
the  rest  of  the  artillery,  properly  equipped,  was  placed  as  a  reserve 
under  command  of  the  ranking  officer  of  artillery  present,  is  the 
only  instance  of  which  record  has  been  found  of  any  proper  and 
intelligent  effort  having  been  made  during  the  war  of  1812  to 
organize  that  arm  in  the  field. 

The  active  service  of  the  artillery  subsequent  to  the  war  of  1812, 
and  prior  to  that  with  Mexico,  was  performed  almost  wholly  as 
infantry,  and  embraced  participation  in  the  Indian  hostilities  of 
that  period,  particularly  the  remarkable  struggle  with  the  Florida 
Seminoles,  which,  with  varying  fortune,  covered  the  period  begin- 
ning 1835  and  ending  1842.  Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  companies 
directed  (by  the  act  of  March  2d,  1821,)  to  be  equipped  as  light 
artillery  had  never  been  placed  upon  a  proper  footing,  they  were 
not  prepared  to  act  efficiently  in  that  capacity;  and  though  a  few 
guns  and  ammunition  wagons  were  taken  into  the  Indian  country,* 

*  Paragraph  12,  General  Orders  No.  68. — Headquarters  2d  Division,  Army  of 
the  South,  Camp  on  Jupiter  River,  January  27th,  1838. — "  Captain  Washington's 
Company,  [(B),  Fourth  Artillery,]  serving  as  artillery,  with  its  pieces,  caissons, 
ammunition  wagons,  and  travelling  forge,  will  move  with  the  column,  carrying 
the  necessary  supplies  of  ammunition  in  addition  to  that  in  the  hands  of  troops." 

Companies  (B)  and  (H)  of  the  First,  united,  served  some  light  artillery  in  the 
Seminole  war ;  and  doubtless  other  artillery  companies  did  the  same;  but  it  was 
of  little  consequence. 


DUTIES:     AS    AN    ARM    OF   SERVICE.  2O1 

the  service  they  rendered  was  of  little  importance  either  against 
the  enemy  or  in  giving  the  officers  practical  experience  as  light 
artillerymen.  It  was  during  the  progress  of  the  Seminole  war 
(1838)  that  the  number  of  companies  in  a  regiment  of  artillery  w_a$_ 
increased  from  nine  to  ten.  This  number  was,  owing  to  the  de- 
fenceless condition  in  which  during  the  Mexican  war  the  sea-coast 
fortresses  were  left,  temporarily  increased  to  twelve  companies  in 
each  regiment.  The  two  additional  companies  were  afterwards 
made,  as  they  have  continued,  part  of  the  regular  military  estab- 
lishment. 

At  the  date  of  the  campaign  in  the  valley  of  Mexico  there  were, 
therefore,  forty-eight  companies  of  regular  artillery.  Eight  of 
these,  under  the  acts  of  March  2d,  1821,  and  March  3d,  1847,  were 
authorized  to  be  equipped  as  field  artillery.  Other  companies, 
as  Captain  Steptoe's  of  the  Third,  served  temporarily  as  field 
batteries.  Company  (G)  of  the  Fourth  served  both  as  field  and 
heavy  artillery,  its  captain  (Drum),  with  his  lieutenant  (Ben- 
jamin), falling  by  the  side  of  their  guns  before  the  gates  of  the 
Mexican  capital.  Other  companies  and  detachments  were,  upon 
occasion,  equipped  as  field  artillery,  only  to  be  again  relegated  to 
the  position  of  infantry,  in  which  latter  capacity  three-fourths  of 
the  artillery  companies  served  during  the  whole  war. 

While  this  was  the  case,  there  were  equipped  and  serving 
against  the  enemy  a  siege-train  and  a  howitzer  and  rocket  bat- 
tery, officered  and  manned  by  the  ordnance  department. 

This  the  artillery  arm  felt  to  be  a  deep  wrong.  It  seemed 
strangely  inconsistent  then,  and  no  less  so  now,  that  a  branch  of 
service  which  had  maintained  that  its  exclusive  function  was  to 
manufacture  materiel,  whose  enlisted  men  were  designated  in  the 
laws  as  mechanics,  should  seek  to  exclude  from  its  duties  in  the 
field  a  combatant  arm  of  service,  and  to  appropriate  those  duties 
to  itself.  To  understand  this  unique  affair,  wherein  the  ordnance 
department  appears  as  the  first  and  foremost  exemplar  of  the 
maxim  "the  makers  should  be  the  users,"  which  on  some  occa- 
sions it  affects  to  deprecate,  it  will  be  necessary  to  take  a  retro- 
spective glance  at  the  position  in  the  army  of  the  suddenly  bellig- 
erent department. 

It  was  formally  established  under  our  present  form  of  government 
by  the  act  of  May  i4th,  1812,  for  the  better  regulation  of  the  ord- 
nance.    It  followed  in  the  footsteps  of  the  revolutionary  "depart- 
26 


202      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

• 

ment  of  the  commissary-general  of  military  stores,"  resolved  upon 
by  Congress  February  i  ith,  1778.  The  duties  were  essentially  the 
same.  In  the  parent  organization  the  chief,  styled  "commissary- 
general  of  military  stores,"  had  the  rank  of  colonel;  most  of  his 
assistants  and  employe's  were  civilians,  the  only  branch,  and  it  the 
least  important  one,  of  the  department  having  a  semblance  of 
military  organization  being  the  so-called  regiment  of  artillery- 
artificers.  In  the  newly-created  department  (of  1812)  the  head 
had  also  the  rank  of  colonel,  and  was  styled  commissary-general 
of  ordnance.  His  assistants  had  military  rank,  but  the  rest  of  the 
personnel — the  wheelwrights,  carriage-makers,  blacksmiths,  and 
laborers — were  civilians.  In  military  features,  therefore,  the  Rev- 
olutionary department  had  the  advantage,  as  the  presence  in  its 
ranks  of  enlisted  artificers  made  it  at  least  military  in  appearance. 

That  the  artillery-artificers  were  not,  however,  military  except 
in  appearance  there  is  abundant  proof.  When  the  few  officers  of 
this  corps  who  remained  in  service  until  the  end  of  the  Revolu- 
tionary war  applied  for  commutation  of  the  half-pay  for  life  which 
Congress  promised  those  honorably  discharged  from  its  service, 
they  were  refused,  for  the  reason  that  the  artillery-artificers  had 
not  been  a  military  organization,  and  because  Congress  "intended 
to  restrict  that  grant  to  officers  of  the  army  who  could  be  consid- 
ered military,  whereas  commissions  were  given  the  artificers  for 
the  sole  purpose  of  rank  in  their  own  corps,  and  to  hold  courts- 
martial  ;  they  belonged  to  nothing  more  than  a  civil  branch  of 
the  ordnance  department."  This  was  equally  true  of  the  depart- 
ment organized  in  1812.  The  general  duties  of  each  were,  first, 
to  manufacture  warlike  materiel;  second,  to  enforce  a  system  of 
accountability  therefor.  These  duties,  in  themselves,  are  wholly 
civil  in  their  nature — a  fact  not  in  the  least  affected  by  the  circum- 
stance that  since  the  reorganization  of  1815  the  rank  and  file  have 
been  in  part,  as  during  the  Revolution,  enlisted  men  ;  they  re- 
mained, as  formerly,  armorers,  carriage-makers,  blacksmiths,  or 
other  skilled  laborers,  and  were,  in  contemplation  of  law,  as 
strictly  non-combatants  as  their  associates,  the  civilian  employe's. 

Colonel  Decius  Wadsworth,  the  first  chief  of  ordnance,  and  in 
ability  second  to  none,  strongly  advocated  restricting  the  depart- 
ment to  objects  defined  by  law.  Upon  this  subject  he  remarked  : 
"  The  duties  of  the  ordnance  department  should  be  limited  to  pro- 
viding for  and  supplying  the  different  armies,  forts,  posts,  maga- 


DUTIES:  AS  AN  ARM  OF  SERVICE.  203 

zines,  and  arsenals  of  the  United  States.  It  is  incompatible  with 
the  other  duties  of  the  department  to  take  charge  of  ordnance  and 
ordnance  stores  in  the  field.  The  responsibility  of  the  depart- 
ment should  cease  with  the  act  of  delivery  from  the  arsenal  or 
magazine." 

Regarding  the  true  status  of  the  enlisted  men,  Colonel  Bomford, 
the  worthy  successor  to  Wadsworth,  remarked  to  one  of  his  subor- 
dinates :  ' '  Enlisted  men  of  the  ordnance  department  are  to  be  con- 
sidered as  mechanics  and  laborers,  and  not,  of  course,  to  be  em- 
ployed as  soldiers,  except  in  case  of  emergency,  when  you  are 
justified  in  equipping  any  portion  of  them  as  a  guard."  And 
again  :  "A  guard  of  ordnance  men  has  never  been  contemplated 
by  the  laws  or  regulations,  which  have  all  been  formed  on  the 
presumption  that  these  men  are  always  to  be  employed  as  laborers 
and  mechanics,  saving  only  on  certain  occasions  of  emergency 
requiring  a  guard  for  a  short  time." 

The  appearance  of  these  non-combatants  in  the  field,  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  artillery,  whose  functions  they  performed,  was  a 
spectacle  which,  in  view  of  the  foregoing  facts,  was  well  calculated 
to  excite  criticism. 

The  immediate  steps  by  which  this  was  brought  about  are  now 
well  known,  and  can  be  told  in  a  few  words.  It  is  necessary  to 
premise,  by  observing  that  Colonel  Bomford  was  absent  from  the 
seat  of  Government  at  this  time,  absorbed  in  those  experiments 
which  resulted  in  the  development  of  a  new  and  improved  system 
of  guns — the  Columbiad.  He  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  trans- 
formation scene  in  question,  whereby  non-combatants  were  tem- 
porarily converted  into  artillerymen. 

In  a  communication  to  the  Secretary  of  War  early  in  1845,  the 
acting  chief  of  ordnance  used  the  following  language :  ' '  An  in- 
crease of  the  enlisted  men  [of  the  department],  by  the  addition 
of  one  hundred  and  fifty  to  the  present  number,  is  earnestly  urged. 
This  may  be  done  without  additional  expense  to  the  Government, 
as  it  will  save  the  employment  of  that  number  of  hired  rhen.  It 
will  also  have  the  advantage  of  giving  the  control  of  a  description 
of  labor  not  always  readily  found  when  wanted,  but  indispensable 
to  the  proper  care  and  preservation  of  munitions,  and  cheaper,  as 
well  as  better,  than  the  hired  labor  now  devoted  to  such  pur- 
poses." When  hostilities  had  commenced  on  the  Rio  Grande, 
the  acting  chief  of  ordnance  renewed  his  recommendations  in  yet 


204      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

more  urgent  language,  remarking  that  ''the  law  now  provides 
two  hundred  and  fifty  men  to  be  enlisted  in  the  corps.  These 
are  not  sufficient.  To  increase  the  number  to  meet  the  needs  of 
service  will  involve  no  expense  whatever.  On  the  contrary,  it 
will  be  a  measure  of  economy.  The  enlisted  men  would  merely 
take  the  place  of  men  who  are  now  hired  at  these  ordnance  posts, 
and  their  pay  would  be  less  than  that  paid  to  hired  men."  In- 
fluenced by  these  specious  representations,  and  believing  that  an 
increase  in  the  number  of  enlisted  men  was  directly  in  the  line  of 
economy,  and  would  reduce  the  number  of  higher-priced  civilians, 
Congress,  by  act  of  June  i8th,  1846,  authorized  the  senior  officer 
of  the  ordnance  department  to  enlist  as  many  armorers,  carriage- 
makers,  blacksmiths,  and  laborers  as  the  public  service,  in  his 
opinion,  under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  might 
require. 

The  time  for  throwing  off  the  non-combatant  mask  had  now 
arrived.  A  large  number  of  men  were  enlisted  under  authority 
of  this  act.  No  sooner  had  this  been  cleverly  effected  than  the 
acting  chief  of  ordnance  submitted  a  proposition  to  the  Secretary 
' '  of  War ' '  to  gather  at  Fort  Monroe  Arsenal,  partly  by  drafts 
from  other  arsenals  and  by  enlistment  of  laborers  of  ordnance,  a 
sufficient  number  of  men  to  man  a  battery  of  mountain  howitzers 
now  at  that  post,  and  also  form  a  brigade  of  rocketers.  Under 
the  law,  any  number  deemed  necessary  may  be  provided.  They 
will  of  course  be  commanded  by  ordnance  officers. ' '  This  was 
followed  by  flaming  posters  calling  for  recruits,  and  stating  that 
' '  in  pay,  provisions,  and  clothing  this  corps  will  be  superior  to 
any  yet  raised,  and,  from  the  kind  of  arms,  will  be  constantly  in 
the  advance  when  the  hardest  fighting  may  be  expected. ' '  Ord- 
nance officers  in  command  of  posts  were  directed  to  send  to 
Fortress  Monroe  any  suitable  and  spare  men  to  man  the  before- 
mentioned  batteries,  and,  in  addition,  a  siege-train  there  fitting 
out  by  the  ordnance  department.  The  places  of  the  enlisted  men 
so  detached  were  authorized  to  be  filled  by  hired  men. 

Here,  then,  was  the  act  of  duplicity  complete!  Congress  is 
assured  that,  in  the  interests  of  economy,  hired  men  should  be 
replaced  by  enlisted  mechanics.  No  sooner  are  these  carriage- 
makers  and  blacksmiths  secured  than  they  are  armed  and  sent  to 
the  field  equipped  as  artillery,  while  at  the  ordnance  posts  their 
places  are  supplied  by  that  higher-priced  labor  to  avoid  the  em- 


DUTIES:    AS    AN    ARM    OF   SERVICE.  205 

ployment  of  which  was  the  chief  and  oft-repeated  argument  urged 
for  increasing  the  enlisted  force  of  the  department. 

Candid  men  will  draw  their  own  conclusions.  The  character 
of  the  transaction  is  easily  understood.  Comment  is  unnecessary, 
further  than  to  observe  that  no  such  systematic  deception  for  the 
purpose  of  aggrandizing  a  non-combatant  department  at  the 
expense  of  a  fighting  arm  of  service  can  be  found  elsewhere  in 
the  history  of  the  army. 

The  reason  given  by  the  acting  chief  of  ordnance  for  usurping 
the  functions  of  the  artillery,  viz. ,  that  the  latter  were  unacquainted 
with  the  duties  of  their  own  arm,  was  as  wanting  foundation  in 
fact  as  the  methods  to  build  up  his  department  were  questionable. 
The  part  acled  by  the  artillery  in  Mexico  does  not  demand  de- 
fense here  or  elsewhere;  it  is  written  in  the  history  of  every  siege 
and  battle  of  that  war.  It  was  given  no  opportunity  to  use  the 
rocket  battery,  that  duty  being  entirely  usurped  by  the  ordnance 
department,  in  violation  not  only  of  the  law,  but  in  disregard  of  the 
decision  of  the  Secretary  of  War  (Mr.  Poinsett)  in  1838  that  this 
service  in  the  field  should  be  intrusted  to  the  artillery. 

In  his  annual  report  dated  November  3Oth,  1847,  the  adjutant- 
general  of  the  army,  adverting  to  this  subject,  made  the  following 
pertinent  remarks: 

"  It  may  not  be  irrelevant  to  state  in  this  place  that,  while  probably  not  more 
than  ten  companies  of  the  four  regular  artillery  regiments  are  serving  with  their 
appropriate  arm — the  other  thirty-eight  companies  are  armed  and  equipped  as 
infantry — there  are  two  batteries  with  the  main  army  in  Mexico  served  by  ord- 
nance men  (with  several  officers)  and  one  by  the  Maryland  and  District  of  Colum- 
bia volunteers.  The  men  of  the  ordnance  department  are  enlisted  as  artisans  and 
laborers,  and  receive  a  higher  rate  of  pay  than  is  allowed  by  law  to  soldiers  of  the 
light  artillery.  At  the  last  session  of  Congress  an  incre'ase  of  the  ordnance 
corps  was  authorized,  because  the  number  of  officers  was  deemed  inadequate 
to  the  wants  of  that  branch  of  service.  It  would  seem,  therefore,  peculiarly 
proper  to  confine  officers  of  the  ordnance  to  the  defined  objects  of  that  depart- 
ment. Economy  as  well  as  military  propriety  requires  that  all  the 
harnessed  batteries  be  transferred  to  the  artillery ;  and  it  is  respectfully  recom- 
mended that  the  transfer  be  directed  accordingly.  No  corps  in  service  has  been 
more  distinguished  in  the  present  war  than  the  artillery,  and  they  are  justly 
entitled  to  be  equipped  with  the  arm  which  they  have  proved  themselves 
capable  of  using  so  efficiently  against  the  enemy." 

It  is  not  an  uninteresting  fact,  but  one  over  which  artillery  offi- 
cers may  do  well  to  ponder,  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  relative 
position  of  their  arm  and  that  of  the  ordnance  department  to- 


206      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

day  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  this  experience,  when  they  may 
find  themselves  marching  as  infantry  supports  to  batteries  com- 
manded by  ordnance  officers.  There  is  now  just  as  much  reason 
for  this  as  there  was  thirty-seven  years  ago. 

Following  the  Mexican  war,  although  the  artillery  was  still,  as 
before,  taken  equipped  as  infantry  into  the  field  against  the  In- 
dians, the  practice  was  somewhat  abated.  This  was  perhaps  due 
to  the  service  therein  of  the  light  companies,  which  turned  the 
attention  of  the  artillery  to  the  necessity  and  advantage  of  being 
properly  equipped  and  trained  in  its  special  duties;  but  the  policy 
affecting  it  was  as  variable  as  were  the  Administrations,  one  tear- 
ing down  what  the  other  built  up.  It  was  during  this  period 
that  the  artillery  school  was  re-established,  through^which,  every 
ten  years,  all  the  companies,  except  those  mounted,  were  ex- 
peeled  to  pass,  thus  receiving,  each  in  its  turn,  a  good  practical 
course  of  instruction  in  foot  artillery  duties,  while  the  field  com- 
panies were  scattered  over  the  western  country,  each  associated 
with  several  foot  companies  (aggregating  more  than  half  the 
whole  number  in  the  army),  and  forming  for  the  latter  at  each 
post  the  nucleus  of  a  field  artillery  school. 

As  in  the  Seminole  war  it  had  been  found  necessary  to  increase 
the  number  of  companies  in  each  artillery  regiment  by  one,  and 
in  the  Mexican  war  by  two,  so,  when  the  Civil  war  broke  out, 
an  additional  regiment  of  field  artillery  was  rendered  necessary, 
owing  to  the  scattered  condition  of  the  field  companies,  as  just 
mentioned,  and  the  impossibility  of  concentrating  them  where 
they  were  needed.  This  increased  the  number  of  artillery  com- 
panies and  batteries  in  service  to  sixty.  During  that  war  fifty- 
six  of  the  sixty  served  for  longer  or  shorter  terms  as  field  bat- 
teries, and  of  these  about  twenty-two  were  horse  batteries.  In 
some  instances  two  and  even  three  distinct  organizations  were 
united  to  form  a  complete  battery.  The  other  four  regular  com- 
panies were,  by  accidents  of  service,  assigned  to  duty  in  the  per- 
manent defenses  of  the  country,  from  which  it  was  not  found 
advisable  to  move  them.  The  attention  given  to  the  subject  of 
field  artillery  subsequent  to  the  Mexican  war,  and  the  strenuous 
efforts,  under  adverse  circumstances,  of  the  general-in-chief  and 
of  the  field  company  commanders  to  keep  these  organizations 
mounted,  now  bore  fruit  in  the  number  of  officers  the  regular 
artillery  could  turn  out  acquainted  with  the  rudiments,  at  least, 


DUTIES:  AS  AN  ARM  OF  SERVICE.  207 

of  field  artillery  duty,  and  who  were  invaluable  in  the  emergency 
that  had  arisen. 

The  large  increase,  at  the  close  of  the  Civil  war,  of  the  number 
of  infantry  and  cavalry  regiments  has  obviated  the  necessity 
almost  entirely  of  using  the  artillery,  equipped  as  infantry,  on 
the  interior  frontier  against  the  Indians.  Its  employment  in 
this  manner  has  been  rare,  and  for  a  pressing  emergency,  when 
the  batteries  have  returned  to  their  appropriate  stations  and  duties. 

The  principle  of  National  defense,  first  recognized  in  1794,  by 
authorizing  the  raising  a  corps  of  artillerists  and  engineers — 
viz.,  that  for  garrisoning  the  sea-coast  fortifications  certain  troops 
should  be  set  apart — has  ever  since  been  acknowledged  as  an 
important  feature  of  the  military  policy  of  the  Government. 
The  wisdom  of  this  cannot  be  questioned.  It  is  admitted  by 
all  thinking  men  that  there  is  no  branch  of  the  military  service 
requiring  more  careful  preparation  to  render  it  efficient  than 
modern  foot  artillery.  The  duties  of  the  sea-coast  garrison  are 
undeniably  the  field  of  scientific  research  pre-eminent  above 
others.  The  refined  armaments  of  modern  times  are  useless  in 
the  hands  of  novices.  The  importance,  therefore,  of  maintaining 
this  species  of  troops  at  the  highest  state  of  efficiency  that  can 
be  attained  with  the  means  at  hand  or  within  reach  of  the  Gov- 
ernment can  scarcely  be  overestimated.  So  far  as  is  consistent 
with  other  public  interests,  they  should  be  kept  in  this  condition. 
True  economy  and  a  proper  administration  alike  forbid  their 
diversion  to  other  purposes,  or  their  being  deprived  of  facilities 
for  both  theoretical  and  practical  instruction  in  their  special,  and 
now  more  than  ever  scientific,  duties. 


208      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF  THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

- 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

DUTIES   OF    THE    CHIEF   OF   ARTILLERY   IN   THE    FIELD. 

A  question  of  importance  in  the  proper  administration  of  artillery 
affairs  in  the  field  is  that  of  the  true  status  of  the  chief  of  artillery, 
i.  e. ,  whether  he  be  commander  of  the  artillery  in  the  army,  corps, 
or  division  in  which  he  is  chief,  or  whether  he  be  a  staff  officer 
simply,  with  authority  to  issue  orders  only  in  the  name  of  the 
commanding  general.  The  subject  gave  rise  to  much  discussion 
and  to  diverse  practices  during  the  Civil  war.  It,  was  not  gener- 
ally understood,  and  confusion  of  ideas  operated  to  the  disad- 
vantage of  the  arm.  There  is  no  law  defining  the  duties,  rights, 
and  privileges  of  a  chief  of  artillery ;  the  very  designation  is  of 
comparatively  recent  introduction  into  our  service ;  but  it  is  neces- 
sary that  it  be  determined  whether  he  be  a  commander  or  not, 
and,  in  the  absence  of  positive  law,  this  can  only  be  done  from- 
custom  (common  law)  and  the  regulations. 

If  we  recur  to  the  revolutionary  period,  we  find  that  General 
Knox  was  commander  of  all  the  artillery  of  what  was  designated 
by  Congress  as  the  regular4  army — the  war  organizations.  This  is 
manifest  from  the  orders  and  correspondence  of  the  times — seems 
never  to  have  been  questioned,  but,  on  the  contrary,  to  have  been 
fully  recognized  by  both  the  army  and  the  Congress.  The  orders 
issued  by  him  to  artillery  officers  in  armies  other  than  the  main 
army,  with  which  the  general  served  in  person,  establish  beyond 
question  that  he  occupied  towards  them  the  position  of  commander. 
These  officers  were  also  subject  to  the  orders  of  the  general  with 
whom  they  served;  and  just  how  conflict  of  authority  was  avoided 
in  every  case  it  is  not  possible  here  to  state.  From  what  has  been 
gathered  on  the  subject,  the  inference  is  that  the  orders  of  the 
general  of  artillery  were  sufficient  to  cause  his  views  to  be  every- 
where executed  in  his  department  of  service.  The  instructions 
given  to  officers  of  artillery  commanding  during  campaign  the 
companies  attached  .to  divisions  and  brigades  evince  the  perfect 
control  exercised  over  them  by  the  general  of  artillery  ;  the  pre- 
servation of  both  personnel  and  materiel,  the  exercise  of  both, 


DUTIES!    CHIEF    OF    ARTILLERY    IN    THE    FIELD.  2O$ 

were  carefully  provided  for,  and  regulations  therefor  were  deliv- 
ered direct  to  the  officers  concerned  by  the  general  of  artillery. 
The  authority  of  division  and  brigade  commanders  over  these 
artillerymen  would  naturally  soon  become  a  question  to  be  deter- 
mined ;  and  to  pointedly  set  the  matter  right,  in  some  respects  at 
least,  General  Washington  issued  the  following  order,  dated 
Orangetown,  August  i5th,  1780: 

"  The  officers  and  men  of  the  artillery  corps  attached  to  the  divisions  and 
brigades  are  not  to  be  furloughed  by  division  and  brigade  commanders,  as  it  is 
irregular,  and  interferes  with  the  internal  arrangement  of  the  corps." 

This  order  makes  manifest  that  at  the  date  of  its  being  issued 
the  artillery  serving  with  divisions  and  brigades  was  on  the  footing 
of  troops  attached  for  service,  but  belonging  permanently  to  a 
central  and  distinct  command,  which  in  the  order  is  called  the 
corps. 

The  trial  of  General  McDougall,  in  1782,  resulted  partially  from 
misunderstandings  which  arose  from  this  dual  responsibility  of 
artillery  officers.  In  January,  1782,  General  Heath,  commanding 
the  Department  of  the  Highlands,  with  headquarters  at  Newburgh, 
assigned  Colonel  Crane,  of  the  Third  Regiment,  to  the  command 
of  all  artillery  in  the  department.  He  was  enjoined  to  pay  par- 
ticular attention  to  the  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores  at  the 
posts,  and  at  all  of  them  to  place  the  artillery  in  position  as  he 
deemed  best.  Major  Perkins,  of  Crane's  regiment,  was  placed 
by  the  same  order  in  charge  of  the  artillery  at  West  Point,  under 
the  orders  of  both  Colonel  Crane  and  of  General  McDougall, 
commanding  at  that  important  post.  This  position  of  Major 
Perkins,  it  is  important  to  remark,  is,  in  the  matter  of  responsibility 
to  superiors,  that  prescribed  by  paragraph  1022  of  the  existing 
army  regulations  for  artillery  commanders  at  all  headquarters. 

It  so  happened  that  Crane,  for  the  time  being  stationed  at 
West  Point,  although  commander  of  the  department  artillery,  was 
ordered  by  McDougall  to  make  certain  dispositions  of  artillery 
materiel  at  the  post.  This  Crane  refused  to  do,  justifying  him- 
self by  orders  received  from  General  Heath,  department  com- 
mander. McDougall  insisted  upon  being  obeyed,  and  was  court- 
martialed  for  his  actions  in  the  premises. 

There  are  two  facts  clearly  established  by  the  correspondence 
growing  out  of  this  court-martial,  and  which  are  pertinent  to  an 
elucidation  of  the  subject  now  under  consideration:  (i)  that  Major 
27 


2IO      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.  S.  ARMY. 

Perkins,  McDougall's  artillery  officer,  was  in  technical  affairs 
under  the  orders  of  the  commander  of  artillery  of  the  department; 
(2)  that  the  latter  officer  was  answerable  only  to  the  commanding 
general  of  the  department.  It  would  seem  there  should  have  been 
no  trouble  about  the  latter  point,  but  it  required  the  court-martial 
of  a  major-general  to  set  the  matter  right.  In  the  positions  occu- 
pied by  Major  Perkins  and  Colonel  Crane,  as  before  indicated, 
we  see  put  into  practice  the  principle  of  a  direct  chain  of  subordi- 
nation connecting  the  commanders  of  artillery  at  general  with  , 
those  at  subordinate  headquarters,  afterwards  embodied  in  Scott's, 
and  at  this  time  recognized  (ostensibly)  in  paragraph  1022,  regu- 
lations of  the  army,  edition  of  1881.* 

Following  the  Revolution  was  what  may  be  called  the  dark  age 
of  our  army;  and,  as  tending  to  throw  light  upon  the  subject  of 
artillery  command,  nothing  appears  until  the  regulations  spring- 
ing out  of  our  experience  in  1812.  We  may  except  General 
Wilkinson's  order,  dated  Sackett's  Harbor,  N.  Y.,  October,  1813, 
when  preparing  for  the  descent  on  Montreal,  and  which  assigned 
the  command  of  all-  artillery  troops,  the  care  and  custody  of  all 
artillery  materiel,  without  exception,  to  Brevet  Brigadier-General 
Porter.  This  officer  at  that  time,  and  afterwards  Major  Eustis, 
his  successor,  exercised  command  as  much  as  any.  brigadier  with 
the  army;  neither  thought  of  using  the  name  of  the  general  of  the 
forces  in  matters  affecting  the  artillery,  any  more  than  did  the 
brigade  commanders  in  giving  orders  to  their  regiments. 

The  regulations  of  September,  1816,  promulgated  pursuant  to 
act  of  April  24th,  same  year,  provided  for  the  stationing  a  com- 
mander of  artillery  at  the  headquarters  of  an  army,  and  of  course 
wherever  at  subordinate  headquarters  the  presence  of  an  artillery 
officer  might  be  necessary;  and  further,  that  "the  conductors  of 
stores  will  keep  the  senior  officer  of  the  corps  of  artillery  in  com- 
mand acquainted  with  the  state  of  the  ordnance  of  their  respective 
divisions.  Besides  the  ordnance,  ammunition,  and  stores  appro- 

*The  modification  of  paragraph  489,  regulations  of  1863,  which  appears  in 
paragraph  1022,  regulations  of  1881,  is  a  plain  violation  of  the  law  of  June  23d, 
1879,  authorizing  the  codification  of  the  "  regulations  of  the  army  and  general 
orders  "  then  in  force.  The  unauthorized  change  consists  in  substituting  the 
word  officers  for  commanders  where  the  latter  was  used  with  particular 
significance. 


DUTIES:    CHIEF   OF    ARTILLERY   IN   THE    FIELD.  211 

priated  to  each  division  of  artillery,  the  senior  officer  of  that 
corps  in  command  with  the  army  will  apportion  to  the  respective 
divisions,  according  to  his  judgment,  the  spare  arms,  ammunition, 
gun-carriages,  equipments."  [The  divisions  here  referred"  to 
were  those  of  artillery,  viz.,  a  company  having  six  pieces  of 
ordnance,  with  the  requisite  stores.]  (Appendix  C,  [i].)  "The 
conductors  of  stores  will,  from  time  to  time,  as  opportunities  may 
offer,  and  under  direction  of  the  senior  officer  of  artillery  in  com- 
mand, disincumber  the  division  of  the  empty  ammunition  wagons 
and  carriages  needing  repairs." 

In  the  first  complete  code  of  regulations  supplied  the  army,  and 
drawn  up  by  Brevet  Major- General  Scott,  were  laid  down  with 
great  care,  and,  considering  the  times,  with  great  precision,  the 
functions  of  artillery  commanders.  These  regulations  were  written 
after  much  experience,  research,  and  reflection  on  the  part  of  the 
compiler.  There  is  a  singleness  of  purpose  manifest  throughout 
the  work,  desirable  in  any  system  of  regulations,  resulting  from 
the  fact  that  the  compilation  was  the  product  of  one  man's 
judgment. 

As  bearing  on  the  subject  now  under  consideration,  we  quote 
from  paragraph  14,  article  44,  Scott's  Regulations:  "  The  number 
and  description  of  staff  officers,  as  adjutants-general,  inspectors- 
general,  &c.,  at  the  disposal  of  the  War  Department,  for  any 
particular  army,  will  depend  on  creations  made  by  Congress; 
but,  of  the  staff  officers  who  may  be  assigned  to  an  army  in  the 
field,  the  commandants-in- chief  of  the  *  *  *  artillery  *  *  * 
will  be  attached  to  general  headquarters,  for  the  direction  or 
administration  of  their  particular  departments  of  service."  This 
plainly  contemplated  that  the  chief  of  artillery  was  to  be  also 
commandant  of  his  corps  with  the  army;  and,  to  clearly  set  at  rest 
the  possible  vexed  question  of  double  responsibility  of  subordinate' 
chiefs  of  artillery,  paragraph  15,  ibid,  provided  that  "the  superior 
officer  of  artillery  serving  with  one  of  the  army  corps,  a  detached 
division,  or  a  brigade  will  receive  the  orders  of  the  commandant 
thereof,  to  whom  the  said  superior  officer  of  artillery  will  commu- 
nicate any  orders  he  may  receive  from  his  own  particular  com- 
mandant-in-chief  attached  to  general  headquarters. ' '  And  to  show 
the  chain  of  subordination  connecting  these  various  artillery  offi- 
cers, it  was  provided  in  paragraph  3,  article  45:  "A  colonel,  who 
occupies  that  position  in  a  division,  will  have  a  direct  authority  over 


212       HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.  S.   ARMY. 

a  major,  chief  of  one  of  the  brigade  staffs,  in  the  same  division, 
independent  of  the  commander  of  the  division;  but  in  this  example, 
should  the  colonel  give  an  order  to  the  major  incompatible  with 
the  duties  of  the  latter  towards  his  brigade,  such  order  would  not 
be  obeyed  until  communicated  to  the  brigadier-general  for  his 
approbation."  It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  position  of  these  com- 
mandants-in-chief  of  artillery  was  in  a  measure  that  of  staff  officer, 
but  with  this  distinction — that  they  commanded  in  their  own 
branch  of  service. 

Paragraph  14,  article  44,  Scott's  Regulations,  appears  in  the 
edition  of  1841;  the  others  quoted  had  by  that  time  disappeared. 
The  term  "chief  of  the  artillery"  now  (1841)  for  the  first  time 
made  its  appearance,  although  that  of  commandant-in-chief  was 
also  retained,  thus  by  the  context  showing  that  these  designations 
were  synonymous.  It  was  enjoined  in  these  regulations,  also,  that 
all  communications  relating  to  ordnance  supplies,  when  in  the 
field,  should  be  transmitted  to  the  ordnance  officer  in  charge  of 
the  depots,  through  the  adjutant-general  or  the  chief  of  the  artil- 
lery with  the  army. 

The  war  with  Mexico  elicited  apparently  neither  interest  in  nor 
information  on  the  subject  of  the  proper  functions  of  chiefs  of  the 
artillery.  They  were  charged  with  duties  relating  wholly  to 
supply;  the  batteries  were  considered  as  exclusively  under  the 
control  of  division  or  brigade  commanders;  in  battle  the  chief  of 
artillery  of  an  army  had  nothing  more  to  do  with  the  manage- 
ment of  the  batteries  than  other  officers  on  the  staff  of  the  gen- 
eral, i.  e, ,  he  acted  only  on  the  orders  of  the  general. 

In  the  edition  of  1857  there  first  appeared  paragraphs  1021  and 
1022  of  the  present  regulations  of  the  army.  They  represent 
what  is  left  of  that  portion  of  Scott's  Regulations  of  1821  before 
quoted,  after  they  had  been  pruned  in  the  interests  of  a  certain 
staff  bureau.  Such  was  the  status  of  the  question  under'  con- 
sideration when  the  Civil  war  broke  out. 

When  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  being  organized,  in  1861, 
the  question  early  arose  whether  the  chief  of  artillery  should  have 
command  of  that  arm,  or  whether  his  functions  should  be  purely 
administrative.  A  board  of  officers  was  assembled  to  take  the 
subject  into  consideration,  and  reported  as  a  result  of  its  labors 
that  the  practice  varied  in  different  armies.  Owing  to  the  peculiar 
situation  of  the  artillery  arm,  General  McClellan  determined  to 


DUTIES:  CHIEF  OF  ARTILLERY  IN  THE  FIELD.         213 

make  the  functions  of  his  chief  of  artillery  administrative  only; 
and,  as  the  cavalry  was  similarly  situated,  the  following  order 
was  issued,  applying  equally  to  both  these  arms  of  service : 

"HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  March  26th,  1862. 
"  [General  Orders  No.  110.] 

"  I.  The  duties  of  the  chief  of  artillery  and  cavalry  are  exclusively  adminis- 
trative, and  these  officers  will  be  attached  to  the  headquarters  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac.  They  will  be  required  to  inspect  the  artillery  and  cavalry  when- 
ever it  may  be  necessary,  and  will  be  responsible  that  they  are  properly  equipped 
and  supplied.  They  will  not  exercise  command  of  the  troops  of  their  arms, 
unless  specially  ordered  by  the  commanding  general,  but  they  will,  when  prac- 
ticable, be  selected  to  communicate  the  orders  of  the  general  to  their  respective 
corps.  All  requisitions  for  officers  and  men,  and  for  supplies  for  artillery  and 
cavalry  other  than  the  regular  supplies  furnished  by  the  staff  departments  on 
ordinary  returns,  will  be  sent  to  the  chiefs  of  artillery  and  cavalry,  to  whom 
will  also  be  rendered,  in  addition  to  those  rendered  to  general  headquarters  and 
division  commanders,  such  reports  of  artillery  and  cavalry  practice,  marches, 
actions,  and  other  operations  pertaining  to  these  arms  as  may  be  necessary  to 
enable  them  to  judge  of  the  efficiency  both  of  men  and  material."  *  *  * 

General  William  F.  Barry,  at  the  time  chief  of  artillery  of  the 
army,  pointed  out  the  disadvantages  under  which  he  and  his  arm 
labored  in  consequence  of  the  provisions  of  this  order,  but  to  no 
purpose.  It  has  been  said  that  the  peculiar  situation  of  the  arm 
as  regards  field  officers  was  held  to  render  it  necessary  that,  in 
the  first  instance,  their  duties  should  be  supervisory  rather  than 
of  command.  That  situation  was  as  follows :  Comparatively 
few  artillery  officers,  and  those  mostly  of  the  lower  grades,  had 
been  instructed  in  field  battery  duties;  not  half  a  dozen  of  them 
had  commanded  artillery  in  battle.  In  the  volunteer  regiments 
field  officers  were  wholly  inexperienced,  and  it  was  deemed  proper, 
in  the  first  months  of  active  operations,  to  give  to  the  officers 
who  had  been  instructed  the  command  of  the  batteries  in  the 
field.  The  duties  of  the  field  officers,  or  chiefs  of  artillery,  were 
made  purely  administrative,  they  being  all,  except  the  chief  of 
artillery  of  the  army,  from  the  volunteers.  The  batteries  were 
assigned  to  divisions,  then  about  10,000  strong,  giving  four  bat- 
teries— one  regular  and  three  volunteer — to  each  division,  the 
captain  of  the  regular  battery,  an  experienced  officer,  commanding 
the  four.  The  object  was  to  so  organize  the  artillery  as  best  to 
develop  its  fighting  powers,  and  this  was  attained  by  allowing 
field  officers  of  volunteer  regiments  first  to  learn  something  about 


214      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.  S.   ARMY. 

handling  artillery  before  taking  command  according  to  their  rank. 
Under  authority  granted  by  the  act  of  August  5th,  1861,  several 
artillery  officers  fr,om  the  lower  grades  were  appointed  additional 
aids-de-camp,  and  assigned  according  to  their  .staff-rank  to  com- 
mand in  the  artillery,*  to  meet  the  practical  difficulty  existing  of 
having  with  the  army  uninstructed  volunteers  who  would  com- 
mand them.  As  time  passed,  battles  were  fought,  the  regular 
captains  were,  in  great  measure,  promoted  and  removed  from 
the  artillery,  the  volunteer  officers  became  conversant  with  their 
duties,  the  divisions  were  reduced  in  strength,  half  their  batteries 
were  withdrawn  and  formed,  agreeably  to  the  original  plan  of 
organization,  into  corps  reserves,  some  of  which  were  under  the 
command  of  the  volunteer  field  officers,  the  chief  of  artillery  of 
the  army  commanding  the  whole.  (Appendix  A,  [51].)  This 
was  during  the  Peninsula  campaign,  after  the  termination  of  which 
General  Barry  was  removed  to  other  duties,  and  was  succeeded, 
as  chief  of  artillery,  by  the  late  commander  of  the  general  artillery 
reserve. 

The  position  of  the  chief  of  artillery  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
under  the  various  generals  who,  in  rapid  succession,  were  appoint- 
ed to  its  command  during  the  following  months,  cannot  better  be 
described  than  is  done  by  the  former  in  the  official  report  of  the 
operations  of  his  arm  at  Chancellorsville.  He  says  : 

"  Command  of  the.  artillery,  which  I  held  under  Generals  McClellan  and 
Burnside,  and  exercised  at  the  battles  of  Antietam  and  Fredericksburg,  was 
withdrawn  from  me  when  you  assumed  command  of  the  army,  and  my  duties 
made  purely  administrative,  under  circumstances  very  unfavorable  to  their  effi- 
cient performance.  I  heard  after  the  movement  [preliminary  to  the  battle] 
commenced  that  when  the  corps  were  put  in  motion  to  cross  the  river  they 
left  part  of  their  artillery  in  their  camps.  No  notice  of  this  was  given  to  me, 
and  it  was  by  accident  that  I  learned  that  the  batteries  so  left  behind  were 
afterwards  ordered  to  join  their  corps.  As  soon  as  the  battle  commenced,  I 
began  to  receive  demands  from  corps  commanders  for  more  artillery,  which  I 
was  unable  to  comply  with,  except  partially,  and  at  the  risk  of  deranging  the 
plans  of  other  corps  commanders.  Being  ordered  to  proceed  to  Bank's  ford, 
I  was  recalled  by  telegraphic  instructions  on  the  night  of  the  3d  [Sunday, 
May,  1863],  when  I  was  ordered  by  the  commanding  general  at  Chancellorsville 
to  take  charge  of  all  the  artillery  of  the  army." 

As  a  result,  although  there  was  sufficient  artillery  during  the 
first  periods  of  the  battle,  it  was  not  at  the  places  where  needed, 

*A  similar  device  was  resorted  to  by  General  Hampton  in  1813. 


DUTIES:    CHIEF    OF    ARTILLERY    IN    THE    FIELD.  21$ 

and  no  one  had  authority  or  knowledge  of  affairs  sufficient  to 
supply  the  demands  of  corps  commanders  for  guns  and  ammuni- 
tion, as,  in  the  language  of  an  eye-witness,  the  "woods  seemed 
alive  with  artillery"  in  a  state  of  utter  confusion.  This  was  in 
marked  contrast  with  the  artillery  of  the  Confederates,  which,  ac- 
cording to  one  of  their  first  authorities,  ' '  in  spite  of  the  difficulties 
of  the  Wilderness,  here  co-operated  with  the  infantry  in  a  manner^ 
never  excelled  in  promptness  and  vigor." 

When,  from  want  of  a  directing  hand,  the  artillery  was  in  the 
condition  above  described,  the  general  commanding  reinstated  his 
chief  of  artillery  in  the  position  of  which  he  had  deprived  him, 
that  order  might  be  brought  out  of  this  chaos  which  the  com- 
manding general  had  himself  created.  We  thus  see  a  general, 
when  the  battle  was  bearing  hard  against  him,  when  it  was  a 
question  whether  or  not  anything  could  save  his  army  from  dis- 
aster, abandoning  his  speculative  ideas,  and  placing  his  chief  of 
artillery  in  command,  in  order  that  the  batteries  might  be  assem- 
bled and  directed  against  the  enemy.  No  circumstance  of  the 
Civil  war  more  forcibly  illustrates  the  necessity  that  exists  for 
understanding  the  functions  of,  and  placing  in  his  true  position, 
the  chief  of  artillery  of  an  army,  than  does  this  of  Chancellorsville. 
Whatever  may  or  may  not  have  been  the  views  of  the  command- 
ing general  regarding  the  distribution  and  command  of  the  artil- 
lery, the  fact  remains  that  on  the  field,  when  pressed  by  the  enemy 
and  disaster  seemed  impending,  he  was  constrained  to  forego 
them,  and  recall  the  officer  whom  he  had  deprived  of  that  com- 
mand. Further  remark  is  unnecessary.  Armies  are  organized 
and  maintained  to  beat  the  enemy;  and  that  system  which,  over- 
riding every  prejudice,  is  resorted  to  when  armies  meet,  is  the 
true  one. 

It  may  be  said  that  General  Hooker  was  only  returning  to  the 
system  instituted  by  General  McClellan  in  General  Orders  No. 
no,  Army  of  the  Potomac,  1862,  before  quoted.  While  this 
may  be  true,  the  reasons  for  the  order  having  been  issued  origi- 
nally seem  either  not  to  have  been  understood  or  to  have  been 
ignored;  and  while  the  letter  of  the  order,  so  far  as  it  affected 
the  chief  of  artillery,  may  have  been  observed,  the  spirit  of  it  was 
entirely  lost  sight  of. 

After  the  battle  of  Chancellorsville,  when  the  occasion  which 
rendered  it  necessary  had  passed,  the  command  with  which  he 


2l6      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

had  been  temporarily  intrusted  was  again  taken  from  the  chief  of 
artillery.  This  was  the  state  of  affairs  when,  oft  the  28th  of  the 
following  month — June — the  army  once  more  changed  command- 
ers, on  the  eve  of  the  great  battle  at  Gettysburg.  The  chief  of 
artillery,  during  the  preliminary  movements  leading  to  that  event, 
was  directed  by  the  new  commanding  general  ' '  to  see  to  the 
position  of  the  artillery,  and  make  such  arrangements  respecting 
it  as  were  necessary,"  which  order  was  interpreted  by  the  officer 
receiving  it  as  vesting  in  him  all  the  powers  of  commander  of  that 
arm  for  the  particular  occasion. 

To  every  reflecting  mind  it  must  appear  strange  that  the  duties, 
powers,  and  rights  of  command  of  so  important  a  personage  as 
the  chief  of  artillery  of  an  army  having  364  field-guns,  served  by 
8000  men  and  7000  horses,  should  have  been  changed  from  day 
to  day,  and,  above  all,  that  his  status  in  his  own  arm,  when  battles 
were  being  fought,  was  one  thing,  while  in  the  intervals  between 
it  was  altogether  different. 

The  necessity  for  organizing  the  artillery  as  a  special  arm  of 
service  is  recognized  by  every  nation.  It  is,  as  a  rule,  auxiliary 
to  the  cavalry  and  infantry,  though  by  no  means  always  so  ;  for  in 
siege  operations  and  the  forced  passage  of  rivers  it  becomes  the 
principal,  the  others  the  auxiliary  arms.  But  artillery  is  expensive 
to  organize  and  maintain  in  a  state  of  efficiency ;  therefore  only  so 
much  is  provided  as  is  necessary  for  the  actual  wants  of  the  army, 
and  such  special  rules  adopted  for  the  service  as  will  make  it  avail- 
able, whether  directed  in  mass  by  its  own  superior  officer  with  the 
army,  commonly  called  the  chief  of  artillery,  or  whether  it  be 
attached  to  the  smaller  tactical  units — corps  and  divisions — for 
fighting  purposes.  In  all  armies,  therefore,  it  has  been  found 
necessary  to  regulate  the  management  of  this  arm,  to  define  the 
functions  of  its  principal  officers  in  their  own  corps,  and  their 
relations  to  the  other  arms  of  service. 

General  Meade,  the  new  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac, appreciating  this  fact,  together  with  the  anomalous  and 
unsatisfactory  basis  on  which  the  matter  at  that  time  stood,  pro- 
ceeded, in  the  following  order,  to  clearly  define  the  position  of  the 
chief  of  artillery : 

"  HEADQUAETERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  August  list,  1863. 
"  [General  Orders  No.  82.] 

"The  duties  of  the  chief  of  artillery  of  this  army  are  both  administrative  and 
executive.  He  is  responsible  for  the  condition  of  the  artillery  wherever  serving, 


DUTIES:    CHIEF   OF   ARTILLERY    IN    THE   FIELD.  2iy 

respecting  which  he  will  keep  the  commanding  general  fully  informed.  Through 
him  the  commanding  general  of  the  army  will  take  the  proper  steps  to  insure 
the  efficiency  of  the  artillery  for  movement  and  action  and  its  proper  employ- 
ment in  battle.  All  artillery  not  attached  to  other  troops  will  be  commanded 
by  the  chief  of  artillery.  He  will,  both  personally  and  through  his  staff,  main- 
tain a. constant  supervision  and  inspection  over  the  personnel  and  material  of 
the  artillery  to  insure  the  instruction  of  the  former  and  completeness  of  the 
latter,  as  well  as  the  discipline  of  the  artillery  not  attached  to  other  troops: — Ift 
battle  he  will,  under  the  instructions  of  the  major-general  commanding,  dis- 
tribute and  place  in  position  the  reserve  artillery,  and,  when  so  directed,  select 
positions  for  the  batteries  attached  to  troops,  conveying  to  the  commander  of 
the  troops  the  directions  of  the  commanding  general.  He  will  give  such  direc- 
tions as  may  be  necessary  to  secure  the  proper  supply  of  ammunition  and  to 
furnish  it  promptly  to  the  batteries  when  in  action.  He  will  give  no  orders 
that  will  interfere  with  the  military  control  exercised  by  the  commanders  of  a 
corps  or  division  over  the  batteries  attached  to  their  troops,  nor  will  he  with- 
draw batteries  from  a  corps,  or  transfer  them  from  one  corps  to  another,  unless 
directed  to  do  so  by  the  general  commanding  the  army.  Commandants  of  the 
artillery  attached  to  troops  will  be  responsible  to  the  chief  of  artillery  for  the 
condition  and  efficiency  of  their  batteries  so  far  as  relates  to  equipments,  sup- 
plies, and  instruction,  and  will  be  governed  with  respect  to  orders  received 
from  him  by  paragraph  489,  Revised  Army  Regulations  of  1861." 

This  order  sets  forth  the  powers  of  the  chief  of  artillery  of  an 
army  in  a  manner  clear  and  precise,  and  not  equalled  in  these 
particulars  by  any  other  orders  and  regulations  of  our  service. 
Analysis  will  evince  that  this  officer  commanded  the  artillery 
reserve  and  such  unattached  batteries  as  were  awaiting  assignment; 
that,  for  purposes  of  equipment  and  supply  of  materiel,  and  the 
instruction  of  the  personnel,  he  commanded  every  artilleryman 
and  every  gun  in  the  army;  but,  for  disciplinary  and  fighting  pur- 
poses, the  artillery  attached  to  corps  or  divisions  was  exclusively 
under  the  orders  of  the  immediate  military  commanders  ;  with 
these  matters  the  chief  of  artillery  had  nothing  to  do,  except 
when  directed  by  "the  general  commanding  the  army."  The 
order  very  nicely  balances  the  various  parts  of  a  delicate  machin- 
ery, the  disjointing  of  which  had  caused  serious  inconvenience. 
It  continued  in  force  until  the  close  of  the  Civil  war,  and  deserves 
to  be  preserved  among  the  valuable  contributions  to  our  code  of 
regulations  resulting  from  experience  then  acquired. 

Although  little  precise  information  has  been  obtained  touching 

the  subject  under  consideration,    enough   has  been  gathered  to 

indicate  that   the   provisions  of  the  general  order  just  quoted 

embody  the  fundamental  ideas  which  in  the  main,  if  not  exactly, 

28 


218      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

govern  in  European  armies.  (Appendix  B,  [4]  and  [5].)  And 
although  army  reserves,  made  up  of  a  large  proportion  of  the 
artillery,  and  under  the  immediate  command  of  the  chief  of  ar- 
tillery, are  nowhere  at  this  time  maintained  as  in  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  when  this  order  was  issued,  its  provisions  are  of 
almost  universal  application,  the  absence  of  the  Reserve  only  less- 
ening the  immediate  command  of  the  chief  of  artillery,  without 
in  the  least  affecting  the  principles  governing  the  employment 
of  the  arm  or  the  duties  and  rights  of  its  officers,  either  in  their 
own  corps  or  as  affecting  the  army  at  large. 

In  this  connection,  the  experience  .of  the  Confederate  army  will 
be  found  to  be  interesting ;  and  although  it  may  be  stated  that  their 
orders  on  the  subject  never  so  completely  covered  the  ground  as 
did  our  own,  still  the  practical  results  at  which  both  armies  ar- 
rived were  almost  identical.  Prior  to  the  Peninsula,  and  even 
during  that  campaign,  their  artillery  had  no  organization  worthy 
of  the  name  ;  there  was,  however,  a  large  and  well-appointed  artil- 
lery reserve,  commanded  by  the  chief  of  artillery  of  the  army,  the 
batteries  of  which  were  afterwards,  in  1863,  distributed  to  the  army 
corps.  Before  the  second  Manassas  a  great  improvement  had 
been  effected  in  the  artillery  organization  by  arranging  the  bat- 
teries in  battalions,  under  iield  officers,  and  attaching  them  to 
divisions ;  at  that  battle  the  efficiency  of  the  artillery  battalion 
organization  was  fully  demonstrated.  When  army  corps  were 
organized  artillery  was  attached  to  each  corps,  under  its  own  chief. 
Following  this  came  General  Orders  No.  7,  Richmond,  January, 
1863,  providing  that — 

"Hereafter  all  field  artillery  belonging  to  any  separate  army  will  be  parked 
together  under  the  direction  of  the  general,  or  other  chief  officer  of  artil- 
lery having  control  of  the  same,  to  be  distributed,  when  required,  accord- 
ing to  the  judgment  of  the  commanding  general  .of  such  army." 

This  order  may  be  considered  as  another  step  in  the  plan  of 
concentration  which  had  been  commenced  as  soon  as  the  mistakes 
of  organization  were  made  manifest  by  experience,  and  by  which 
plan  of  concentration  the  artillery  was  gradually  withdrawn  from 
control  of  the  subordinate  (brigade  and  regimental)  commanders 
and  placed  under  generals  of  divisions,  corps,  and  armies ;  but  it 
is  believed  that  the  order  just  quoted  went  farther  in  this  direction 
than  has  been  done  in  any  other  modern  army,  and  it  may  be 
doubted  if  it  was  ever  given  practical  effect  in  the  Army  of  North- 


DUTIES:    CHIEF    OF    ARTILLERY    IN    THE    FIELD.  2IQ 

ern  Virginia  ;  this  will  become  manifest  when  we  examine  General 
Lee's  order  issued  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  that  under  re- 
view. General  Lee  directed  that — 

"  All  the  battalions  of  each  corps  will  be  under  the  command  of  and  will 
report  to  the  chief  of  artillery  for  the  corps.  The  whole,  in  both  corps,  will 
be  superintended  by  and  report  to  the  general  chief  of  artillery." 

A  question  would  immediately  arise  as  to  the  meaning  of  the 
word  superintend  in  this  order.  Is  it  synonymous  with  com- 
mand ?  If  it  were  so  considered,  then  why  not  use  the  latter  in  the 
order?  It  would  have  removed  ambiguity  by  terms,  the  signifi- 
cance of  which  is  well  known  to  every  military  man.  The  inference 
is  that  if  it  had  been  intended  to  give  the  chief  of  artillery  com- 
mand of  that  arm  the  order  would  have  said  so.  He  was  not, 
therefore,  a  commander,  but  a  superintendent,  the  functions  of 
whose  office  must  have  been  confined  to  matters  of  administration. 
It  may,  indeed,  have  been,  and  doubtless  was,  true  that  the  chief 
of  artillery  of  the  army  commanded  the  few  batteries  unattached 
to  corps,  which  either  by  accident  or  design  accompanied  the 
army  at  various  times  after  the  general  reserve  was  broken  up 
in  1863.  These  unattached  batteries,  however,  formed  no  proper 
command  for  a  general  officer;  and  hence  the  chief  of  artillery  was 
confined  from  necessity  to  a  general  superintendency  of  the  equip- 
ment, supply,  and  instruction  of  his  arm,  the  command  of  the 
artillery  attached  to  troops  being  expressly  vested  in  the  chiefs  of 
artillery  of  the  various  army  corps.* 

It  will  be  conceded  without  argument  that  the  position  and 
authority  of  the  chief  of  artillery  of  an  army,  i.  e.,  whether  he 
act  the  part  of  an  administrative  officer  simply,  or  whether  he  be 
commander  of  the  artillery,  is  a  matter  the  correct  determination 
of  which  is  of  the  first  consequence  to  the  proper  service  of  that 
arm. 

In  approaching  the  consideration  of  the  subject,  the  importance 
of  which,  as  affecting  the  efficiency  and  credit  of  the  artillery, 
cannot  be  overestimated,  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  this  is  a  case 
wherein  a  great  mistake  might  be  made  by  attempting  to  apply 
an  inflexible  rule,  without  taking  into  account  the  varied  circum- 

*  For  information  concerning  the  organization  of  the  Confederate  artillery, 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  I  am  indebted  principally  to  General  E.  P.  Alex- 
ander, late  0.  S.  A.,  and  at  one  time'  chief  of  artillery  of  Longstreet's  corps. 


220      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.    ARMY. 

stances  under  which  the  armies  of  different  nations  are  organized 
and  maintained. 

Of  this  we  may  be  reasonably  certain:  Unless  the  question  of 
the  true  position  of  the  chief  of  artillery  be  happily  determined, 
much  cannot  be  expected  from  that  arm.  If  the  duties  of  those 
at  the  head  of  affairs  be  not  defined,  how  is  it  possible  for  them 
to  direct  those  lower  in  the  scale?  The  hand  which  should  control 
being  palsied,  the  machinery  either  works  heavily,  wastes  its 
power  in  a  useless  friction  of  its  parts,  or  stops  altogether. 

In  the  carefully-organized  and  highly-trained  armies  of  conti- 
nental Europe  each  piece  in  the  machine  has  a  well-ascertained 
function.  Its  appointed  sphere  of  action  in  the  complete  working 
of  the  whole  is  determined  beforehand  and  known  to  all  concerned. 
The  result  is  this  :  As  each  knows  perfectly  what  he  is  to  do,  there 
is  less  need  for  supervision  by  those  in  chief  authority.  Each 
commander  of  both  divisional  and  corps  artillery,  (Appendix  A, 
[52],)  from  study,  reflection,  and  the  annual  and  other  exercises  in 
time  of  peace,  knows  his  duty  under  any  and  all  circumstances. 
To  him  the  management  of  his  batteries  in  war  is  different  from 
that  in  peace  in  this  only:  that  the  former  gives  opportunity  for 
putting  in  practice  those  principles  with  which  peace  has  made 
him  familiar.  In  these  thoroughly  disciplined  and  equipped 
armies  there  may  be  no  objection  to  the  distribution  of  the  entire 
artillery  to  army  corps.  The  functions  of  the  chief  of  artillery  of 
the  army  would  in  this  case  be  administrative.  As  the  artillery 
of  each  corps  has  its  commander,  and  as  all  the  artillery  is  dis- 
tributed to  corps,  there  is  no  direct  artillery  command — i.  e.,  of 
troops — left  for  the  chief  of  artillery  of  the  army.  It  is  understood 
that,  under  the  orders  of  the  commanding  general,  he  can  at  any 
time  assume  those  functions,  and  whenever  the  various  corps 
artilleries  are  massed  for  any  purpose  he  would  assume  com- 
mand of  the  mass.  Except  on  these  rare  occasions,  his  duties 
would  be  purely  advisory  and  administrative.  This,  it  will  be 
found,  is  the  role  assigned  in  the  field  to  the  chief  of  artillery  of 
the  principal  armies  of  continental  Europe.  As  to  the  special 
arm  —  artillery — its  tactical  units  form  permanent  parts  of  the 
divisions  and  army  corps,  and  for  fighting  and  disciplinary  pur- 
poses they  are  wholly  under  the  orders  of  the  division  and  corps 
generals.  The  establishment  of  an  imperium  in  imperio  is  in  this 
manner  rendered  impossible. 


DUTIES:    CHIEF    OF    ARTILLERY    IN    THE    FIELD.  221 

Is  this  system  best  suited  to  our  service? 

If  our  artillery  took  the  field  under  similar  circumstances  as  to 
practice  and  discipline;  if  the  armies  which  the  Government  would 
send  forth  in  case  of  war  were  veterans,  well  organized;  if  the  duties 
of  each,  from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  were  well  understood  and 
executed  with  facility,  there  would  be  left  no  room  to  doiibt_ 
about  it;  we  could  not  in  that  case  do  a  wiser  thing  than  adopt  a 
system  which,  amidst  the  surroundings  indicated,  has  led'  to  splen- 
did results  elsewhere.  It  may  be  assumed,  however,  that  the  large 
armies  which  the  United  States  will  send  out  will  not  be  of  this  de- 
scription. They  certainly  have  not  been.  Veterans  are  not  re- 
cruited directly  from  the  walks  of  civil  life.  With  present  practices 
the  artillery  which  will  accompany  these  armies  cannot  be  expected 
to  be  well  versed  in  their  special  duties,  for  during  peace  the 
regulars  received  no  instruction,  administrative  or  tactical,  in  the 
management  of  that  organization — the  artillery  brigade — into 
which,  when  war  calls  them  to  action,  they  will  at  once  be  formed; 
and  as  for  the  volunteers,  they  will  have  everything  to  learn. 

In  armies  such  as  ours  would  be  it  is  doubtful  if  the  existing 
methods  of  European  armies  are  the  best,  even  if  they  be  practi- 
cable. There  should  be  a  closer  bond  connecting  the  detached 
portions  of  the  artillery  scattered  throughout  the  army  than  the 
European  system  recognizes.  This  will  be  secured  by  a  code  of 
regulations  having  for  its  foundation-stone  the  two  following 
principles:  First,  a  chief  of  artillery  is  commander  of  that  arm; 
second,  batteries  or  other  artillery  organizations  assigned  to 
divisions  and  corps  are  on  the  footing  of  troops  attached  for  service. 
It  is  to  be  understood  that  artillery  will  be  neither  attached  to,  nor 
taken  from,  these  commands  without  the  authority  of  the  com- 
manding general  of  the  army;  and,  when  so  attached,  it  is  for  dis- 
ciplinary and  fighting  purposes,  exclusively  under  the  orders  of  the 
division  and  corps  commanders.  Batteries  and  other  artillery 
organizations  not  attached  to  military  commands  will  be  under 
the  direct  orders  of  the  chief  of  artillery;  this  to  include  the  artil- 
lery reserve,  if  there  be  one;  also  the  ammunition  columns,  For 
purposes  of  supply,  instruction,  and  inspection,  all  artillery, 
wherever  serving,  should  be  under  the  orders  of  the  chief  of 
artillery  of  the  army. 

In  the  cantonments  of  winter  season,  when  hostilities  are  sus- 
pended, it  would,  when  compatible  with  safety,  add  to  the  effi- 


222      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.  S.   ARMY. 

* 

ciency  of  the  artillery  to  withdraw  it  temporarily  from  divisions 
and  corps  into  one  body,  for  more  thorough  and  uniform  instruc- 
tion and  equipment,  and  with  a  view  to  the  batteries  being  return- 
ed in  a  replenished  condition  at  the  opening  of  a  new  cam- 
paign. This  was  the  plan  pursued  with  the  artillery  of  the  main 
army  during  the  Revolutionary  war;  and,  not  because  of  its  ancient 
origin,  but  rather  of  its  excellent  features,  it  deserves  careful 
consideration. 

If  the  management  of  our  artillery  in  campaign  be  based  upon 
the  principles  before  announced,  it  would  insure  all  being  done  that 
a  correct  administrative  system  could  accomplish  to  render  the 
service  of  that  arm  efficient,  to  impart  unity  of  purpose  and  action 
to  its  dispersed  members,  without  in  the  least  impairing  military 
discipline,  and  open  a  certain  pathway  to  its  honorable  career 
in  the  field.  This  done,  the  prestige  and  glorious  traditions  of 
the  arm  would  be  intrusted  to  the  guardianship  of  the  personnel, 
in  which,  more  than  ever  before,  character,  professional  attain- 
ments, and  abilities  will  be  found  to  be  absolutely  necessary. 


MATERIEL:  CARRIAGES.  223 


CHAPTER  IX. 

MATERIEL. 

The  term  ''system  of  artillery,"  as  used  generally,  is  synony- 
mous with  "system  of  guns;"  but  this  is  not  always  so,  as  illus- 
trated in  the  Gribeauval,  the  most  complete  in  all  its  parts  of 
any  system  of  artillery  ever  devised,  embracing  not  only  guns, 
carriages,  and  their  appliances,  but  the  organization  of  the  per- 
sonnel as  well,  the  last  being  as  important  a  feature  as  any  other. 
The  division  of  Gribeauval  formed  the first  distinct  artillery  tactical 
unity  whence  sprang  the  present  battery,  with  the  men,  their  pieces 
and  the  horses  inseparably  connected. 

Vallier's  system  related  only  to  the  calibres  of  guns  to  be 
used;  the  stock-trail  system  to  the  carriages  alone,  the  calibres 
of  the  pieces  and  the  organization  of  the  personnel  remaining 
unchanged. 

As  the  organization  of  the  United  States  artillery  is  elsewhere 
treated  of,  the  -materiel  of  the  system  will  here  exclusively  receive 
attention. 

CARRIAGES. 

It  has  been  naturally  but  erroneously  supposed  that  the  Gri- 
beauval carriage  was  introduced  into  the  American  service  during 
the  Revolution;  instead,  the  English  was  then  used,  and  it  re- 
mained during  the  eighteenth  century  the  only  style  known 
practically  to  the  American  artillery  service.  Many  cannon  and 
other  military  stores  were  procured  in  France,  and  the  con- 
clusion was  drawn  that  the  carriages  accompanied  them,  and 
that  in  effect  the  whole  Gribeauval  system  was  transplanted  to 
American  soil.  There  is  no  proof,  however,  that  this  was  the 
case.  On  the  contrary,  the  existence  of  the  system  seems  scarcely 
to  have  been  known,  and  only  during  the  later  periods  of  the 
war.  No  reference  to  the  system  by  American  officers  while 
the  war  was  in  progress  has  been  found;  and  even  those  Amer- 
icans who  served  with  Rochambeau's  army  seem  to  have  been 
entirely  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  the  French  set  up  claims  to 
special  merit  for  their  artillery,  if  indeed  at  that  time  they  did. 


224      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   TPIE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

In  Captain  Stevens'  "System  for  the  Discipline  of  the  Artil- 
lery" (1797)  there  is  no  reference  to  the  Gribeauval  system,  ex- 
cept in  a  foot-note,  the  purport  of  which  confirms  the  view  here 
taken.  Following  the  exercise  of  the  field-piece  by  the  American 
(English)  plan,  he  remarks  that  "students,  as  a  matter  of  curi- 
osity, may  like  to  contrast  this  with  a  practice  the  manuscript  for 
which  was  given  General  Knox  at  Yorktown  by  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Nadal,  director  of  the  French  artillery  park."  This 
proved  to  be  the  manual  for  the  Gribeauval  field  artillery — a  fact 
of  which,  farther  than  supposing  it  was  the  system  adopted  by 
the  French  army,  Stevens,  in  1797,  was  apparently  profoundly 
ignorant;  as  he  was  also  of  the  further  fact  that  such  a  person  as 
Gribeauval  had  ever  lived.  We  are  justified  in  drawing  this  infer- 
ence, for,  had  he  been  aware  of  the  existence  of  the  great  artil- 
lery reformer,  nothing  would  have  been  more  natural  than  for 
him  to  have  mentioned  his  name  when  he  was  dealing  with  his 
system  of  artillery.  General  Knox  did  not  take  the  trouble  to 
have  Nadal' s  manuscript  translated — a  task  which,  several  years 
afterwards,  the  American  author  found  great  difficulty  in  having1 
accomplished;  not,  he  remarked,  that  there  was  any  trouble  in 
having  ordinary  French  converted  into  English,  but  because  the 
technical  artillery  terms  were  almost  unknown.  So  far  was  Ste- 
vens from  conceding  special  merit  to  the  unknown  system  that 
he,  in  true  English  style,  took  just  the  opposite  view,  remarking 
triumphantly,  and  without  thought  of  having  the  assertion  brought 
in  question,  that  ' '  to  clearly  establish  the  superiority  of  the 
American  (English)  method  over  the  French,  one  had  only  to 
study  their  respective  manoeuvres  as  they  were  here  contrasted. ' ' 

Beaumarchais,  who  furnished  large  quantities  of  stores  to  the 
Americans  during  the  Revolution,  including  cannon  and  other 
materiel,  did  not,  so  far  as  can  now  be  ascertained,  send  over  a 
single  carriage. 

It  is  easily  understood  why  the  American  artillery  adhered  to 
the  English  system  as  nearly  as  possible  in  everything.  First, 
they  were  familiar  with  it,  both  through  inheritance  and  the  fact 
that  Muller's  Treatise,  with  its  plans  and  tables  for  artillery  con- 
structions, was  in  every  workshop  and  foundry  which  turned  out 
this  species  of  materiel ;  second,  they  deemed  it  superior  to  every 
other;  and  the  reason  they  supplemented  home  products  by  im- 
portations from  France  was,  that  the  brass-foundry  art  being  in  its 


.TERIEL:  CARRIAGES. 


225 


infancy  in  America,  the  ordnance  yielded  was  not,  particularly 
during  the  first  year  of  the  war,  entirely  satisfactory,  nor  was  it 
easy  to  procure  the  copper  and  tin  necessary  for  brass  castings. 

There  was  every  reason  why  they  should  not  look  with  favor 
on  the  Gribeauval  or  French  system.  The  Du  Coudray  affair  had 
disgusted  them  with  anything  that  had  the  semblance  of  it.  They 
felt  that  they  had  been  compelled  to  show  that  they  could  teke- 
care  of  themselves,  not  with  the  assistance,  but  in  spite  of  French 
artillery  officers ;  and  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  separate  the 
personnel  from  the  system  of  materiel  it  represented. 

General  Knox,  commanding  the  artillery,  stamped  on  all  apper- 
taining to  that  arm  the  impress  of  an  active,  well-balanced  mind, 
stored  with  both  theoretical  and  practical  knowledge.  That  he 
considered  the  English  artillery  the  best  in  the  world  there  is 
abundant  evidence ;  when,  in  1776,  urging  upon  a  committee 
of  Congress  the  advisability  of  establishing  for  our  artillery  an 
academy  similar  to  that  at  Woolwich,  he  observed  that  it  was 
confessedly  to  this  institution  that  the  enemy  owed  the  superiority 
of  their  artillery  to  all  that  had  opposed  it ;  and  in  recommend- 
ing to  the  commander-in-chief  the  organization  of  additional  regi- 
ments, about  the  same  time,  he  remarked  that  we  were  safe  so 
long  as  we  followed  the  example  of  the  English  in  this  and  all 
other  particulars  touching  the  management  of  the  artillery  arm, 
either  the  personnel  or  the  materiel.  The  standard  set  up  by  the 
Royal  Artillery  Regiment  was  good  enough  for  him  ;  he  used  the 
French  guns  just  as  though  they  had  come  from  Turkey,  or  else- 
where, in  happy  ignorance  of  the  fact  that  they  belonged  to  and 
were  the  exponents  of  a  system  destined  soon  to  become  famous, 
and,  except  by  the  English,  to  be  adopted  with  but  slight  changes 
into  every  artillery  of  the  world,  including  the  American.  There 
is  no  reason  to  doubt  that,  had  Du  Coudray  succeeded  Knox  as 
general  of  artillery,  the  Gribeauval  system,  in  its  entirety,  would 
have  followed  him  to  our  shores.  General  Gribeauval  himself 
was  perhaps  the  staunchest  of  Du  Coudray's  friends;  but  the  utter 
and  humiliating  failure  of  that  scheme  proved  the  American  artil- 
lery to  be  strong  enough  in  every  way  to  bid  defiance  to  outside 
interference.  It  was  intellectually,  and  in  all  that  goes  to  make 
up  an  efficient  arm,  the  peer  of  any  other  in  the  Revolutionary 
army. 

So  far  as  is  known,  Professor  Muller's  work  on  gunnery  was 
29 


226      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

the  only  text-book  for  artillery  constructions  extant  in  this  country 
prior  to  1797.  That  it  was  extensively  used  by  those  having 
charge  of  artillery  technical  affairs  is  well  known.  With  this 
book  in  the  hands  of  a  superintendent,  there  was  no  reason  why 
skilled  artisans  should  not  produce  English  guns  and  carriages 
of  the  most  approved  patterns.  The  carriages  that  Stevens 
describes  as  having  been  used  during  the  Revolution  and  down 
to  the  time  at  which  he  wrote  were  Muller's.  The  American 
edition  of  Muller's  treatise,  published  in  Philadelphia  in  1779,  was 
dedicated  (doubtless  without  the  author's  consent*)  "to  Gen- 
erals Washington  and  Knox,  to  Colonel  Proctor,  and  the  officers 
of  the  continental  army."  The  typographical  and  artistic  execu- 
tion of  the  work  was  rough,  yet  sufficiently  exact  for  practical 
purposes.  Contemporaneous  testimony  establishes  the  fact  that 
the  tables  of  construction  and  the  drawings  therein  contained 
were  extensively  made  use  of,  while  there  is  no  evidence  to  show 
that  any  other  than  this  style  of  carriage  was  known.  It  was 
called  the  "bracket,"  as  the  Gribeauval  was  called  the  "flask," 
and  its  successor,  the  present  style,  the  ' '  stock-trail ' '  system. 

The  ' '  travelling  carriages ' '  were  used  to  transport  the  heavier 
pieces  which  accompanied  troops;  "field  carriages,"  to  carry  the 
lighter  pieces.  In  both  cases  the  material  used  was  wood,  except 
for  bolts  and  bands  required  to  hold  the  wooden  parts  together. 
The  cheeks  of  the  traveling  carriage  flared  outwards  towards  the 
trail,  and  were  joined  together  by  three  transonis — trail,  centre, 
and  breast.  Firmly  mortised  into  the  cheeks  was  a  piece  of  wood, 
upon  which  rested  a  wedge  for  elevating  or  depressing  the  gun. 
The  inside  of  the  cheeks  between  the  trail  and  centre  transoms 
was  cut  away  considerably  to  lighten  the  trail,  while  immediately 
in  rear  of  the  centre  transom  was  placed  a  locker  for  carrying  tools. 
The  field-carriage  did  not  differ  materially  in  design  from  the 
other;  wooden  axles  were  used  for  all;  but  in  the  field-carriage 
the  wedge  was  suppressed  and  the  elevation  given  by  means  of  a 
screw.  The  traveling  gun-carriage  wheels  for  all  calibres — 3, 
6,  12,  and  24-pounders — were  of  the  diameter  of  field  artillery 
carriage-wheels  of  the  present  day — fifty-eight  inches;  but  the 

*It  could  not  be  expected  that  the  preceptor  to  H.  R.  H.,  the  Duke  of 
Gloucester,  would  view  with  entire  approbation  this  wholesale  purloining  by 
unrepentant  rebels  of  the  fruits  of  his  brain-work. 


MATERIEL:  CARRIAGES:  227 

field  gun-carriage  wheels  were  only  fifty  inches  in  diameter.  Ex- 
cept for  the  3-pounder  gun,  where  they  were  but  forty-five  inches, 
the  limber-wheels  for  all  gun-carriages  were  forty-eight  inches  in 
diameter.  From  this  it  appears  that  there  was  not  that  disparity 
in  the  size  of  limber  and  carriage  wheels — twelve  inches — which 
characterized  the  Gribeauval  system. 

The  horses  were  attached  to  the  carriages  of  the  pieces  in  single- 
file.  There  was  no  ammunition  chest  on  the  limber.  That  a  few 
rounds  might  be  at  hand  when  the  pieces  came  into  action,  two 
side  boxes,  placed  one  above  the  other,  the  upper  for  cartridges, 
the  lower  for  projectiles,  were  attached  to  either  side  of  the 
bracket-trail  stock  in  rear  of  the  axles.  When  the  piece  was  "in 
battery ' '  the  side  boxes  were  placed  on  the  ground  three  paces 
in  rear  of  the  end  of  the  trail  handspike.  The  ammunition  in  the 
side  boxes  made  the  piece  in  a  measure  independent  of  the  ammu- 
nition wagons.  When  the  British  started  out  on  the  expedition 
which  terminated  in  the  affair  at  Lexington,  in  1775,  they  carried 
with  them  none  other  than  twenty-four  rounds  per  gun  in  these 
side  boxes,  which  therefore  served  the  same  purpose  as  the  small- 
trail  ammunition-box  of  the  Gribeauval,  and  the  limber  chest  of 
the  stock-trail  carriage;  and  it  is  worthy  of  remark  that,  after 
having  been  universally  suppressed  about  the  beginning  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  when  the  Gribeauval  and  block-trail  had  sup- 
planted all  other  systems  of  carriages,  the  side  box  is  again  com- 
ing into  use,  not  only  with  some  of  the  mitrailleurs,  but  also  in 
the  most  recent  patterns  of  improved  metallic  field  gun-carriages. 

Aside  from  that  carried  in  side  boxes,  ammunition  was  trans- 
ported in  tumbrels,  carts,  and  ammunition  wagons.  The  wagon 
had  four,  the  tumbrel  and  cart  each  two  wheels,  which  were  all  of 
different  sizes,  and  unlike  either  the  limber  orguri-carriage  wheels. 
The  inconvenience  resulting  from  this  multiplicity  in  the  sizes  of 
artillery  wheels  must  have  been  very  great,  and  it  is  hard  to 
understand  why  it  was  tolerated.  To  the  British  artillery  belongs 
the  credit  of  having  first  corrected  this  evil,  by  making  inter- 
changeable the  wheels  of  limbers  and  gun-carriages,  an  important 
step  in  the  simplification  of  artillery  materiel,  which  their  off- 
spring, the  American  artillery,  did  not  imitate  for  many  years,  nor 
until,  with  many  doubts  and  misgivings,  the  Gribeauval  system 
had  first  been  adopted,  and  then  discarded. 

Secretary  McHenry  was  the  first  to  move  against  the  ancient 


228      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

and  honored  system  of  the  fathers.  He  had  drawings  purchased 
of  carriages  of  the  German  horse-artillery  system,  concerning  the 
power  of  which  he  had  an  exalted  opinion,  and  with  a  view  to 
having  it  introduced  into  the  United  States  army.  An  elaborate 
report  on  the  subject  was  made  to  Congress,  which  body  did  not, 
however,  partake  of  the  Secretary's  enthusiasm ;  and  so  during 
the  latter  part  of  Mr.  Adams'  administration  the  matter  dropped 
out  of  sight. 

Modifications  of  the  old  system  were  begun  by  Secretary  Dear- 
born almost  as  soon  as  he  was  installed  in  office,  March  5th,  1801, 
but  not  in  the  manner  contemplated  by  his  predecessor.  The 
introduction  of  horse  artillery  was  held  in  abeyance,  even  as  a 
measure  to  be  advocated  before  Congress,  and  improvements  in 


NOTE — The  enlisted  men  of  the  artillery  did  not  drive  the  teams ;  that  was 
done  by  civilians,  employed  sometimes  by  contract  for  a  certain  time,  as  a  year, 
and  at  others  hired  for  temporary  service.  The  artillery  soldier  served  his  guns 
and  prepared  his  ammunition.  To  make  a  driver  of  him  was  considered  a 
degradation.  Horses  for  the  artillery  were  sometimes  purchased  for  that  arm 
alone,  but  generally  the  demands  of  service  required  the  transfer  of  horses  from 
that  to  other  branches,  and  the  reverse.  During  the  latter  years  of  the  war  the 
impressment  of  horses  became  quite  a  common  practice,  those  belonging  to 
Tories  being  levied  upon  when  possible.  The  following  warrant  given  Colonel 
Pickering,  quartermaster-general,  when  Lafayette's  detachment  was  about  to 
march  for  Virginia,  illustrates  the  manner  of  procuring  means  of  transport  in 
an  emergency  :  "  HEADQUARTERS,  NEW  WINDSOR,  February  16^,  1781. — Whereas 
I  have  ordered  a  detachment  to  march  from  Peekskill  on  the  19th  instant,  on  a 
service  that  may  not  admit  of  delay  resulting  from  an  observance  of  the  usual 
forms  of  procuring  teams  and  forage  on  the  route,  you  are  hereby  authorized 
by  yourself  or  deputy  (whenever  it  may  be  necessary)  to  procure  those  articles 
by  military  impress  in  the  country  through  which  the  detachment  marches,  for 
which  this  shall  be  your  warrant."  This  was  signed  by  the  commander-in- 
chief.  The  "usual  forms  of  procuring  forage  and  teams"  here  alluded  to  was 
by  making  requisitions  for  them  on  the  civil  magistrates.  There  was  often  no 
money  with  which  to  purchase ;  levies  on  Tories  were  not  always  practicable ; 
and  as  owners  refused  to  hire  their  teams  when  pay  therefor  was  so  uncertain, 
there  was  nothing  to  do  except  to  invoke  the  aid  of  authority;  either  civil  or 
military.  The  former  was  appealed  to  preferably,  but  when  prompt  action  was 
necessary,  as  in  the  instance  cited,  the  vigor  of  military  impress  alone  sufficed. 

Benedict  Arnold  introduced  the  use  of  oxen  for  transporting  heavy  artillery, 
and  in  this  Colonel  Pickering  followed  his  example.  He  has  left  on  record  the 
statement  that  without  oxen  there  could  not  have  been  assembled  at  Yorktown 
the  necessary  siege  artillery,  and  that  to  their  extensive  employment  might  be 
attributed  the  success  of  American  arms  in  that  decisive  campaign. 


MATERIEL:    CARRIAGES.  22Q 

the  existing  but  ancient  system  of  materiel  became  the  order  of 
the  day. 

The  translation  in  1800  of'De  Scheel's  Treatise  on  the  Gribeau- 
val  Artillery  paved  the  way  for  these  innovations.  This  work, 
which  consisted  of  a  text  accompanied  by  a  volume  of  plates, 
contained  all  the  information  necessary  to  the  proper  construction 
of  the  Gribeauval  carriages.  It  gave  the  first  information  to  trie" 
army  and  the  public  in  an  available  form  concerning  the  particu- 
lars of  the  (to  them)  new  system  of  artillery;  for,  though  there 
were  many  officers  of  artillery  who  were  cognizant  of  its  existence 
and  its  merits,  they  were  those  versed  not  only  in  the  French 
language,  but  also  in  French  military  literature.  This  number 
was  very  small,  and,  as  they  never  imparted  their  knowledge  to 
the  community,  it  availed  the  latter  nothing. 

De  Scheel's  treatise  dealt  wholly  with  materiel ;  hence  it  for 
some  time  longer  escaped  the  attention  of  the  authorities  that 
Gribeauval' s  completed  system  extended  to  the  organization  of 
the  personnel. 

Secretary  Dearborn  retained  in  some  degree  the  prejudice 
against  foreign  importations  which  he  had  imbibed  during  the 
first  years  of  the  Revolution,  when  many  incompetent  officers 
who  sought  service  in  the  forces  of  the  colonies  were  given  posi- 
tions, because  of  their  supposed  knowledge,  over  more  deserv- 
ing Americans.  So  great  had  been  this  abuse  that  a  reaction  set 
in  naturally  enough,  yet  as  unreasonable  as  the  practice  it  was 
intended  to  correct,  and  which  for  some  time  left  even  the  gallant 
De  Kalb  knocking  in  vain  at  the  doors  of  Congress  for  admission 
into  its  army. 

But  although  Dearborn  deprecated  the  practice  of  servilely 
copying  that  which  was  European,  he  had  the  practical  sense 
which  enabled  him  to  recognize  a  good  thing  when  he  saw  it; 
nor  were  his  prejudices  so  great  as  to  deter  him,  through  mere 
sentiment,  from  adopting,  if  not  the  exact  form,  at  least  the  sub- 
stance of  the  Gribeauval  carriage  improvements.  This  will  ex- 
plain how  it  was  that,  while* he  did  not  hesitate  to  appropriate 
the  new  system  piece-meal,  he  could  not  make  up  his  mind  to 
adopt  it  bodily.  He  desired  to  secure  a  lighter  and  more  mobile 
carriage  for  his  new  system  of  cast-iron  field-guns,  and  for  this 
purpose  was  anxious  to  secure  whatever  there  was  of  merit  in  the 
Gribeauval;  but  he  determined  to  make  no  change  until  the 


230      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

wisdom  of  the  measure  was  established  to  his  satisfaction.  He 
relied  on  his  own  judgment,  instead  of  being  guided  by  the 
counsels  of  other  men.  By  failing  to  appreciate  the  importance 
of  having  the  same  parts  of  all  carriages  precisely  alike  and  inter- 
changeable, the  soul  of  the  Gribeauval  system  was  passed  by 
without  recognition;  but  by  taking  up  one  after  the  other  its  most 
striking  features,  the  manoeuvring  power  of  the  field  artillery  was 
greatly  increased.  Thus  by  degrees  the  American  carriage  was 
brought  to  the  point  where  but  one  step  was  necessary  to  make 
it  the  Gribeauval  in  its  entirety;  and  this  step  was  taken  by 
Dearborn's  successor  within  a  month  of  the  time  he  was  estab- 
lished in  the  war  office. 

It  will  be  interesting  to  trace,  as  they  were  successively  made, 
these  changes  from  the  old  bracket-trail  carriage.  First  of  all,  the 
weight  was  cut  down  in  1801  about  thirty  per  cent.,  taken  pretty 
evenly  from  every  part  except  the  axler  The  wooden  axle 
next  gave  way  to  one  of  wrought-iron,  incased  in  wood,  with 
composition  boxes.  Driving  teams  tandem  was  discontinued,  the 
shafts  of  former  days  being  replaced  by  the  pole.  These  alterations 
had  all  been  made  before  1807,  and  the  year  following  both 
traveling  as  well  as  firing  trunnions  were  adopted  for  the  heavier 
field-gun  carriages.  Thus,  during  Dearborn's  incumbency,  and 
under  his  directions,  four  of  the  most  prominent  features  of  tile 
Gribeauval  carriage  were  adopted:  First,  the  carriages  reduced 
thirty  per  cent,  in  weight;  second,  wrought-iron  axles  with 
composition  boxes  replaced  those  of  wood;  third,  the  pole  sup- 
planted the  shafts;  fourth,  firing  and  traveling  trunnions  were 
used  for  the  heavier  calibres.  Except  the  last,  which  was  a  very 
inconvenient  arrangement,  these  changes  have  stood  their  ground 
for  three-quarters  of  a  century,  attesting  the  sterling  worth  of 
him  who,  in  that  dark  age  of  our  army's  history,  discerned  their 
advantages,  and  was  not  deterred  by  a  sense  of  his  exalted  position 
from  seeing  to  it  that  their  merits  should  be  tested,  and,  when 
demonstrated  to  be  such,  that  the  improvements  themselves  should 
be  adopted  in  service. 

The  pent-house  ammunition  box  of  the  Gribeauval  system  was 
not  made  part  of  the  new  carriages.  Its  advantages  over  the  old- 
fashioned  English  side  boxes  were  not  clearly  established;  it 
carried  no  more  ammunition  than  they,  and  its  manipulation  was 


MATERIEL:  CARRIAGES.  23! 

equally  difficult.  But  it  will  be  seen  that  the  new  system  had 
been  pushed  to  the  verge  of  the  French  without  having,  however, 
become  identical  with  it. 

It  was  the  intention  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  equip  all  the 
companies  of  the  light  artillery  regiment  raised  pursuant  to  the 
act  of  April  i2th,  1808,  with  the  new  carriages  and  the  new 
system  of  cast-iron  field  guns,  which  also  been  perfected  during^ 
his  administration  of  the  War  Department.  Every  effort  was 
made  to  supply  the  requisite  materiel,  but,  as  has  been  mentioned, 
the  expense  that  would  attend  the  measure  caused  its  abandon- 
ment, except  for  a  single  company. 

During  the  Revolution,  Americans  had  accepted  the  English 
artillery  as  the  standard  of  perfection.  Time  had,  however, 
wrought  changes  in  the  artilleries  of  both  countries.  Both  had 
abandoned  their  old  and  honored  system  for  a  new  one.  Though 
in  many  places  their  lines  of  research  and  improvement  had  been 
parallel,  they  had  on  the  whole  diverged,  until,  in  1809,  their 
respective  systems  were  diametrically  opposed  to  each  other. 
The  Americans  had  partially  copied,  and  were  now  about  to 
adopt,  what  was  considered  by  all,,  except  the  British,  the  finest 
system  in  the  world.  The  English  artillery  had  wrought  out  a  new 
system  for  itself— one  as  much  superior  to  the  Gribeauval  as  the 
latter  was  superior  to  any  that  had  preceded  it,  and  which  was 
destined  in  a  few  years  to  sweep  all  rivals  from  the  field. 

Secretary  Eustis  was  appointed  March  yth,  1809.  On  the  i8th 
of  the  following  April  he  ordered  the  military  agent  at  Boston  to 
construct  for  the  light  artillery  regiment  some  gun-carriages  of 
the  Gribeauval  style,  without  modifications,  adding  the  injunction 
that,  "as  these  are  the  first  of  the  kind  on  this  plan ,  it  is  particu- 
larly desirable  that  they  should  be  made  in  a  proper  manner  and 
of  the  best  materials  and  workmanship. ' '  This  is  the  date  at  which 
the  Gribeauval  system  of  carriages,  pure  and  simple,  was  intro- 
duced into  the  American  service. 

Other  carriages  of  this  pattern  had,  however,  been  manufactured, 
and  others  still  had  been  turned  over  to  the  United  States  author- 
ities at  New  Orleans  in  1803,  after  the  Louisiana  purchase;  hence 
those  which  Eustis  ordered  to  be  constructed  were  not  the  first 
seen  in  this  country.  In  his  letter  of  instruction  to  the  agent, 
before  mentioned,  the  latter  was  directed  to  accept  as  a  model  in 


232      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

his  constructions   a  carriage  that  had  already  been   made  by  a 
mechanic  of  Boston  and  approved  of  by  competent  judges. 

The  New  Orleans  artillery — received  from  the  French — con- 
sisted of  four  12-pounder,  four  8-pounder,  eight  4-pounder  guns, 
and  eight  6-inch  howitzers,  with  the  most  approved  Gribeauval 
carriages,  caissons,  and  equipments  complete.  In  the  fall  of  1809 
two  of  these  carriages  were  by  the  Secretary's  order  sent  to  Wash- 
ington city  for  examination,  and  to  serve  as  patterns  for  others. 

The  Wurst  wagon,  which  at  that  time  was  the  French  light 
(horse)  artillery  caisson,  was  not  introduced,  or  even  manufac- 
tured, until  1812,  after  the  declaration  of  war  against  Great  Britain. 
Colonel  Izard,  of  the  Second  Artillery,  was  the  first  to  construct  a 
few  of  them  for  the  equipment  of  part  of  his  regiment  fitting  out 
for  the  Canadian  frontier ;  but,  so  far  as  can  be  ascertained,  they 
were  not  issued  to  any  part  of  the  army.  That  portion  of  the 
light  (horse)  regiment  which,  in  the  first  months  of  the  war,  took 
the  field,  was  equipped  as  horse  artillery  proper,  with  the  ordinary 
caisson. 

As  the  war  progressed  and  the  construction  of  many  new  car- 
riages became  necessary  the  Gribeauval  system  was  gradually 
extended  to  embrace  all  calibres — 3,  6,  12,  18,  and  24-pounders 
— the  most  noticeable  improvement  being  that  the  tire,  instead  of 
being  put  on  the  wheels  in  sections,  as  in  the  Gribeauval,  was  made 
into  a  hoop. 

Although  the  Americans  met  in  the  field  the  new  English  sys- 
tem of  artillery  during  the  war  of  1812,  the  events  of  the  war  were 
not  of  sufficient  magnitude  to  demonstrate  its  superiority,  which 
seems  to  have  escaped  the  attention  of  all  except  one  man— 


NOTE. — It  has  been  stated  that  the  complete  Gribeauval  system  embraced  two 
parts:  (1)  materiel;  (2)  personnel.  The  former  included  (a)  guns ;  (b)  car- 
riages. Of  these,  (a)  was  never  adopted  into  the  United  States  service.  The 
manner  in  which  (b)  was  adopted  has  been  narrated.  This  left  (2)  to  be  ac- 
counted for,  to  take  in  the  completed  Gribeauval  system. 

The  laws  had  organized  the  personnel  of  the  United  States  artillery  into 
companies  and  regiments.  The  division  of  Gribeauval  found -no  place  in  the 
strictly  legal  organization.  It  was  given  one  by  regulations.  After  Secretary 
Armstrong  assumed  control  at  the  War  Department  (January  13,  1813),  the 
artillery,  on  paper  at  least,  was  distributed  for  field  service,  under  the  regula- 
tions of  May  1st,  1813,  into  divisions  or  half  divisions.  This  was  simply  copying 
the  Gribeauval  system.  It  left  the  adoption  of  the  guns  (a)  to  make  that  sys- 
tem complete;  but  this  step  was  never  taken.  [See  Appendix  C,  (1).] 


MATERIEL  !    CARRIAGES.  233 

Colonel  Decius  Wadsworth,  of  the  ordnance  department.*  This 
officer  was  attracted  by  the  peculiarities  of  the  English  field-car- 
riages, and,  having  given  careful  attention  to  their  construction, 
became  convinced  of  their  many  advantages,  particularly  as  to  the 
increased  mobility  thereby  insured.  He  was  at  the  time  engaged, 
under  the  authority  and  requirements  of  the  act  of  February  Sth^ 
1815,  in  devising  a  complete  system  of  artillery  mat6riel,  which  he 
hoped  to  have  adopted  by  the  War  Department.  Among  other 
things,  he  proposed  a  field-carriage  in  principles  of  construction 
very  much  like  the  English  block-trail.  But  the  idea  was  novel;  it 
was  departing,  almost  as  soon  as  adopted,  from  the  system  of  Gri- 
beauval,  with  its  glorious  associations,  and  which,  save  by  the 
British  artillery,  had  been  everywhere  accepted  as  superior  to  all 
others.  It  was  natural,  therefore,  that  Secretary  Calhoun  should 
hesitate  to  approve  this  new  and  unique  field-carriage ;  and,  as 
the  safest  course,  he  proposed  that  a  board  of  officers  should 
examine  and  report  upon  the  merits  of  the  Wadsworth  system  of 
materiel.  The  personnel  of  the  board  was  selected  by  Colonel 

*  Writing,  in  1869,  concerning  the  attempts  of  Colonel  Wadsworth  to 
improve  the  style  of  gun-carriage  after  the  war  of  1812,  Mr.  William  Wade, 
who  was  at  the  time  (1812-1821)  an  ordnance  officer  and  a  co-laborer  with 
Wadsworth,  remarked:  "In  181*7,  Colonel  Decius  Wadsworth,  who  had  been 
chief  of  the  ordnance  department  since  its  first  establishment,  in  1812,  de- 
vised a  field-carriage  of  a  model  entirely  different  from  any  hitherto  known 
to  our  service.  Its  leading  features  were  similar  to  the  carriages  used  by 
the  British  army  in  our  war  of  1812.  One  of  the  British  carriages  captured 
at  the  battle  of  Plattsburg  in  September,  1814,  was  sent  to  the  Washington 
arsenal.  It  was  of  the  stock-trail  kind,  which  coupled  with  its  limber  by 
means  of  a  pintle-hook  fastened  upon  the  rear  of  the  limber-axle  body..  The 
limber  had,  instead  of  a  single  pole,  three  thills  or  shafts,  designed  for  the 
use  of  three  horses  abreast.  One  of  the.  shafts  was  movable,  to  be  displaced 
or  attached  at  pleasure.  A  large  ammunition  chest  was  placed  upon  the 
limber-axle  body,  upon  which  six  men  could  ride,  and  seats  for  two  men 
were  placed  on  the  carriage,  thus  carrying  eight  men  in  all  upon  the  carriage. 
This  was  the  first  field-gun  carriage  of  the  stock-trail  model  that  I  ever  saw 
or  heard  of,  and  was  doubtless  the  first  ever  known  in  the  United  States. 

"Colonel  Wadsworth,  in  constructing  his  carriage,  modified  this  English 
model  by  substituting  the  single  pole  for  the  three  shafts,  and  by  using  two 
bent  cheeks  instead  of  the  stock-trail,  and  also  by  supporting  the  limber  ammu- 
nition chest  on  springs,  instead  of  fixing  it  upon  the  axle,  as  in  the  English 
carriage.  By  bending  the  two  cheeks  so  that  they  came  nearly  together  at 
the  trail  ends,  he  retained  all  the  advantages  of  the  stock-trail  for  wheeling 

30 


234      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

Wadsworth,  and  embraced  Colonel  Porter  and  Captain  Towson 
of  the  light  artillery,  Captain  Archer  of  the  corps  of  artillery, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Bomford  and  Captain  Wade  of  the  ordnance 
department.  Convened  by  general  order  from  the  adjutant  and  in- 
spector-general's  office,  July  28th,  1818,  the  board  was  directed 
to  meet  on  the  ist  of  the  following  September  "to  examine  the 
patterns  and  models  of  cannon,  howitzers,  and  mortars;  of  field 
and  fixed  carriages ;  of  caissons  and  other  appendages  of  the  artil- 
lery, and  such  other  subjects  as  may  be  referred  to  it,  with  a  view 
to  the  establishing  of  a  permanent  system  of  uniformity  in  relation 
to  that  branch  of  the  service.  The  board  will  report  its  opinion 
on  all  subjects  referred  to  its  consideration."  Porter  was  excused, 
because  of  ill-health,  from  attending.  Towson  was  made  paymas- 
ter-general in  1819,  so  the  board  was  soon  reduced  to  its  three 
junior  members.  It  was  the  pioneer  in  the  field  of  artillery  boards, 
of  which  more  recent  years  have  been  so  prolific. 

In  the  acrimonious  correspondence  that  ensued  when  the  board 
reported  adversely  to  his  system  the  colonel  of  ordnance  showed 

the  carriage  on  a  curve  of  short  radius.  I  constructed  several  of  these  carriages, 
the  first  one  under  the  personal  supervision  of  Colonel  Wadsworth,  in  1817. 
I  made  several  trials  at  Pittsburg  with  one  of  these  carriages  in  1818,  with 
as  many  men  mounted  upon  it  as  were  needed  to  serve  the  piece,  driving 
over  rough  roads,  the  horses  at  full  gallop,  then  suddenly  halting  and  firing 
the  gun.  I  rode  myself  on  the  limber  with  the  men  that  I  might  observe 
any  defects.  This  test  was  as  complete  as  could  well  be  made  with  untrained 
horses  and  men,  and  was  quite  satisfactory,  and  I  am  now  of  opioion  that  if 
Colonel  Wadsworth  had  continued  in  authority,  with  health  and  other  favoring 
circumstances,  he  would  have  effected  an  entire  revolution  in  the  old  [Gribeau- 
val]  system,  and  have  made  important  improvements." 

There  was  another  particular,  not  noticed  by  Mr.  Wade,  in  which  Wadsworth 
deviated  from  the  British  system,  viz.,  he  proposed  that  while  the  limber  wheels 
for  all  field-carriages  should  be  of  the  same  height,  they  should  be  different 
from  the  gun-carriage  wheels ;  and  the  latter  differed  among  themselves,  those 
for  the  6-pounder  being  4  feet  6  inches  in  height,  those  for  the  12-pounder, 
4  feet  9  inches.  During  the  Peninsular  war  all  limber  wheels  of  the  British 
artillery  were  of  the  same  height  as  the  gun-carriage  wheels — an  improvement 
that  Wadsworth  had  done  well  to  copy,  as  likewise  the  block-trail,  instead  of 
the  two  bent  flasks.  It  is  evident  that,  by  placing  the  ammunition  box  on  the 
limber,  carrying  on  them  a  number  of  men  sufficient  to  serve  the  piece,  making 
practically  a  stock-trail  of  the  two  flasks,  Wadsworth  had  struck  the  key-note 
to  the  modern  British  artillery  system,  which  he  recognized,  contrary  to  the 
opinion  of  his  contemporaries,  as  being  superior  to  any  other. 


MATERIEL:   CARRIAGES.  235 

himself  a  master  in  the  polemic  art  as  well  as  an  artillerist  of  true 
genius.  Referring  to  the  field-carriage  before  mentioned,  and 
the  reception  it  had  received,  he  remarked  : 

"The  board  have  thought  proper  to  criticise  the  carriage  constructed  under 
my  direction.     Whether  or  not  I  have  succeeded  in  improving  our  field  carriage, 
let  unprejudiced,  intelligent  men  decide.     They  say  in  one  place  that  mine_are_ 
the  only  carriages  which  have  not  been  altered  for  the  worse  from  the  French  ; 
in  another,  that  mine  are  in  every  way  inferior  to  the  latter. 

"  My  carriage  has  some  improvements  that  will  stand  their  ground.  The 
arrangement  of  the  elevating  screw  is  superior  to  anything  of  the  kind  that  has 
yet  appeared.  I  stake  my  reputation  upon  that.  The  6-pounder  carriage  pro- 
posed by  the  board  carries  fifteen  rounds ;  mine  twenty-nine  rounds.  The  lim- 
bers of  my  carriage  admit  of  being  employed  in  time  of  action  as  tumbrels  to 
convey  ammunition  from  the  caissons  to  the  pieces,  thereby  permitting  the 
former  to  remain  out  of  range  of  the  fire.  The  explosion  of  a  British  caisson  at 
Chippewa  by  a  shell  from  Towson's  battery,  if  it  did  not  decide  the  fate  of  that 
action,  at  least  contributed  greatly  to  its  success.  If  a  better  plan  than  mine 
can  be  devised,  let  it  be  proposed. 

"The  6-pounder  carriage  of  my  construction  permits  a  number  of  men  suffi- 
cient to  serve  the  gun  to  ride  upon  the  limber  and  carriage ;  and,  as  it  is  lim- 
bered and  unlimbered  with  the  greatest  facility,  which  is  even  partially 
acknowledged  by  the  board,  changes  of  position  may  be  effected  with  it  in 
inconceivably  less  time  than  with  carriages  of  the  French  construction." 

He  appreciated  the  fact  that  the  Gribeauval  was  inferior  to  the 
English  system,  the  latter  of  which  he  proposed  essentially  to 
adopt.  In  that  opinion  he  stood  without  support ;  but  events 
have  vindicated  the  keenness  of  his  perception  and  the  soundness 
of  his  judgment.  Remarking  upon  the  disposition  to  blindly 
adhere  to  the  French  system,  without  examining  its  value,  when 
compared  with  others,  he  continued  : 

"  The  making  of  wheel  carriages  is  well  understood  in  this  country,  and  we 
should  lose  a  great  deal  and  expose  ourselves  to  derision  in  the  minds  of 
those  who  know  how  carriages  ought  to  be  built  to  servilely  copy  French  patterns 
invented  fifty  or  sixty  years  ago.  It. is  a  mistake  to  suppose  the  French  system 
of  artillery  is  the  most  perfect  in  existence.  The  British  artillery  has  been 
greatly  improved  within  the  last  twenty  years.  In  the  construction  of  carriages, 
in  the  celerity  of  their  movements,  in  the  facility  of  their  manoeuvres,  in  the 
excellent  quality  of  their  ammunition,  and  the  convenience  with  which  their 
pieces  are  supplied  in  time  of  action,  the  British  artillery  is  now  superior  to 
what  the  French  ever  was.  It  is  in  vain  for  us  to  try  to  underrate  it.  We 
shall  be  obliged  sooner  or  later  to  contend  with  it,  and  a  knowledge  of  its 
perfections  and  power  ought  to  stimulate  us  to  greater  exertions  to  bring  our 
own  to  a  point  of  excellence — to  equal,  at  least,  if  we  cannot  surpass  it.  The 


236      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

British  artillery  has  been  brought  to  its  present  state  by  gradual  improvements, 
made  under  the  direction  of  men  of  intelligence  and  experience,  equally  versed 
in  the  theory  and  the  practice  of  their  profession.  The  Government  has  spared 
no  expense  to  attain  the  object  in  view." 

This  statement  of  the  relative  merits  of  the  two  opposing  sys- 
tems, considering  the  time  at  which  it  was  made,  is  remarkable. 
The  colonel  of  ordnance  only,  of  the  artillerists  in  this  country, 
took  in  at  a  glance,  as  it  were,  though  he  had  carefully  studied  it, 
the  great  superiority  of  the  English  system — something  that  the 
French  Government,  with  every  proof  before  it,  did  not  acknowl- 
edge until  ten  years  later.  Wadsworth  did  not  live  to  see  the 
justness  of  his  views  established,  the  English  sweep  the  Gribeauval 
and  all  other  systems  before  it,  to  become,  as  it  has  remained, 
without  change  in  principle  and  but  few  in  minor  details,  master 
of  the  battle  field.  He  discerned  what  others,  bound  by  that 
strange  spell — a  name — could  not  see.  It  is  due  the  memory  of 
this  truly  great  man  to  place  on  record  this  narrative  of  his 
labors.  The  opposition  he  encountered,  and  principally  from 
within  his  own  department,  was  like  that  which  for  a  time  bafHed 
Congreve,  Gribeauval,  and  other  artillery  reformers.  He  com- 
bined the  learning  and  sense  of  Muller  with  a  power  of  analysis 
equal  to  Gribeauval  Jhimself.  Ill  health  impaired  his  usefulness 
and  frustrated  his  plans,  though  it  did  not  for  one  moment 
cloud  his  clear  intellectual  horizon.  He  lived  before  his  time. 
Twenty  years  afterwards  his  associates  and  opponents  acknowl- 
edged that  he  had  been  right.  He  retired  from  the  service  in  that 
struggle  illustrating  the  survival  of  the  physically  fittest — the 
reduction  of  1821.  Had  he  remained  at  the  head  of  the  technical 
artillery,  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  would,  with  proper  support, 
have  overturned  the  system  finally  (in  1819)  determined  upon, 
and  which,  almost  as  soon  as  established,  went  down  before  that 
other,  the  advantages  of  which  Wadsworth  alone  of  his  cotem- 
poraries  had  pointed  out  to  the  army. 

The  contest  between  the  Gribeauval  and  the  Wadsworth 
systems  was  an  unequal  one.  The  former  was  backed  by  the 
memories  of  a  brilliant  career;  the  latter,  unknown  and  without 
honor  even  in  its  own  country,  was  considered  as  merely  an  ex- 
periment, which,  however  successful  it  might  be,  could  produce 
nothing  having  merit  equal  to  that  of  its  world-renowned  rival. 


MATERIEL:  CARRIAGES.  237 

The  board  reported  adversely  to  the  proposed  system,  and, 
acting  under  instructions  from  the  War  Department,  it  then  pro- 
ceeded to  digest  another,  complete  in  all  its  parts,  embracing  every 
branch  of  the  artillery  service,  and  which  would  strictly  conform — 
except  as  to  the  calibres  of  the  ordnance  and  the  metals  used  in  the 
construction  thereof— to  the  latest  and  most  improved  patterns-ol 
the  Gribeauval.  After  much  labor,  prolonged  experiment,  and 
patient  investigation,  the  board  submitted  a  system  for  the  approval 
of  the  Secretary  of  War,  embracing  three  general  features:  First, 
cast-iron  as  the  gun-metal  for  all  calibres;  second,  cast-iron  as  the 
materiel  for  gun-carriages  of  all  fixed  batteries;  third,  the  most 
recent  patterns  of  the  Gribeauval  for  field,  siege,  and  garrison 
artillery  carriages.  The  proceedings  of  the  board  were  approved 
by  Secretary  Calhoun,  and  the  system  of  artillery  recommended 
by  it  was  adopted  for  the  service  of  the  United  States. 

The  French  system,  now  definitely  determined  upon,  after  a 
vigorous  effort  to  obtain  a  better  one  had  failed,  retained  undis- 
puted sway  until,  in  1829,  there  were  deposited  with  the  technical 
artillery  department  complete  and  accurate  drawings  of  carriages — 
field,  siege,  garrison,  and  sea-coast,  all,  except  the  last,  based  on 
the  English  plan,  which  Colonel  Wadsworth  had  championed 
ten  years  before.  The  construction  of  modol  stock-trail  carriages 
was  at  once  begun.  The  first  stroke  of  the  hammer  sounded 
the  death-knell  of  the  Gribeauval  regime. 

We  will  briefly  notice  the  career  of  the  system — English  block- 
trail — which,  after  twelve  years  of  rigorous  experiment,  had, 
despite  national  prejudice,  and  at  the  sacrifice  of  the  cherished 
idol  of  a  half  century,  forced  itself  upon  the  French  artillery,  and 
was  now  to  be  retransplanted  into  our  own.* 

Captain  Congreve  broke  ground  against  the  bracket-trail  system 
as  early  as  1776,  and  the  following  year  experimental  carriages, 
having  the  ammunition-boxes  on  the  limber-axle,  were  made  at 
his  suggestion.  He  pointed  out  the  advantage  of  having  the  lim- 
ber and  the  gun-carriage  wheels  of  the  same  size,  and  interchange- 

*  The  facts  here  given  concerning  the  gradual  introduction  of  the  salient 
features  of  the  English  stock-trail  system  of  carriages  were  furnished  the  author 
by  the  late  General  Tyler,  who,  through  the  courteous  assistance  of  Major 
Hime,  Eoyal  artillery,  and  perhaps  others  of  that  service,  was  enabled  to 
establish  their  correctness  from  the  official  records  at  Woolwich. 


238      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,  U.   S.  ARMY. 

able.  The  associate  of  Congreve  in  these  improvements  was  De 
Sagulier,  who,  in  1778,  constructed  carriages  with  interchange- 
able limber  and  piece  wheels,  and  in  1779  introduced  wrought- 
iron  axles  for  3-pounder  and  i -pounder  gun-carriages.  The 
substitution  of  a  block  of  wood  for  the  bracket-trail  seems  first  to 
have  occurred  to  De  Sagulier,  who,  in  1778,  proposed  block- 
trails  for  heavy  3-pounder  carriages.  By  1794,  due  to  the  joint 
labors  of  these  officers  and  of  others,  perhaps,  wrought-iron  axles 
with  composition-boxes,  the  block-trail,  the  pintle-hook,  wheels 
for  limber  and  gun-carriage  interchangeable,  with  ammunition- 
chest  placed  on  the  limber-axle,  were  generally  recognized  im- 
provements which,  one  after  another,  had  become  leading  features 
of  the  English  field  artillery  materiel.  Having  taken  these  steps, 
it  was  but  making  another  in  the  same  direction  to  convert  the 
clumsy  caisson  into  a  carriage  built  upon  the  same  general  prin- 
ciples, thus  enabling  it  to  turn  upon  the  same  ground  as  the  piece. 
The  forge  and  battery  wagon  were  similarly  affected  by  this  spirit 
of  change,  which  had  so  thoroughly  accomplished  its  work  that 
when  Wellington  began  his  Peninsular  campaigns  the  artillery 
materiel  of  his  army  was  the  same  in  principle,  and  almost  the 
same  in  detail  of  construction,  with  that  adopted  by  the  French  in 
1827,  and  concerning  which,  in  1829,  the  United  States  War 
Department  received  its  first  information. 

The  superiority  of  the  new  English  system  could  not  but  have 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  veteran  artillerists  who  had  to  contend 
against  it.  They  saw  that  its  mobility  far  exceeded  what  it  was 
possible  to  attain  with  their  own.  After  the  fall  of  Napoleon, 
when  the  allies  were  encamped  in  the  environs  of  Paris,  the  sim- 
plicity of  this  unique  system  and  the  facilities  of  its  manoeuvres 
attracted  the  attention,  awakened  the  interest,  and  challenged  the 
admiration  of  not  only  the  artillery,  but  of  all  the  principal  officers 
in  that  vast  assembly  of  the  armies  of  Europe.  Following  the 
Restoration,  when  the  Congress  of  Aix-la-Chapelle  had  freed 
France  of  the  allies,  the  question  whether  or  not  the  English  sys- 
tem should  be  chosen  to  supersede  the  time-honored  Gribeauval 
attracted  the  serious  consideration  of  the  French  military  authori- 
ties. Boards  of  experienced  officers  were  appointed  to  examine 
into  the  subject  in  all  its  bearings.  After  years  of  careful  investi- 
gation, aided  by  the  severest  and  most  elaborate  series  of  experi- 


MATERIEL:    CARRIAGES.  239 

ments,  and  including  many  futile  attempts  to  modify  the  Gribeauval, 
reports  were  made  in  favor  of  the  proposed  change.  To  accept 
the  system  of  a  victorious,  exultant,  and  insolent  enemy  drove 
the  iron  to  the  soul  of  the  French  artillery.  Many,  blinded  by 
national  predjudice,  held  out  against  it,  but,  to  the  honor  of  those 
upon  whom  the  responsibility  rested,  be.it  remembered  that  th£y_ 
had  the  courage  of  their  convictions  ;  and  placing  behind  them 
as  unworthy  of  consideration  whatever  of  professional  pride  they 
felt  which  might  bias  their  judgment  in  a  matter  affecting  the 
well-being,  of  the  State,  they  united  in  recommending,  regardless 
of  its  origin,  the  adoption  of  a  system  of  artillery  which  in  every 
point  of  view  added  strength  to  the  military  power  of  the  Nation. 

Several  copies  of  the  able  and  dispassionate  report  of  the  com- 
mittee which  finally  determined  the  matter,  and  upon  which  report 
the  French  Government  ordered,  July,  1827,  that  the  stock-trail 
system  of  artillery  should  be  adopted,  were  among  the  valuable 
papers  furnished  the  United  States  authorities  through  the  un- 
tiring labors  of  Lieutenant  Tyler  during  a  few  months'  stay  in 
Europe. 

The  principal  changes  made  in  the  English  system  by  the 
French  were  as  follows  :  (i)  The  iron  axle,  encased  in  wood,  was 
replaced  by  a  single  piece  of  iron  without  any  support.  (2)  A 
pole  replaced  the  shafts  of  the  limber.  (3)  The  height  of  the 
wheels  was  diminished  a  little  more  than  an  inch,  to  better  adapt 
them  to  the  draft  of  the  French  horses.  (4)  The  elevating  screw, 
which  in  the  English  system  was  bolted  to  the  knob  of  the  cascable 
and  worked  in  a  movable  bed,  was  given  a  fixed  seat,  with  the 
breech  of  the  piece  resting  on  the  head  of  the  screw.  (5)  The 
limber  was  given  a  movable  splinter-bar.  (6)  In  place  of  the 
two  small  ammunition-boxes,  side  by  side  on  the  limber  and  the 
caissons,  and  secured  by  cords,  a  single  ammunition-box  was  sub- 
stituted, retained  in  place  by  iron  fastenings.  (7)  In  the  English 
ammunition-boxes  the  apartments  were  made  to  carry  the  ball 
and  cartridge  separately;  in  the  modified  chest  the  apartments 
were  for  fixed  ammunition. 

The  drawings  which  the  lieutenant  placed  at  the  disposition  of 
the  Department  were  of  the  latest  models.  By  July,  1830,  the 
preliminary  work  was  begun  looking  to  the  construction  of  some 
of  the  field  carriages  based  on  these  drawings,  from  which  was 


240      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF  THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

derived  the  only  information  possessed  concerning  the  new  sys- 
tem.* 

The  young  officer,  to  whose  intelligent  and  almost  unaided  exer- 
tions the  artillery  arm  was  indebted  for  this  important  acquisition, 
deserves  to  be  remembered  among  those  who  have  contributed 

*The  following  letter,  written  by  Major  Alfred  Mordecai,  late  of  the  United 
States  ordnance  department,  dated  September  27th,  1872,  confirms  in  the  most 
positive  manner  the  claim  here  put  forward,  that  to  this  officer,  and  to  him 
alone,  is  due  the  credit  of  having  introduced  into  our  service  a  full  knowl- 
edge of  the  stock-trail  system  of  artillery.  Major  Mordecai  was  a' lieutenant  of 
engineers  in  1832,  and  was  appointed  a  captain  in  the  ordnance  department 
organized  that  year.  *  *  *  "  My  actual  service  in  the  ordnance  depart- 
ment began  on  the  1st  of  January,  1833,  when  I  joined  Captain  Symington  at 
Washington  arsenal,  and  soon  after  succeeded  him  in  the  charge  of  that  post. 
He  had  then  constructed  the  first  of  the  field  gun-carriages  and  caissons  of  the 
pregent  system,  adopted  from  the  French,  and  in  doing  so  he  used  as  models  the 
drawings  of  the  French  system  which  Lieutenant  Daniel  Tyler  had  obtained 
in  France  and  deposited  in  the  ordnance  office.  I  made  at  that  time  from  the 
same  drawings  the  first  drawings,  and  translated  the  tables  of  construction  for 
the  field  forge,  which  was  afterwards  modified,  I  think  at  Watervliet  arsenal, 
by  a  slight  change,  perhaps,  in  the  bellows,  and  covering  it  with  a  roof.  At  the 
same  time  Symington  was  just  finishing  the  first  of  the  barbette  carriages, 
which  were  also  copied  from  the  French  system,  knowledge  of  which  in  detail 
was  obtained  also  from  drawings  deposited  by  Lieutenant  Tyler  in  the  ord- 
nance office.  The  first  of  these  barbette  carriages  was  sent  in  the  winter  or 
spring  of  1833  for  the  armament  of  Fort  Moultrie  on  account  of  the  political 
disturbances  in  South  Carolina.  I  can  have,  therefore,  no  hesitation  in  saying 
that  the  first  full  knowledge  of  the  French  system,  which  we  copied  in  the 
field,  siege,  and  barbette  carriages,  was  derived  from  the  complete  drawings 
and  tables  of  construction  which  were  furnished  by  Lieutenant  Tyler  to  the 
ordnance  office."  The  writer  of  the  above  (Major  Mordecai)  was  one  of  the 
officers  who  labored  most  intelligently  and  with  greatest  effect  to  secure 
to  the  artillery  a  complete  sys-tem  of  materiel.  From  1835  to  1860  his  name 
was  intimately  associated  with  every  effort  to  build  up  an  efficient  national 
armament.  From  1835  to  1840,  to  his  exertions  more  than  to  those  of  any 
other,  and,  so  far  as  can  be  seen,  from  1840  to  1850,  to  his  industry  and  perse- 
verance more  than  to  those  of  all  others  united,  the  vast  mass  of  data  on  artil- 
lery subjects  which  had  been  collected  was  systematically  arranged,  published, 
and  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  army  in  the  "  Artillery  of  the  United  States 
Land  Service,"  text  and  plates,  1849,  and  in  the  "  Revised  Ordnance  Manual  " 
of  1850.  No  other  testimonial  to  the  work  that  Lieutenant  Tyler  performed 
could  be  wished  than  is  here  given  by  this  accomplished  scholar,  profound 
thinker,  and  scientific  artillerist. 


MATERIEL:  CARRIAGES.  241 

most  to  its  advancement.  With  no  wish  to  make  invidious  com- 
parisons, it  can  be  claimed,  without  risk  of  being  successfully  con- 
troverted, that  none  others  of  the  many  who  have  been  dispatched 
by  this  Government  to  Europe  have  secured,  either  in  so  short  a 
time  or  at  so  great  pecuniary  sacrifice,  such  a  variety  of  useful 
information,  or  made  it  so  directly  available  to  his  associates  -&f  - 
the  military  profession.  After  a  few  months'  sojourn  in  France, 
there  appeared,  as  the  result  of  his  labors  :  (i)  300  lithographed 
copies  of  a  translation,  accompanied  by  plates,  of  the  whole  sys- 
tem— field,  seige,  garrison,  and  sea-coast — of  the  Gribeauval  artil- 
lery tactics.  (2)  Many  lithographic  copies  of  the  report  (trans- 
lated) of  the  French  committee,  which  discussed  the  relative  merits 
of  the  ancient  and  the  modern  systems  of  artillery  materiel,  and 
finally  decided  the  question  between  them.  (3)  Most  important  and 
useful  of  all,  complete  copies  of  the  working  drawings  and  tables 
of  construction,  perfect  in  every  particular,  of  the  latter  system,  as 
modified  and  adopted  by  the  French  Government.  All  this  was 
done  at  the  expense  of  the  young  military  enthusiast.  In  addi- 
tion, he  obtained  and  rendered  promptly  available  to  the  Gov- 
ernment (4)  valuable  information  concerning  the  most  improved 
patterns  of  small  arms  used  abroad.  For  the  pecuniary  outlay 
incurred  he  received  but  a  tardy  and  most  inadequate  return. 

Disappointed  at  the  lack  of  a  just  appreciation  of  his  services  in 
building  up  the  technical  artillery,  in  which  field  he  was  at  that 
time  the  most  prominent  and  advanced  laborer,  disgusted  that 
merit  should  remain  unrewarded,  while  in  some  instances  mere 
political  favorites  were  promoted  into  this  branch  of  the  artillery, 
now  organized  as  the  ordnance  department,  he  resigned  his 
commission  to  seek  and  receive  in  the  open  competition  of  civil 
life  that  recognition  of  great  talents  and  business  capacity,  and 
the  rewards  of  indefatigable  industry,  for  which  in  the  army  he 
had  hoped  and  struggled  in  vain.  Death,  in  1882,  terminated 
a  life  of  activity  and  usefulness  that  may  well  serve  as  a  model  for 
the  emulation  of  the  youth  of  his  native  land.  Full  of  years  and 
honors,  he  has  been  gathered  to  rest,  but  the  work  he  did  lives 
after  him.  In  the  light  artillery  system  of  the  present  day,  with 
its  distinguished  career  in  peace  and  war,  in  the  bivouac  and  on 
the  battle-field,  there  stands  an  enduring  monument  to  the  memory 


242      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

of  Lieutenant  Daniel   Tyler,  of  the   First  regiment   of  United 
States  artillery.* 

The  system  of  artillery  prepared  by  the  board  of  1818,  although 
it  had  been  adopted  after  what  were  deemed  sufficient  tests,  was 
not  found  to  be  adapted  to  actual  service.  A  half  battery,  com- 
posed of  Wadsworth  carriages  and  the  long  6-pounders  of  the 
adopted  pattern,  was  sent  to  the  artillery  school  of  practice  at 
Fortress  Monroe  in  1827  for  trial,  f  The  guns  burst  under  cir- 

*  The  author  experiences  great  pleasure  at  being  authorized  to  insert  the 
following  tribute  to  the  memory  and  later  services  of  this  distinguished  officer, 
written  by  Senator  Joseph  R.  Hawley,  of  Connecticut,  late  major-general  U.  S. 
volunteers,  who  received  his  first  lessons  in  the  military  art  under  General 
Tyler's  instructions  in  1861,  when,  although  sixty-four  years  of  age,  the  gallant 
patriot  and  soldier,  abandoning  lucrative  civil  pursuits,  buckled  on  the  armor 
and  went  forth  to  do  battle  for  the  maintenance  of  the  Union  with  all  the  fervor 
of  a  youth  of  twenty-five : 

"  General  Tyler's  name  is  remembered  with  the  warmest  gratitude  in  Con- 
necticut. Of  the  best  blood  of  the  Revolutionary  era,  he  was  every  inch  a  sol- 
dier. His  residence  and  business  connections  in  the  South  as  well  as  the 
North  gave  him  a  very  thorough  comprehension  of  the  temper  and  purposes  of 
the  conspirators  against  the  Union.  Like  General  Sherman,  he  was  misunder- 
stood, and  believed  to  be  magnifying  the  coming  war.  The  moment  Sumter 
was  fired  upon  he  placed  himself  at  the  service  of  the  good  war  governor, 
Buckingham.  The  first  regiment  of  three-months  volunteers  was  raised  in  a 
very  few  days,  and  Captain  Tyler,  as  he  was  then  called,  was  made  colonel 
thereof.  The  other  two  three-months  regiments  followed  quickly,  and  Colonel 
Tyler  was  made  a  brigadier.  These  three  regiments  he  took  into  camp  at  New 
Haven,  thoroughly  equipped  in  every  respect,  and  put  them  under  the  severest 
drill  for  two  or  three  weeks  before  they  started  for  Washington.  Several  hun- 
dred of  the  officers  and  privates  of  these  three  regiments  became  officers  of  the 
three-years  regiments  raised  immediately  after.  General  Tyler  infused  into 
all  under  his  command  a  spirit  of  severe,  exact  discipline,  a  determination  to 
master  speedily  the  details  of  a  soldier's  duty,  and  a  blazing  patriotism  that 
made  no  measure  of  its  devotion.  Without  doubt  his  influence  was  most 
beneficially  felt  during  the  four  years  of,  and  among  the  54,000  troops  Con- 
necticut sent  to,  the  war.  Some  people,  doubtless,  thought  him  unduly  im- 
petuous, but  he  was — physically,  morally,  and  mentally — to  those  under  him 
the  model  of  a  chivalrous,  fearless  gentleman  and  thorough  soldier." 

f  Why  Wadsworth's  rejected  carriages  should  have  been  selected  for  these 
important  experiments  with  the  new  field-gun  is  not  known.  The  fact  that 
they  were  so  used  is  established.  After  that  officer  had  left  the  army,  it  is 
possible,  and  altogether  probable,  that  his  note  of  warning  concerning  the 
superiority  of  the  English  carriage,  on  which  his  was  modeled,  began  more 


MATERIEL:  CARRIAGES.  243 

cumstances  which  destroyed  all  confidence  in  them  and  their  sys- 
tem, and  the  attention  of  the  department  was  at  once  drawn  to 
the  fac~l  that  a  new  one,  for  the  field  artillery  at  least,  was  abso- 
lutely necessary. 

Without  any  accepted  pattern  of  field-piece,  and  with  the  at- 
tention of  the  department  divided-  between  the  Gribeauval  going 
out  and  the  stock-trail  system  coming  in,  it  is  not  to  be  wondered 
at  that  Secretary  Cass  should  have  reported,  in  1831,  that  the  ma- 
te"riel  of  the  artillery  was  in  an  unsettled  state.  He  also  an- 
nounced that  a  board  would  be  appointed  to  examine  into  the 
matter  and  definitely  settle  upon  some  permanent  system.  Ac- 
cordingly, by  Order  No.  74,  Headquarters  of  the  Army,  Decem- 
ber 24th,  1831,  instructions  from  the  War  Department,  dated  De- 
cember 8th,  1831,  were  promulgated,  instituting  a  board,  consisting 
of  Generals  Macomb  commanding  the  army,  and  Scott  commanding 
the  eastern  department,  Inspector-General  Wool,  Colonel  Eustis 
commandant  of  the  artillery  school  of  practice,  and  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Bomford  on  ordnance  duty,  "to  take  into  consideration 
the  establishing  of  a  uniform  system  of  operations  in  the  ord- 
nance department,  both  as  regards  the  models  and  patterns  of 
arms,  carriages,  and  equipments  of  every  species,  as  well  as 
all  kinds  of  supplies  furnished  by  that  department."  It  was 
further  directed  to  report,  for  the  examination  and  decision 
of  the  War  Department,  such  a  system  for  the  government  of 
the  ordnance  department  as  should  appear  proper  and  neces- 
sary. This  board  first  met  March  28th,  1832,  when  Colonel 

and  more  to  attract  the  attention  of  those  who  had  been  his  colaborers,  and 
who  had  remained  in  the  artillery  service.  The  desire  would  naturally  arise 
to  give  the  carriage  a  fair  trial,  that  its  merits,  if  any  it  had,  might  be  found 
out.  Had  this  been  the  reasoning  of  those  having  such  matters  in  charge,  the 
result  would  have  been  just  what  happened — the  occasion  for  more  severely 
testing  the  new  guns  was  seized  on  as  a  proper  one  for  similar  experiments 
with  the  carriage.  As,  however,  the  guns  failed  so  signally,  (being  only 
rivaled  in  this  respect  by  the  "conversion  system"  of  1881,)  the  carriage, 
with  the  pieces,  seems  to  have  been  permanently  relegated  to  the  obscurity 
whence  it  had,  for  a  temporary  purpose,  emerged.  There  was  no  further 
opportunity  given  to  test  the  Wadsworth,  as,  before  another  pattern  of  field- 
gun  was  decided  on,  the  Government  was  actively  engaged  in  constructing  the 
latest  model  of  stock-trail  carriage,  of  which  Wadsworth's  was  at  best  but  an 
inferior  copy,  made  before  the  original  of  the  system  had  been  brought  to  its 
present  state  of  perfection. 


244      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

Gratiot,  of  the  engineers,  relieved  Scott,  and  the  labors,  which, 
after  many  mutations  of  the  personnel — caused  by  changes  in  the 
boards  which  one  after  another  took  up  the  work,  here  given  the 
original  in  charge — were  finally  to  result  in  giving  a  definite 
system  of  artillery  to  the  United  States  army.  The  Macomb, 
officially  designated  the  ' '  ordnance  board, ' '  continued  in  exist- 
ence until  June  22d,  1837,  when  the  duties  of  its  members,  con- 
sequent upon  the  Florida  war,  being  such  as  to  prevent  their 
giving  that  attention  to  the  subjects  intrusted  to  it  which  their 
importance  demanded,  another  board  was  convened  to  take  up 
the  duties  of  the  former.  The  relieving  board  was  assembled 
pursuant  to  General  Orders  No.  41,  Headquarters  of  the  Army, 
agreeably  to  instructions  from  the  War  Department  of  June  2ist, 
1837,  and  was  composed  of  Brevet  Brigadier-General  Eustis, 
president ;  Colonel  Cutler  of  the  infantry,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Crane  of  the  artillery,  Major  Craig  and  Captain  Baker  of  the 
ordnance,  members  ;  Captain  A.  Mordecai,  ordnance,  secretary. 
By  Special  Orders  No.  45,  June  26th,  1837,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Talcott,  ordnance,  relieved  Major  Craig;  and  on  July  4th  follow- 
ing, the  board  met  at  West  Point,  and  proceeded  to  take  up  the 
thread  of  the  armament  investigation  where  it  had  been  left  off  by 
its  predecessor.  The  same  causes,  however,  which  had  rendered 
a  dissolution  of  the  original  board  advisable  now  operated  to  pre- 
vent the  reassembling  of  its  successor,  thus  seemingly,  but  not  in 
fact,  retaining  matters  relating  to  the  procurement  of  an  efficient 
artillery  materiel  in  statu  quo.  But  this  was  not  true.  On  the 
contrary,  some  of  the  most  important  measures  looking  to  the 
solution  of  the  armament  problem,  and  which  had  been  inaugu- 
rated by  the  Macomb  board,  were  being  successfully  prosecuted, 
and  had  led  to  the  procurement  of  a  large  amount  of  materiel,  with 
more  in  process  of  manufacture.  '  The  results  of  this  labor  were 
placed  at  the  disposition  of  a  board  convened  by  General  Orders 
No.  20,  Adjutant-General's  Office,  July  2d,  1838,  and  used  by  it 
to  definitely  settle  upon  a  system  of  field,  seige  and  garrison,  and 
sea-coast  artillery,  which  was  approved  by  the  Secretary  of  War, 
as  announced  officially  to  the  army  in  1839.  The  board  of  1838 
was  composed  originally  of  Colonel  Fenwick  and  Captain  Erving, 
of  the  artillery  ;  Lieutenant-Colonel  Talcott  and  Captains  Baker 
and  Mordecai,  of  the  ordnance.  The  unique  spectacle  was  pre- 
sented of  a  civilian — Paymaster-General  Towson — sitting,  at  the 


MATERIEL:    CARRIAGES.  245 

special  request  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  as  an  honorary  member 
of  this  military  board,  and  partaking  of  its  deliberations.  When 
the  question  of  the  sea-coast  armament  was  being  determined  on, 
Colonel  Totten,  the  chief  of  engineers,  was,  by  Special  Orders 
No.  93,  Adjutant- General's  Office,  December  24th,  1838,  also 
added  to  the  board. 

In  the  meantime  the  board  appointed  by  Order  No.  50,  Adjutant- 
General's  Office,  August  24th,  1835,  which  was  practically,  though 
not  altogether  in  personnel,  a  branch  of  the  Macomb  board 
and  acted  the  part  of  a  committee  of  the  latter,  had,  in  pursuance 
of  the  general  plan,  made  its  important  contribution  to  the  stock 
of  information  being  acquired  in  the  line  of  field  artillery.  The 
members  were  Inspector- General  Wool,  Colonels  Gratiot  and 
Eustis,  all  of  the  "ordnance  board,"  with  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Talcott,  Major  Worth,  and  Captain  Mordecai,  of  the  ordnance. 
By  Special  Orders  No.  63,  Adjutant-General's  Office,  September 
1 2th,  1835,  Captain  Huger,  ordnance,  was  appointed  an  addi- 
tional member  of  the  board,  with  the  proceedings  of  which,  be- 
cause of  some  difficulty  regarding  relative  rank,  Major  Worth 
refused  to  have  anything  to  do.  The  board  was  instructed  to 
examine  into,  prove,  and  report  upon  the  merits  of  new  field-guns, 
carriages,  harness,  and  equipments  which  had  been  manufactured 
in  pursuance  of  the  resolutions  of  the  ordnance  board,  of  which 
General  Macomb  was  president.  Its  proceedings,  therefore,  were 
in  strict  conformity  with  the  general  plan  of  operations  mapped 
out  by  the  latter  at  its  first  session,  and  they  form  a  most  important 
link  in  that  unbroken  chain  which  connects  the  labors  of  the  ord- 
nance board  of  1831  with  those  of  its  successors  of  1837  and 
1838,  and  which,  the  succeeding  year,  resulted  in  the  adoption 
of  those  calibres  of  ordnance,  the  models  of  their  carriage  and 
equipments,  which  constituted  the  main  features  of  a  new  and 
improved  system  of  artillery. 

Much  had  been  done,  but  the  work  was  not  complete  ;  a  mass 
of  valuable  data  was  collected  in  these  years  of  research  and  ex- 
periment, which  had  either  to  be  systematically  arranged  and 
published,  or  lost  to  the  public  service  ;  besides,  the  question  of  a 
proper  metal  for  field-guns  was  still  undecided  ;  in  a  word,  the 
task  of  naturally  and  methodically  putting  in  order  the  accumu- 
lated materials  brought  together  through  the  intelligent  labors  of 
so  many  boards,  all  directed  to  the  same  end,  had  yet  to  be  per- 


246      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

formed.  The  particulars  as  to  metals,  models,  and  dimensions 
of  the  adopted  ordnance,  to  a  considerable  extent,  remained  to  be 
determined. 

It  was  now  that  Secretary  Poinsett,  placing  before  it  all  informa- 
tion thus  far  acquired,  devolved  on  a  committee  of  ordnance 
officers  the  onerous  duty  of  putting  the  last  hand  to  the  work 
begun  by  the  ordnance  board  of  1831.  This  committee,  consist- 
ing of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Talcott,  Major  Baker,  Captains  Mor- 
decai  and  Huger,  was  appointed,  April  i6th,  1839,  for  the  pur- 
pose, as  announced  ~  by  the  Secretary  of  War  in  his  letter  of 
instruction,  ' '  of  devising  and  arranging  a  uniform  system  of 
artillery  and  other  supplies  of  every  kind  furnished  for  the  mili- 
tary service  by  the  ordnance  department."  The  result,  as  im- 
mediately affecting  the  artillery,  was  the  gradual  perfecting,  and 
ten  years  afterwards  the  adoption,  of  a  uniform  system  of  materiel, 
the  most  minute  particulars  of  which  were  carefully  worked  out, 
and  which  in  its  leading  features  has  remained  to  this  day  essen- 
tially unchanged. 

The  labors  of  this  committee  were  but  a  continuation  of  those 
of  its  immediate  predecessors,  the  ordnance  boards  of  1831,  1835, 
1837,  and  1838.  Each  acted  its  part  for  the  attainment  of  the 
grand  object  kept  steadily  in  view.  Without  the  contribution  of 
each,  the  result  would  have  stopped  short  of  success  ;  the  con- 
nected efforts  of  all  produced  the  perfect  system. 

Upon  the  ordnance  department  was  placed  the  responsible  duty 
of  digesting,  reducing  to  method,  and  publishing  to  the  world 
the  outcome  of  the  ten  years'  investigations  of  the  mixed  boards, 
supplemented  by  much  valuable  information  acquired  through  a 
commission  of  its  own  officers  sent  to  Europe,  and  the  original 
researches  of  the  ordnance  committee.  This  committee  per- 
formed well  the  part  allotted  it  by  the  Secretary  of  War  ;  but, 
while  conferring  this,  its  just  meed  of  praise,  it  will  not  be  lost 
sight  of  that  it  had,  as  a  foundation  on  which  to  base  its  inquiries, 
the  accumulated  knowledge  resulting  from  the  efforts  of  many 
hard-working,  conscientious,  and  intelligent  boards  of  officers, 
without  which  the  triumph  which  crowned  its  protracted  labors 
would  have  been  much  more  difficult  of  accomplishment  and 
much  less  complete. 

The  calibres  and  natures  of  the  standard  ordnance,  the  system 
of  carriages  and  their  equipments,  the  nomenclature  of  every  part, 


MATERIEL:  CARRIAGES.  247 

with  the  principles  to  be  observed  in  preparing  the  whole  for 
active  service,  were  definitively  settled  upon  before  the  appoint- 
ment of  the  ordnance  committee  of  1839,  nor  were  they  afterwards 
modified  in  any  essential  particular.  The  efforts  of  that  com- 
mittee were  directed,  not  to  tearing  down  what  others  with  so 
much  laborious  care  had  built  up,  but  rather,  by  rounding  ojfif 
angles  and  filling  in  vacant  places,  adding  not  so  much  strength 
as  beauty  and  symmetry  to  the  structure,  the  frame-work  of  which 
had  been  placed,  already  joined  together,  in  its  hands. 

Notwithstanding  the  very  generally-conceded  superiority  of  the 
stock-trail,  it  did  not  formally  and  entirely  supersede  the  Gri- 
beauval  for  several  years  after  its  first  introduction  into  the  service. 
It  was  no  doubt  deemed  unprofessional  to  discard  an  old,  faithful, 
and  valued  servant  for  one  comparatively  unknown,  and  of  the 
merits  of  which,  from  personal  experience,  we  knew  nothing. 
Such  seemed  to  be  the  view  of  the  ordnance  board  of  1831;  and 
one  of  the  first  questions  to  the  determinate  settlement  of  which 
it  addressed  itself  was  that  of  the  relative  merits  of  these  two 
systems  of  carriages.  Among  other  resolutions  adopted  by  the 
board  at  its  first  meeting,  were  the  following  :  "  *  *  * 
3.  That  the  chief  of  ordnance  be  required  to  procure  from  Europe 
the  best  models  of  French  and  English  *  *  *  artillery,  *  *  * 
including  guns  and  carriages  of  field-artillery,  and  models  of  sea- 
coast  and  garrison  guns  and  mortars,  with  their  carriages,  for  the 
use  of  the  board.  *  *  *  5.  That  a  committee  of  the  board 
be  appointed  to  consider  the  proper  calibres  and  models  for  guns 
and  carriages  of  field  artillery,  the  materials  of  which  they  should 
be  made,  to  report  its  opinion  on  the  subject,  and  prepare  a  plan 
for  carrying  its  views  into  effect. ' ' 

The  next  day  it  resolved  :  "  i.  That  the  Secretary  of  War  be 
requested  to  send  to  Europe  one  or  more  officers  of  the  army  for 
the  purpose  of  carrying  into  execution  the  third  resolution  of  yester- 
day." This  being  approved  by  Secretary  Cass,  Inspector-.General 
Wool,  a  member  of  the  board,  and  of  course  conversant  with  its 
views,  was  dispatched  to  Europe  with  the  necessary  funds  and 
instructions  to  purchase  one  English  6-pounderand  one  4-pounder, 
one  i2-pounder,  and  one  5^ -inch  howitzer  of  the  French  system, 
with  their  carriages,  caissons,  and  equipments  complete  ;  also 
models  of  the  French  siege  and  sea-coast  mortars,  with  their  beds, 
and  drawings  of  the  rest  of  both  the  English  and  French  systems  of 


248      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

artillery.  The  inspector-general  started  on  his  mission  with  alac- 
rity, and  no  doubt,  as  a  matter  of  personal  gratification,  it  was 
eminently  successful  ;  but,  so  far  as  the  objects  of  the  ordnance 
board  and  the  interests  of  the  Government  were  concerned,  it  was 
devoid  of  any  useful  results.  He  brought  back  eight  swords  and 
belts  ! 

The  committee  appointed  under  the  fifth  resolution  of  the  board 
before  mentioned  was  composed  of  Colonel  Eustis  and  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Bomford.  They  were  met  at  the  threshold  of  their  in- 
vestigations by  an  absence  of  proper  facilities  for  conducting  the 
experiments  which  that  resolution  necessitated  being  made.  This 
fact  was  reported  to  the  board  by  the  committee  in  February, 
1834,  accompanied  by  a  request  to  be  furnished  with  the  neces- 
sary ordnance,  mounted  in  equal  proportions  on  the  Gribeauval 
and  on  the  stock-trail  style  of  carriages,  to  enable  the  committee 
to  execute  the  duty  devolving  upon  it.  The  request  received  the 
approval  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  measures  were  taken  to 
have  the  iron  guns  and  the  stock-trail  carriages  procured,  but  it 
was  not  given  to  the  committee  to  pursue  the  investigations;  this 
duty  was  devolved  on  the  ordnance  board  of  1835,  before  men- 
tioned, and  which  met  for  the  first  time  September,  1835,  at 
Watervliet  arsenal.  The  Gribeauval  carriage  was  not  experi- 
mented with,  as  it  was  doubtless  considered  that  nothing  which 
was  not  well  known  could  be  developed  concerning  it ;  but  the 
stock-trail  carriages  were  day  after  day  put  to  the  severest  tests 
possible  with  the  ample  facilities  placed  at  the  disposition  of  the 
board,  which,  September  22d  following — 

"Resolved,  That  the  system  of  carriages  for  field  artillery,  recently  adopted 
after  much  trial  and  minute  investigation  by  the  Government  of  France,  is  the 
best  hitherto  devised  for  the  service  of  the  United  States,  and  that  it  ought  to 
be  received,  with  no  further  alterations  than  may  be  found  necessary  for  the 
adoption  of  the  respective  carriages  to  our  guns  and  roads." 

Before  the  board  adjourned,  September  26th,  following,  similar 
resolutions  were  passed  concerning  all  carriages  appertaining  to  the 
field-train  of  the  French  system.  After  the  usual  number  of  refer- 
ences from  one  department  to  another,  this  report  was  approved 
by  Secretary  Cass  July  8th,  1836,  who  directed  that  the  money 
appropriated  for  the  purpose  by  Congress  at  its  last  session  should 
be  expended  in  carrying  into  execution  the  measures  proposed  in 
the  resolutions  of  the  board. 


MATERIEL:  CARRIAGES.  249 

We  are  not,  therefore,  left  in  doubt  as  to  the  date  at  which,  or 
the  circumstances  under  which,  the  stock-trail  system  of  car- 
riages was  adopted  into  our  service.  Its  position  has  never  been 
questioned  since.  Time  has  served  to  only  more  fully  develop 
its  merits,  and  while  alterations  in  a  few  of  the  details  of  construc- 
tion have  been  made,  the  underlying  principles  have  remained 
unchanged  ;  the  system  itself,  taken  as  a  whole,  seems  incapable 
of  improvement.  The  harness  and  all  equipments  making  up  the 
complete  French  materiel  were  adopted  at  the  same  time,  with 
but  slight  and  generally  unimportant  modifications. 

Recent  attempts  at  improvement  have  been  directed,  not  at  the 
system  on  which  they  are  constructed,  but  towards  the  securing  a 
better  material  for  the  carriages,  limbers,  caissons,  and  wagons, 
replacing  the  wooden  frame  by  combinations  of  wood,  steel,  and 
iron,  each  placed  so  as  most  advantageously  to  perform  the  work 
thrown  upon  it. 

Attention  began  to  be  directed  to  the  subject  of  metallic  car- 
riages soon  after  the  Civil  war.  At  that  time  wrought-iron  was 
the  only  metal  thought  of.  The  advantages  which  it  was  sup- 
posed would  result  from  the  change  were — I.  Lightness  and 
cheapness.  2.  By  placing  the  pintle  two  feet  in  rear  of  the  limber 
axle-tree  the  trail  of  the  gun-carriage  would  act  as  a  counterpoise, 
relieving  the  wheel  horses  of  the  weight  of  the  pole.  3.  By 
bringing  the  trunnion-beds  nearer  the  axle-tree  the  liability  of  the 
carriage  to  overturn  while  traveling  would  be  diminished.  4.  By 
allowing  no  part  of  the  limbered  carriage  to  project  below  the 
plane  of  the  axle-trees  the  breaking  of  implements  in  passing 
over  stumps,  stones,  and  other  obstacles  would  be  prevented. 
5.  A  more  convenient  method  of  carrying  rammers  and  the  trail 
handspike  would  be  secured.  6.  By  placing  thimbles  in  the  trun- 
nion holes  for  the  larger,  when  the  smaller  calibred  guns  were 
being  used,  one  carriage  would  be  made  to  suffice  for  all  calibres 
of  field  guns. 

A  few  wrought-iron  carriages  were  made  and  issued  to  the 
artillery  for  trial,  but  they  were  heavier  than  was  necessary,  of 
rough  construction,  and  were  pronounced  unsatisfactory.  It 
would  seem,  however,  that  they  were  not  intended  to  exhibit  what 
the  department  could  do,  but  were  made  for  preliminary  tests 
merely,  and  to  indicate  in  what  line  of  investigation  the  carriage 
of  the  future  would  be  found.  Strong  and  not  very  clumsy  can- 
32 


25O      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

noneer  seats  were  placed  between  the  wheel  and  the  gun  ;  but  its 
excessive  weight,  and  an  awkward  angle  to  the  trail,  which  caused 
undue  labor  in  limbering  and  unlimbering,  with  other  defects, 
caused  the  carriage  to  be  rejected  as  inferior  to  that  already  in 
use  ;  and,  as  there  was  a  large  stock  of  wooden  carriages  on 
hand,  the  subject  of  metallic  ones  dropped  out  of  sight,  while  the 
inventive  and  mechanical  ingenuity  of  the  country  was  taxed  to 
the  limit  in  endeavors  to  devise  a  heavy  armament  equal  to  the 
necessities  of  the  nation,  and  has  but  recently  come  up  again  for 
serious  consideration. 

Steel  has  invaded  this  as  it  has  all  other  fields  of  improvement  in 
modern  ordnance.  In  the  more  recent  constructions  the  prominent 
features  consist  of  (i)  a  trail  formed  of  steel  flasks,  strengthened 
by  flanges  and  bolted  together;  (2)  steel  axle-tree,  so  strengthened 
by  steel  plates  as  to  resist  shock  of  discharge  ;  (3)  wheel  with 
wooden  spokes  and  fellies,  steel  tire,  and  brass  boxes  ;  (4)  a 
brake  for  changing  the  wheels  from  rolling  to  sliding  friction  ; 
(5)  a  tool-box  placed  in  rear  of  the  elevating  screw  between  the 
trail  flasks.  The  last  was  one  of  the  devices  which  characterized 
the  Wadsworth  carriage  of  1818.  The  flasks  are  assembled  very 
much  as  in  the  old  bracket-trail,  but  the  principles  on  which  the 
carriage  is  constructed  are  strictly  those  of  the  stock-trail  system. 

A  new  departure  has  been  taken  recently  in  regard  to  the 
method  of  eliciting  information  on  artillery  subjects,  which  bids 
fair  to  lead  to  the  better  construction  of  carriages  as  well  as  of 
other  field  artillery  materiel.  Pursuant  to  General  Orders  No.  39, 
Adjutant-General's  Office,  series  of  1881,  a  board  of  artillery 
officers  was  convened  to  consider  recent  changes  in  guns,  harness, 
and  equipments  for  field  batteries,  and  to  recommend  any  devi- 
ations from  existing  methods  which  to  their  experience  and  judg- 
ment seemed  fit.  The  recommendations  of  the  board  were  in  the 
direction  which  has  been  marked  out  as  that  taken  with  reference  to 
gun-carriages,  but  they  embraced,  besides,  changes  in  the  caissons, 
battery-wagons,  and  forges,  for  not  only  field  but  magazine  guns, 
and  were,  for  the  former,  in  substance  as  follows  :  i.  All  wheels 
to  have  eight  fellies,  sixteen  spokes,  and  to  be  interchangeable 
throughout  the  field-gun  system.  2.  Gun-carriages  (a)  to  be  of 
steel  in  two  parts;  that  on  which  the  gun  rests  to  have  a  small 
movement,  independent  of  the  other,  cheeked  by  an  elastic  buffer, 
and  by  which  means  the  shock  received  by  the  trunnions  may  be 


MATERIEL:  CARRIAGES.  251 

progressively  and  with  diminished  force  transmitted  to  the  second 
part ;  (£)  two  axle-seats  between  the  gun  and  wheels,  so  can- 
noneers face  towards  the  muzzle ;  (V)  brake  to  be  operated  if  on 
the  march  by  cannoneers  on  axle-seats ;  (d)  cheeks  and  elevating 
apparatus  to  admit  of  curved  fire  with  reduced  charges;  the  angle 
of  depression  to  be  six  degrees;  (<?)  single  elevating  screw,  with 
slot  and  side-screw,  to  prevent  its  running  down  when  gun  is  fired; 
(/)  trail  handspike  of  hollow  metal  to  fold  back  securely  on  stock ; 
(g)  trail-box  for  implements  between  cheeks.  3.  Limber:  (a) 
pole  of  wood;  (<5)  frame-work,  steel  or  iron;  (c]  limber-chest  of 
steel,  projectiles  placed  horizontally  therein,  cartridges  in  water- 
proof apartments  above  projectiles;  two  drawers,  one  exclusively 
for  implements,  the  other  for  friction  primers;  the  back  to  let 
down  to  horizontal  position  by  means  of  hinges  at  the  bottom, 
exposing  rear  of  chest ;  (d}  canvas  boot  in  front  of  limber-chest 
for  men's  knapsacks;  (e)  pintle  to  project  in  rear  of  chest,  securing 
longer  lever-arm  for  the  weight  acling  as  counterpoise  to  pole, 
which,  unless  rendered  absolutely  necessary  by  other  details  of  con- 
struction, should  not  bring  more  than  eight  pounds  pressure  on  the 
neck  of  each  wheel  horse.  4.  Caisson :  (a)  limber  similar  to  and 
interchangeable  with  that  of  piece;  ($)  frame  of  caisson  body  to  be 
of  iron  or  steel;  (c)  one  steel  chest,  lid  movable,  projectiles  placed 
therein  on  end,  cartridges  in  trays  above  projectiles,  the  chest  so 
placed  as  to  serve  as  counterpoise  to  pole;  (d)  common  lever 
brake.  5.  Battery  wagon:  (a)  framework,  iron x)r steel;  (£)  box, 
iron  or  steel,  rectangular  in  shape,  longitudinal  strip  along  roof,  to 
which  two  sloping  lids  can  be  hinged.  6.  Forge:  (a)  frame  -work 
and  box-like  battery  wagon,  with  drawers  for  the  safe  and  con- 
venient transport  of  stores  and  tools.  7.  Wagon  for  ammunition 
columns:  (a]  this  to  be  of  easy  draught,  good  capacity,  for  trans- 
portation of  spare  ammunition;  ($)  have  a  wooden  instead  of  a 
canvas  cover;  (V)  carry  two  spare  wheels  for  field-artillery  car- 
riages. 8.  Carriages  for  machine  guns:  (a)  to  be  of  steel,  similar 
in  construction  to  field  gun-carriage  ;  (&)  axle-tree  ammunition- 
boxes'  to  'hinge  so  as  to  fold  to  front  if  necessary ;  (c)  no  style  of 
caisson,  properly  so  called,  recommended,  there  being  probably 
better  arrangements  for  meeting  the  same  end;  (af)  forge  and  bat- 
tery wagon  similar  to  those  for  field-artillery  train;  (e)  steel  two- 
wheeled  cart  for  ammunition  of  45-calibre  Catling  gun,  short. 
Field-gun  carriages  must  fulfill  two  conditions,  which  are  incom- 


252      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

patible,  and  their  construction  in  the  most  approved  form  will  be 
a  compromise:  First,  they  must  be  light;  second,  their  recoil  must 
not  be  excessive.  As  the  shock  producing  recoil  is  expended 
principally  in  communicating  motion  to  the  carriage,  it  is  evident, 
if  condition  second  is  to  be  insisted  upon,  that  condition  first  cannot 
be,  and  vice  versa.  With  the  large  charges  and  heavy  projectiles 
of  the  present  field  artillery,  the  problem  of  how  best  to  adjust 
the  opposing  conditions  becomes  the  more  difficult.*  The  result 
has  been  that,  contrary  to  what  at  the  first  blush  might  seem 
possible,  and  what  was  expected,  the  field  gun-carriage  has  not 
been  diminished  in  weight  to  any  extent,  whatever  other  advan- 
tages may  be  claimed  for  the  metallic  construction. 

The  appointment  of  the  light  artillery  board  of  1881  was  a  move 
in  the  right  direction.  Under  the  present  imperfect  system  offi- 
cers of  the  ordnance  department  cannot  acquire  experience  with 
their  own  handicraft;  that,  so  far  as  artillery  materiel  is  concerned, 
is  reserved  for  artillery  officers  alone.  In  the  United  States  two 
separate  departments  are  the  custodians  of  a  knowledge  which, 
in  the  first  armies  of  the  world,  is  entrusted  to  a  single,  and, 
therefore,  a  much  more  perfectly  equipped  artillery  service  than 
our  double  one  is  or  may  hope  to  be. 

The  deliberations  of  the  board  covered  as  completely  as  it  was 
practicable  for  them  to  do  the  matters  referred  to  it,  and  in  its 
recommendations  it  traversed  the  whole  subject  of  light  artillery 
materiel.  But,,  because  of  our  dual  artillery  organization — one 
part  for  constructing  things,  the  other  part  for  using  them — it  is 
impossible  for  the  board  to  see  its  recommendations  followed  out 
to  their  legitimate  consequences,  except  through  the  agency,  and 
perhaps  the  interference,  of  a  distinct  bureau.  It  is  understood, 
however,  that  in  the  matter  of  carriages  and  caissons  its  recom- 
mendations are  being  favorably  acted  upon ;  their  manufacture  has 
been  begun.  Referring  to  this  board  and  its  work,  in  his  annual 
report  of  1882,  the  chief  of  ordnance  remarks: 

"  The  action  of  such  a  board  I  deemed  of  the  first  importance,  as  little  had 
been  done  in  that  direction  for  some  years.  The  board  made  a  preliminary  re- 
port to  enable  this  department  to  manufacture  samples  of  carriages,  harness, 

*  Recent  experiments  with  the  spring  recoil  check  indicate  that,  as  at  present 
applied,  it  will  be  impracticable  elsewhere  than  on  the  proving  ground  and 
with  guns  of  position.  A  lock  which  requires  the  gun-carriage  to  be  halted 
and  backed  at  the  foot  of  a  declivity  is  worthless  for  service  purposes. 


MATERIEL:  CARRIAGES.  253 

&c.,  embodying  its  views,  so  as  to  present  to  a  subsequent  board  the  articles  or 
improvements  recommended,  that  action  might  be  taken  on  practical  results. 
The  preparation  of  a  metal  field-carriage,  limber,  and  caisson  has  been  greatly 
delayed  by  the  difficulty  of  procuring  suitable  material  in  proper  shapes,  but 
it  is  confidently  believed  that  we  will  be  ready  for  the  action  of  an  artillery 
board  at  an  early  day." 

We  may  hope,  therefore,  that  the  labors  of  this  board  will  yet 
be  productive  of  good,  by  stamping  on  the  field  artillery  materiel 
the  impress  of  a  certain  knowledge  only  to  be  derived  from  offi- 
cers of  practical  experience.  If  so,  this  may  be  the  precursor  of 
an  era  marked  by  a  closer  relationship  between  two  departments 
which,  when  a  proper  organization  becomes  the  order  of  the  day, 
will  become  one;  but  until  that  time  arrives,  and  while  an  un- 
natural divorce  renders  them  independent  of,  yet  dependent  on, 
each  other,  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance,  though  working  sepa- 
rately, that  they  should  be  directed,  not  only  in  their  aims,  but  in 
their  methods,  towards  a  common  purpose — an  increased  efficiency 
of  the  public  service. 

SIEGE,  GARRISON,  AND   SEA-COAST   CARRIAGES. 

The  same  general  principles  which  have  governed  with  the 
field  have  been  observed  in  the  construction  of  siege  and  garrison 
carriages.  In  early  days  the  heavier  were  denominated  "trav- 
eling," in  contradistinction  to  the  "light  field"  carriages  which 
were  to  manoeuvre  with  troops  on  the  field  of  battle.  The  former 
term  was  not,  however,  applied  to  the  carriages  of  any  particular 
calibres,  as  there  were  both  light  and  heavy  guns  for  every  cali- 
bre in  the  service,  the  latter  being  used  in  siege  or  garrison,  or 
forming,  on  the  line  of  battle,  guns  of  position.  Traveling  car- 
riages were  used  to  transport  every  species  of  heavy  gun,  and 
therefore  were  as  necessary  with  the  heavy  6-pounder  as  with  the 
heavy  24-pounder. 

The  systems  of  siege  and  garrison  carriages  have  conformed 
to  those  of  the  field  service.  First  came  the  bracket-trail;  then 
the  Gribeauval;  finally  the  stock-trail;  but  the  fact  that  equal 
mobility  cannot  be  attained  with  siege  and  garrison  as  with  the 
field-carriage  has  modified  the  construction  of  the  former.  For 
instance,  ammunition-boxes  have  never  formed  a  feature  of  the 
heavier  carriages — ammunition,  as  well  as  implements  and  tools, 
being  transported  in  wagons,  and  when  taking  the  road,  the 


254      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

pieces  are  now  shifted  from  their  firing  to  what  in  effect  is  the 
Gribeauval  traveling  trunnion-beds.  Nor  have  they,  until 
quite  recently,  been  made  of  any  other  material  than  wood; 
but,  following  as  usual  the  lead  of  the  field,  a  few  of  the  siege 
gun-carriages  have  of  late  been  made  of  various  kinds  of  metal; 
and  it  has  been  announced  that  metallic  constructions  will  in  the 
near  future  replace  entirely  those  heretofore  in  vogue. 

It  was  not  until  after  1800  that  a  gun  heavier  than  the  32- 
pounder  was  mounted  in  the  sea-coast  defenses.  The  carriages 
for  these  guns  were,  as  a  rule,  wooden  frames,  mounted  on  four 
heavy  wheels,  although  there  were  also  in  vogue  those  made  up 
of  two  parts — a  chassis  and  an  upper  carriage;  the  former,  fastened 
to  a  front  pintle,  and  supported  in  rear  on  wheels,  was  capable  of 
being  traversed,  as  in  the  barbette  carriage  of  the  present,  through 
an  angle  approximating  180  degrees. 

Except  slight  attempts  at  improvements,  there  was  no  change 
made  in  these  carriages — the  only  iron  work  in  which  appeared  to 
be  bolts  and  traverse- wheels — until  Wads  worth,  in  1818,  projected 
his  system  of  artillery.  In  this,  cast-iron  was  contemplated  for 
all  carriages  to  be  used  in  the  sea-coast  defenses;  and  in  this  one 
respect,  as  the  views  of  his  antagonist,  the  ordnance  board,  coin- 
cided with  his  own,  the  measure  was  adopted.  Cast-iron  sea- 
coast  carriages,  to  replace  those  of  wood,  began  to  be  extensively 
made.  The  former  were  at  the  time  in  favor  abroad,  and  the  ex- 
periments of  the  ordnance  board  were  considered  to  have  demon- 
strated their  general  superiority.  They  cost  less  and  lasted  longer 
than  the  wooden  carriages;  in  fact  were  as  indestructible  as  the 
guns  themselves.  From  1819  to  1839  they  continued  to  be  man- 
ufactured, the  appropriations  for  the  armament  of  fortifications 
at  times  being  almost  entirely  used  in  their  purchase. 

With  more  extended  experience,  however,  their  superiority 
was  brought  in  question;  and  among  other  matters  referred  to 
the  Macomb  board,  was  the  determination  of  the  relative  merits 
of  these  two  rival  systems  of  heavy  gun-carriages.  That  board 
did  not  make  a  report  on  the  subject,  which  was  then  referred  to 
its  successor — the  board  of  1838.  In  its  final  report  of  January, 
1839,  the  latter  embodied  a  resolution  condemning  cast-iron  for 
gun-carriages  a.s  being  for  this  purpose  inferior  to  wood,  neither 
was  it  suited  for  general  use.  It  recommended  that  no  more  be 
purchased,  but  that  the  cast-iron  carriages  on  hand  be  distributed 


MATERIEL:  CARRIAGES.  255 

for  service,  and  that  transoms  of  this  metal  be  no  longer  pro- 
cured for  casemate  or  barbette  carriages,  until  by  proper  trials  the 
relative  cost  and  efficiency  of  the  iron  and  wooden  transoms  be 
certainly  known.  These  recommendations  having  been  approved 
by  the  Secretary  of  War,  cast-iron  carriages,  except  to  use  up  the 
stock  on  hand,  may  from  that  time  be  said  to  have  become  a  thing 
of  the  past.  After  a  trial  of  twenty  years,  resort  was  had  again  to 
wood,  which  remained  for  fifteen  years  longer  the  favorite  material 
for  all  classes  of  fixed  carriages. 

Meanwhile  in  Europe  wrought-iron  was  forcing  its  way  to  the 
front.  Officers  who  had  inspected  foreign  armaments  reported 
that  for  sea-coast  carriages  this  metal  was  superior  to  any  other. 
The  matter  was  brought  formally  before  the  ordnance  board  by  let- 
ter of  September  I2th,  1856.  Drawings  of  some  of  the  European 
patterns  had  been  procured  by  the  commission  of  1855,  and  the 
board  recommended  that  wrought  iron  be  tried  for  carriages,  both 
barbette  and  casemate.  Finally,  in  April,  1859,  it  recommended 
their  definitive  adoption — one  style  each  for  the  lo-inch  and  8-inch 
Columbiads,  en  barbette;  one  for  42-pounder  and  32-pounder,  en 
barbette;  one  for  the  24-pounder  and  smaller  calibres,  en  barbette; 
one  for  8-inch  Columbiad  and  42-pounder  casemate;  one  for  32- 
pounder  and  24-pounder  casemate, — altogether  six  different  kinds. 
When  guns  of  different  calibres  were  used  on  the  same  carriage, 
trunnion-plates  to  fit  the  smaller  were  to  be  adjusted  to  the  perma- 
nent trunnion-beds  of  the  larger  calibres. 

The  wisdom  of  changing  to  wrought-iron  has  been  vindicated. 
In  the  United  States  it  is  to-day  the  sole  material  used  for  sea-coast 
carriages.  Its  superiority  over  all  others  and  its  adaptability  to 
the  object  in  view  has  been  more  completely  demonstrated  by 
time  and  experience;  and  though  in  some  styles  of  German  coast- 
carriages  the  upper  part,  which  works  on  the  chassis,  is  made  of 
cast-iron,  it  is  exceptional — the  use  of  wrought-iron  for  this  pur- 
pose being  almost  universal,  not  only  at  home,  but  abroad. 

The  material  for  construction  having  been  definitively  settled, 
the  remaining  problems  connected  with  the  securing  a  suitable 
heavy  gun-carriage  were — first,  to  take  up  the  recoil;  second,  to 
depress  the  gun  en  barbette  behind  the  parapet  after  being  fired, 
and  while  being  loaded;  third,  to  manoeuvre  the  carriages  by 
mechanical  means  alone,  thereby  economizing  the  labor  of 
cannoneers. 


256      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    Of   THE  ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

The  first  has  been  very  happily  solved  by  the  use  either  of  the 
English  hydraulic  or  the  American  pneumatic  buffers,  which  not 
only  take  up  recoil,  but  relieve  both  carriages  and  platforms  from 
danger  of  being  broken  to  pieces  by  the  shocks  to  which  they 
are  subjected. 

The  solution  of  the  other  problems  has  not  been  so  satis- 
factory. Several  models  of  depressing  carriages  have  been  pro- 
posed, and  Major  King's  has  been  experimented  with.  The  results 
were  favorable,  but  the  carriage  is  apparently  complicated,  and 
for  twelve  years  it  has  not  been  heard  of  among  the  measures 
brought  forth  to  improve  the  sea-coast  armament.  For  sim- 
plicity, an  elegant  adjustment  of  parts,  and  an  exact  compliance 
with  mechanical  principles,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Buffington's  model 
leads  the  others  ;  but,  so  far  as  is  known,  no  carriage  of  his  design 
has  been  constructed  and  practically  tested.  Until  that  be  done, 
the  question  of  its  merits  will  remain  a  matter  of  speculation. 

The  manoeuvring  of  carnages  by  mechanical  appliances  is  a 
problem  as  far  from  solution  as  the  other.  While  abroad  the  aid 
of  the  steam-engine  has  been  successfully  brought  to  bear,  the 
sole  attempt  in  that  direction  in  this  country  is  Benton's  apparatus, 
consisting  of  ropes  and  a  windlass,  by  which  means  the  piece  is 
run  from  and  into  the  battery,  traversed  to  the  right  or  left,  the 
muzzle  raised  or  depressed.  To  a  limited  extent,  and  under  favor- 
able circumstances,  it  has  been  tried,  and  found  to  work  well. 

The  buffers  serve  their  important  office  without  in  any  degree 
complicating  the  machinery  to  be  manoeuvred.  This  is  not  true 
of  either  the  depressing  or  the  manoeuvring  apparatus.  Each  of 
the  latter,  as  experimented  with  in  the  land  service,  is  complex, 
making  the  result  of  accidents  a  more  serious  matter  than  with 
the  simpler  machine  it  is  intended  to  supersede.  Moreover, 
the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  either  depressing  carriages  or 
manoeuvring  appliances  are,  it  is  believed,  generally  overestimated. 
The  increased  immunity  from  danger  is  questionable.  The  whole 
matter  seems  for  the  present  to  be  held  in  abeyance.  Questions 
concerning  the  carriage  are  overshadowed  and  lost  sight  of  in 
presence  of  more  important  problems  affecting  the  gun  it  is 
intended  to  carry. 


MATERIEL:  METAL.  257 


CHAPTER  X. 

MATERIEL:    METAL. 

From  1775  down  to  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century  brass 
was,  in  the  American  service,  the  metal  almost  exclusively  used 
for  ordnance,  the  largest  calibre  (the  32-pounder)  alone  being 
always  made  of  cast-iron.  Though  more  expensive  than  iron, 
there  was  not  the  same  danger  from  the  guns  bursting ;  besides, 
brass  guns  were  at  that  time  more  generally  used  abroad,  which 
naturally  caused  them  to  be  looked  on  with  favor  in  the  colonies. 
This  is  evinced  in  the  resolutions  of  Congress  instructing  its  can- 
non committee  to  procure  certain  calibres  of  guns;  as,  for  instance, 
August  2ist,  1776,  that  committee  was  ordered  to  purchase  six 
6-pounders,  six  i2-pounders,  four  8-inch  and  four  6-inch  how- 
itzers, and  six  Coehorn  mortars,  preferably  of  brass;  but  if  that 
were  impracticable,  then  of  iron.  The  igth  of  the  following  No- 
vember, on  General  Washington-' s  recommendation,  Congress 
directed  that  there  should  be  procured  for  the  field  service  of  the 
United  States  one  hundred  3-pounders,  fifty  6-pounders,  thirteen 
i8-pounders,  and  thirteen  24-pounders,  all  of  brass.  These 
instances,  from  among  many  that  might  be  cited,  are  mentioned 
to  show  that  brass  was  the  favorite  metal,  iron  being  resorted  to 
only  when  the  other  was  not  to  be  obtained. 

Some  of  this  ordnance  was  manufactured  in  the  United  States, 
some  in  France.  Castings  of  this  nature  began  to  be  made  in 
the  colonies  before  the  war;  and,  from  evidence  elicited  by  the 
Duke  of  Richmond,  November  loth,  1775,  it  appears  that  large 
quantities  of  both  brass  and  iron  cannon  were  at  that  time  being 
turned  out  by  the  foundries  of  Philadelphia. 

The  brass  was  substantially  what  was  afterwards,  and  is  now, 
known  as  bronze.  Muller  called  the  alloy  gun  metal,  also  brass, 
and  stated  that  its  constituents  were  copper  and  tin.  In  Martil- 
lier's  "  Observations  on  Casting,"  published  in  1790,  and  quoted 
by  Tousard,  the  mixing  of  a  little  zinc  with  the  copper  and  tin 
was  recommended,  in  proportions  depending  upon  the  nature  of 
the  gun,  and  with  the  object  of  increasing  the  endurance  of  the 
33 


25&      HISTORICAL    SKfifCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.   ARMY. 

resulting  alloy.  The  brass  gun  metal  of  Woolwich  at  that  time 
was  made  of  sixty-eight  parts  copper,  fifty-two  parts  brass,  and 
twelve  parts  tin.  Stevens  gave  as  the  mixture  of  different  metals : 
for  4,200  pounds,  3,68yff  copper,  204!!  brass,  and  307!!  tin. 

Some  of  the  bids  for  supplying  ordnance  that  have  been  pre- 
served prove  that  at  this  time  copper  and  tin  alone  were  the  con- 
stituents of  the  gun  metal,  the  founders  covenanting  that  none 
others  should  enter  into  the  products  of  their  manufactories.*  It 
appears,  also,  from  various  sources,  that  this  continued  until  after 
1800,  when  Secretary  Dearborn  began  to  have  extensive  experi- 
ments made  to  test  the  suitableness  of  cast-iron  for  the  construc- 
tion of  field  guns,  as  for  some  time  it  had  been  exclusively  used  in 
the  construction  of  heavy  ordnance. 

In  the  United  States,  as  in  Europe,  the  cheapness  of  cast-iron 
ordnance,  as  compared  with  brass,  had  caused  the  former  to  be 
looked  on  with  favor,  which  was  only  counter-balanced  by  the 
supposed  superiority  of  the  latter.  During  the  Revolution  there 
was  neither  time  nor  opportunity  to  test  the  question  here  raised; 
but  when  peace  was  restored,  the  attention  of  founders  began  to  be 
directed  to  cast-iron  as  the  metal  from  which  the  heavier  natures 
could  be  not  only  more  cheaply  but  more  serviceably  made.  We 
find,  therefore,  that  the  commissioner  of  revenue,  in  all  contracts 

*In  a  bill  rendered  to  the  Government  by  Daniel  Foy,  superintendent  of 
ordnance,  Philadelphia,  1*778,  are  the  following  items  and  memorandum  :  "For 
making  alterations,  improvements,  and  proving  cannon,  as  per  orders  of  cannon 
committee  of  Congress,  f>  ,  viz.:  (1)  Boring  and  proving  new  brass  3,  6, 

and  12-pounderedguns,  5j-inch  and  8-inch  howitzers,  $  .  (2)  Boring  out 

Hessian  3-pounders  to  6-pounders,  $  .  (3)  Drawing  draughts  and  alter- 

ing plan  of  brass  ordnance,  which  were  much  approved  of,  $  .  (4)  To 

drawing  draughts  and  calculating  proportions  of  wrought-iron  cannon,  from 
3  to  12-pounders,  $ 

a  N.  B. — Not  one  of  Mr.  Bird's  cannon  that  were  made  before  I  got  the  plan 
altered  stood  the  proof,  nor  was  any  of  the  brass  ordnance  sound  until  my 
advice  was  taken." 

The  field  commissary  issued  this  new  ordnance  to  the  artillery  at  White 
Plains  in  the  fall  of  the  same  year.  It  may  be  interesting  to  know  what  was 
considered  a  full  equipment  for  a  brass  6-pounder,  on  this  occasion  :  Ready 
shot,  80 ;  grape,  70  ;  case-shot,  35  ;  tubes,  35  ;  tube-boxes,  3  ;  sponges  and 
rammers,  2  ;  coils,  slow-match,  6  ;  portfires,  24  ;  portfire  stocks,  2  ;  lint  stocks, 
2  ;  hammers,  4 ;  pairs  pincers,  4 ;  priming  wires,  6  ;  gimlets,  2 ;  sets  drag 
ropes,  4  ;  gunners'  belts,  2  ;  sheepskins,  2  ;  sponge  tacks,  20  ;  powder-horns,  3  ; 
budge  barrel,  1 ;  wagon  with  gears,  1. 


MATERIEL:  METAL.  259 

for  supplying  the  first  heavy  ordnance,  which  under  the  consti- 
tutional government  Congress  authorized  for  a  sea-coast  arma- 
ment, stipulated  cast-iron  as  the  metal  of  which  these  32-pounder 
and  24-pounder  guns  should  be  constructed;  12-pounders  and  18- 
pounders  were  also  included  in  the  list,  and  from  this  time  on  a 
bold  effort  was  made  to  push  cast-iron  to  the  front.  But  the  little 
encouragement  given  to  founders  by  the  Government,  as  well  as" 
lack  of  skill  on  the  part  of  the  artisans,  for  some  time  delayed 
the  success  of  the  scheme,  and  brass  held  its  own  in  public  favor 
against  the  constantly  increasing  strength  of  its  rival  until  about 
the  year  1800.* 

The  career  of  the  coming  metal  was  not  without  reverses.  In 
a  report  to  Congress,  December  i2th,  1795,  on  the  measures 
which  had  been  taken  to  replenish  the  magazines  with  military 
stores,  Secretary  of  War  Pickering  remarked  : 

"  The  casting  of  cannon  has  not  been  attended  hitherto  with  the  expected 
success.  The  foundries,  which  formerly  succeeded  very  well  in  the  casting  of 
small  guns,  were  not  well  adapted  to  the  casting  of  24  and  32-pounders.  A 
French  gentleman,  of  some  knowledge  and  experience  in  cannon  foundries,  has 


*In  1793  Secretary  Knox  reported  that  at  Springfield,  Massachusetts,  there 
were  being  cast  thirty  brass  guns  and  twenty  howitzers.  This  was  the  Gov- 
ernment foundry;  and  however  trustworthy  the  products  of  private  establish- 
ments were,  it  would  seem  from  the  following  extract  from  the  New  York  State 
"arms  commissioner's"  report  (1795)  that  those  cast  at  Springfield  were  not  to 
be  depended  on  implicitly  :  "  The  field  pieces  to  be  cast  by  Mr.  Byers  were  to 
be  proved  as  were  those  made  for  the  United  States.  On  September  3d,  1794, 
the  deputy  commissary  of  military  stores  at  Springfield  certified  that  he  had 
proved  twelve  3-pounders,  and  October  22d,  1794,  eight  3-pounders  and  four 
6-pounders,  all  of  brass.  Nevertheless,  certain  persons  deemed  it  expedient  to 
further  prove  the  pieces  before  mounting  them  on  carriages.  Of  twenty-three 
thus  proved  thirteen  burst.  Another  6-pounder,  proved  in  presence  of  the 
maker,  the  commissioner,  General  Lamb,  Colonel  Stevens,  and  Colonel  Beau- 
man,  burst  also.  The  pieces  were  then  recast  into  fourteen  guns,  (the  number 
burst,)  all  of  which,  except  one,  stood  the  test  at  Springfield." 

Some  attempts  were  made  to  make  wrought-iron  guns  during  the  Revolution, 
the  principal  manufacturer  being  Mr.  Samuel  Wheeler,  of  Philadelphia.  The 
congressional  cannon  committee  ordered  several  to  be  purchased,  and  Tousard 
says  that  one  of  them,  with  the  artillery  at  Brandywine,  gave  very  satisfactory 
practice,  but  it  was  captured  by  the  enemy.  Due  to  difficulties  of  welding, 
perhaps,  but  certainly  to  some  cause,  this  metal  was  not  used  to  any  extent, 
though  Tousard  favored  giving  it  an  exhaustive  trial.  From  the  Revolution 
down  to  the  time  when  the  Macomb  board  commenced  to  experiment  with 
various  gun  metals,  wrought-iron  dropped  completely  out  of  sight. 


260      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.    ARMY. 

lately  been  employed  to  amend  the  process  of  casting  and  to  improve  the  ma- 
chinery for  boring ;  but  in  an  undertaking  so  important,  and  at  the  same  time 
so  expensive,  it  was  desirable  to  obtain  a  complete  cannon  founder.  Measures 
have  accordingly  been  taken  to  procure  one  from  the  first  foundries  of  Europe." 

We  may  infer,  however,  that  the  evil  was  not  at  once  remedied, 
for  Secretary  McHenry,  in  1798,  when  war  with  France  seemed 
to  be  a  foregone  conclusion,  expressed  himself  on  the  same  sub- 
ject in  a  clear  and  forcible  manner.  (See  page  163,  ante.) 

The  reasoning  of  the  Secretary  appealed  so  favorably  to  the 
sense  of  the  Legislature  that  an  inspector  of  artillery  was  at  once 
authorized,  whom  Mr.  McHenry  immediately  set  to  work  super- 
intending the  construction  and  proof  of  cast-iron  field-guns.  The 
results  were  encouraging;  and  upon  Secretary  Dearborn  entering 
the  war  office,  he  proceeded  to  follow  up  energetically  the  path  thus 
marked  out,  and  which  gave  so  much  hope  of  leading  to  important 
practical  results.  He  at  once  stopped  the  casting  of  brass  guns, 
and  directed  that  no  more  should  be  manufactured  until  either  the 
practicability  or  the  reverse  of  the  successful  casting  of  iron  field- 
guns  was  demonstrated.  It  was  at  this  time  (1801)  that  cast-iron 
for  field  artillery  supplanted  brass.  Great  deliberation  was  used 
in  every  step.  The  best  advice  the  country  afforded  was  sought 
in  determining  the  proportions  of  the  guns  and  all  details  of  con- 
struction. The  pieces  were  cut  down  to  fourteen  calibres  in 
length,  and  the  weight  reduced  to  that  of  brass  guns  of  the  same 
calibre. 

The  new  departure  was  considered  by  many  of  the  best-inform- 
ed artillerists  as  a  doubtful  experiment.  The  example  of  the 
world  was  against  it.  But  Dearborn  was  a  man  who  depended 
more  on  his  own  judgment,  deliberately  formed,,  than  upon  the 
opinions  of  others.  Having  made  up  his  mind  to  the  advisability 
of  the  measure,  he  never  faltered  in  its  execution.  The  price  of 
brass  was  five  or  six  times  that  of  iron.  The  country  produced 
the  best  iron-ore,  but  as  yet  only  a  small  quantity  of  copper,  and 
no  tin.  There  were  two  important  reasons  why  cast-iron  should 
be  experimented  with  until  a  definite  conclusion  could  be  arrived 
at  as  to  its  adaptability  for  field-guns:  First,  economic  considera- 
tions; second,  that  we  might  depend  on  our  own  resources.  Suc- 
cess the  most  complete  crowned  the  Secretary's  efforts.  The 
excellent  character  of  the  6-pounder  field-guns  then  introduced 
was  proved  in  the  war  of  1812.  They  were  referred  to  in  terms  of 


MATERIEL:    METAL.  26l 

highest  praise  by  Colonel  Wadsworth,  and  by  every  board  assem- 
bled for  the  amelioration  of  the  artillery  down  to  that  of  1838, 
And,  as  will  be  seen  hereafter,  it  was  to  these  guns  that  Secretary 
Poinsett,  in  his  controversy  with  the  committee  of  ordnance  officers 
in  1840,  referred  as  establishing,  in  the  manner  most  convincing 
of  all — in  actual  field  service — that  efficient,  trustworthy  cannon^ 
could  be  made  of  cast-iron. 

The  change  from  brass  to  iron  was  not  effected  without 
opposition.  No  sooner  was  Dearborn  gone  than  an  effort  was 
made  to  bring  the  department  back  to  former  practices.  A  few 
orders  were  given  by  his  successor  for  brass  guns,  one  of  March, 
1812,  being  for  twenty-four  6-pounders  and  twelve  i2-pounders. 
But  so  complete  was  the  triumph  of  the  other  that  an  officer  of 
the  ordnance  department,  who,  in  the  year  1813,  fitted  out  the 
field  artillery  sent  to  the  armies  operating  against  Canada,  has 
left  on  record  the  statement  that  during  that  time  he  did  not  see 
a  single  piece  of  brass  ordnance. 

Practically  speaking,  the  use  of  brass  ceased  in  1801,  and  was 
not  resumed  until  1836,  upon  a  recommendation  of  the  ordnance 
board  of  1835.  That  brass  guns,  &c.,  in  limited  quantities  were 
manufactured  during  this  period  of  thirty-five  years,  which  may 
properly  be  called  the  "iron  age"  of  our  ordnance,  is  true;  but  it 
was  apparently  in  deference  to  the  wishes  of  individual  States  or 
private  corporations;  the  policy  of  the  Government  was  against  it. 

In  the  first  system  of  land  ordnance  formally  adopted  by  the 
War  Department — that  promulgated  in  the  regulations  of  1816 
— cast-iron  alone  appears  as  a  gun  metal.  While  in  the  style 
of  carriages  and  the  disposition  of  the  personnel  for  field  service 
we  followed  the  Gribeauval  system,  this  was  not  true  of  the  guns. 
Except  the  Napoleon  gun,  the  French  ordnance  has  had  no  foot- 
ing in  the  United  States  artillery  since  the  Revolutionary  war. 
While  the  French  used  brass,  we  used  iron;  while  they  adhered 
to  4  and  8-pounders,  we  clung  to  6  and  i2-pounders.  Neither 
in  Colonel  Wadsworth' s  system  nor  in  that  of  the  ordnance  board 
of  1818  was  the  use  of  any  other  metal  than  cast-iron  contem- 
plated. 

Notwithstanding  this,  however,  and  the  fact  that  cast-iron, 
after  great  deliberation,  had  been  definitively  adopted  and  used 
for  several  years,  one  of  the  first  acts  of  the  Macomb  board  was  to 
throw  wide  open  the  door  for  investigation  and  experiment,  with 


262      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

a  view  to  returning  to  the  employment  of  brass  for  all  kinds  of 
field  ordnance. 

This  action  of  the  board  was  due  to  one  cause — a  lack  of  confi- 
dence in  cast-iron.  The  want  of  confidence  in  its  turn  was  due 
to  the  complete  breaking  down,  in  1827,  of  the  field-gun  system 
of  the  board  of  1818,  which,  after  enduring  what  were  deemed 
satisfactory  tests  prior  to  adoption,  went  to  pieces  in  a  most 
unaccountable  manner.  Besides,  in  Europe,  whence  we  have 
drawn  most  of  our  ideas  concerning  military  supplies,  brass  had 
remained  the  generally  accepted  material  for  field  service. 

It  may  be  asked,  Where  were  the  Dearborn  guns  now  ?  They 
had  been  pushed  to  one  side  in  that  desire  for  change  which 
characterized  the  proceedings  of  the  ordnance  board  of  1818 — to 
have  their  places  filled  by  an  inferior  system.  When  the  Ma- 
comb  board  began  its  labors,  this  inferior  system  attracted  very 
little  attention.  On  the  other  hand,  reference  was  constantly  made 
in  the  most  eulogistic  terms,  by  those  '"ho  were  cognizant  of  the 
facts,  to  the  great  endurance  and  the  excellent  record  in  action 
of  the  cast-iron  guns  of  1812.  After  brass  returned  to  the  field 
as  a  competitor  with  cast-iron,  it  had  a  long,  precarious,  and 
uncertain  struggle  for  supremacy,  during  which  its  opponent 
based  its  claim  to  favor  upon  the  Dearborn  system,  tried  by 
the  ordeal  of  battle,  and  not  upon  the  ' '  walking-stick ' '  system 
of  1818. 

The  old  brass  guns  on  hand  not  being  considered  reliable,  and 
it  not  being  practicable  to  purchase  any  abroad,  as  contemplated 
by  the  board  of  1831  (Macomb),  the  comparative  tests  directed 
by  this  board  to  be  made  could  not  be  at  once  instituted;  and 
when  the  board  of  1835  met  at  Watervliet,  it  found  awaiting  trial 
none  other  than  cast-iron  ordnance,  which  it  proceeded  to  dispose 
of  in  what  was  no  doubt  meant  for  a  very  deliberate,  but  in  fact  was 
a  very  summary,  manner.  After  subjecting  the  6-pounder  and 
i2-pounder  pieces  to  what  they  considered  a  proper  trial,  the 
board  resolved  unanimously  that  none  of  them  were  such  as 
should  be  received  as  models  for  the  field  service  of  the  United 
States ;  that  the  howitzers  were  not  worthy  the  labor  and  expense 
of  proving  them ;  and  finally,  that  iron  was  not  a  proper  material 
for  field  ordnance,  which  should  be  made  wholly  of  bronze*  It 

*This  is  the  first  instance  in  our  records  in  which  the  alloy  commonly  called 
brass  is  officially  designated  bronze. 


MATERIEL:    METAL.  263 

then  proceeded  to  enumerate  the  natures,  weights,  and  dimensions 
of  the  bronze  ordnance  which  should  form  the  field  armament 
of  the  United  States;  and,  continuing,  observed:  "  If,  however,  the 
Government,  rejecting  the  experience  of  the  warlike  nations  of 
Europe  and  the  opinions  above  expressed  by  this  board,  determines 
to  adhere  to  the  system  of  iron  guns  for  field  service,  the  board  is 
of  opinion  that  neither  the  6  nor  the  i2-pounder  should  be  less 
than  fifteen  calibres  long,  the  former  weigh  not  less  than  850,  the 
latter  1 800  pounds. ' '  This  report  was  approved  by  the  Secretary 
of  War  (Mr.  Cass)  July  8th,  1836,  which  is  therefore  an  important 
date  in  the  history  of  our  artillery  materiel,  marking  as  it  does  the 
formal  introduction  of  the  stock-trail  system  of  carriages  and  the 
authorization  of  brass  as  a  material  for  field-guns. 

The  contest  between  brass  (bronze)  and  iron  now  began  in 
earnest.  The  struggle  was  not  unlike  that  at  present  going  on 
in  this  country — the  iron-founders  on  one  side,  the  most  respect- 
able professional  artillerists  on  the  other. 

July  1 3th,  1836,  a  contract  was  entered  into  with  the  Ames 
Manufacturing  Company,  and  in  October,  1837,  ten  bronze  guns 
were  turned  over  by  that  company  to  the  ordnance  department. 
The  competitive  trials  which  the  Macomb  board  had  resolved  to 
make  were  now  commenced.  Malleable  cast-iron,  as  well  as  cast- 
iron,  entered  the  lists  as  a  disturbing  factor,  and  for  a  time  threat- 
ened to  sweep  all  else  before  it,  eliciting  from  the  colonel  of  ord- 
nance the  remark,  that  by  this  process  guns  could  be  made  lighter 
and  stronger  than  brass,  and  that  the  trials  then  being  prose- 
cuted promised  to  establish  the  great  superiority  of  this  species 
of  ordnance.  In  this,  however,  he  and  the  other  adherents  to  iron 
were  disappointed.  The  malleable  burst  like  all  the  other  cast- 
iron  guns,  and,  though  they  tested  well,  their  good  qualities  was 
not  conspicuous. 

The  diversity  of  opinion  entertained  by  artillerists  in  this 
country  concerning  the  proper  material  for  field-guns  was  no- 
where more  manifest  than  in  the  proceedings  of  the  ordnance 
board  of  1838.  At  first  the  cast-iron  element  seemed  to  pre- 
dominate, and  a  resolution  was  adopted  to  the  effect  that,  while 
this  metal,  as  ordinarily  manufactured,  was  unreliable,  still,  as  had 
been  shown  in  the  field-guns  of  the  late  war  (1812),  it  was  possi- 
ble to  make  iron  guns  of  such  patterns  as  would  endure  success- 
fully every  strain  incident  to  service. 


264      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    f HE    ARtlLLERY,   U.  S.   ARMY. 

For  horse  artillery  the  board  recommended  both  malleable 
cast-iron  and  bronze;  but  under  instructions  from  the  Secretary 
of  War  to  choose  between  these  two  metals,  they  took  the 
latter.  At  this  time  Ringgold's  horse-artillery  battery  was  being 
mounted  and  equipped  with  its  proper  arm. 

The  bursting  of  both  the  cast-iron  and  the  malleable  cast-iron 
guns  and  howitzers  which  were  being  tested  but  increased  the 
uncertainty  of  the  board  regarding  the  merits  of  the  several 
metallic  contestants.  The  result  was  to  leave  undisturbed  the 
bronze  field-gun  system  of  1835,  except  the  suppression  of  the 
9-pounder.  Regarding  the  seige,  garrison,  and  sea-coast  arma- 
ments, they  were  wholly  of  cast-iron,  except  the  bronze  Coehorn 
and  the  i6-inch  Stone  mortars. 

Thus  the  matter  of  gun  metal  stood  when  was  assembled  the 
committee  of  ordnance  officers  appointed  by  Mr.  Poinsett  April, 

1839.  Experiments  with  bronze,  cast-iron,   and  malleable  cast- 
iron  had  been  industriously  carried  .on,  but  without  any  definite 
result.     The  best  metal  for  a  field  armament  was  as  far  from  set- 
tlement as  ever;  each  had  its  partisans. 

This  was  one  of  the  first  questions  to  the  determination  of 
which  the  committee  addressed  itself.  The  interesting  cor- 
respondence which  ensued  between  the  committee  and  the  Secre- 
tary of  War — the  former  advocating  bronze,  the  latter  inclining  to 
cast-iron — led  directly  to  the  sending  of  the  first  ' '  armament 
commission ' '  to  Europe  to  study  on  the  ground  and  from  the 
masters  in  the  art  the  practical  details  of  gun-casting,  to  which 
we  were  in  a  measure  strangers.  (Appendix  C,  [2].)  This  cor- 
respondence makes  clear  the  fact  that  to  Mr.  Secretary  Poinsett 
more  than  to  any  other  of  the  many  who  contributed  to  that  end 
is  the  artillery  indebted  for  the  elegant  and  complete  system  of 
1849.  It  will  be  readily  admitted  that  he  had  a  much  clearer  per- 
ception of  what  was  needed,  and  the  proper  methods  to  attain  it, 
than  the  ordnance  committee.  He  rejected  all  temporary  expe- 
dients. What  he  wanted,  and  determined  to  have,  was  a  system 
of  artillery  based  on  correct  principles.  The  first  step  was  'for 
those  into  whose  hands  the  working  out  of  details  was  intrusted 
to  acquire  knowledge  of  their  business.  These  considerations 
led  to  sending  the  commission  of  ordnance  officers  to  Europe  in 

1840.  This  strengthened  and  fitted  the  department  for  its  work. 
The  information  acquired  abroad  by  the  members  of  this  commis- 


MATERIEL:  METAL.  265 

sion  gave  dignity  and  importance  to  the  deliberation  of  the  com- 
mittee, now  become  the  "ordnance  board."  From  the  return 
of  the  commission  the  work  of  arranging  details  of  the  proposed 
system  went  straight  on  without  break  or  hindrance,  other  than 
those  properly  incident  to  the  service.  There  was  no  halting, 
no  thought  of  meeting  by  temporary  devices  an  assumed  present^ 
demand  which  did  not  exist.  The  foundation  of  the  new  system 
was  deep  laid  in  experience,  knowledge  of  the  practices  of  the  old 
nations,  and  professional  lore,  and  it  was  permanent. 

The  commission,  consisting  of  Major  Baker,  Captains  Mordecai 
and  Huger  of  the  ordnance  department,  with  Mr.  Wade,  a  prac- 
tical founder,  (formerly  captain  of  ordnance,)  spent  about  nine 
months  in  Europe,  visiting  the  principal  arsenals,  cannon  foun- 
dries, and  armories.  It  had  seen  enough  to  have  its  views  con- 
cerning field-gun  metal  confirmed,  and,  January  2d,  1841,  the 
ordnance  board  again  unanimously  recommended  bronze.  This 
was  approved  by  Mr.  Pouisett.  From  this  time,  therefore,  we 
may  date  the  undisputed  ascendency  of  bronze  over  cast-iron  of 
all  kinds. 

Nor  were  wrought-iron  guns  more  successful.  They  had  been 
urged  as  a  last  resort  by  the  friends  of  iron,  but  neither  those 
experimented  with  in  1832,  nor  those  of  improved  manufacture 
tested  in  1839  and  1840,  gave  results  that  inspired  confidence 
in  this  method  of  gun  making.  The  first  difficulty  was  to 
weld  the  parts;  the  next  and  greater  was  to  determine  whether 
the  welds  were  perfect.  Wrought,  with  all  kinds  of  cast-iron,  not- 
withstanding the  persistent  efforts  of  the  founders,  at  last  for  twenty 
years  gave  way  to  bronze.  It  may  be  stated,  therefore,  that  in 
1835  bronze  became  the  favorite.  The  next  year  its  use  was 
authorized.  In  1841  it  was  officially  and  permanently  recognized 
as  the  metal  for  field  ordnance — a  position  which  it  retained,  with 
none  to  dispute  its  title,  until  1861.  Except  the  Stone  and  Coehorn 
mortars,  the  former  of  which  was  abandoned  in  1861,  the  heavy 
ordnance — siege,  garrison,  and  sea-coast — continued  to  be  made 
of  cast-iron,  the  quality  of  which,  in  all  that  went  to  make  up  first- 
class  gun  metal,  was  second  to  none  in  the  world. 

The  Civil  war  inaugurated  a  revolution  in  this  as  in  every  other 
feature  of  gun  construction.     Although  the  French  rifled  field- 
pieces  used  in  1859  were  of  bronze,  experience  showed  that  this 
metal  was  not  adapted  to  the  strains  and  wear  of  guns  constructed 
34 


266      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.  S.   ARMY. 

on  the  rifle  principle.  In  1860  a  board  of  officers  had  recom- 
mended that  the  bronze  guns  then  in  service,  or  at  least  fifty  per 
cent,  of  them,  be  rifled.  The  latter  recommendation  was  ordered 
to  be  put  in  execution  ;  but  scarcely  had  the  work  of  conversion 
begun,  when  it  was  found  the  altered  bronze  pieces  were  too 
weak,  and  the  scheme  was  abandoned ;  thus  forming  a  fitting 
prelude  to  the  fate  of  the  conversion  heavy-gun  system  of  1881. 

As,  however,  it  was  necessary  to  have  rifled  guns,  the  Secretary 
of  War  (Mr.  Cameron),  June  22d,  1861,  ordered  three  hundred 
wrought-iron  field-guns  to  be  purchased.  Two-hundred  of  these 
were  rifles.  But  the  use  of  wrought-iron  was  not  looked  upon 
with  favor.  The  ordnance  board  passed  a  resolution  giving  their 
sanction  to  its  employment  as  a  temporary  expedient  only  and 
to  supply  the  pressing  demands  for  rifled  ordnance  of  the  armies 
in  the  field.  Notwithstanding  this,  wrought-iron  has  not  only 
held  its  ground,  but  at  this  time  has  driven  bronze  before  it,  and 
it  will  surrender  only  to  steel.  During  the  Civil  war  it  had  as 
competitors  in  the  field  armaments  bronze,  cast-iron  hooped  with 
wrought,  and  steel ;  but  as  a  representative  of  the  Government 
department,  wrought-iron  for  rifled  guns  stood  alone.  The  3- 
inch  wrought-iron  rifle,  called  the  "ordnance  gun,"  although 
made  upon  a  plan  devised  at  a  private  foundry,  was  recognized 
from  the  date  of  its  first  appearance,  in  1861,  as  the  Government 
gun.  After  a  quarter  of  a  century  it  maintains  that  position. 

In  larger  natures  of  ordnance  the  use  of  wrought-iron  first 
began  in  1861,  when  the  plan  of  hooping  large  cast-iron  rifles  at 
the  breech,  which  had  been  suggested  to  the  ordnance  board  in 
1858,  and  rejected  by  it,  was  successfully  put  in  practice  by  Cap- 
tain Parrott.  This  was  known  as  the  "Parrott  system,"  and 
it  furnished  the  only  large  rifled  ordnance  which  appeared  during 
the  war.  Thus,  after  having  been  uniformly  rejected  whenever 
it  knocked  at  the  door  for  admission  into  the  list  of  gun  metals, 
from  1777  down,  wrought-iron,  in  1861,  forced  itself  to  the  front, 
where  it  has,  for  field  artillery,  retained  the  position  then  acquired. 
The  want  of  confidence  expressed  by  the  ordnance  board  in  1861 
has  not  been  justified  by  events. 

Since  the  close  of  the  Civil  war,  and  down  to  this  time,  the 
problem  which  has  engrossed  attention,  to  the  exclusion  of  every 
other  connected  with  a  public  armament,  has  been  the  building 
up  of  an  efficient  system  of  heavy  ordnance.  The  most  perplex- 


MATERIEL:  METAL.  267 

ing  element  entering  into  the  determinate  solution  of  this  problem 
has  been  the  selection  of  a  proper  gun  metal.  So  long  as  the 
smooth-bore  held  its  own  against  the  rifle,  the  racking  stood  up 
in  the  presence  of  the  punching  system  of  fighting,  cast-iron 
alone  was  used.  That  contest  was  short.  It  ended,  even  in  the 
opinion  of  the  most  enthusiastic  supporters  of  the  old  system, 
about  1871.  The  struggle  between  cast-iron  and  other  metals 
for  purposes  of  rifled-gun  construction  had  been  going  on  for 
some  time  prior  to  this.  The  former  was  that  of  which,  excepting 
the  Parrott  guns,  American  heavy  artillery  had  alone  been  made. 
Cast-iron  was  part  and  parcel  of  the  smooth-bore  system;  but  it 
did  not  follow  that  the  two  elements  were  inseparable.  Large 
smooth-bore  guns  had  elsewhere  been  made  of  other  metals  than 
cast-iron.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  hoped  that  this  metal  could 
be  manufactured  into  efficient  heavy  rifles.  Although,  intimately 
associated,  the  smooth-bore  system  and  the  metal  of  which  it  had 
been  built  were  to  be  considered  separately,  each  to  stand  by  its 
own  merits  or  fall  from  its  own  weakness.  The  fate  of  the  smooth- 
bore will  be  considered  elsewhere.  Attention  will  for  the  present 
be  directed  to  cast-iron  (i)  as  a  gun  metal,  pure  and  simple;  (2) 
in  combination  with  other  metals. 

i.  The  excellent  character  of  the  cast-iron  of  the  United  States 
ordnance,  which  was  second  to  none  in  the  world,  even  if  it  did 
not  lead  all  others,  together  with  Rodman's  method  of  cooling 
the  molten  mass  from  the  interior,  gave  rise  to  the  hope,  which 
in  some  influential  though  not  official  quarters  has  not  yet  died 
out,  that  this  metal  might  prove  equal  to  all  the  demands  of 
heavy  rifled  ordnance.  In  1861  a  oast-iron  1 2-inch  rifle — experi- 
mental gun — and  in  1862  an  8-inch,  both  on  Rodman's  plan,  were 
constructed.  This  number  was  increased  in  1868  by  another  12- 
inch  rifle.  The  result  of  the  experiments  instituted  with  these 
guns  was  not  favorable.  The  chief  of  ordnance,  who  was  the 
firm  friend  and  champion  of  cast-iron,  in  his  report  of  1870,  re- 
marked on  this  subject: 

"  The  principal  nations  of  Europe,  fully  aware  of  the  necessity  of  having 
heavy  rifled  guns  for  their  coast  defense,  have  spent  millions  in  search  of  a 
reliable  rifle  gun.  We  have  confined  our  experiments  to  one  or  two  cast-iron 
rifled  guns.  The  results  obtained  do  not  warrant  me  in  recommending  that 
any  cast-iron  rifled  guns  be  procured  for  arming  the  forts.  We  must  try  some 
other  material  for  heavy  rifle  guns." 


268      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

Nothing  could  be  plainer  than  this:  cast-iron  had  been  weighed 
in  the  balance  by  its  own  zealous  advocates,  and  found  wanting. 
Just  at  this  juncture,  however,  hope  was  revived  by  two  experi- 
mental facts:  First,  the  expanding  metallic  sabot,  which  replaced 
the  buttons  of  rifle  projectiles,  had  made  it  possible  to  secure 
uniform  results  (action  in  the  bore)  with  the  latter ;  second,  the 
increase  in  size  of  powder-grain,  and  the  successful  manipulation 
of  the  ingredients,  had  rendered  it  possible  to  greatly  increase 
the  initial  velocity  of  the  projectile,  with  a  diminished  pressure  on 
the  walls  of  the  gun.  So  favorable  were  these  to  the  metal  just 
discarded,  that,  in  1873,  the  chief  of  ordnance  recommended  that 
an  appropriation  of  $75,000  be  asked  of  Congress  for  the  manu- 
facture and  trial  of  1 2-inch  cast-iron  rifles.  The  money  was  not 
appropriated.  The  test  of  heavy  rifled  cast-iron  guns  under  the  new 
conditions  of  projectile  and  powder  has  not  been  made.  Neverthe- 
less, in  the  opinion  of  the  most  experienced  military  authorities  of 
the  world,  the  views  of  the  chief  of  ordnance,  as  expressed  in  1870, 
relative  to  the  fitness  of  cast-iron,  are  as  sound  to-day  as  they 
were  then;  nor  have  the  new  and  supposed  favorable  conditions 
raised  it  in  the  scale  of  relative  merit.  Neither  the  board  of 
officers  assembled  pursuant  to  act  of  June  6th,  1872,  to  designate 
models  of  heavy  ordnance,  nor  that  assembled  pursuant  to  the 
act  of  March  3d,  1881,  for  the  same  purpose,  nor  has  any  other 
board  of  officers  since  1870,  recommended  that  cast-iron,  except 
when  combined  with  other  metals,  be  used  for  heavy-rifled  guns ; 
but,  on  the  contrary,  it  has  been  uniformly  proscribed.  It,  how- 
ever, is  not  dead.  Private  founders  having  failed  to  secure  recog- 
nition from  the  military  profession,  have  appealed  their  case  to  a 
non-military  but  more  powerful  tribunal — the  Congress  of  the 
United  States — and  with  better  success.  The  result  is  that  while 
others,  after  the  most  exhaustive  trials,  have  given  up  cast-iron, 
we  are  to-day  making  experimental  guns  with  this  metal.  The 
outcome  will  be  looked  for  with  great  interest.  Fortunately,  the 
experiments  by  which  these  souvenirs  of  a  past  age  in  gun  con- 
struction are  to  be  put  on  their  trial  will  be  conducted  under  the 
surveillance  of  officers  actuated  by  the  sole  desire  to  arrive  at  truth, 
regardless  of  the  interests  of  individuals  or  corporations.* 

*  The  cast-iron  guns  now  being  made,  one  of  which  is  tubed  with  steel 
from  the  breech  to  a  point  just  in  front  of  the  trunnions,  are  "  in  lieu  of"  the 
new  Americanized  Krupp  12-inch  rifles,  which,  although  contracted  for,  were, 


MATERIEL:  METAL.  .  269 

Happily  for  the  safety  of  the  country — in  great  degree  depend- 
ent on  its  sea-coast  armament,  standing  sentinel,  grim-visaged, 
at  the  portals  of  the  Nation — the  character,  professional  and 
scientific  attainments  of  those  who  control  in  the  councils  of  the 
present  ordnance  board,  the  consciencipus  attention  to  duty 
evinced  in  the  modest,  yet  thorough,  painstaking,  and  able  re- 
ports which  have  of  late  emanated  therefrom,  leave  no  room 
for  doubt  but  that  these  representative  of  an  elsewhere-discarded 
heavy  gun  metal  will  be  tested  without  ''fear,  favor,  or  affection," 
and  with  an  eye  single  to  the  good  of  the  public  service. 

2.  Cast-iron  in  combination  with  other  metals. — The  first  con- 
structions on  this  principle  \vere  Parrott's  guns,  which,  in  1862, 
formed  the  most  powerful  rifled  system  in  existence.  The  ex- 
perience of  the  Civil  war  was  not  favorable  to  this  type  of  built-up 
gun,  which,  after  its  close,  seems  to  have  passed  out  of  notice, 
while  attention* was  being  directed  to  other  systems. 

In  the  next  attempt  to  combine  wrought  with  cast-iron,  the  order 
of  metals  was  reversed,  the  wrought-iron  being  placed  as  a  tube 
inside  the  cast-iron  body  of  the  gun — a  plan  which,  in  the  conver- 
sion of  old  smooth-bore  guns  into  low-power  rifles,  is  still 
practiced. 

The  armament  board  of  1867  having  decided  that  the  rifled 
heavy-gun  system  of  the  United  States  should  consist  of  lo-inch 
and  12-inch  rifles,  it  became  a  question  for  the  ordnance  board  to 
decide  what  should  be  the  construction  of  these  guns  and  the 
metal  used  therein.  Among  other  types,  this  board  recommended 
the  building  up  of  cast-iron  guns  with  steel  tubes.  There  was  not, 
however,  spite  of  all  these  resolutions  as  to  calibres,  metals,  and 
modes  of  construction,  a  single  built-up  rifle  gun  in  the  United 
States,  except  Parrott's,  until  after  the  board  appointed  pursuant 
to  act  of  June  6th,  1872,  made  its  report.  Congress  had  appro- 
priated $270,000  for  experiments  and  tests  with  the  models  of 
heavy  ordnance  to  be  selected  by  this  board,  half  of  which,  as  it 
proved,  viz.,  the  converted  smooth-bores,  the  Thompson  and  the 
Sutcliff  types,  were  combinations  of  a  cast-iron  body,  with  either 
a  steel  or  a  wrought-iron  tube. 

after  the  failure  of  the  "  system  "  in  1881,  not  constructed.  They  may  be  con- 
sidered as  in  some  degree  compensating  the  cast-iron  founders  for  the  expense 
and  trouble  they  were  put  to  in  taking  the  preliminary  steps  looking  to  the 
manufacture  of  the  subsequently  abandoned  guns. 


270      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

Of  these,  the  Thompson  and  the  Sutcliff  have  never  been  tested 
beyond  a  few  preliminary  shots.  Every  attention  was  given, 
every  nerve  bent,  to  the  development  of  the  conversion  system, 
and  with  such  success  that  the  manufacture  of  new  constructions 
on  the  same  general  plan  was  determined  on,  and  carried  into 
execution  in  1877  by  the  building  of  a  12. 25-inch  cast-iron  gun 
with  wrought-iron  tube. 

In  the  system  of  standard  ordnance  promulgated  by  the  ord- 
nance department  in  1880,  the  only  built-up  heavy  guns  are  com- 
binations of  cast  and  wrought-iron.  The  friends  of  the  conversion 
system  were,  however,  doomed  to  disappointment;  the  system 
itself,  brought  up  with  so  much  care,  and  to  the  exclusion  of 
everything  else,  " burst  to  pieces,"  not  figuratively,  but  literally— 
a  fact  to  which,  in  the  Fall  of  1881,  testimony  was  amply  borne  by 
the  fragments  of  its  guns  scattered  everywhere  over  the  Sandy 
Hook  proving  ground. 

Meantime  the  board  of  officers  convened  pursuant  to  act  of 
March  3d,  1881,  had  been  at  work.  As  a  result  of  its  exhaustive 
researches,  and  in  the  guns  recommended  by  it,  wrought-iron,  in 
combination  with  cast,  was  replaced  by  steel.  Ten  varieties  of 
heavy  ordnance  were  deemed  by  this  board  to  be  worthy  of  trial. 
Five  of  these  were  built-up  guns  embracing  two  metals  in  their 
constructions  and  in  all  of  them  the  metals  were  steel  and  cast- 
iron. 

The  recommendations  of  this  board,  whether  they  be  carried 
into  execution  or  not,  will  stand  their  ground  against  adverse 
criticism.  Private  interests  may,  through  political  influence, 
frustrate  the  legitimate  results  that  should  flow  from  the  labors  of 
the  board  ;  the  spectacle  be  presented  of  the  United  States  going 
backward  while  other  nations  go  forward  in  the  grand  march 
towards  the  securing  an  efficient  national  armament ;  but  what- 
ever deviations  may  be  made  from  the  course  marked  out  by  it, 
those  who  are  familiar  with  the  subject  will  not  expect  them  to 
make  easier  of  attainment  that  great  desideratum — the  object  of 
years  of  patient  labor  and  experiment — a  heavy  gun  system  which 
will  guarantee  security  to  our  shores  and  consideration  before  the 
nations  of  the  world. 

Wrought-  iron . 

Except  when  used  in  combination  with  cast-iron,  either  as  bands 
or  as  tubing,  this  metal  has  received  but  little  consideration  during 


MATERIEL:  METAL.  271 

the  last  fifteen  years.  For  independent  heavy-gun  constructions, 
while  not  ignored,  it  has  been  pushed  completely  out  of  sight  by 
its  more  popular  and  powerful  rivals. 

As  with  steel,  the  practical  difficulty  that  lay  in  the  way  was 
the  inadequacy  of  foundry  facilities  to  forge  or  otherwise  prepare 
large  and  homogeneous  masses,  and  the  other  alternative  which 
has  been  seized  on  with  steel,  viz.,  to  build  up  a  wire  gun,  was 
not  practicable  with  wrought-iron. 

In  1868  the  chief  of  ordnance  recommended  that  a  wrought-iron 
12-inch  gun  be  constructed  to  be  tested,  in  a  series  of  comparative 
trials,  with  a  cast-iron  rifle  of  the  same  calibre.  The  proposition 
met  with  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  but  neither  of 
these  proposed  rifles  has  been  manufactured.  Notwithstanding 
that  armament  boards  met  and  decided  on  the  calibres  of  the 
ordnance  that  should  be  used,  and  ordnance  boards  followed  with 
plans  and  specifications,  embracing  the  metals,  their  combination, 
and  their  distribution  in  the  completed  gun,  nothing  was  done 
until  the  board  of  officers  appointed  pursuant  to  act  of  June  6th, 
1872,  had  completed  its  work.  Among  other  designs  approved 
of  by  the  board  was  that  of  Mr.  Hitchcock  for  a  wrought-iron 
12-inch  rifle,  built  up  by  welding  rings  end  to  end  ;  and  although 
the  inventor  was  given  every  facility  he  asked,  and  personally 
superintended  the  preliminary  arrangements,  the  difficulties  were 
so  great  and  the  promised  results  so  unsatisfactory  that  he  aban- 
doned the  project  in  despair. 

The  result  of  these  failures  has  been,  taken  in  conjunction  with 
the  successful  manipulation  of  other  metals,  to  remove  wrought- 
iron  from  the  list  of  even  possible  materials  for  efficient  heavy- 
gun  constructions. 

Steel. 

The  career  of  steel  has  been,  in  the  long  run,  diametrically 
opposite  that  of  wrought-iron;  as  the  latter  disappeared,  the  former 
came  more  boldly  into  view — first  as  an  auxiliary  in  the  shape  of 
tubing  to  cast-iron,  then  for  both  wrapping  and  tubing,  and 
finally  for  the  building  up  independently  of  the  heaviest  calibres. 
Down  to  the  time  that  conversions  became  the  rage,  the  two 
metals — wrought-iron  and  steel — were  about  equally  favored  as  a 
tubing  material,  in  which  form  alone,  practically  speaking,  either 
had  entered  as  a  factor  into  the  gun  problem.  In  the  muzzle- 


272      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,   U.  S.   ARMY. 

loading  conversions,  wrought-iron  linings  were  supposed  to  have 
quickly  established  their  superiority.  The  tubing  metal  of  the 
standard  gun  system,  as  appears  in  the  report  of  the  chief  of 
ordnance  of  1880,  was  wrought-iron  alone.  Indeed,  steel  does 
not  appear  in  any  manner  in  the  heavy-gun  armament  there  pre- 
sented. 

From  this  state  of  utter  exclusion,  steel  quickly  recovered,  not 
only  regaining  from  wrought-iron  the  ground  thus  lost,  but 
driving  out  the  latter,  and  springing  by  a  single  bound  into  the 
first  rank  of  gun  metals.  Nor  is  this  a  temporary  victory.  Steel 
in  some  form,  either  in  masses  or  wire,  or  both  combined,  is 
conceded  by  all  artillerists  to  be  the  metal  of  the  future  as  well 
as  of  the  present. 

This  reaction,  which  from  the  first  impulse  has  gone  on  gaining 
strength,  until  to-day  all  competitors  have  been  passed,  began  in 
this  country  when  breech-loading  conversions  won  their  way  to 
favor.  The  board  of  1872  had  recommended,  among  other  things, 
that  a  Krupp  1 2-inch  be  procured  as  a  representative,  (i)  of  a 
breech-loading  system,  (2)  of  a  system  of  gun  construction. 
The  gun  was  not  purchased ;  instead,  the  attempt  was  made  to 
graft  the  Krupp  breech-loading  mechanism  upon  the  conversion 
system  of  rifled  guns.  The  jacket,  breech-block,  and  breech-band 
for  the  members  of  this  new  departure  in  the  scheme  of  conver- 
sion were  of  imported  steel.  The  pioneer  gun  was  manufactured 
and  on  the  proving  ground  by  July,  1878,  and  by  1880  the  record 
was  such  as  to  justify  the  ordnance  board  in  the  following 
conclusions: 

"The  endurance  of  this  system  of  gun  construction,  and  the  endurance  as 
well  as  the  successful  manipulation  of  the  breech  mechanism,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  board,  have  been  satisfactorily  established,  and,  in  its  judgment,  the  depart- 
ment is  warranted  in  their  adoption  for  future  new  constructions  as  well  as  in 
future  conversions  of  smooth-bore  into  rifled  guns." 

At  the  same  time  that  the  breech  mechanism  was  being  thus 
successfully  tested,  another  important  element  was  added  to  the 
system  by  the  introduction  of  the  chamber,  which,  without  any 
bad  effects,  had  increased  the  power  of  the  8-inch  muzzle-loading 
converted  rifle  thirty  per  cent. ,  and  led  the  board  to  the  following 
conclusions  and  recommendations: 

"  This  experiment  shows  that,  with  pressures  entirely  within  the  limits  of 
safety,  the  increased  velocity  due  to  chambering  has  increased  the  power  of  the 


MATERIEL:  METAL.  273 

8-inch  rifle  about  one-third,  and  that  the  increased  power  has  been  accompanied 
by  an  increased  accuracy  of  fire.  The  area  of  bore  incident  to  the  higher 
charge  with  the  one  hundred  and  eleven  rounds  fired  seems  no  greater  than 
that  in  the  unchambered  gun  with  the  35-pound  charge.  The  board,  there- 
fore, recommends  the  adoption  of  the  system  of  chambering  in  all  future  con- 
versions or  new  constructions  of  this  and  of  11 -inch  calibres.  In  higher  calt-~ 
bres  the  system  has  already  received  the  approval  of  the  department." 

The  conversion  system  had  now  reached  the  summit  of  its  pros- 
perity, whence,  through  the  untoward  events  which  followed,  it 
rapidly  descended.  The  successful  application  separately  of  the 
breech-loading  and  the  chamber  principles  to  the  conversions  led, 
very  naturally,  and  under  the  preceding  resolutions  of  the  board, 
to  the  next  step,  which  was  to  combine  the  two  in  the  same  gun ; 
but  the  overstrained  system  broke  down  completely,  the  pieces 
bursting  one  after  the  other  as  they  were  subjected  to  trial.  The 
system,  passing  its  limit  of  safety,  fell  at  once  into  disfavor,  and 
work  on  the  1 2-inch  rifles  of  the  new  Americanized  Krupp 
models,  contracts  for  which  had  been  let,  was  immediately 
stopped. 

Without  waiting  to  inquire  into  the  causes  of  this  hopeless 
collapse,  it  is  a  fact  that  the  prestige  of  steel  as  a  metal  for  gun 
constructions  was  not  thereby  impaired,  but  the  reverse.  When 
the  Americanized  Krupp  system  went  to  wreck  amidst  the  debris 
from  its  own  exploded  members,  the  board  appointed  pursuant 
to  the  act  of  March  3d,  1881,  was  pursuing  its  investigations.  It 
recommended  that  nine  different  models  of  guns  and  a  rifled  mor- 
tar be  constructed,  all  on  the  built-up  plan.  Five  of  the  guns 
were  to  be  constructed  wholly  of  steel,  the  remaining  four, 
as  has  been  previously  mentioned,  of  steel  and  cast-iron  com- 
bined; the  latter  being  mere  make-shifts,  as  "they  can  be 
readily  and  rapidly  produced  in  this  country  without  the 
delay  of  sending  abroad  for  large  masses  of  forged  steel."* 
With  us,  therefore,  as  abroad,  steel,  either  by  itself  or  combined 
with  other  metals,  has  supplanted  wrought-iron  in  the  construc- 
tion of  heavy  armaments ;  and  although  quacks  may  still  advocate 
others,  the  masters  turn  to  steel  as  that  material  which  alone  gives 
promise  of  meeting  successfully  the  crucial  tests  of  modern  gun- 
nery. 

*  One  of  these  12-inch  guns,  concerning  the  endurance  of  which  there  was 
not  even  "the  suggestion  of  a  doubt,"  went  to  pieces,  with  the  rest  of  its  type, 
on  the  Sandy  Hook  proving  grounds. 

35 


274      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

Investigations  and  experiments  having  in  view  the  selection 
of  proper  materials  for  siege  and  field  ordnance,  under  the 
modern  conditions  of  increased  weight  of  metal  thrown  and  larger 
charges  of  powder,  have  of  recent  years  attracted  comparatively 
little  attention  pending  the  solution  of  that  infinitely  more  difficult 
problem — the  construction  of  an  efficient  sea-coast  armament. 

Fqf  siege  guns  cast-iron  retains  its  place,  although  in  the  pro- 
posed 4^ -inch  rifle  a  body  of  this  material  is  both  hooped  and 
lined  with  steel ;  and,  like  all  others  of  the  recent  models  for  the 
land  service,  the  breech-loading  mechanism  is  a  prominent  feature. 
Both  steel  and  wrought-iron  4^2  -inch  guns  were  recommended 
by  the  ordnance  board  of  1868  to  be  tested  for  power  and  endur- 
ance with  those  of  cast-iron,  and  which  during  the  Civil  war  did 
excellent  service,  but  they  have  not  been  constructed. 

In  the  line  of  field  artillery  there  has  been  greater  activity  ; 
more  experiments  have  been  made,  and  a  greater  variety  of  metals 
have  been  tested.  The  Moffatt  steel  breech-loader,  the  Dean 
bronze  muzzle  loader,  (with  metal  around  bore  hardened  by  com- 
pression,) and  several  3 -inch  wrought-iron  rifles  converted  to 
3. 20-inch  breech-loaders  by  screwing  on  a  breech  block  of  steel, 
have  all  received  attention.  The  latter  is  apparently  a  most  ex- 
cellent field  piece,  forming  by  far  the  most  successful  attempt  that 
has  been  made  at  converting  old  into  new  and  more  powerful 
guns. 

In  siege  and  field  equally  with  sea-coast  artillery  the  tendency 
has  been  towards  the  use  of  steel,  and  it  seems  to  be  simply  a 
question  of  time  when  this  metal  will  supersede  all  others. 


MATERIEL:    SYSTEMS    OF   ARTILLERY.  275 


CHAPTER  XI. 

MATERIEL:  SYSTEMS  OF  ARTILLERY. 

The  great  variety  of  calibres  presented  by  the  artillery  during 
the  Revolution  may  be  judged  from  the  array  set  forth  in  a  gen- 
eral return  of  the  commissary  of  military  stores  at  the  end  of  that 
war.  In  this  there  were  enumerated  as  being  on  hand,  mounted 
and  ready  for  service:  Of  guns,  1,3,  4,  6,  9,  12,  and  24-pounders; 
of  mortars,  4^,  5^,  8,  10,  13,  and  i6-inch;  of  howitzers,  5^ 
and  8-inch,  all  of  brass;  and  of  iron,  i,  2,  3,  4,  6,  9,  12,  18,  24, 
and  32-pounder  guns,  i8-pounder  carronades,  and  3^ -inch  how- 
itzers. 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  all  these  guns,  howit- 
zers, and  mortars  accompanied  each  army  to  incumber  it;  or  even 
that,  in  all  the  ordnance,  both  field  and  garrison,  used  actively 
against  the  enemy,  this  great  variety  of  calibres  could  be  found. 
It  would  be  just  as  reasonable  to  assume,  because  an  ordnance 
return  of  the  present  day  took  account  of  many  varieties  of  an- 
cient and  antiquated  models,  that  these  formed  part  of  the  present 
artillery  system.  Fortunately,  the  records  do  not  leave  us  in 
doubt  on  this  point;  they  reduce  the  calibres  and  the  natures  of 
ordnance  which  were  habitually  used  to  narrow  and  well-defined 
limits,  making  it  for  practical  purposes  as  easy  a  matter  to  fix 
upon  what  was  the  Revolutionary  system  as  though  it  had  been 
formally  announced  in  orders. 

In  an  official  report  submitted  January,  1778,  General  Knox 
mentioned  the  following  as  the  artillery  which  it  would  be  neces- 
sary for  the  main  army  to  have  during  the  ensuing  campaign: 

"  Brigade  artillery,  seventeen  brigades,  with  four  guns  each,  sixty-eight 
pieces,  to  be  3 ,  4,  or  6-pounders ;  with  the  park,  two  24-pounders,  four  12- 
pounders,  four  8-inch  howitzers,  eight  5^-inch  howitzers,  ten  3  or  4-pounders, 
ten  6-pounders ;  for  the  reserve,  to  be  kept  at  a  proper  distance  from  camp, 
thirty  3,  4,  and  6-pounders,  two  12-pounders,  one  24-pounder;  all  the  forego- 
ing brigade,  park,  and  reserve  guns  and  howitzers  to  be  of  brass.  In  addition, 
twelve  18-pounders,  twelve  12-pounders,  battering  pieces,  on  traveling  car- 
riages, together  with  two  5^-inch  and  twelve  8,  9,  and  10-inch  mortars ;  the 
battering  pieces  and  mortars  to  be  of  cast-iron." 


276      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

When  preparing  for  the  eventful  and  decisive  campaign  of 
1781,  the  general  of  artillery  estimated  that,  to  accompany  the 
main  army  into  the  field,  there  would  be  necessary,  three  24- 
pounders,  seven  i2-pounders,  twenty  each  of  3  and  4-pounders, 
thirty  6-pounders,  five  8-inch  howitzers,  and  six  5^ -inch  howit- 
zers. From  which  it  will  be  seen  that  he  had  concluded,  for  active 
field  duty,  to  dispense  with  the  heavy  32-pounder  gun  and  discard 
mortars  entirely.  When,  however,  soon  after,  preparations  were 
making  to  lay  siege  to  New  York,  the  train  collected  for  this  pur- 
pose embraced  12,  18,  24,  and  32-pounder  guns;  5^,  8,  10,  and 
1 3- inch  mortars;  5^  and  8-inch  howitzers.  Finally,  there  were 
taken  on  the  march  to  the  southward  when  the  siege  was  aban- 
doned, and  were  present  with  the  army  before  Yorktown,  of  field 
artillery,  two  12-pounders,  four  3-pounders,  six  6-pounders,  three 
5^-inch  howitzers;  of  siege  artillery,  two  8-inch  mortars,  ten  10- 
inch  and  six  5^ -inch  mortars,  and  three  8-inch  howitzers,  all  of 
brass;  and  of  iron,  three  24  and  twenty  i8-pounders. 

The  ordnance  which  accompanied  others  than  the  main  army 
was  of  the  same  character  as  that  which  made  up  the  armament 
of  the  latter.  It  were  useless  to  particularize  concerning  it. 

It  is  seen  from  what  precedes  that  the  field  artillery  embraced— 
of  guns,  3,  4,  6,  12,  and  24-pounders;  of  howitzers,  5^  and  8-inch, 
all  of  brass.  Of  these,  the  3,  4,  and  6-pounder  guns  habitually, 
and  the  howitzers  occasionally,  were  attached  to  the  infantry 
brigades;  while  the  12  and  24-pounders  were  held  for  guns  of 
position.  The  siege  artillery  embraced  (in  addition  to  the  field) 
iron  1 8,  24,  and  32-pounder  guns,  with  the  1 3-inch  mortar;  of 
brass,  the  5^,  8,  and  lo-inch  mortars. 

The  field  system  included  five  different  calibres  of  guns  and  two 
of  howitzers;  for  the  siege  there  were  added  two  distinct  calibres 
of  guns  and  four  of  mortars,  or  seven  calibres  of  guns,  two  of 
howitzers,  and  four  of  mortars — total,  thirteen.  Thus,  instead  of 
the  Revolutionary  army  being  loaded  down,  as  were  those  of 
Europe  a  few  years  before  this  time,  by  an  almost  endless  variety  of 
guns,  mortars,  and  howitzers,  it  was  not  incumbered  at  all. 
Thirteen  different  calibres  will  not  appear  a  large  number  when 
we  recall  that  the  field  and  siege  train  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
before  Petersburg  in  1864  numbered  seventeen  different  calibres 
of  guns,  mortars,  and  howitzers,  and  that  the  complete  system  of 
ordnance  of  1850  embraced  eighteen  different  calibres. 


MATERIEL:  SYSTEMS  OF  ARTILLERY.  277 

Subsequent  to  the  Revolution,  and  prior  to  1800,  there  was  no 
change  worthy  of  note  made  in  the  calibres  of  artillery  constructed 
for  either  field,  siege,  or  sea-coast  armaments.  The  32-pounder 
continued  the  heaviest  gun.  The  act  of  March  2oth,  1794,  pro- 
viding for  the  manufacture  of  sea-coast  guns,  directed  that  they 
should  be  24  and  32-pounders.  Men  longed  for  and  dreamed  of 
peace.  Though  brought  to  the  verge  of  war  in  1794,  and  again 
in  1798,  we  had  escaped  it.  The  danger  passed,  retrenchment 
brought  to  a  stand-still  every  measure  looking  to  the  building  up 
of  the  artillery  system. 

The  new  century  ushered  in  a  new  era  in  gun  making.  The 
42-pounder  was  added  in  1801,  the  5O-pounder  Columbiad  in  181 1, 
while  in  1819  these,  as  well  as  loo-pounder  guns,  formed  part  of  the 
sea-coast  armament.  But  we  are  forced  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  utility  of  each  and  all  of  these  larger  natures  was  not  apparent 
at  the  time,  as,  in  the  systems  for  the  land  service  as  announced 
by  the  War  Department  both  in  1816  and  1821,  the  24-pounder 
was  the  largest  calibre  prescribed,  the  contingency  which  would 
require  heavier  guns  being  so  remote  that  it  was  not  considered 
necessary  to  provide  against  it. 

If  we  examine  the  calibres  of  the  artillery  in  use  at  the  close  of 
the  War  of  1812  we  will  find  that,  except  the  addition  of  the  42- 
pounder  and  the  Columbiad,  and  replacing  the  field  8- inch  how- 
itzer by  the  24-pounder  howitzer,  there  had  been  no  change  since 
the  Revolution.  No  inconvenience  was  experienced  from  the 
multiplicity  of  calibres;  but  there  were  very  many  varieties  of 
each  calibre,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  guns  were  not  cast  upon 
any  exact  plan,  and  this  led  to  interminable  confusion  in  the 
construction  of  carriages. 

Colonel  Wadsworth's  service  in  the  artillery,  the  engineers, 
and  finally  in  his  position  as  head  of  the  ordnance  department, 
gave  him  opportunity  to  observe  the  evils  resulting  from  this  state 
of  affairs.  From  the  time  of  his -appointment  as  colonel  of  ord- 
nance until  his  muster  out  of  service  in  the  reduction  of  1821  he 
labored  faithfully  and  intelligently  to  correct  them,  and  to  secure 
for  the  artillery  a  uniform,  practical,  and  permanent  system  of 
materiel.  Dearborn  had  done  much  for  the  artillery,  particularly 
the  field  artillery,  by  making  it  lighter,  and  otherwise  increasing  its 
mobility;  but  his  improvements  seem  rather  like  disjointed  efforts, 
all  tending  towards  the  desired  end,  it  is  true,  yet  lacking  that 


278      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.   S.  ARMY. 

important  characteristic— method — without  which  no  extensive, 
consistent,  and  lasting  amelioration  could  be  effected.  With 
Wadsworth  the  case  was  different.  He  had  the  benefit  of  the 
labors  of  those  who  had  gone  before.  He  carefully  surveyed  the 
ground,  saw  what  the  difficulties  were,  proceeded  promptly,  yet 
deliberately,  and  upon  a  matured  plan,  to  the  work  of  reformation. 
Whatever  may  be  claimed  for  others,  to  Colonel  Wadsworth  is 
due  the  credit  of  having  first  worked  out  upon  proper  principles 
the  details  of  a  complete  system  of  artillery  materiel.  Commenc- 
ing his  administration  of  the  ordnance  department  when  the 
armies  were  taking  the  field,  in  1812,  he  found  time  amidst  the 
turmoil  that  involved  his  own  as  well  as  every  other  branch  of  the 
public  service  to  develop  a  plan  for  placing  the  artillery  upon  a 
sound  basis.  (Appendix  C,  [3.])  As  a  result,  the  system  of 
artillery  for  the  land  service  of  the  United  States  was  first  formally 
announced  by  authority  of  the  War  Department,  in  the  regu- 
lations of  1816,  as  follows: 

"To  insure  greater  simplicity  and  uniformity  in  future  in  the  calibres  and 
patterns  of  cannon,  &c.,  the  cannon,  howitzers,  and  mortars  to  be  provided 
hereafter  for  the  land  service  will  be  as  follows: 

"  For  the  field:  Cannon — light  6-pounder,  light  12-pounder,  and  medium 
18-pounder;  howitzers,  24-pounder,  8-inch. 

"For  sieges  (including  also  field  pieces  of  the  foregoing  descriptions):  Can- 
non— heavy  24-pounders  ;  mortars — 8-inch,  10-inch,  and  13-inch. 

"For  fixed  batteries  on  the  seaboard  and  forts  in  the  interior  (including  also 
field  pieces  of  the  foregoing  descriptions):  Cannon — heavy  24-pounders  ;  mor- 
tars— 10-inch  and  13-inch. 

•"All  ordnance  to  be  provided  hereafter  of  any  of  the  natures  and  calibres 
above  expressed  are  to  be  invariably  of  the  same  pattern ;  and  it  will  be  the 
duty  of  the  ordnance  department  to  adopt  proper  measures  for  insuring  uni- 
formity in  the  ordnance  hereafter  by  gradually  abolishing  and  replacing  the 
guns  of  other  calibres  than  the  foregoing  which  have  been  introduced  into  the 
service,  as  well  as  guns  of  patterns  different  from  those  which  have  or  may  be 
established,  so  as  eventually  to  bring  all  the  guns  of  any  one  calibre  to  a 
uniform  pattern." 

A  comparison  of  this  list  of  ordnance  with  that  proposed  by 
Colonel  Wadsworth  in  May,  1813,  (Appendix  C,  [3])  the  lan- 
guage of  the  regulations,  together  with  the  views  of  the  colonel  of 
ordnance  as  there  expressed,  will  at  once  evince  that  the  system 
adopted  was  on  the  recommendation  of  that  officer. 

The  3-pounder  which  in  1813  had  been  proposed  as  part  of 
the  field  train,  was  suppressed  in  1816,  as  Wadsworth  had  inti- 


MATERIEL:  SYSTEMS  OF  ARTILLERY.  279 

mated  that  it  might  be,  thus  reducing  the  total  number  of  calibres 
to  eight  instead  of  nine.  Following  Napoleon,  (Appendix  C,  [i],) 
the  6-pounder  had  supplanted  the  4  and  8-pounders  of  Gribeauval. 

Having  thus  secured  the  limiting  to  eight — the  number  of  cali- 
bres that  should  constitute  the  land  armament — the  next  step  was . 
to  devise  patterns  therefor,  together  with  models  for  the  carriages 
on  which  they  should  be  mounted.  This  work  was  completed 
and  submitted  to  the  Secretary  of  War  in  1818,  and  constituted 
our  first  complete  system  of  artillery  for  the  service  of  the  United 
States,  the  details  of  which  had  been  worked  out  in  the  minutest 
particulars.  The  main  features  of  the  gun  system  proposed  were: 
First,  the  retention  of  all  calibres  then  prescribed  by  regulations; 
second,  increasing  the  power  of  the  guns  by  diminishing  the 
windage.  For  carriages,  the  main  features  were :  First,  the  adop- 
tion of  a  modified  English  block-trail  in  place  of  the  Gribeauval 
for  field  service ;  second,  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  carriages 
by  mounting  different  pieces  on  the  same  carriage;  third,  the 
replacing  wooden  by  cast-iron  carriages  in  all  fixed  batteries.  It 
was  the  patterns  and  models  of  this  system  which  were  referred 
by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  the  ordnance  board  of  1818  for  ex- 
amination, and  upon  which  that  board  reported  adversely. 

Having  rejected  Wadsworth's,  the  board  proceeded,  under  the 
instructions  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  to  devise  another.  Its 
action  regarding  carriages  has  been  mentioned.  For  the  guns  it 
proposed  a  new  system,  built  upon  a  plan  of  its  own.  For  field 
artillery  the  weight  was  cut  down  to  the  proportion  of  100  pounds 
of  metal  to  one  pound  of  shot.  This,  together  with  the  length  of 
the  6-pounders  (18  calibres  of  bore),  gave  the  6-pounder  field- 
guns  recommended  the  popular  name  of  ' '  walking-sticks. ' '  The 
medium  i8-pounder  was  abolished,  thus  reducing  the  field  artil- 
lery to  6  and  i2-pounder  guns  and  the  24-pounder  howitzer. 
The  8-inch  and  1 3-inch  mortars  were  abolished;  a  1 5-inch  Stone 
mortar  introduced,  as  were  also  battering  12  and  i8-pounder 
guns.  The  siege  artillery  embraced,  therefore,  heavy  12,  18,  and 
24-pounder  guns,  the  8-inch  howitzer,  the  lo-inch  mortar  (light), 
and  the  1 5-inch  stone  mortar.  The  sea-coast  armament  embraced 
the  heavy  24-pounder  and  the  lo-inch  mortar  (heavy).  Thus 
the  entire  system  as  proposed  embraced  four  calibres  of  guns, 
two  of  howitzers  and  two  of  mortars,  the  same  as  Colonel  Wads- 
worth's. 


2§0      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OE  THE  ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

While  the  6-pounder  had  the  same  length  as  the  French,  it 
weighed  only  two-thirds  as  much.  The  12-pounder  did  not  weigh 
two-thirds  as  much  as  the  French,  and  was  but  fifteen  and  one- 
half  calibres,  while  the  French  i2-pounder  was  eighteen  calibres 
long.  The  howitzers  proposed  by  the  board  were  both  longer 
and  heavier  than  the  French,  and  intended  for  larger  charges. 
The  24-pounder  battering-gun  weighed  5,500,  the  1 8  pounder, 
3, 700  pounds — not  differing  from  the  English  guns  of  correspond- 
ing calibres.  In  one  word,  so  far  as  can  be  discovered,  the 
board  followed  no  rule  in  devising  its  system,  which,  excepting 
the  15-inch  mortar,  was,  however,  in  1819,  adopted  for  the  land 
service  of  the  United  States. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  the  heaviest  calibre  was  a  24-pounder. 
In  1829  a  32-pounder  was  added  and  in  1831  a  42-pounder.  With 
these  two  exceptions,  and  that  of  the  1 5-inch  Stone  mortar  men- 
tioned, the  system  of  the  1818  board  remained  without  change 
until  replaced  by  that  devised  by  the  Macomb  board  of  1831 — 
a  list  of  the  calibres  of  which  appeared  in  the  army  regulations 
of  1835.  This  was  as  follows: 

For  field  service  :  6,  9,  and  12-pounder  cannon  (light)  and  12  and  24-pounder 
howitzers  (long). 

Siege  and  garrison:  12,  18,  and  24-pounder  cannon,  8-inch  howitzer  (light), 
and  8  and  10-inch  mortars  (light). 

Sea-coast:  24,  32,  and  42-pounder  cannon,  18,  24,  32,  and  42-pounder  car- 
ronades,  and  10-inch  mortars  (heavy). 

The  changes  from  the  system  of  the  1818  board,  besides  those 
already  mentioned,  consisted  in  the  addition  to  the  field  system 
of  the  9-pounder  gun  and  the  12-pounder  light  howitzer;  to  the 
siege,  the  8-inch  mortar,  which  the  1818  board  had  discarded, 
while  the  sea-coast  was  increased  by  the  carronades.  In  fact, 
however,  the  carronades  never,  except  on  paper,  became  part  of 
the  land  armament.  None  were  manufactured.  The  colonel  of 
ordnance  reported,  in  1837,  that  the  only  knowledge  he  possessed 
regarding  them  was  derived  from  the  British  regulations;  and 
the  following  year  they  were  dropped  out  altogether. 

This  ordnance  was  iron  throughout.  But  the  whole  subject  of 
a  land  armament  being  then  in  a  state  of  transition,  the  preceding 
list  of  calibres  could  only  be  considered  as  temporarily  indicating 
what,  in  the  opinion  of  the  board,  the  artillery  system  should  be. 

From  1835  until  1839,  when  the  ordnance  board  of  1838  made 


MATERIEL:  SYSTEMS  OF  ARTILLERY.  281 

its  final  report,  which  was  approved  by  the  Secretary  of  War, 
there  w,as  constant  change  either  being  attempted  or  being  made 
in  the  field  artillery;  the  siege  and  the  sea-coast  remained  com- 
paratively undisturbed.  This  change  was  inaugurated  by  the 
board  of  1835,  which,  rejecting  in  toto  the  iron  field-artillery  sys^ 
tern  presented  to  it  for  trial,  recommended  the  following  as  a 
substitute  therefor,  and  to  be  made  wholly  of  bronze. 

Nature  of  Piece.          Length  in  Calibres.  .Weight.  (Ibs.) 

6-pounder  gun.                15.669  67'2 

9-pounder  gun.                16  1,350 

12-pounder  gun.                16  1,800 

12-pounder  howitzer.       10  (not  exceed.)  700  (fit  6-pounder  carriage.) 

24-pounder  howitzer.  11  (not  exceed.)  1,260  (fit  9-pounder  carriage.) 
— the  9-pounder  and  12-pounder  guns  and  24-pounder  howitzers  to  have  square 
handles,  like  the  French  patterns. 

As  the  recommendation  was  approved,  the  manufacture  of 
bronze  guns  and  howitzers  was  immediately  begun.  The  brass 
ordnance  enumerated  became  an  authorized  field  system  of  the 
United  States,  and,  excepting  the  9-pounder,  which  fell  into 
disfavor  from  the  first,  these  calibres  were  only  retired  from  that 
system,  by  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War>  in  1868. 

But  it  seemed  impossible  to  settle  permanently  anything  con- 
nected with  the  artillery.  Nothing  ought  to  have  changed  the 
field  system  after  it  had  been  definitely  fixed  upon  by  competent 
authority.  Yet  this  was  exactly  what  was  done.  When  the  ord- 
nance board  of  1838  met,  the  instructions  given  it  plainly  indicated 
that  nothing  appertaining  to  the  national  armament  was  considered 
as  determined.  This  state  of  affairs  was  probably  due  to  two 
causes:  First,  a  change  of  administration;  second,  the  persistent 
efforts  of  the  iron  founders  to  gain  back  for  their  metal  the  ground 
it  had  lost.  The  result  was  that  the  field  system  of  1835,  (except- 
ing the  9-pounder,)  while  it  eventually  triumphed,  had  to  fight 
its  way  at  every  step,  and  victory  was  not  assured  until  after  the 
return  of  the  ordnance  commission  from  Europe,  and  its  recom- 
mendation that  bronze  be  adopted  definitely  as  the  metal  for  field 
artillery. 

The  board  of  1838  retired  the  neglected  9-pounder  from  service, 
recommended  the  substitution,  in  lieu  of  the  9-pounder  and  12- 
pounder  bronze  guns,  of  a  malleable  cast-iron  12-pounder,  and  the 
replacing  for  horse  artillery  of  the  6-pounder  of  1835  by  one  four- 
36 


2$2      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

teen  calibres  in  length.  This  action  did  not  make  any  impression 
further  than  to  rid  the  service  of  the  9-pounder.  So  far  as  is  known, 
the  i2-pounder  malleable  cast-iron  gun  was  not  made,  or,  if  made, 
not  issued  to  troops;  and  though  a  few  short  6-pounders  were 
cast,  they  seem  to  have  been  looked  upon  as  parasites,  clinging 
to  without  having  a  place  in  the  system,  and  they  soon  disap- 
peared. 

To  siege  artillery  the  board  added  an  iron  24-pounder  howitzer, 
the  Cj>ehorn  and  the  1 6-inch  Stone  mortars,  both  of  bronze;  to 
the  sea-coast  armament,  iron  8-inch  and  24-pound  howitzers  and 
a  13-inch  mortar;  while  the  carronades  were  abolished. 

Secretary  Cass  had,  in  1836,  added  the  French  mountain  how- 
itzer to  the  field  system  through  a  belief,  which  events  confirmed, 
that  this  gun  would  be  of  practical  utility  against  the  Indians,  with 
whom  at  that  time  we  were  commencing  the  tedious  and  not  very 
glorious  Seminole  war.  The  various  calibres  composing  the  land 
artillery,  as  determined  by  the  joint  labors  of  the  ordnance  boards 
of  1831,  1835,  and  1838,  and  as  announced  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment in  1839,  were  as  follows:* 

For  the  field:  6  and  12-pounder  guns  (light),  12  and  24-pounder  howitzers, 
and  the  12-pounder  mountain  howitzer. 

Siege  and  garrison:  12,  18,  and  24-pounder  guns,  8-inch  and  24-pounder 
howitzers,  8  and  10-inch  mortars  (light),  and  Coehorn  and  16-inch  stone 
mortars. 

Sea-coast :  24,  32,  and  42-pounder  guns,  8-inch  and  24-pounder  howitzers, 
and  10  and  13-inch  mortars  (heavy). 

This  was  the  condition  of  affairs  when  the  ordnance  committee 
of  April  1 6th,  1839,  was  appointed.  In  commencing  its  labors 
this  committee  laid  down  as  a  principle  not  to  change  any  piece 
of  ordnance  so  that  the  carriage  already  made  for  it  could  not  be 

*  In  October,  1838,  Mr.  Poinsett  informed  the  board  that  it  was  advisable  to 
introduce  rocket  service  into  the  army,  and  it  was  directed  to  report  whether, 
in  its  opinion,  the  service  of  rocket  batteries  should  be  given  to  the  artillery 
arm,  or  whether  a  separate  brigade  should  be  organized  for  that  purpose.  The 
board  gave  as  its  opinion  that  this  service  should  be  committed  to  the  artillery 
troops.  This  view  was  concurred  in  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  This  was  the 
origin  of  the  "rocket  battery"  which  was  taken  to  Mexico  in  1847,  manned, 
not  by  the  artillery,  but  by  the  mechanics  of  the  ordnance  department.  From 
1838  to  1847  information  concerning  rockets  had  been  carefully  guarded  by 
that  close  corporation.  What  the  artillery  learned  was  picked  up  in  spite  of 
this  secrecy. 


MATERIEL:  SYSTEMS  OF  ARTILLERY.  283 

utilized.  After  the  return  of  the  commission  from  Europe  the 
committee  suggested  slight  changes  in  the  models  of  the  32  and 
42-pounders,  the  6-pounder  gun  and  the  24-pounder  howitzer;  but 
the  field  pieces  were  not  altered  as  recommended.  The  remain- 
der of  the  system,  as  received  from  the  board  of  1838,  was~4eft 
untouched. 

In  1843  a  32-pound  howitzer  was  added  to  the  field  service  as 
a  shell-gun,  to  be  used  in  conjunction  with  the  heavy  i2-pounders. 

At  this  time  Colonel  Bomford  was  making  experiments  with 
heavy  ordnance,  which  resulted  in  the  development  of  the 
Columbiad,  only  to  make  way  for  the  stronger  Rodman  sys- 
tem. The  lo-inch  sea-coast  howitzer  and  the  8  and  ro-inch  Co- 
lumbiads  recommended  by  him  were  added  to  the  land  system, 
the  former  in  1841,  the  latter  in  1844.  This  model  of  Colum- 
biad was,  in  1858,  pronounced  too  weak  for  the  work  expected 
of  it,  and  these  guns  were  then  degraded  to  the  position  of  shell- 
guns  using  reduced  charges. 

In  1850  the  system  embraced  the  following  calibres: 

Field  service:  6  and  12-pounder  guns,  12,  24,  and  32-pounder  howitzers,  and 
12-pounder  mountain  howitzer,  all  of  bronze. 

Siege  and  garrison:  12,  18,  and  24-pounder  guns,  8-inch  and  24-pounder 
howitzers,  and  8  inch  (light)  and  10-inch  (light)  mortars,  of  iron ;  Coehorn 
24-pounder  mortar,  and  16-inch  stone  mortar,  bronze. 

Sea-coast:  32  and  42-pounder  guns,  8  and  10-inch  Columbiads,  8  and  10-inch 
howitzers,  and  10  and  13-inch  (heavy)  mortars,  of  iron. 

Six  different  calibres  of  guns,  two  of  Columbiads,  five  of 
howitzers,  five  of  mortars,  or  eighteen  altogether — an  increase  of 
four  over  the  system  of  1839,  and  principally  in  the  larger 
natures — the  precursor  of  that  ceaseless  struggle  for  an  efficient 
heavy  armament  which  from  that  day  to  this  has  gone  ever  for- 
ward, guided  by  the  inventive  genius  of  the  Nation,  inspiring 
hope  that  the  grand  object  kept  steadily  in  view  is  at  last  to  be 
realized. 

Rodman's  plan  of  casting  by  cooling  from  the  interior  was  a 
conception  of  true  genius.  It  raised  the  American  artillery,  in 
1 86 1,  to  a  leading  position  among  the  heavy-gun  systems  of  the 
world. 

Lieutenant  Rodman  began  the  investigations  which  led  to  the 
development  of  his  theory,  about  1845,  when  superintending  the 
construction  of  the  Columbiads.  In  1849  two  guns — an  8-inch  and 
a  lo-inch — were  cast  upon  this  principle,  and  in  the  tests  to  which 


284      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

they  were  subjected  vindicated  completely  its  correctness.  Other 
experiments  were  carried  on  at  various  times,  in  all  with  six  pairs 
of  guns,  the  results  only  confirming  the  conclusions  first  arrived 
at  regarding  the  great  practical  advantages  of  this  method  of 
casting.  The  six  solid-cast  guns  endured  772  rounds  altogether, 
while  the  hollow-cast  fired  5,515  rounds,  and  remained  unbroken. 
Upon  the  evidence  here  afforded  of  its  superiority  the  War  De- 
partment, in  1859,  directed  that  thereafter  all  the  larger  natures 
of  ordnance  should  be  cast  on  Captain  Rodman's  plan. 

So  early  as  1855  experiments  were  made  at  Fortress  Monroe 
with  a  grooved  gun — the  forerunner  of  the  rifled  cannon  that  was 
speedily  to  follow,  and  the  development  of  which  has  given  in- 
creased interest  to  every  question  appertaining  to  field,  siege,  and 
sea-coast  armaments,  of  armor  and  of  land  defense.  But,  though 
bearing  evidence  of  intrinsic  merit,  the  rifle  principle,  the  workings 
of  which  as  illustrated  in  the  performances  of  the  Lancaster  guns 
wrere  not  altogether  satisfactory,  could  only  be  considered  as 
foreshadowing  great  possibilities.  Experiments  were,  however, 
pursued  in  a  small  way  to  develop  the  new  principle,  and  with 
encouraging  results.  By  Special  Orders  No.  144,  Adjutant- 
General's  Office,  1860,  a  board  of  artillery  and  ordnance  officers 
was  appointed  to  make  more  elaborate  trials  of  the  rifled  cannon 
and  projectiles.  The  report  of  this  board  was  submitted  Novem- 
ber ist,  1860.  Regarding  the  method  of  rifling  and  of  construct- 
ing projectiles  to  be  used  therewith  presented  to  it  for  trial,  the 
board  remarked: 

"  It  is  admirably  adapted  to  the  various  calibres  of  guns  now  in  use,  requiring 
only  that  they  be  rifled  (which  can  be  done  at  the  forts  and  arsenals  where 
they  now  are)  and  supplied  with  proper  proportions  of  rifled  projectiles. 
-Another  advantage  is  that  these  same  guns,  and  without  increase  of  charge, 
will  be  enabled  to  throw  a  weight  of  metal  about  double  what  they  have  here- 
tofore fired,  with  more  accuracy,  effectiveness,  and  greater  range.  The  board, 
therefore,  recommends  the  rifling  of  all,  or  at  least  fifty  percent.,  of  the  guns  at 
forts  and  arsenals." 

Thereupon  fifty  per  cent,  of  the  guns,  as  here  recommended, 
were  ordered  by  the  War  Department  to  be  rifled  on  the  James 
plan.  But  this  attempt  to  secure  an  efficient  artillery  by  con- 
verting old  guns  on  hand,  like  its  antitype,  the  conversion 
system  of  1881,  was  a  total  failure.  After  a  brief  yet  more 
extended  experience  than  that  of  the  board  the  project  was  aban- 


MATERIEL:  SYSTEMS  OF  ARTILLERY.  285 

doned,  as  the  increased  weight  of  projectile,  when  fired  with  a 
proper  charge  of  powder,  strained  the  conversions  of  1860, 
as  it  did  afterwards  those  of  1881,  beyond  endurance.  / 

The  War  Department  had  been  put  in  possession  of  drawings 
of  the  i2-pounder  Napoleon  or  gun  howitzer,  designed  by  Na- 
poleon III,  and  intended  to  increase  the  power  of  the  light,  reduce 
the  weight  of  the  heavy,  and  render  but  one  field-gun  necessary. 
As  in  the  Dearborn  gun  and  those  recommended  by  the  board 
of  1818,  the  weight  of  metal  per  pound  of  shot  was  fixed  at 
100.  This  gun  was  adopted  in  1857,  an<^  still  forms  part  of  the 
field  system.  It  was  a  most  efficacious  weapon — proved  to  be 
such  on  many  battle-fields  of  the  Civil  war,  where  the  heavily- 
wooded  and  broken  surface  of  the  country  together  with  the 
inferior  small  arms  of  the  enemy  caused  the  severest  fighting  to 
be  done  at  short  ranges,  where  the  gun  howitzer,  with  its  heavier 
shell  and  case-shot,  was  often  found  to  be  more  destructive  than 
the  light  lo-pounder  rifle  gun. 

The  Civil  war  gave  an  impetus  to  the  manufacture  of  all 
kinds  of  artillery  materiel.  The  talent  and  mechanical  skill  of 
the  country  at  large  were  given  remunerative  employment  in 
this  branch  of  the  public  service.  The  result  was  that  private 
manufactories  alone,  unaided  by  the  military  authorities,  gave  to 
the  armies  operating  in  the  field  their  first  systems  of  rifled  ord- 
nance. As  the  sources  from  whence  the  guns  came  were  numerous, 
the  varieties  of  calibres  and  types  were  very  great.  Some  idea 
may  be  formed  of  the  complexity  of  the  resulting  armaments  from 
the  fact,  cited  at  random  from  among  many  similar  instances  that 
could  be  mentioned,  that  the  field  artillery  with  Rosecrans' 
army,  February  8th,  1863,  was  made  up  of  thirty-two  6-pounder 
smooth-bores,  twenty-four  i2-pounder  howitzers,  eight  12-pounder 
light  Napoleons,  twenty-one  James  rifles,  thirty-four  lo-pounder 
Parrotts,  two  i2-pounder  Wiard  steel  guns,  two  6-pounder  Wiard 
steel  guns,  two  1 6-pounder  Parrotts,  and  four  3-inch  rifle  ordnance 
guns. 

Of  all  private  corporations  to  which  the  Government  was  in- 
debted for  prompt  and  efficient  aid  at  this  time,  without  which 
the  Union  armies  would  have  been  equipped  with  a  field  arma- 
ment worthy  at  that  time  only  the  semi-barbarous  nations  of  Asia, 
the  Cold  Spring  foundry  may  perhaps  lay  claim  to  pre-eminence. 
The  specialty  of  this  foundry  was  the  Parrott  gun,  upwards  of 


286      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.  S.   ARMY. 

seventeen  hundred  of  which,  with  three  million  projectiles,  were 
procured  by  the  War  Department  alone  during  the  war.  From  a 
report  made  November,  1861,  of  a  board  of  officers  upon  the  rifled 
guns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  this  system  appears  to  have 
embraced,  among  others,  10,  20,  and  3O-pounder  Parrotts,  all  of 
which  had  been  tested  with  satisfactory  results  before  the  3-inch 
(lo-pounder)  ordnance  gun  made  its  appearance  among  the  field 
batteries  of  that  army. 

The  decade  from  1850  to  1860  had  been  signalized  by  experi- 
ments which  laid  the  foundation  for  changes  that  now  followed 
each  other  in  quick  succession.  The  original  8-inch  and  lo-inch 
Columbiads  having  been  previously  turned  into  shell-guns,  were 
finally  suppressed  in  1861,  their  places  supplied  by  others  of  the 
same  calibre,  but  strengthened  at  the  breech  to  withstand  the  shock 
of  heavy  charges.  The  42-pounder  gun  and  the  1 6-inch  stone 
mortar  were  suppressed.  In  February,  1861,  a  1 5-inch  Columbiad, 
of  the  type  afterwards  known  as  the  Rodman  gun,  was  adopted. 
In  the  same  year  new  modeled  8  and  lo-inch  siege  mortars,  10 
and  13-inch  mortars  and  an  8-inch  howitzer  for  sea-coast  service, 
were  adopted.  These  were  all  distinguished,  as  were  the  Rod- 
man guns,  by  an  absence  of  ornamental  mouldings.  In  the  line 
of  rifled  ordnance,  the  4^ -inch  siege  and  the  3-inch  field  were 
adopted  in  1861.  The  changes  which  have  been  noted  estab- 
lished the  artillery  system  in  the  Fall  of  1861,  when  the  Civil  war 
had  been  fairly  inaugurated,  so  as  to  embrace  the  following: 

Field:  Wrought-iron  3-inch  rifle,  bronze  6  and  12-pounder  guns; 
i2-pounder  Napoleon,  12-pounder  mountain,  and  12,  24,  and  32- 
pounder  howitzers. 

Siege  and  garrison:  Cast-iron  4^ -inch  rifle,  12,  18,  and  24- 
pounder  guns,  24-pounder  and  8-inch  howitzers,  and  8-inch  and 
io-inch  mortars;  Coehorn  mortars  (bronze). 

Sea-coast:  32-pounder  gun,  8,  10,  and  15-inch  Columbiads,  10 
and  13-inch  mortars.  The  total  embraced  seven  different  calibres 
of  guns,  three  of  Columbiads,  four  of  howitzers,  and  four  of 
mortars,  or  eighteen  altogether — the  same  as  in  1850. 

In  1861  the  smooth-bore  system  of  the  United  States  was  cer- 
tainly excellent.  In  quality  of  cast-iron  used  and  its  manipula- 
tion during  manufacture  it  has  been  claimed,  and  with  reason, 
that  our  ordnance  department  led  all  others.  If  not  the  first  upon 
the  ground,  the  department  was  among  the  pioneers  in  heavy 


MATERIEL:  SYSTEMS  OF  ARTILLERY.  287 

modern  armaments,  as  was  shown  by  the  casting  successfully 
in  that  year  what  at  the  time  was  the  most  powerful  weapon 
known — a  1 5-inch  Rodman  gun — followed,  in  1864,  by  a  similar 
but  2O-inch  smooth-bore,  throwing  a  shot  weighing  1,080  pounds. 
This  was  a  grand  stride,  and  placed  the  American  artillery  in  no 
secondary  position  in  the  array  of  national  armaments  at  that 
time  developing. 

The  power  of  these  smooth-bore  guns  developed  the  '  rack- 
ing '  as  distinguished  from  the  rifle-gun  '  punching  system '  of 
attack  on  iron-clads,  and  enabled  the  former  for  several  years  to 
hold  its  own  against  the  latter.  To  bring  about  this  result  was  a 
task  of  no  mean  magnitude.  Its  accomplishment  redounds 
immeasurably  to  the  credit  of  those  to  whose  labors  success  was 
due.  It  was  a  new  thing  for  a  system  of  artillery,  distinctly 
American,  to  command  the  serious  attention  and  respect  of  the 
military  nations.  The  disabling  of  numerous  iron-clads,  how- 
ever, by  shots  from  exemplars  of  the  '  racking  system '  placed 
beyond  question  its  efficiency  when  brought  to  bear  on  the  armor- 
plated  vessels  of  that  day. 

But  the  contest  which  sprang  up  between  the  two  systems 
proved  to  be  an  unequal  one.  The  '  rackihg, '  after  a  gallant 
fight,  went  down  before  its  opponent.  This  followed  naturally 
the  successful  application  abroad  of  the  principle  of  rifling  to  heavy- 
gun  constructions.  In  the  United  States  men's  minds  were  too 
busily  occupied  with  the  paramount  duties  of  the  hour,  growing 
out  of  the  Civil  war,  to  fully  take  cognizance  of— as  they  had  not 
time  to  investigate — the  great  advantages  of  the  rifled  cannon. 
Seasons  of  active  hostilities  are  not  favorable  to  well-considered 
changes  of  armament.  The  study — the  deliberate  experiment 
which  must  precede  alterations  based  on  correct  scientific  princi- 
ples— can  only  be  secured  in  time  of  peace.  Napoleon,  at  St. 
Helena,  while  complaining  that  the  Gribeauval  system  was  too 
heavy,  and  otherwise  objectionable,  took  care  to  observe  that, 
though  he  had  appreciated  these  facts,  yet  he  had  been  too  busily 
engaged  to  apply,  except  imperfectly,  the  remedies,  as  this  could 
only  be  done  when  quiet  and  opportunity  for  experiment  enabled 
intelligent  investigation  to  work  out  its  methods  of  reform. 

This  was  eminently  true  in  the  United  States  during  the  Civil 
war.  The  development  of  the  smooth-bore  system  went  on 
naturally  and  as  a  matter  of  course;  it  involved  no  principle  not 


288      HISTORICAL  SKETCH   OP  THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

already  understood;  it  was  but  unfolding  one  after  another  the 
principles  of  a  system  the  foundations  of  which  were  laid  by  the 
labors  of  Bomford  and  Rodman  years  before.  Under  the  circum- 
stances it  was  to  be  expected  that  the  smooth-bore  would,  and 
it  was  right  that  it  should,  receive  more  attention  than  the  rifle. 
Nor  was  this  due  to  a  disposition  to  ignore  the  importance 
of  the  latter.  In  the  report  of  the  armament  board  appointed 
December,  1861,  it  was  remarked  that  "at  present  it  is  not 
deemed  expedient  to  recommend  placing  any  large  rifled  guns  in 
our  forts,  but  at  an  early  day  it  is  anticipated  that  guns  of  this 
nature  may  take  the  place  of  an  equal  number  of  those  in  the 
tables  of  armaments  prepared  by  the  board.  In  the  meantime, 
we  recommend  that  unremitting  experiments  be  made  to  settle 
this  point." 

But,  as  Napoleon  had  found,  due  attention  to  the  enemy  in 
front  left  little  time  for  experiments  in  the  rear.  Only  one  8-inch 
and  one  12  inch  cast-iron  Rodman  rifle  were  placed  on  the 
proving  ground  down  to  1865.  The  result  was  that  at  the  end 
of  the  Civil  war  the  only  rifled  guns  of  large  calibre  that  had 
been  tested  in  service  were  the  sole  products  of  private  foundries, 
where  plans  for  thefr  construction  had  been  matured  prior  to  the 
commencement  of  hostilities. 

From  1 86 1  to  1867,  therefore,  the  heavy  armament  of  the 
United  States  was  made  up  of  smooth-bores,  except  in  so  far  as 
the  purchased  products  of  private  foundries  were  put  in  requi- 
sition to  add  a  rifle  element  of  secondary  importance. 

Meanwhile  the  punching  system — rapidly  abroad,  at  home 
slowly — had  advanced  in  favor.  It  had  begun  to  be  doubtful 
as  to  how  long  the  racking  could  hold  its  own  against  the  punch- 
ing system.  That  the  rifle  should  longer  be  excluded  from 
the  sea-coast  armament  seemed  suicidal.  Accordingly  the  arma- 
ment board  of  1867*  was  instructed  to  determine,  not  only  the 
calibres  of  the  ordnance  for  the  forts,  but  also  the  proportion 
of  rifled  guns  which  should  be  procured.  This  was  a  recognition 
officially  of  the  necessity  that  existed  for  supplementing  (as  in 
that  light  it  seemed  to  be  viewed)  the  power  of  the  smooth-bore 
by  that  of  the  rifle.  The  board  recommended  the  purchase  of 

*  Convened  per  Special  Orders  No.  29,  Adjutant-General's  Office,  January 
18th,  1867. 


MATERIEL:    SYSTEMS    OF   ARTILLERY.  289 

equal  numbers  of  smooth-bores  and  of  rifles;  but  it  seemed  to  dis- 
cern the  handwriting  on  the  wall  which  foretold  that  the  days  of 
the  smooth-bore  were  numbered;  for,  after  having  made  the  recom- 
mendation indicated,  it  adopted  a  resolution  practically  stultifying 
itself,  but  no  doubt  expressing  its  views  truthfully  as  to  the  rifle-_ 
gun  problem,  to  the  following  effect:  "  From  the  fact  we  are  now 
dealing  with  a  new  and  greatly  more  powerful  gun,  and  as  the 
emplacements,  traverses,  and  platforms  in  fortifications  will  all 
undergo  change  from  the  use  of  rifled  artillery,  we  can  express 
no  determinate  opinion  as  to  the  relative  number  of  rifled  and 
smooth-bore  guns  which  should  go  to  make  up  our  armaments." 
From  this  time  on,  however  much  the  gospel  of  the  '  racking 
system '  might  be  preached  by  its  disciples,  its  glory  had  de- 
parted. Thenceforth  the  most  that  could  be  hoped  for  was  that 
the  smooth-bore  might  share  honors  equally  with  its  more  prom- 
ising competitor.  The  postponement  of  the  inevitable — the  rele- 
gation of  the  smooth-bore  to  the  position  of  a  mere  auxiliary — was 
due  to  the  fact  that  it  was  not  practicable  to  procure  a  proper 
metal  for  the  rifle  gun.  Our  cast-iron,  indeed,  was  unsurpassed, 
but  such  had  been  the  experience  with  it  that  the  chief  of  ordnance 
reported  in  1870  that  the  results  obtained  did  not  warrant  him  in 
recommending  that  any  cast-iron  rifle  guns  be  procured  for  arm- 
ing the  forts,  and  followed  it  the  next  year  by  the  remark  that, 
with  our  knowledge  of  their  construction  and  the  metals  of 
which  they  should  be  made,  he  was  dot  willing  to  recommend 
the  purchase  of  any  rifled  cannon,  but  adding,  ' '  as  our  smooth- 
bore Rodmans  are  regarded  as  reliable  and  perfectly  fit  for  service, 
I  shall  continue  to  recommend  their  purchase." 

From  1867  down  to  1871,  therefore,  the  smooth-bore,  due  partly 
to  the  fact  that  efficient  rifles  seemed  beyond  our  manufacturing 
facilities,  and  partly  to  the  reluctance  of  its  devotees  to  acknowledge 
that  it  had  a  superior,  was  in  assumed  relative  importance  kept  side 
by  side  with  the  rifle.  The  year  1871  saw  it  fall  to  the  rear  in 
spite  of  the  efforts  of  its  friends  and  admirers.  That  which  had 
happened  in  every  other  artillery  happened  here — the  smooth- 
bore took  its  proper  and  secondary  place.  This  event,  which  had 
been  foreseen  by  the  armament  board  of  1867,  was  officially  an- 
nounced by  the  chief  of  ordnance  in  his  report  of  1872.  After 
recommending  the  purchase  of  more  smooth-bore  cast-iron  guns, 
he  remarked  of  their  accuracy  that  "  within  a  mile  distance  it  is 
37 


290      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

fully  equal  to  that  of  rifled  guns,  and  in  many  of  our  exposed 
positions  within  easy  range  of  hostile  ships  would  be  entirely 
effective.  To  solve  the  problem  completely,  rifled  guns  with  great 
accuracy  and  long  ranges  and  great  penetrating  power  must  be 
provided."  Although  the  smooth-bore  was  still  clung  to,  the 
insignificant  part  it  was  considered  competent  to  act  may  be 
judged  when  we  reflect  that,  standing  outside  the  range  at  which 
it  was  claimed  to  be  efficient,  a  modern  iron-clad  with  even  third- 
rate  rifles  could  crumble  to  pieces  the  foundation  on  which  rested 
its  helpless  and  impotent  adversary. 

But  even  reduction  to  this  unimportant  role  could  not  long  save 
the  once  formidable  smooth-bore  system,  which  was  to  receive  no 
rest  until  retired  permanently  from  respectable  modern  armaments. 
The  chief  of  ordnance,  it  is  true,  continued  as  late  as  1873  to  urge 
the  purchase  of  more  smooth-bores;  but  the  only  result  was  to  add 
to  the  already  generous  array  of  antiquities  that  garnished  the  de- 
fences of  our  extended  sea-board.  The  reign  of  the  smooth-bore 
was  ended.  Congress,  by  act  of  June  6th,  1872,  had  appropriated 
$270,000  for  experiments  and  tests  with  heavy-rifled  ordnance. 
This  was  the  last  nail  in  the  coffin  of  the  racking  system,  con- 
fessedly worthless  as  it  was  for  purposes  of  defense  against  even 
second-rate  armor-plated  vessels  of  modern  construction.  The 
lid  which  shut  out  forever  the  remains  from  view  was  firmly  yet 
decently  closed  by  the  hand  of  that  faithful  advocate  and  friend, 
the  chief  of  ordnance  himself,  who,  December  i4th,  1874,  in  an 
official  letter  or  report  calling  the  attention  of  the  authorities  to 
the  importance  of  building  up  the  sea-coast  armament,  remarked: 

"Rifle  guns  ranging  from  eight  inches  to  twelve  inches  in  calibre,  with  power 
sufficient  to  penetrate  at  considerable  distances  the  armor  of  iron-clad  vessels, 
must  be  provided.  The  heaviest  rifles  are  the  guns  of  the  present,  as  they  will  be  of  the 
future;  and  while  smooth-bores  may  for  some  time  to  come  play  a  secondary  part, 
for  want  of  a  more  powerful  weapon,  they  must  inevitably  yield  to  the  rifle  in  every 
important  juncture  as  the  old  smooth-bore  musket  has  given  place  to  the  breech- 
loading  rifle  in  the  hands  of  the  soldier." 

In  the  United  States,  therefore,  the  final  and  overwhelming 
triumph  of  the  heavy-rifle  gun  dates  from  1874.  While  the 
smooth-bore  remains  in  our  list  of  standard  ordnance,  it  is  simply 
for  the  utilization  of  material  on  hand;  the  system  is  as  obsolete 
as  anything  can  be;  and,  amidst  the  interesting  questions  that  now 


MATERIEL:  SYSTEMS  OF  ARTILLERY.  291 

absorb  the  attention  of  the  artillery  world,  it  is,  except  as  a 
relic  of  the  past,  almost  forgotten.* 

At  the  same  time  that  the  question  of  smooth-bore  against  rifle 
was  being  decided,  that  of  breech  against  muzzle-loading  was  re- 
ceiving attention. 

The  proposition  to  construct  heavy-rifle  guns  on  the  breech- 
loading  principle  received  little  serious  consideration  until,  in 
1872,  the  importance  of  the  measure  was  so  convincingly  presented 
to  Congress  that  special  appropriation  was  made  to  enable  breech 
mechanisms  to  be  tested  experimentally.  Previously,  however, 
the  subject  had  been  discussed  and  reported  on  favorably  by 
boards  of  officers;  but,  except  to  fire  a  few  shots  on  the  proving 
ground  with  the  Mann  cast-iron  rifle,  nothing  in  the  line  of  testing 
the  breech-loader  was  done  until  about  1879.  The  ordnance 
board  of  1868  and  the  mixed  board  of  1870  recommended  the 
construction  of  12- inch  breech-loading  cast-iron  rifles,  but  the 
chief  of  ordnance  announced  that  he  disapproved  of  and  would 
oppose  the  measure,  until  it  was  determined  whether  or  not  a 
successful  muzzle-loading  rifle  of  large  calibre  could  be  manu- 
factured. 

The  act  of  June  6th,  1872,  providing  funds  for  experiments  and 
tests  with  heavy-rifled  ordnance,  stipulated  that  the  money  should 
be  used  to  procure  at  least  three  models,  to  be  designated  by 
a  board  of  officers  appointed  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  to 
include  both  classes — breech  and  muzzle-loading  cannon.  Of 
the  seven  different  models  selected  by  the  board  as  worthy  of 

*The  truth  of  what  precedes  is  in  nowise  impaired  by  recent  apparent  at- 
tempts to  galvanize  into  life  the  corpse  of  the  obsolete  system  and  the  report  of 
the  ordnance  board,  as  a  result  of  experiments,  that :  "  With  our  improved  pow- 
ders and  projectiles  the  projectile  energy  of  this  gun  [15-inch  smooth-bore]  has 
been  increased  to  an  extent  which  renders  it  not  only  an  efficient  weapon  for  sec- 
ondary defense,  but  even  formidable  as  a  primary  gun  for  racking  in  many  of 
our  harbors." 

We  have  three  hundred  15-inch  smooth-bore  guns  distributed  to  the  sea-coast 
forts.  The  effort  (a  most  laudable  one)  seems  to  be  to  prevent  their  being  a  total 
loss  on  our  hands  without  having  fired  a  shot.  The  best  we  can  hope  from  them 
is  to  prevent  a  contemptible  enemy  approaching  our  shores  with  impunity.  But 
no  amount  of  experiment,  nor  yet  the  profoundest  reverence  for  the  racking  sys- 
tem, will  save  the  fort  defended  by  these  guns  from  being  knocked  to  pieces  by 
even  low-power  rifles  held  beyond  the  range  at  which  the  smooth-bore  is  claimed 
to  be  efficient. 


2Q2      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,   U.  S.   ARMY. 

trial,  four  were  breech-loaders,  viz.:  (i)  Krupp's,  (2)  Sutcliff's, 
(3)  Thompson's,  and  (4)  French  and  Swedish;  and,  contingent 
upon  the  appropriation  proving  sufficient,  the  Mann  and  the 
Lyman  multi-charge  guns  were  recommended  for  trial. 

Of  these  systems  Krupp's  alone  had  a  well-established  reputa- 
tion; and  the  board  was  led  to  recommend  the  purchase  of  a  12- 
inch  gun  of  this  pattern.  No  purchase,  however,  was  made 
of  the  i2-inch  or  any  other  Krupp.  Instead,  as  is 'elsewhere 
mentioned,  an  attempt  was  made  to  build  up  an  American-Krupp 
system,  by  attaching  the  Krupp  breech-loading  mechanism  to 
the  converted  8-inch  and  the  cast-iron  1 2-inch  rifles  of  new 
construction.  As  a  final  result,  the  intentions  of  the  board  of 
1872  have  been  entirely  frustrated.  Neither  the  conversions  nor 
the  new  constructions  could  in  any  proper  sense  be  said  to  test 
either  the  Krupp  breech  mechanism  or  that  system  of  gun- 
making.  In  the  attempt  to  build  up  a  breech-loading  Amer- 
ican system  the  principle  of  the  breech  mechanism  was  held  en- 
tirely subordinate  to  the  absorbing  desire  to  develop  successfully 
the  conversion  idea,  which  for  years  monopolized  the  time  and 
attention  of  the  authorities  to  the  exclusion  of  all  else.  Yet 
experiments  made  in  pursuance  of  this  plan  were  so  satisfactory 
as  to  lead  the  ordnance  board  in  1880  to  conclude  that  "breech- 
loading  systems  must  supersede  muzzle-loading;"  and  immedi- 
ately contracts  were  entered  into  for  the  construction  of  four  new 
12-inch  breech-loading  rifled  guns,  appropriation  for  the  manu- 
facture of  which  had  been  specially  made  by  Congress.  Fortu- 
nately, before  work  had  far  progressed,  the  breaking  down  of 
the  American-Krupp  system,  upon  which  they  had  been  pro- 
jected, enabled  their  construction  to  be  arrested  before  the  Gov- 
ernment had  been  put  to  the  expense  of  adding  four  more  to  the 
number  of  pieces  in  its  weak  and  inefficient  heavy-rifle  armament. 

The  other  breech-loaders  recommended  by  the  board  of  1872 
were  duly  manufactured ;  but,  except  the  Lyman  multi-charge, 
they  had  not,  save  to  fire  a  few  rounds  each,  been  experimentally 
tested.  Until  the  conversion  mania  had  subsided,  "by  the  blowing 
up  of  the  system  in  1881,  there  was  neither  time  nor  money  avail- 
able for  other  purposes.  Other  systems  were  placed  to  one  side, 
while  the  favorite  went  boldly  on  to  its  natural  and  legitimate 
end — complete  failure.  But  ere  this  time  had  arrived  the  idle 
guns — in  the  presence  of  that  new  and  powerful  element  of  gun 


MATERIEL:  SYSTEMS  OF  ARTILLERY.  293 

construction,  steel — had  joined  the  ranks  of  systems  past  and  gone; 
nor  had  their  peculiar  breech  mechanisms  any  advantages  over 
that  of  Krupp,  already  thoroughly  tested,  not  only  on  the  proving 
ground,  but  in  the  more  trying  practice  of  active  service. 

To  summarize,  we  see  that,  until  1868,  the  muzzle-loader  alone  - 
was  thought  of.  The  few  shots  fired  from  the  Mann  before  this 
had  led  to  no  practical  result  whatever.  From  1868  to  1872,  the 
breech-loader,  while  it  had  entered  the  lists,  was  kept  subordinate 
to  the  other ;  but  it  gradually  gained  ground,  until,  in  the  latter 
year,  the  two  systems  about  equally  divided  the  attention  and 
favor  of  our  authorities.  The  breech-loader  kept  straight  on  in  its 
course,  passing  its  competitor,  which,  under  the  announcement 
of  the  ordnance  board  that  breech-loading  systems  must  supersede 
muzzle-loading,  finally,  in  1880,  retired  from  the  field.  The  ap- 
propriateness of  this  act  was  confirmed  by  the  unanimous  voice  of 
the  board  appointed  pursuant  to  act  of  March  3d,  1881,  not  one  of 
the  constructions  recommended  by  it  being  a  muzzle-loader.  The 
venerable  and  venerated  associates — the  smooth-bore  and  the 
muzzle-loader,  full  of  years  and  honors — were  together  laid  quietly 
away  to  rest.  The  latter  has,  however,  been  dragged  temporarily 
forth  to  fill  the  obscure  niche  cut  out  for  it  in  the  system  of  8-inch 
rifles  converted  from  lo-inch  smooth-bores.  But  all  new  construc- 
tions are  breech-loaders,  which  system  is  therefore,  for  all  prac- 
tical purposes,  master  of  the  situation,  without  a  rival  worthy  of 
the  name. 

Among  improvements  in  modern  gun  construction,  each  of 
which  acts  an  important  part  in  the  perfect  machine,  is  the 
chamber.  Although  experimented  with  abroad  before  that  time, 
the  first  test  of  the  principle  in  this  country,  so  far  as  known,  was 
made  with  a  muzzle-loading  3.  1 7-inch  wrought-iron  gun  at  Sandy 
Hook  in  1879.  In  reporting  on  the  results,  the  ordnance  board 
remarked  : 

"It  will  be  seen  that  the  advantage  of  chambering  is  fully  established,  as  the 
results  attained  are  most  excellent,  and  fully  equal  to  any  developed  abroad. 
It  is,  therefore,  of*  the  highest  importance,  in  the  opinion  of  the  board,  that 
further  experiments  be  made  by  applying  this  principle  to  higher  calibres,  and 
practically  establishing  the  extent  to  which  it  can  be  used  in  our  sea-coast 
armament/' 

The  results  of  the  experiments  here  recommended  have  been 


294      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.  S.  ARMY. 

elsewhere  mentioned.  They,  in  1880,  established  that  the  cham- 
ber was  an  indispensable  feature  of  all  gun  constructions — field, 
siege,  and  sea-coast. 

Regarding  siege  artillery,  there  is  little  to  say.  No  gun,  except 
the  4^ -inch  rifle,  adopted  in  1861,  has  been  added  to  that  arma- 
ment. The  same  general  principles  of  construction  which  affect 
the  heavier  calibres  must  have  their  influence  on  the  siege  and 
field-guns.  The  12,  18,  and  24-pounder  smooth-bores  have  dis- 
appeared from  the  list  of  siege  pieces;  and  in  proposed  construc- 
tions, steel  as  the  metal,  and  the  breech-loading  and  chambering 
principles,  appear  as  prominent,  absolutely  necessary,  features. 

There  has  been  greater  activity  in  the  province  of  field  artillery. 
The  3-inch  wrought-iron  rifle  of  1861  was  pronounced  too  light, 
in  weight  of  metal  thrown,  by  those  who  used  it  extensively 
during  the  Civil  war.  Since  then  the  effort  has  been  to  secure  a 
gun  which  will  correct  this  evil.  This  caused  the  adoption,  in 
1868,  of  a  model  for  a  3.5-inch  rifle  of  wrought-iron  firing  a  shot 
weighing  16.75  pounds  with  three  pounds  of  powder.  While  the 
weight  of  the  projectile  would  be  an  important  point  in  its  favor, 
it  is  not  likely  this  gun  will  ever  appear  in  the  field.  With  all 
other  wrought-iron  muzzle-loaders  it  must  give  way  before  the 
breech-loading  steel  guns,  which  alone  at  this  time  and  prospect- 
ively  will  make  up  first-power  field  armaments. 

Experiments  have  been  made  with  Moffatt's  3.o7-inch  breech- 
loading  steel  rifle,  Sutcliff's  breech-loading  mechanism  applied 
to  an  ordinary  3-inch  rifle,  Dean's  3.5-inch  muzzle-loading  rifle, 
made  of  bronze  with  hardened  metal  around  the  bore,  and  with 
several  3-inch  rifles  converted  into  both  muzzle  and  breech- 
loaders of  various  models.  The  result  has  been  that  all  interested 
have  settled  down  tq  the  belief  that  a  breech-loading  steel  gun 
is  the  field-piece,  not  of  the  future  only,  but  of  the  present.  Of 
the  conversions,  the  3.2O-inch,  consisting  of  the  original  3-inch 
wrought-iron  gun  reamed  out  and  a  steel  breech-receiver  attached, 
seems  to  solve  very  efficiently  the  problem  as  to  what  disposition 
shall  be  made  of  the  present  stock  of  3-inch  rifle  muzzle-loaders. 

In  the  United  States,  as  in  most  countries,  much  attention  has 
been  given,  since  1870,  to  machine  guns.  In  1874  the  .45-cal- 
ibre  Catling  was  adopted  as  an  auxiliary  for  flank  defense  and  for 
all  other  parts  of  the  national  armament.  By  1880  the  i-inch  and 


MATERIEL:    SYSTEMS   OF   ARTILLERY.  295 

•  5-inch  Gatlings,  the  i.  45-inch  Hotchkiss  revolving  cannon,  with 
the  i. 65-inch  Hotchkiss  breech-loading  rifle,  the  latter  for  moun- 
tain service,  had  been  added  to  the  field  system.  The  part  that 
these  guns  are  to  act  in  war  remains  to  be  determined.  Their 
chances,  if  brought  against  the  longer  range  and  more  powerful^ 
field-gun  of  the  present  day,  would  appear  to  be  slight,  and 
their  employment  has  been  rejected  by  some  of  the  first  artilleries 
of  the  world.  Still,  for  flanking  purposes,  and  in  positions  where 
they  can  be  protected  from  the  projectiles  of  the  rifle-gun,  they 
are  very  formidable,  and  in  their  effects  on  human  life  terribly 
destructive. 

The  latest  views  on  the  subject  of  field  artillery  are  contained 
in  the  report  of  the  board  convened  by  General  Orders  No.  39, 
Adjutant-General's  Office,  April  28th,  1881,  which,  in  treating  of 
the  field  armament,  proceeded  as  follows: 

"After  a  careful  examination  of  the  various  field-guns  tested  by  the  ordnance 
board,  we  recommend  for  immediate  adoption  the  converted  3.20  inch  calibre 
breech-loading  gun  with  the  round-back  wedge  fermeture,  and  that  a  sufficient 
number  to  equip  the  five  field  batteries,  for  purposes  of  instruction  and  for 
service  generally,  be  prepared  and  issued  as  soon  as  practicable.  Although 
not  in  all  respects  such  a  gun  as  the  board  would  suggest  in  a  new  construction 
of  the  same  calibre,  the  gun  we  have  recommended  satisfies  nearly,  if  not  quite, 
all  the  conditions  sought  for  in  a  light  gun.  Additional  reasons  render  this 
gun  suitable  for  adoption,  and  they  may  be  briefly  stated  as  follows : 

"1st.  From  the  trial  reports  of  the  ordnance  board  it  appears  that  this  gun 
compares  favorably  with  any  other  field-gun  of  the  same  calibre  in  velocity, 
accuracy,  range,  and  weight  of  metal  in  the  shell.  In  the  simplicity  of  the 
breech  mechanism,  and  the  facility  with  which  it  can  be  worked  and  handled, 
it  possesses  undoubted  advantages  over  any  other  gun  presented  or  known  to 
the  board;  in  this  respect  it  is  not  inferior  to  any  other  field  gun  now  manu- 
factured. 

"  2d.  It  is  a  tested  and  approved  construction  of  the  ordnance  department 
far  superior  to  any  field-gun  now  in  our  service. 

"3d.  As  it  is  a  converted  gun,  it  is  comparatively  inexpensive,  and,  if 
adopted,  will  enable  the  Government  to  advantageously  and  speedily  dispose 
of  the  old  3-inch  muzzle-loading  guns. 

"4th.  The  only  change  recommended  by  the  board  in  this  gun  is  that  the 
position  and  direction  of  the  vent  and  action  of  the  fermeture  shall  be  such 
that  the  gun  cannot  be  fired  until  the  breech  is  closed  and  locked. 

"  The  board  is  of  opinion  that  for  a  permanent  field  system  there  should  be 
steel  guns  of  two  calibres,  having  weight  and  length  of  bore  sufficient  to  give 
a  muzzle  velocity  of  not  less  than  1,600  feet— the  lighter  gun  to  throw  a  shell 
of  about  thirteen  pounds  weight,  and  the  heavier  a  shell  of  about  twenty-two 


296      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF  THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

pounds  weight;  both  guns  to  be  modeled  on  the  3. 20-inch  gun  recommended 
by  the  board.  ******** 

"  In  determining  the  most  suitable  gun  for  field  service,  the  board  has  not 
lost  sight  of  the  value  of  vertical  fire  in  all  field  operations,  and  the  likelihood 
of  its  greater  development  in  consequence  of  the  influence  of  intrenchments, 
rifle-pits,  forts,  and  other  temporary  covers  to  which  troops  resort  when  con- 
fronting each  other.  To  provide  for  this  kind  of  fire,  the  board  recommends  a 
short  rifle  steel  howitzer  or  mortar  of  not  less  than  5j-inch  calibre,  and  of  a 
weight  not  to  exceed  1,000  pounds,  the  same  to  be  mounted  on  an  iron  or  steel 
carriage,  so  arranged  that  it  can  be  attached  to  a  limber,  and  when  unlimbered 
be  ready  for  firing.  Such  a  piece  would  find  its  use  in  reaching  an  enemy 
sheltered  by  intrenchments,  rifle-pits,  or  other  cover,  and  in  such  temporary 
siege  operations  as  might  take  place. 

"In  fact,  the  usefulness  of  such  batteries  would  be  very  great ;  and  while 
the  board  is  in  doubt  whether  the  service  of  such  a  piece  does  not  more  prop- 
erly belong  to  the  heavy  than  the  field-artillery  branch,  its  importance  in 
future  field  operations  may  be  given  as  the  reason  for  alluding  to  it." 

The  board  commended  the  i. 65-inch  calibre  Hotchkiss  moun- 
tain rifle  as  an  excellent  gun  for  mountain  and  Indian  service. 

Concerning  machine  guns,  the  board  made  the  following  recom- 
mendations : 

"  1.  That  the  Hotchkiss  revolving  cannon,  calibre  1.5  inch,  be  adopted  for 
field  service. 

"  2.  That  the  Gatling  gun  be  retained,  and  that  the  calibre  .45  gun  have  the 
side-action  crank  and  the  improved  rear  adjustment. 

"  3.  That  the  improved  Gardner  gun  be  adopted  for  service. 

"  4.  That  all  guns,  calibre  .45,  intended  for  field  service  be  made  to  take  the 
cartridge  of  *70  grains  powder  and  500  grains  bullet." 

In  conclusion,  it  will  not  be  uninteresting  to  notice  in  detail  the 
measures  which,  since  1860,  have  been  taken  to  secure  a  proper 
system  of  artillery.  First,  there  was  the  armament  board  of 
1 86 1,*  and  which  was  instructed  "  to  regulate  and  fix  the  number 
and  calibre  of  the  cannon  to  be  mounted  en  barbette  and  in  case- 
mates in  each  of  the  permanent  fortifications  of  the  United  States, 
and  also  the  number  and  descriptions  of  guns  to  comprise  field 
batteries."  This  board  recommended  the  adoption  of  a  1 3-inch 
smooth-bore  as  an  intermediate  calibre  between  the  lo-inch  and 
the  15-inch  then  in  service,  and  that  both  2o-inch  and  3o-inch 
smooth-bores,  on  the  same  plan  as  the  15-inch  (Rodman's),  should 
be  constructed.  Except  for  the  3O-inch  gun,  these  recommenda- 

*  Appointed  pursuant  to  Special  Orders  No.  314,  Headquarters  of  the  Army, 
November  26th,  1861. 


MATERIEL:   SYSTEMS  OF  ARTILLERY.  297 

tions  were  carried  into  execution,  the  first  2O-inch  being  cast  in 
1864.*  The  armament  board  of  1867  added  a  15-inch  mortar  and 
10  and  12-inch  rifle-guns  to  the  list  of  calibres,  and  expressed  the 
opinion  that  the  Catling  gun,  or  one  of  similar  character,  might 
be  advantageously  used  in  flank  defense  in  place  of  the  24- 
pounder  howitzer  of  1839. 

The  calibres  of  guns,  mortars,  and  howitzers  having  been 
determined  upon  by  the  armament  board,  a  board  of  ordnance 
officers  was  assembled  to  determine  the  best  mode  and  metal  for 
their  construction.  The  latter  was  the  first  board  to  recommend 
the  construction  of  lined  cast-iron  rifle-guns.  Among  others,  this 
board  also  made  the  recommendation  that  the  8-inch  howitzer, 
without  preponderance,  supplant  the  24-pounder  flank  defense, 
the  latter  to  be  abolished.  Further,  it  presented  the  following 
as  a  list  of  the  standard  ordnance;  and  as  this  part  of  the  pro- 
ceedings was  approved  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  it  exhibits  the 
authorized  artillery  system  of  1868: 

Field  service  :  3  and  3.5  inch  rifles,  wrought- iron  ;  4.62-inch  smooth-bore 
(bronze)  Napoleon;  4.62-inch  smooth-bore  mountain  howitzer;  and  1-inch  and 
.5-inch  Gatling  guns  (on  trial). 

Siege  and  sea-coast:  4.5-inch  rifle,  cast-iron;  8-inch  smooth-bore  howitzer, 
cast-iron;  8-inch  smooth-bore  mortar,  cast-iron;  and  10-inch  smooth-bore  mor- 
tar, cast-iron. 

Sea-coast:  10-inch  rifle,  cast-iron  ;  12-inch  rifle,  cast-iron  ;  13-inch  smooth- 
bore, cast-iron  ;  15-inch  smooth-bore,  cast-iron  ;  20-inch  smooth-bore,  cast-iron  ; 
13-inch  smooth-bore  mortar,  cast-iron;  and  15-inch  smooth  bore  mortar,  cast- 
iron. 

*  The  committee  of  the  armament  board  of  1861,  upon  which  was  devolved 
the  duty  of  determining  the  number  and  kinds  of  guns  for  field  batteries,  was 
composed  of  General  Barry,  Colonel  Hunt,  and  Captain  Rodman.  The  report 
of  this  committee,  which  was  adopted  by  the  board  and  approved  by  the  Sec- 
retary of  War,  was  in  substance  as  follows.  In  the  light  of  subsequent  events 
it  will  not  be  uninteresting.  They  recommended  (1)  that  mounted  batteries  be 
composed  of  eight  pieces  ;  horse-artillery  batteries  of  six  pieces ;  (2)  that  but  one 
calibre,  smooth-bore  or  rifled,  be  used  in  any  battery  ;  that  for  the  time  being 
those  calibres  be  12-pounder  Napoleons  and  3-inch  rifles,  and  that  horse-artil- 
lery batteries  be  equipped  exclusively  with  3-inch  rifles. 

"  However,  as  to  mounted  batteries,  we  have  not  yet  sufficient  experience  with 
the  rifled  field-gun  to  fix  their  composition  definitely,  but,  so  far  as  practicable, 
but  one  kind  of  gun  should  be  used  in  any  battery. 

"  The  description  of  guns  for  each  battery  and  the  proportion  of  each  in  mixed 
batteries  must  be  determined  by  the  nature  of  the  service  to  be  performed  and 
by  other  circumstances." 

38 


298      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.   S.   ARMY. 

This  list  embraced  no  model  of  a  date  previous  to  1861,  except 
the  i2-pounder  Napoleon.* 

The  lo-inch  Rodmans,  since  become  famous  through  the  efforts 
to  build  up  thereon  a  system  of  8  and  g-inch  rifles,  are  omitted 
from  this  table.  In  so  far  as  the  heavy-rifled  guns  were  concerned 
( 10  and  12-inch),  it  would  appear  that  they  were  standard  ord- 
nance in  name  and  on  paper  only,  as,  in  1873,  the  chief  of 
ordnance,  in  his  report,  remarked  that  "  no  rifle  of  large  calibre 
has  yet  been  adopted  for  our  service. ' ' 

As  a  result  of  the  recommendations  of  the  board  convened 
pursuant  to  act  of  June  6th,  1872,  and  the  exertions  of  the  ord- 
nance department  in  the  same  line  of  action,  the  converted  system 
of  rifles  was  added  to  the  list  of  heavy  ordnance.  Between  1874 
and  1880  the  machine  guns  and  the  i.  65-inch  breech-loading 
Hotchkiss  rifle,  as  previously  mentioned,  were  added  to  the  field 
system. 

The  modifications  here  mentioned  changed  the  list  of  1868  to 
that  of  1880 — the  last  published  system  of  United  States  artillery— 
which  is: 

Field  service :  4.62-inch  (12-pounder)  smooth-bore,  bronze;  3.5-inch  rifle, 
wrought-iron ;  3-inch  rifle,  wrought-iron  ;  J  .65-inch  rifle  (breech-loader),  steel ; 
1.45-inch  revolving  cannon,  steel ;  .45-inch  Gatling  (both  long  and  short),  and 
4.62-inch  smooth-bore  howitzer,  (mountain  service.) 

Siege  and  garrison :  4.5-inch  rifle-gun,  cast-iron ;  8-inch  smooth-bore  how- 
itzer, cast-iron;  8-inch  smooth-bore  mortar,  cast-iron;  10-inch  smooth-bore 
mortar,  cast-iron  ;  and  5.82-inch  Coehorn  mortar,  bronze. 

Sea-coast:  12-inch  rifle,  cast-iron;  12-inch  rifle,  cast-iron,  with  wrought-iron 
tube;  10-inch  rifle  (converted),  cast-iron,  with  wrought-iron  tube;  8-inch 
rifle  (converted),  cast-iron,  with  wrought-iron  tube  ;  20-inch  rifle  (smooth-bore), 
cast-iron;  15-inch  rifle  (smooth-bore),  cast-iron;  13-inch  rifle  (smooth-bore), 
cast-iron;  and  13-inch  and  15-inch  mortars,  (smooth-bore),  cast-iron. 

*  The  24-pounder  Coehorn  was,  perhaps  inadvertently,  omitted  from  the  list. 


TACTICS:  GENERALLY.  299 


CHAPTER  XII. 

TACTICS:  GENERALLY. 

Introductory  to  a  few  remarks  on  the  tactics  of  artillery,  it  will 
be  interesting,  and  tend  as  well  to  an  understanding  of  the  subject, 
to  mention  in  their  order  the  various  works  in  this  field  that  have 
been  published  for  the  use  of  the  army. 

Only  meagre  information  has  been  gathered  concerning  instruc- 
tion for  and  manoeuvres  of  artillery  during  the  Revolutionary 
war.  Tousard's  Artillerists'  Companion,  printed  in  1809,  gives 
the  manual  as  then  practiced,  and  the  simplest  exercises  of  bat- 
talion pieces,  with  their  ammunition  wagons  or  tumbrels.  But  from 
Stevens'  ' '  System  of  Discipline  for  the  Artillery, ' '  we  are  led  to 
believe  that  each  artillery  officer  exercised  his  detachment  or 
company  as  suited  his  fancy,  according  to  traditional  ideas,  as 
there  was  nothing  written  and  stamped  with  the  seal  of  authority 
for  his  guidance. 

The  first  treatise  on  the  tactics  and  discipline  of  the  artillery 
arm  emanating  from  an  American  source  that  has  descended  to 
these  times  was  that  of  Captain  Stevens  referred  to.  Prepared 
for  the  press  as  early  as  1792,  its  publication  was  delayed  until 
1797.  The  author  had  been  a  captain  in  Lamb's  regiment 
of  Revolutionary  artillery.  The  manuscript  was  prepared  for 
three  volumes,  duodecimo.  Volume  one  treated  of  the  formation 
of  a  corps  of  artillery  and  the  duties  and  practice  of  light  field  ar- 
tillery; volume  two,  of  the  theory  and  practice  of  heavy  artillery 
in  garrison  and  on  board  the  navy,  and  furnished  an  extract  on 
the  origin  and  principles  of  courts-martial.  Volume  three  treated 
of  laboratory  duty,  gave  a  great  variety  of  directions  for  making 
compositions,  the  method  of  preparing  fire-works,  and  the  various 
kinds  of  ammunition  necessary  for  different  species  of  ordnance. 
Thus  the  plan 'of  the  work  covered  the  ground  of  both  theoretical 
and  practical  artillery,  except  fortification,  very  thoroughly;  but 
in  fact  only  volume  one  was  published. 

It  is  not  known  whether  this  system  was  or  was  not  adopted 
by  the  War  Department  for  the  regular  artillery.  There  is  no 


3OO      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF  THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

doubt  as  to  its  adaptability,  although  the  context  shows  that 
Stevens  had  directly  in  view  supplying  the  wants  of  the  militia 
artillery,  in  which  he  was  an  officer.  In  those  early  days, 
when  the  hopeless  failure  of  Knox's  Utopian  plan  of  militia  or- 
ganization had  not  become  an  established  fact,  it  was  believed 
that  this  branch  of  the  national  force  could  be  equipped,  prepared 
for,  and  placed  in  the  field,  as  provided  by  law,  which  illusion 
has  since  been  rudely  dispelled. 

That  the  System  of  Discipline  was  not,  however,  considered  all 
that  was  needed  by  the  regular  artillery,  even  if  adopted  therefor, 
maybe  inferred  from  the  fact  that  Inspector -General  Hamilton 
and  Major -General  Pinckney  had  made  considerable  progress  in 
digesting  a  system  of  exercises  and  discipline  for  the  artillery 
arm,  when,  in  1800,  the  additional  army  raised  in  anticipation 
of  war  with  France  was  disbanded,  and  those  officers  mustered 
out  of  service.  Their  manuscript  was  left  at  the  War  Office,  where 
it  was  doubtless,  in  the  same  year,  destroyed  by  the  fire  which 
consumed  the  Department  records. 

In  September,  1808,  General  James  Wilkinson,  then  command- 
ing the  army,  had  prepared  a  complete  "modern  system  of 
movements  and  manoeuvres  for  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry," 
translated  principally  from  the  French,  and  was  arranging,  under 
the  direction  of  Secretary  Dearborn,  for  its  publication;  but,  so 
far  as  is  known,  the  work  was  never  prosecuted  to  completion, 
although  the  Secretary  urged  that  it  be  given  to  the  army  with 
all  possible  celerity.  The  manuscript,  like  its  predecessor  pre- 
pared by  Hamilton  and  Pinckney,  has  disappeared,  and  left  be- 
hind but  the  faintest  trace  of  having  existed.  It  is  possible  that 
the  change  of  administration,  March  4th,  1809,  put  an  end  to  this 
measure,  as  it  did  to  others  of  great  practical  utility  which  Secre- 
tary Dearborn  had  set  on  foot  for  the  benefit  of  the  army.  The 
result  was  that  a  second  war  with  Great  Britain  found  the  United 
States  without  any  recognized  system  of  instruction  save  Baron 
Steuben's  infantry  regulations  and  a  system  of  horse -artillery 
manoeuvres  written  at  Paris  in  1800  by  General  Kosciusko.  The 
latter  had  been  prepared  at  the  request  of  an  American  citizen, 
who  presented  it  to  the  Philosophical  Society  of  West  Point,  New 
York.  Although  Kosciusko' s  manoeuvres  were  written  on  the 
supposition  that  the  battery  was  organized  as  in  France,  they 


TACTICS:  GENERALLY.  301 

could  be,   with  obvious  modifications,   equally  adapted  to  the 
light  artillery  of  the  United  States. 

The  paucity  of  materials  on  the  subject  of  regulations,  tactics, 
and  military  administration  impaired  alike  the  discipline  and  effi- 
ciency of  the  army,  and  formed  an  almost  insurmountable  barrier- 
to  the  progress  of  an  officer  ambitious  to  excel  in,  or  even  attain 
a  fair  knowledge  of,  the  theoretical  part  of  his  profession.  This 
fact  was  forcibly  presented  to  the  War  Department  by  Captain 
Winfield  Scott,  of  the  .new  light  artillery  regiment,  in  a  letter 
dated  July  I4th,  1809,  in  which  he  requested  to  be  sent  to  Europe 
to  collect  and  compile  materials  for  supplying  the  army  with 
treatises  on  military  police,  discipline,  and  tactics.  Referring  to 
the  limited  knowledge  of  officers  regarding  the  proper  manage- 
ment and  uses  of  horse  artillery,  the  writer  remarked:  "The 
recent  introduction  of  this  important  corps  into  the  American 
service,  and  its  peculiar  duties  and  organization,  leave  it  certain 
that  it  can  be  but  imperfectly  practiced  or  understood  in  this 
country.  France  is  the  best  school  for  obtaining  a  knowledge 
of  it."  Captain  Scott's  proposition  was  not  accepted.  It  was 
left  for  him,  six  years  later,  when,  as  a  general  officer  of  the  reg- 
ular army,  he  visited  Europe,  to  collect  the  necessary  data  for 
the  first  comprehensive  system  of  regulations  given  to  the  regu- 
lar army,  and  which,  to  use  General  Scott's  words,  after  being 
"obscured,  mutilated,  and  pirated  from  1836  down  to  1861, 
inclusive, ' '  forms  the  foundation  on  which  rest  the  army  regula- 
tions of  the  present  day. 

War  was  declared  without  the  Government  having  at  its  dis- 
posal any  system  of  manoeuvres  for  the  artillery  except  that  of 
Kosciusko.  Major  Amos  Stoddard  compiled  and  hurried  through 
the  press  a  small  work  on  the  manual  of  cannon  and  the  ma- 
noeuvres of  field  and  horse  artillery.  It  was  incomplete  in  de- 
tails. The  emergency  did  not  permit  elaboration;  yet  it  proved 
sufficient  for  practical  purposes.  And  as  the  order  formally 
adopting  Stoddard' s  work  furnishes  the  first  instance  of  the  artil- 
lery being  authoritatively  supplied  with  a  general  system  of  in- 
struction, it  merits  preservation.  It  is  as  follows: 

"WAR  DEPARTMENT,  August  1st,  1812. 

"The  'exercises  for  cannon  and  field  ordnance,'  and  'manoeuvres  for  horse 
artillery,  as  altered  from  the  manual  of  General  Kosciusko  and  adapted  to  the 
service  of  the  United  States/  are  hereby  ordered  for  the  government  of  the 


302      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

several  corps  of  artillery  in  the  said  service.  Such  alterations  and  improve- 
ments as  experience  may  suggest  will  be  reported  to  the  several  commanding 
officers  of  regiments,  and  by  them  to  the  Department  of  War." 

The  Government  gave  the  West  Point  Philosophical  Society 
$200  for  the  copyright  of  Kosciusko's  manoeuvres  thus  appropri- 
ated. No  alterations  or  improvements  in  Stoddard's  work  were 
announced  during  the  war  of  1812.  It  remained  the  standard 
authority  until  the  adoption  of  Lallemand's  system  in  1821. 

Tousard's  Artillerists'  Companion,  before  mentioned,  which 
appeared  in  1809,  although  an  exhaustive,  scientific,  and  excel- 
lent treatise,  was  neither  a  system  of  tactics  nor  of  instruction. 
In  the  language  of  Colonel  Tousard,  it  was  intended  to  demon- 
strate, ' '  first,  the  necessity  for  both  theoretical  and  practical 
instruction  to  officers  of  artillery;  second,  that  the  artillery — one 
of  the  most  necessary  branches  of  the  military  profession — re- 
quires at  the  hands  of  its  devotees  early,  constant,  and  attentive 
study;  third,  the  present  advantages  of  improvements,  founded 
on  theory  and  practice;  fourth,  the  advantage  of  uniformity  and 
regularity  in  the  construction  of  materiel."  We  are  informed  in 
the  preface  that  the  work  ' '  was  composed  in  obedience  to  the 
wishes  of  the  great  George  Washington.  It  was  begun  as  early 
as  1795.  This  great  man  often  lamented  the  absolute  want  of  an 
elementary  treatise  on  artillery  and  the  scarcity  of  English  books 
on  this  branch  of  military  science.  He  considered  such  a  defi- 
ciency as  an  obstacle  to  the  progress  of  instruction,  which  he  was 
very  desirous  to  remove,  by  rendering  the  works  of  authors  and 
officers  who  had  written  upon  artillery  in  other  languages  familiar 
to  the  officers  of  the  corps  of  artillerists  and  engineers."  While 
well  serving  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  written,  the  Com- 
panion was  too  voluminous  and  expensive  for  general  distribu- 
tion to  the  army,  though  it  was  long  justly  considered  an  author- 
ity on  the  subjects  of  which  it  treated. 

The  only  other  American  work  which  has  covered,  equally 
with  the  Companion,  the  whole  ground  of  the  artillerists'  profes- 
sional studies,  is  a  "Treatise  on  Artillery"  by  H.  Lallemand. 
The  author  had  been  general  of  artillery  of  the  Imperial  Guard 
under  Napoleon;  and  being  proscribed  by  Louis  XVIII,  July 
24th,  1815,  sought  refuge  in  the  United  States,  where  he  died 
September  i5th,  1823.  His  manuscript  treatise  was  in  three 


TACTICS:    GENERALLY.  303 

volumes.  Volume  one  treated  of  the  organization  of  artillery,  its 
service  in  campaign,  and  tactics  ;  volume  two,  of  the  art  of  forti- 
fication, principally  in  connection  with  artillery,  and  of  castra- 
mentation;  volume  three,  of  the  principles  of  construction  to  be 
used  in  all  kinds  of  artillery  materiel,  and  the  relations  of  trie- 
artillery  to  the  other  arms  of  service.  Volumes  one  and  two 
were  translated  and  published  in  1820.  By  orders  from  the  War 
Department  the  President  directed  that,  having  approved  the 
treatise,  so  much  of  the  work  as  was  embraced  in  the  exercise  of 
field  artillery,  school  of  the  battle  piece,  evolutions  of  field  bat- 
teries, school  of  the  mountain  pieces,  exercise  and  management 
of  siege,  garrison,  and  sea-coast  guns,  and  mechanical  manoeuvres, 
should  be  adopted  for  the  service  of  the  United  States.  Volume 
three,  so  far  as  is  known,  was  never  printed.  It  was  ready  for 
publication  at  the  time  of  Lallemand's  death,  and  Mr.  Calhoun 
authorized  its  purchase,  with  a  view  to  adoption  as  a  text-book 
at  the  artillery  school;  but  as  no  copy  has  been  found,  it  is  inferred 
that  volume  three  was  not  published. 

Lallemand's  were  not  so  bulky  as  Tousard's  volumes,  but  were 
in  other  respects  little  better  suited  for  text-books.  They  formed, 
as  the  name  indicated,  a  treatise  on  artillery  covering 'the  whole 
range  of  professional  subjects,  with  their  bearings  upon  other 
branches  of  service,  and  from  necessity  were  written  in  a  style 
entirely  too  general  to  serve  for  a  system  of  tactical  instruction 
adapted  to  the  needs  of  service. 

By  act  of  May  i2th,  1820,  Congress  prescribed  that  the  tactics 
of  the  regular  army  should  be  used  by  the  militia  also,  but  Lalle- 
mand's  treatise  was  too  elaborate  for  either.  To  supply  the 
deficiency  for  the  militia,  a  mixed  board  of  regular  and  militia  offi- 
cers was  convened  in  October,  1826,  of  which  General  Scott  was 
president,  to  prepare,  among  other  things,  a  system  of  instruction 
for  field  artillery.  The  board  made  a  report  in  December  of  the 
same  year,  recommending  the  "  Manual  for  Artillery  of  'the  Garde 
Roy  ale"  translated  by  Lieutenant  Daniel  Tyler,  First  Artillery. 
It  was  subsequently  published,  and,  pursuant  to  act  of  Congress, 
5,000  copies  purchased  for  the  use  of  the  militia,  the  title  being : 
"A  System  of  Exercise  and  Instruction  of  Field  Artillery,  in- 
cluding Manoeuvres  of  Light  or  Horse  Artillery." 

The  proceedings  of  this  board  early  drew  attention  to  the  fact 
that  if  this  work  were  approved  the  militia  would  be  furnished 


304      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

with  a  system  of  manoeuvres  for  field  and  horse  artillery  far  more 
complete  than  was  that  of  the  regular  army.  It  was  felt  that  this 
was  a  state  of  affairs  neither  creditable  to  the  latter  nor  to  be  perpet- 
uated. To  meet  the  difficulty,  a  board  was  at  first  resolved  upon  to 
digest  a  complete  course  of  instruction  based  on  the  Gribeauval 
system  of  artillery.  There  was  not  a  single  harnessed  battery  in 
service.  It  was  conceded  that  the  facilities  at  hand  were  not  such 
as  would  enable  the  board  to  take  up  and  push  to  a  successful 
issue,  and  in  a  manner  satisfactory  to  the  Government,  the  work 
in  contemplation.  Even  at  the  artillery  school  of  practice,  though 
the  materiel  was  forthcoming,  the  pieces,  when  manoeuvred, 
were  hauled  by  men  using  bricoles.  Under  these  circumstances 
the  plan  that  gave  promise  of  being  most  successful  was  not  to 
convene  a  board,  as  had  been  proposed,  but  to  send  an  officer 
to  study  the  adopted  (Gribeauval)  system  on  its  native  soil  and 
at  the  French  camps  of  instruction.  This  course  was  determined 
on  by  the  Department  after  more  maturely  considering  the  situa- 
tion. The  proposed  board  was  therefore  unnecessary,  its  labors 
being  performed  by  more  satisfactory  methods.  Lieutenant  Tyler 
was  selected  for  this  delicate  and  responsible  duty.  His  orders, 
dated  War  Department,  January  3d,  1828,  directed  him  to  exam- 
ine into  and  report  upon  the  most  recent  system  of  French 
artillery,  to  translate  their  tactics  and  manoeuvres  with  a  view  to 
adopting  all  into  the  regular  service  of  the  United  States;  and  so 
far  as  compatible  with  this,  the  main  object  of  his  mission,  he  was 
to  take  advantage  of  every  opportunity  to  acquire  information 
on  other  military  matters  of  interest  and-  importance. 

Proud  of  the  honor  thus  conferred  upon  him,  and  anxious  to 
prove  himself  worthy  of  it,  Tyler,  with  abundant  opportunities 
for  observation,  soon  translated  the  whole  Gribeauval  system  of 
exercises  and  manoeuvres,  a  lithographic  edition  of  three  hundred 
copies  being  struck  off  at  Metz,  in  1828,  under  his  supervision 
and  at  his  expense.  These  were  sent  to  the  United  States  and 
distributed  to  the  army,  supplying  a  long-felt  want,  when  circum- 
stances to  be  mentioned,  and  which  had  not  been  anticipated, 
rendered  them  valueless.  The  translation  was  in  three  volumes. 
Volume  one  embraced  the  school  of  the  cannoneer,  field  artillery; 
volume  two,  the  service  of  siege,  garrison,  and  sea-coast  artillery; 
volume  three,  manoeuvres  of  field  batteries. 

Although  Lieutenant  Tyler  had,  in  obedience  to  instructions, 


TACTICS:  GENERALLY.  305 

made  the  translations  in  question — by  far  the  most  complete  that 
the  army  had  seen — he  soon  became  convinced  that  the  course 
of  the  Gribeauval  artillery  system  was  run.  The  French  Gov- 
ernment had  already,  after  the  most  exhaustive  trials  to  prove 
its  efficiency,  adopted  a  modification  of  the  English  block-trail 
system  of  gun-carriage.  Notwithstanding  the  efforts  of  that 
Government  to  keep  everything  pertaining  to  it  a  profound 
secret,  the  young  American  obtained  minutely  exact  drawings 
of  the  new  system  of  materiel.  These,  upon  his  return  to  the 
United  States,  were  turned  over  to  the  technical  branch  of  the 
artillery,  and  were  at  once  utilized  to  manufacture  the  first  of  the 
present  style  of  artillery  carriages  for  field,  siege,  and  garrison 
guns.  (See  Materiel,  p.  239,  ante.) 

It  was  at  once  seen  that  labor  on  the  old  system,  if  not  lost, 
would  be  of  questionable  utility.  The  new  system  met  triumph- 
antly every  objection  urged  against  the  Gribeauval,  while  intro- 
ducing scarcely  any  of  its  own. 

Artillery  materiel  being  in  this  state  of  transition,  it  followed 
that  questions  of  tactics  and  instruction  also  remained  in  abey- 
ance. As  a  result,  Lallemand's  Treatise,  with  its  recognized 
imperfections,  remained  for  some  years  longer  the  only  authority 
on  these  subjects  issued  to  the  army. 

As  was  the  case  in  France,  whence  we  had  directly  received 
our  ideas,  it  took  nearly  ten  years  of  discussion  and  experiment 
to  bring  out  the  stock-trail  system,  which  drove  all  competitors 
from  the  field  and  relegated  that  of  Gribeauval  to  the  back-ground. 
Simultaneously  with  this  event  came  the  mounting  of  Ringgold's 
horse  battery  and  the  equipping  as  field  artillery  of  one  company 
in  each  of  the  other  artillery  regiments.  Provisions  for  instruc- 
tion moved  on  with  equal  pace,  and  in  1839  appeared  Captain 
Anderson's  translation  of  the  French  ''Instruction  for  Field 
Artillery,  Horse  and  Foot,"  arranged  for  and  adapted  to  the 
service  of  the  United  States.  These  instructions  were  for  the 
stock-trail  system  what  the  manual  of  the  Garde  Royale  and  the 
work  of  Lallemand  were  for  the  Gribeauval,  but  more  complete 
than  either;  and  so  far  as  field  artillery  was  concerned,  it  super- 
seded both.  The  principles  upon  which  this  arm  of  the  public 
service  is  based  were  unfolded  in  a  manner  at  once  entertaining 
and  instructive;  the  arrangement  of  the  subject-matter  was  sys- 
tematic, the  definitions  clear  and  explicit. 
39 


306      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

There  was,  however,  one  officer  who  was  dissatisfied  with  the 
new  instructions.  This  was  Brevet-Major  Ringgold,  of  the  horse 
artillery,  who  had,  previous  to  the  appearance  of  the  new,  ma- 
noeuvred his  battery  in  accordance  with  the  English  system.  For 
a  time  the  practice  of  that  portion  of  Anderson's  work  relating  to 
horse  artillery  was,  by  War  Department  orders,  suspended;  but 
this  injunction  proving  only  temporary,  Ringgold,  in  1843,  had 
the  address  to  secure  the  ordering  a  board,  of  which  he  was  a 
member,  for  its  revision.  The  result  of  the  labors  of  this  board 
appeared  in  the  form  of  a  system  of  "Instruction  for  Field  Artil- 
lery, Horse  and  Foot,"  which  was  adopted  by  the  War  Depart- 
ment March  6th,  1845.  The  changes  from  Anderson's  Instruction, 
which  characterized  its  successor,  were  adopted  at  Major  Ring- 
gold's  suggestion,  and  resulted  in  an  English- Americanized  re- 
vision of  the  French  system.  The  new  work  appeared  just  in 
time  for  the  Mexican  war,  in  which  the  field  artillery  sprang  at 
once  into  the  front  rank  of  the  combatant  arms. 

The  siege  and  mountain  materiel  of  the  stock-trail  pattern  hav- 
ing been  closely  guarded  by  the  ordnance  department  until  taken  to 
the  field  by  its  employe's,  in  1 846-^7,  and  the  character  of  the  sea- 
coast  armament  not  having  been  determined  upon,  no  change 
from  Lallemand's  system  of  instruction  for  these  was  necessary, 
nor  was  any  made,  until  after  the  return  of  the  army  from  Mexico, 
when,  by  General  Orders  No.  12,  Headquarters  of  the  Army, 
July  27th,  1849,  a  board  of  officers  was  instituted  to  prepare  a  com- 
plete course  of  instruction  for  siege,  garrison,  sea- coast,  and 
mountain  service.  That  for  the  mountain  service  was  approved  by 
the  War  Department  December  5th,  1850,  and  that  for  the  heavy 
artillery  May  loth,  1851,  which  therefore  marks  the  date  when, 
for  the  first  time,  all  branches  of  the  arm  were  provided  with 
tactics  adapted  to  the  stock-trail  system  of  carriages. 

The  instructions  of  1845,  although  excellent  so  far  as  they  went, 
embraced  little  more  than  the  manual  of  the  piece  and  the  ma- 
noeuvres of  a  battery.  The  proper  organization  of  artillery  for  and 
its  management  in  the  field  were  merely  touched  upon.  Much  of 
Anderson's  instruction  germane  to  these  important  features  of  any 
complete  system  were  omitted,  thus  securing  brevity  at  the  ex- 
pense of  clearness  and  a  knowledge  of  the  principles  on  which  the 
field  artillery  rested,  which  made  the  work  very  unsatisfactory  as 
a  text-book. 


TACTICS:    GENERALLY.  307 

The  board  of  officers  appointed  to  supply  this  deficiency  by 
Special  Orders  No.  229,  Adjutant-General's  Office,  1855,  for 
some  cause,  never  met;  but  its  work  was  taken  up  and  pushed  to 
completion  by  another  board,  assembled  in  1858,  which  prepared 
the  "Instruction  for  Field  Artillery,"  approved  by  the  War- 
Department  March  6th,  1860. 

This,  while  embodying  the  instruction  of  1845,  went  much 
further,  far  exceeding  in  breadth  of  design  and  completeness  of 
execution  anything  of  a  similar  nature  that  had  been  given  the 
artillery  arm.  Its  appearance  on  the  eve  of  the  Civil  war  was  a 
most  felicitous  event,  enabling  the  volunteer  batteries  to  system- 
atically and  thoroughly  prepare  for  the  field  in  the  least  possible 
time  and  most  efficient  manner. 

At  the  same  time  with  the  new  instructions  there  was  adopted  in 
service  what  was  a  fitting  supplement  thereto,  viz. ,  ' '  Evolutions 
of  Field  Batteries,"  translated  from  the  French  by  Major  Robert 
Anderson,  and  embracing  essentially  the  same  manoeuvres  as  are 
comprehended  in  the  "School  of  the  Battalion,"  present  light- 
artillery  tactics.  Together,  they  supplied  the  theoretical  knowl- 
edge necessary  to  organize  the  regular  and  volunteer  batteries,  both 
singly  and  in  masses,  for  the  great  events  calling  them  to  action. 

The  features  wherein  the  instruction  of  1860  was  superior  to  its 
predecessors  consisted  in  articles  on  organization,  materiel,  and 
the  service  of  artillery  in  campaign,  presenting  a  philosophical 
and  instructive  expos£  of  the  general  principles  underlying  the 
formation,  discipline,  and  service,  both  in  peace  and  war,  of  an 
efficient  field  artillery.  To  this  rationale  of  the  subject-matter  of 
instruction  there  was  added  the  school  of  the  soldier,  mounted 
and  dismounted,  beginning  at  squad  drill  and  extending  to  the 
exercises  of  detachments,  together  with  a  system  of  battery  ma- 
noeuvres more  complete  than  any  that  had  preceded  it.  The  first 
was  an  important  feature,  rendering  the  instruction  independent 
of  others,  and  making  unnecessary  constant  reference  to  the  tactics 
of  infantry  and  cavalry,  as  had  been  the  case  before;  the  latter 
only  added  to  the  finished  character  of  the  work  as  a  course  of 
instruction.  And  while  the  assimilated  tactics  now  in  use  seek 
to  render  the  information  and  experience  acquired  in  one  arm  of 
service  directly  available  in  others  in  a  greater  degree  than  was 
formerly  attempted,  it  is  equally  true  that  the  clear,  incisive  style 
of  the  instructions  of  1860  has  been  obscured  in  the  assimilated 


308      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

edition  by  transposition,  attempts  at  brevity,  and  a  passion  for 
change,  which  could  only  be  indulged  at  the  sacrifice  of  a  dis- 
tinctive, well-defined  individuality. 

The  result  of  the  labors  of  the  board  appointed  to  assimilate 
the  tactics  of  the  other  arms  to  those  of  infantry  were  given  to  the 
army  in  1873.  The  success  with  which  the  work  of  assimilation 
has  been  met  in  these  tactics — a  principle  the  value  of  which,  if 
properly  put  in  execution  and  restricted  to  its  proper  limits,  is  not 
underestimated — will  be  considered  hereafter;  but  protest  is  here 
entered  against  some  of  the  principles  laid  down  for  the  guidance 
of  artillery  in  the  crucial  test  of  battle. 

In  the  assimilated  infantry  tactics,  it  is  enjoined  upon  officers 
to  ' '  cultivate  among  the  men  the  feeling  that  they  cannot  be 
beaten, ' '  while  with  artillery  the  aim  seems  to  be  to  create  the 
impression  that  they  can  be  beaten,  and  that  easily;  hence  they 
must  take  care  of  themselves,  even  at  a  sacrifice  of  bold  and  decis- 
ive movements.  It  is  taught  that  the  safety  of  the  pieces  depends 
upon  the  advantage  that  is  taken  of  accidents  of  the  ground;  that 
the  increased  range  and  effect  of  infantry  fire  has  impaired  the 
utility  of  guns  at  short  ranges,  and  made  cover  more  necessary 
than  ever  for  the  protection  of  batteries;  that  the  latter  can  no 
longer  move  up  within  short  range  of  troops  and  open  fire  with 
cannister — the  use  offensively  of  which  is  entirely  ended;  that 
artillery  fire  is  apt  to  become  inefficient  at  a  greater  range  than 
2,500  yards;  that  if  a  battery  remains  within  900  yards  of  the 
enemy' s  infantry  the  chances  are,  particularly  if  there  be  no  cover, 
that  it  will  be  disabled. 

So  far  from  these  principles  being  calculated  to  inspire  the 
artilleryman  with  the  ' '  feeling  that  he  cannot  be  beaten, ' '  which 
feeling  alone  can  and  does  render  the  soldier  individually,  or 
soldiers  collectively,  formidable,  they  must  have  the  opposite 
tendency,  engendering  timidity  and  pusilanimity;  as  his  only 
hope  to  escape  annihilation  at  the  hands  of  his  murderous  adver- 
sary, the  infantryman,  inspired  with  the  true  spirit  of  the  soldier, 
through  the  "feeling  that  he  cannot  be  beaten,"  is  to  either  seek 
cover  or  leave  the  field.  The  sole  relief  from  this  impression  of 
decadence  in  the  importance  of  his  arm,  when  compared  with  that 
of  his  more  fortunate  rival,  vouchsafed  to  the  artilleryman,  is  in 
the  reflection  that  the  value  of  his  rifle-gun  fire  has  been  enhanced 
at  long  range. 


TACTICS:    GENERALLY.  309 

This  attempt  at  depreciation  is  hardly  to  be  looked  for,  par- 
ticularly in  artillery  works  of  instruction,  and  must,  if  followed  to 
its  legitimate  consequences — undue  cautiousness  and  loss  of  mili- 
tary spirit — strike  at  the  foundation  of  honor;  is  a  fitting  prelude 
to  disaster,  is  repugnant  to  every  instinct  that  animates  the  soldier,  _ 
and  is  at  variance  with  experience,  which  shows  that  improvements 
in  artillery  .and  infantry  arms  have  gone  on  part  pas 'su,  as  have 
likewise  the  importance  of  these  branches  of  service;  and,  in  truth, 
in  Europe  to-day  more  attention  is  directed  to  bringing  out  the 
powers  of  artillery  than  is  the  case  with  any  other  arm,  through 
a  well-founded  belief,  based  on  the  experience  of  recent  wars,  that 
the  way  is  open  for  the  development  therein  of  an  increased  rela- 
tive importance. 

In  the  field  of  heavy  artillery  tactics,*  the  edition  of  1862,  pub- 
lished when  the  Civil  war  was  in  progress,  formed  the  only  con- 
necting link  between  the  tactics  of  1851  and  Tidball's  Manual, 
approved  in  1880,  for  use  in  sea-coast  garrisons. 

The  heavy  artillery  tactics  of  1851  embraced  only  the  manual, 
mechanical  manoeuvres,  and  the  nomenclature  of  siege,  sea-coast, 
and  garrison  artillery,  with  just  so  much  instruction  for  dismounted 
detachments  as  would  enable  the  cannoneers  to  be  marched  to 
and  from  their  pieces.  The  edition  of  1862  differed  from  that  of 
1851  in  the  parading  of  detachments,  which  was  done  as  in  field 
artillery,  and  the  addition  of  a  few  hints  on  the  service  of  rifled 
guns. 


*  Artillery  troops  are  divided  into  light  and  foot  or  heavy.  Pieces  of  artil- 
lery are  sometimes  designated  as  light  and  heavy.  The  latter  term,  applied  to 
personnel  as  distinguished  from  materiel,  is  of  recent  origin  in  the  United  States 
service  ;  but  confounding  the  piece  with  the  man  who  handles  it  is  not  of  recent 
date,  nor  has  it  been  confined  to  the  heavy  artillery  branch. 

Captain  Stevens  applied  the  terms  light,  field,  and  heavy  to  pieces  equipped 
for  service,  i.  <?.,  materiel.  Light  artillery,  as  used  in  the  act  of  April  12th,  1808, 
referred  to  personnel,  being  by  contemporaneous  authorities  synonymous  with 
horse  artillery ;  and  the  latter,  as  used  by  both  Kosciusko  and  Stoddard,  meant 
personnel,  or  its  organization,  and  had  no  reference  to  the  materiel  used. 

Stoddard  applied  the  term  field  artillery  to  both  personnel  and  materiel, 
while  he  used  the  term  cannon  to  designate  larger  calibres  of  guns. 

Lallemand  divided  the  personnel  of  artillery  into  field,  horse  (or  light),  and 
foot.  The  latter  manned  mountain,  siege,  garrison,  and  sea-coast  artillery. 

In  Anderson's  translation  (1839)  and  the  instruction  of  1845,  the  designations 
horse  and  foot  referred  to  personnel. 


310      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

Tidball's  Manual  of  Heavy  Artillery  is  a  much  more  compre- 
hensive work.  During  the  Civil  war  the  whole  subject  of  the 
proper  handling  of  heavy  artillery  was  in  an  unsettled  state.  It 
was  necessary  to  use  such  means  for  the  management  of  the  new 
materiel  as  circumstances  allowed;  but  from  necessity  there  was 
diversity  of  practice,  and  there  was  neither  time  nor  opportunity 
to  reduce  the  whole  to  system. 

The  re-establishment  of  the  artillery  school  at  Fortress  Monroe 
in  1867  laid  the  foundation  for  this  deferred  work.  Notes  on 
the  results  of  practice  at  the  school  in  the  manual  and  in  the 
mechanical  manoeuvres  of  the  most  recent  siege,  garrison,  and 
sea-coast  guns  in  the  hands  of  artillery  troops  were  carefully 
made,  revised,  and  preserved,  to  appear  in  the  new  Manual,  re- 
placing what  was  old  and  obsolete.  But  this  was  npt  its  only 
important  feature.  Breaking  from  the  fetters  which,  under  the 
specious  plea  of  assimilation,  would  bind  all  arms  to  the  infantry ', 
no  matter  how  incongruous  their  natural  elements  may  make  the 
union,  Major  Tidball  has  given  the  troops  of  heavy  artillery  a 
system  of  manoeuvres  of  their  own.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  this 
system,  founded  on  the  '  exercise  of  detachments, '  Field  Artillery 
Instructions  of  1860,  demonstrates  conclusively  that  the  present 
assimilated  tactics  of  all  arms  rest,  through  the  infantry  tactics, 
upon  the  same  basis,  the  only  difference  being  that  in  the  In- 
struction mentioned  and  in  Tidball's  Manual  the  block  of  eight 
men  is  styled  a  'detachment,'  while  in  the  infantry  tactics  it 
is  called  a  '  set  of  fours. '  Aside  from  the  advantages  that  must 

As  used  in  the  tactics  of  1851,  the  term  heavy  artillery  referred  to  materiel 
only. 

In  the  Instruction  for  Field  Artillery  of  1860,  where  the  analysis  of  principles 
on  which  the  artillery  service. is  founded  is  presented  in  a  clear  manner,  the 
personnel  of  that  arm  is  divided  into  field  and  foot — the  former  serving  mounted 
and  horse  batteries;  the  latter,  mountain,  rocket,  siege,  garrison,  and  sea-coast 
batteries. 

Up  to  this  time  the  term  "  heavy,"  in  the  artillery  nomenclature,  referred  to 
materiel  only,  and  there  was  no  confusion  of  ideas  as  to  what  it  meant ;  but 
during  the  Civil  war,  the  designation  "heavy"  was  given  several  regiments  of 
volunteers  raised  to  serve  siege  and  sea-coast  guns.  Right  here,  and  under 
the  sanction  of  the  highest  military  authority  of  the  Government,  the  practice 
began  of  using  the  same  term — heavy — to  designate  both  personnel  and  mate- 
riel. However  objectionable  this  may  be,  tending  to  confusion  and  being 
unnecessary,  it  has,  for  the  present  at  least,  fixed  itself  upon  the  service. 


TACTICS:  GENERALLY.  311 

result  from  a  system  of  manoeuvres  adapted  to  this  (heavy) 
branch  of  the  artillery,  the  recognition  of  the  fact  that  this  is 
a  distinct  part  of  the  military  service,  subject  to  rules  peculiar 
to  itself,  is  not  only  conducive  to  discipline,  but  creates  and 
strengthens  a  pride  in  their  own  arm,  by  reminding  soldie_rs 
that  they  are  not  simply  infantry  in  artillery  garb,  but  that  they 
are  in  fact  artillerymen. 

The  remaining  articles  of  the  Manual — (i)  Artillery  against 
Armored  Vessels  and  in  Harbor  Defense,  (2)  Attack  and  Defense  of 
Intrenched  Positions,  (3)  Field  Intrenchments,  (4)  Submarine 
Mines,  (5)  Salutes  and  Ceremonies — are  important  and  practically 
useful,  and  add  to  the  completeness  of  the  work  as  a  valuable 
course  of  instruction. 

To  the  credit  of  the  artillery  school  let  it  be  remembered  that 
principally  through  its  instrumentality  is  due  the  fact  that  the 
scope  and  value  of  Tidball's  Manual,  when  compared  with  its 
predecessors — the  various  heavy  artillery  tactics — may  be  taken  to 
measure  quite  accurately  the  interest  in  and  knowledge  of  their 
profession,  which  characterized  officers  of  the  artillery  at  the 
epochs,  respectively,  at  which  they  were  written  and  issued  for 
the  use  of  the  army. 


312      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF  THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

TACTICS:   FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

Except  for  a  few  pieces  mentioned  in  Tousard's  Artillerists' 
Companion,  no  trace  has  been  preserved  of  the  field-artillery 
exercise  of  the  Revolutionary  war.  There  is  the  best  authority 
for  the  statement  that  there  was  in  this  matter  no  uniformity, 
either  prescribed  or  practiced.  In  the  introduction  to  Stevens' 
System  of  Discipline,  it  is  remarked: 

"  Several  authors  have  written  on  the  theoretical  part  of  artillery,  but  the 
manual  exercise  of  field-artillery  has  been  transmitted  by  tradition,  which  ac- 
counts in  some  measure  for  the  variety  in  this  part  of  their  duty  among  artil- 
lerists. It  is  therefore  absolutely  necessary  to  have  a  uniformity  in  the 
exercise  of  artillery,  there  not  being  any  in  particular  adopted,  but  every  offi- 
cer teaching  the  men  he  exercises  according  to  the  traditional  idea  he  forms  of 
this  part  of  his  duty." 

As  Stevens  was  a  captain  in  the  regular  artillery  during  the 
Revolution,  his  word  on  the  subject  must  be  accepted  as  con- 
clusive; but  he  states  that,  in  1779,  General  Knox  had  the  field 
officers  of  artillery  draw  up  a  plan  for  manoeuvring  a  regiment 
of  infantry  with  field-pieces  attached,  whereby  the  whole  moved 
and  the  firings  took  place  by  beat  of  drum.  Stevens  does  not 
state  what  these  manoeuvres  were,  but  Tousard  gives  those  of 
two  pieces  attached  to  and  parading  with  a  battalion;  from  which 
it  appears  that  in  both  line  and  column  the  guns  with  their  tum- 
brels were  held  on  either  flank.  From  necessity  the  exercise  was 
simple  in  nature;  the  pieces  were  hauled  by  drag-ropes  manned 
by  artillerymen,  for  which  purpose  there  was  supplied  the  requisite 
number  to  each  piece  in  excess  of  those  needed  for  the  manual. 

For  the  service  of  the  light  brass  6-pounder  in  action  there 
were  required  one  commissioned  officer,  one  sergeant,  one  cor- 
poral, two  gunners,  and  twelve  matrosses.  This  does  not  include 
the  drivers,  who  as  a  rule  were  hired  with  their  teams.  For  the 
service  of  the  5)^ -inch  howitzer  there  were  necessary  one  com- 
missioned officer,  one  sergeant,  one  corporal,  two  bombardiers, 
and  ten  matrosses.  In  the  manual  of  the  6-pounders,  numbers 
i  and  2  stood  in  front  of  and  close  to  the  axle,  between  the 


TACTICS:  FIELD  ARTILLERY.  313 

wheel  and  the  piece ;  numbers  3  and  4  supplied  number  2  with 
ammunition  from  the  two  side-boxes  which,  when  the  pieces 
were  unlimbered,  were  taken  from  their  axle-seats  on  either 
side  of  the  piece  and  placed  three  yards  in  rear  of  the  end  of 
the  trail  handspike;  numbers  5  to  12,  both  inclusive,  maimed- 
the  drag-ropes;  number  i  sponged  and  rammed;  number  2 
placed  ammunition  in  the  bore;  the  first  gunner  (on  the  right) 
tended  vent  and  primed;  the  second  gunner  (on  the  left)  fired 
the  piece  with  port-fire  and  lintstock;  the  corporal  pointed; 
the  sergeant  was  chief,  and  took  charge  of  the  piece;  the  com- 
missioned officer  supervised  the  whole,  including  the  supply 
of  ammunition.  The  commands  of  the  instructor  in  the  man- 
ual of  the  piece  were :  (i)  Attention.  (2)  Unlimber  piece. 
(3)  Secure  side-boxes.  (4)  Man  out  the  piece.  (5)  From  right 
to  left,  dress.  (6)  Advance  sponge.  (7)  Tend  vent.  (8)  Sponge 
piece.  (9)  Handle  cartridge.  (10)  Charge  piece,  (u)  Ram 
down  cartridge.  (12)  Prime.  (13)  Take  aim.  (14)  Fire.  To 
limber  from  this  position  the  commands  were:  (i)  Unhook  drag- 
ropes.  (2)  Mount  side-boxes.  (3)  Limber  piece.  (4)  Shoulder 
rammer.  (5)  Carry  lintstock.  In  the  manoeuvres,  unlimbered, 
three  men  carried  the  side-boxes,  always  keeping  in  rear  of  the 
trail.  When  prepared  for  action,  the  drag-ropes  were  '  manned 
out'  in  prolongation  of  the  axle-tree  of  the  gun-carriage;  when 
moving  in  advance  they  were  fastened  to  the  washer-hooks  of 
the  wheels;  when  in  retreat,  to  the  trail-hooks. 

The  field  artillery  of  the  Revolution  could  in  no  sense  be  termed 
light.  It  had  little  mobility;  nor  was  that  prime  consideration  of 
the  present  day  deemed  necessary.  Artillery  tactics  embraced 
the  manual  of  the  piece,  with  a  few  of  the  simplest  manoeuvres. 
The  first  system  that  divorced  the  field-gun  from  the  drag-rope 
was  the  horse  artillery  manoeuvres  of  General  Kosciusko.  It 
was  in  1808  translated  from  the  French  by  Colonel  Jonathan 
Williams,  superintendent  of  the  Military  Academy,  and,  so  far  as 
is  known,  was  the  first  artillery  tactics  recognized  as  authority  by 
the  War  Department,  two  hundred  copies  being  distributed  to 
troops  and  fifty  copies  being  purchased  for  the  use  of  cadets 
at  West  Point.  As,  owing  to  this  circumstance,  the  work 
occupies  an  interesting  place  in  artillery  literature,  a  brief  yet 
more  extended  notice  of  it  here  will  not  be  out  of  place. 

Written  in  1800,  but  a  few  years  after  the  introduction  of  horse 
40 


314      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

artillery  into  the  French  army,  and  before  its  organization  in  our 
own,  this  system  of  manoeuvres  was  not  properly  a  treatise  on  the 
functions  and  uses  of  that  species  of  troops,  but  rather  a  short  me- 
moir, such  as  a  distinguished  soldier  could  find  time  in  leisure 
moments  to  write  for  a  friend,  being  in  some  places  so  obscure  that 
translator's  notes  were  necessary  to  render  it  coherent  and  intelli- 
gible. The  movements  were  thirty  in  number;  were  crudely,  often 
erroneously,  illustrated;  yet  furnished  in  a  manner  clear  enough 
for  practical  purposes  all  that  was  necessary  to  enable  a  battery  to 
manoeuvre  in  face  of  the  enemy.  The  habitual  formations  were  not 
arranged  to  their  three  natural  orders — line,  column,  and  in  bat- 
tery— as  has  been  the  case  in  all  subsequent  tactics;  but  these 
orders  evolved  themselves  without  effort  from  the  manoeuvres, 
which  covered  what  at  the  time  was  considered  to  be  the  whole 
science  of  field-artillery  tactics,  illustrating  as  they  did  how,  with 
the  utmost  facility  and  precision,  to  advance  and  retreat  in  column 
and  in  line  of  battle ;  to  fire  both  while  advancing  and  retreating 
in  line;  to  form  front  in  any  direction,  both  from  line  and  column; 
and  to  change  front  from  line  to  fire  either  to  the  right  or  left. 

The  prolonge  had  now  superseded  the  drag-rope;  the  Gribeau- 
val  had  supplanted  the  obsolete  system  of  the  Revolution;  mo- 
bility had  been  thereby  increased,  and  yet,  when  compared  with 
those  of  the  present  day,  Kosciusko's  horse  batteries  were  but 
little  deserving  the  name  of  light  artillery.  Arriving  at  the  field  of 
exercise  or  in  presence  of  the  enemy,  the  prolonge  was  fixed  and 
used  in  all  manoeuvres.  The  habitual  column  of  manoeuvre  was 
that  of  a  front  of  two  pieces,  or  double  column,  formed  from  line 
by  advancing  the  centre,  though  it  might  be  formed  by  throwing 
forward  either  the  right  or  left;  but  although  the  double 
column  was  preferred,  manoeuvring  in  single  column  was  like- 
wise provided  for  equally  with  the  other.  Instead  of  each  gun 
being,  in  all  formations,  immediately  followed  or  preceded  by  its 
caisson — a  practice  introduced  by  Lallemand — the  pieces  were 
grouped  together,  while  the  caissons  formed  another  and  distinct 
group.  Advancing  in  column  and  in  line,  the  group  of  pieces 
preceded  that  of  the  caissons;  in  retreat,  the  caissons  preceded. 
.  The  principle  of  inversions  was  rigidly  adhered  to — Anderson,  in 
1839,  being  the  first  to  disregard  it.  The  original  right  and  left 
of  the  battery  retained,  therefore,  these  designations,  no  matter 
what  the  formations  might  be.  In  column,  the  mounted  gun 


TACTICS:  FIELD  ARTILLERY.  315 

detachment  marched  in  single-file  on  either  side  of  the  teams  of 
the  pieces;  in  line  of  battle  they  moved  in  the  same  order  in  the 
tracks  of  the  gun-carriage  wheels.  There  were  no  horse-holders. 
When  the  men  dismounted  to  serve  the  pieces  they  gave  the  reins 
of  their  horses  to  the  drivers  of  the  gun-carriage  teams  or  tied_ 
them  to  the  limbers.  Kosciusko  favored  the  double  column  on 
the  centre  as  that  of  manoeuvre,  for  the  reason  that  it  was  more 
quickly  formed  than  any  other;  and  while  this  is  true,  the  objec- 
tion that  thereby  some  of  the  lieutenants  have  their  commands 
oroken  up,  has,  in  the  minds  of  other  tacticians,  outweighed  this 
advantage.  Lallemand  did  not  use  it;  and  though  restored  by 
Anderson,  and  since  retained,  it  has  been  considered  rather  in  the 
light  of  an  exceptional  movement,  to  be  resorted  to  only  under 
particular  circumstances. 

The  horse-artillery  manoeuvres  of  Major  Stoddard  were  those 
of  Kosciusko,  only  slightly  modified,  so  as  the  more  readily  to 
adapt  them  to  the  American  light  artillery,  and  therefore  need 
not  be  further  noticed. 

In  forming  the  men  dismounted  for  service  at  the  pieces, 
Stoddard,  as  is  the  case  to-day,  divided  both  field  and  horse 
artillerymen  into  sections,  but  the  sections  were  only  gun  detach- 
ments in  fact,  each  being  composed  of  one  non-commissioned 
officer  and  eight  matrosses.  The  non-commissioned  officer, 
styled  section  officer,  was  a  functionary  similar  to  his  successor — 
the  chief  of  piece,  or  the  present  chief  of  section.  The  matrosses 
were  numbered  in  substantially  the  same  way  as  practiced  since, 
viz.,  numbers  i  and  3,  gunner  of  the  right,  and  number  5,  in  the 
rear  rank;  numbers  2  and  4,  gunner  of  the  left,  and  number  6, 
in  the  front  rank.  Although  in  field  as  in  horse  artillery,  manoeu- 
vring with  the  prolonge  was  recommended,  supernumeraries, 
numbered  from  9  to  14,  inclusive,  were,  in  the  former,  added  for 
the  service  of  each  piece,  for  dragging  which,  when  the  prolonge 
was  not  at  hand,  every  man  of  the  section  carried  a  bricole.  The 
manual  was  an  adaptation  of  American  drill  to  the  Gribeauval 
system  of  carriage,  then  but  recently  introduced  into  the  service. 
The  duties  of  the  different  numbers  were  nearly  the  same  as 
during  the  Revolution,  the  only  difference  being  that  the  small 
ammunition-box,  carried  between  the  flanks  of  the  trail  in  the 
Gribeauval  system,  had  taken  the  place  of  the  side  boxes  formerly 
in  vogue.  Eighteen  rounds  were  carried  in  the  movable  ammu- 


316      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF   THE    ARTILLERY,   U.   S.   ARMY. 

nition-box,  while  in  the  ammunition  wagon,  which,  "  in  battery," 
was  placed  fifty  yards  behind  the  piece,  there  were  eighty-eight 
rounds  for  the  6-pounder,  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  for  the 
4-pounder. 

Comparing  the  exercises  of  1812,  as  presented  in  Stoddard, 
with  those  of  the  Revolution,  set  forth  in  a  fragmentary  manner 
by  Tousard  and  Stevens,  it  is  evident  that  the  mobility  of  field 
artillery  had  been  increased.  Tin's  was  rendered  possible  by  two 
circumstances:  First,  the  gradual  introduction,  under  Secreta- 
ries Dearborn  and  Eustis,  of  the  Gribeauval  system  of  artillery; 
second,  placing  in  the  hands  of  troops  a  system  of  manoeuvres 
for  its  proper  and  efficient  management.  The  drag-rope  had 
given  way  to  the  prolonge;  the  burden  had  been  removed  from 
the  backs  of  men  and  placed  on  the  backs  of  horses. 

As  was  natural  at  a  time  when  knowledge  of  professional  sub- 
jects could  scarcely  be  obtained  in  this  country  for  love  or  money, 
the  organization  and  management  of  horse  artillery  was,  in  the 
early  days  of  the  century,  clouded  in  an  atmosphere  of  mystery. 
One  of  the  services  rendered  by  Stoddard  was  to  clear  this  away, 
by  showing  that  the  only  difference  between  what  were  known  as 
field  and  horse  artillery  lay  in  the  circumstance  that  in  the  latter 
the  cannoneers,  to  facilitate  rapid  movements,  rode  on  horses, 
while  in  the  former  they  walked  by  the  sides  of  their  pieces. 
Plain  as  this  now  appears,  it  was  then  an  important  point  to  have 
established  and  clearly  understood,  and  it  greatly  simplified  to 
the  artillerymen  of  that  day  the  whole  subject  of  light  artillery 
manoeuvres. 

Following  this  idea,  Lallemand  made  the  manoeuvres  applica- 
ble directly  to  dismounted  detachments  (field  artillery),  indi- 
cating, in  the  few  instances  requiring  it,  the  special  movements 
necessary  for  the  horse  artillerymen.  This  plan  has  been  fol- 
lowed by  subsequent  authors,  and  it  has  greatly  facilitated  a 
comprehension  of  the  whole  matter,  for  all  the  horse-artillery 
detachment  has  to  do,  as  a  rule,  is  to  follow  directly  in  rear  of  its 
piece,  while  the  latter  moves  in  the  field-artillery  evolutions. 

Understanding  from  experience  the  value  of  correct  principles 
of  organization,  Lallemand  paid  great  attention  to  this  part  of  his 
treatise.  The  company,  dismounted,  was  formed  into  detach- 
ments, each  containing  a  number  depending  on  the  service  re- 
quired, but  generally  consisting  of  eight  men,  told  off  as  1,2,  3,  4, 


TACTICS:    FIELD    ARTILLERY.  317 

gunner  of  the  right,  gunner  of  the  left,  7,  8.  In  addition,  there 
were  attached  to  each  detachment  one  non-commissioned  officer 
or  artificer,  who  had  charge  of  the  caisson,  and  another  non- 
commissioned officer  who  was  chief  of  piece. 

The  general  principles  on  which  the  battery  was  organized  for 
manoeuvre  were  carefully  and  clearly  presented.  The  duties  of 
each  person  holding  a  position  of  responsibility  were  minutely  set 
forth.  The  term  'section,'  to  indicate  two  pieces  with  their  cais-. 
sons,  was  first  introduced.  The  important  post  of  chief  of  caissons, 
intrusted  by  Stoddard  to  a  sergeant  or  a  cadet,  was  conferred  by 
Lallemand  upon  a  commissioned  officer.  Two  non-commissioned 
officers  were  used  as  special  guides  or  markers.  Upon  them, 
when  forming  line,  the  wheel  horses  of  the  leading  carriages  were 
dressed.  In  double  column,  they  moved  four  feet  in  advance  of 
the  leading  team  of  each  column  of  carriages.  These  special 
guides  disappeared  from  our  tactics  with  Lallemand's  treatise. 

When  formed  in  line  the  pieces,  sections,  and  half-batteries  had 
permanent  numerical  designations,  commencing  on  the  right, 
which  they  retained  under  all  circumstances.  The  principle  of 
inversions,  with  all  its  inconveniences,  was  therefore  fully  recog- 
nized. This  converted  the  battery  into  what,  compared  with  the 
battery  of  these  days,  might  be  called  a  rigid  system.  Advancing 
in  column  and  in  line,  the  piece  preceded  the  caisson;  in  retreat, 
the  caisson  preceded  the  piece.  Any  formation  which  inverted 
the  original  order  of  the  carriages  was  considered  an  inconvenience, 
to  be  escaped  from  as  soon  as  possible. 

The  formations  of  the  battery  in  the  three  natural  orders  for 
manoeuvre — column,  line,  in  battery — were  here  first  fully  elabor- 
ated. The  processes  by  which  passage  was  made  from  one  to 
the  other  were  unfolded  in  an  easy,  natural  manner,  thus  enabling 
the  essential  features  of  battery  exercise  to  be  taken  in  at  a  glance. 
The  single  column  of  pieces  was  never  used  for  manoeuvre;  and 
though  column  of  half  batteries  was  permitted,  that  of  sections, 
formed  by  breaking  line  forward  from  either  the  right  or  left,  but 
never  from  the  centre,  was  habitually  used.  Like  Stoddard, 
Lallemand  presupposed  that  the  system  of  artillery  employed 
would  be  the  Gribeauval ;  but  he  went  a  step  further,  and  intro- 
duced the  French  manual  of  the  piece,  which  was  practiced  until 
supplanted  by  the  instructions  of  1845.  By  this,  numbers  i  and 
2,  acting  together,  handled  the  sponge  and  rammer;  and  while 


318      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF    THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

advantageous  for  large  guns  or  small  men,  it  was  not  necessary, 
and,  for  ordinary  field-guns,  could  by  no  means  be  considered  an 
improvement  on  the  old  method.  Numbers  4,  7,  and  8  supplied 
ammunition;  the  gunner  of  the  right  commanded  during  the 
manual  exercise;  number  3  served  vent  and  primed,  while  the 
gunner  of  the  left  fired  the  piece. 

Whether  the  guns  should  be  grouped  together,  distinct  from 
the  caissons,  as  practiced  by  Kosciusko,  or  whether  each  should 
be  either  followed  or  preceded  by  its  caisson,  were  questions  upon 
which  artillerists  at  that  time  were  divided.  Lallemand  adopted 
the  latter  plan,  which  has  been  followed  since.  The  horse  artil- 
lery detachment  was  moved  from  the  place  assigned  it  by  Stod- 
dard,  placed  two  paces  in  rear  of  the  muzzle  of  the  piece,  when 
limbered,  and  horse-holders  were  introduced. 

Lallemand  added  to  the  battery  manoeuvres  'on  right  into 
battery, '  closing  intervals  in  line,  exercises  with  closed  intervals, 
the  passage  of  obstacles  and  defiles.  His  style  of  commands  was 
vastly  superior  to  Kosciusko' s;  but,  with  the  exceptions  just 
noted,  his  battery  exercise  was  essentially  the  same  as  that  of 
the  latter. 

Considering  the  reputation  and  great  experience  of  General 
Lallemand,  it  might  appear  from  a  casual  examination  of  his  work 
that  he  paid  but  little  attention  to  the  exercise  and  evolutions  of 
artillery;  but  it  must  not  be  lost  sight  of  that  his  was  a  treatise 
on  the  art,  science,  as  well  as  the  practice  of  artillery  in  all  its 
branches,  rather  than  a  tactics  in  any  proper  sense  of  the  term: 
the  geometrical  problem  of  the  movements  of  a  battery  being 
but  an  incident,  and  no  doubt  in  the  author's  mind  a  compara- 
tively unimportant  one,  in  the  main  plan  of  his  work.  It  was 
adopted  as  a  text-book,  for  the  reason  that,  notwithstanding  its 
recognized  imperfections,  it  was  the  best  that  could  be  had.  No 
sooner,  however,  as  has  been  mentioned,  was  it  apparent  to  the 
War  Department  that  the  militia,  through  the  translation  of  the 
manual  of  the  Garde  Royale,  were  about  to  be  supplied  with  a 
plan  of  instruction  superior  to  that  of  the  regular  artillery,  than 
efforts  were  energetically  begun  to  secure  for  the  latter  the  per- 
fect system  of  Gribeauval — materiel,  tactics,  and  all — a  task,  so 
far  as  tactics  were  concerned,  intrusted  to  Lieutenant  Tyler, 
executed  by  him,  and  the  results  given  to  the  army  just  as  that 
celebrated  system  had  been  pronounced  obsolete. 


TACTICS:    FIELD   ARTILLERY.  319 

Between  1830,  when  the  Government  was  furnished  with  draw- 
ings of  the  newly-adopted  French  system  of  artillery,  and  1839, 
when  Anderson's  translation  of  the  field  manoeuvres  appeared, 
the  new  had  gradually  supplanted  the  old  style  of  materiel. 
This  translation  was  for  the  stock-trail  what  Lieutenant  Tylerls  _ 
translation  of  the  whole  French  tactics  had  been  for  the  Gri- 
beauval  system,  viz.,  a  plain  presentation  of  the  principles  of 
organization  and  manoeuvre,  by  which  it  was  to  be  prepared  for 
and  made  available  on  the  field  of  battle.  It  embraced  the  school 
of  the  piece,  including  the  manual  and  the  mechanical  manoeu- 
vres; school  of  the  cannoneer,  mounted;  school  of  the  driver; 
school  of  the  battery.  As  with  Lallemand's  Treatise,  the  text 
was  directly  applicable  to  foot  (field  artillery),  the  variations 
necessary  for  horse  artillery  being  noted  as  they  occurred.  No 
instruction  was  given  in  squad  drill  or  that  of  the  soldier  dis- 
mounted, reference  being  made  for  what  was  needed  to  the 
infantry  tactics.  The  school  of  the  cannoneer,  mounted,  embraced 
but  the  simplest  elements  of  cavalry  exercise.  The  system,  in 
the  matter  of  rudimentary  instruction,  was  therefore  defective — a 
remark  equally  true  of  all  others  prior  to  that  given  the  service 
in  1860. 

The  school  of  the  driver  embraced  (i)  exercises  of  couples  un- 
hitched and  (2)  exercise  of  several  pieces  horsed.  It  was  an  ex- 
tension of  Lallemand's  school  of  the  battle  piece,  and  formed 
altogether  a  very  admirable  preparatory  instruction  for  the 
school  of  the  battery. 

The  cannoneers  for  the  service  of  one  piece  and  its  caisson  were 
styled  a  platoon.  They  were  paraded  in  two  ranks,  as  at  present — 
numbers  i,  3,  gunner  of  the  right,  and  5  in  rear,  and  served  on 
the  right  of  the  piece  unlimbered;  numbers  2,  4,  gunner  of  the 
left,  and  6  in  front,  and  served  on  the  left.  In  the  school  of  the 
piece,  as  in  Lallemand,  numbers  i  and  2,  working  together, 
handled  the  sponge ;  3  fired,  using  port-fire  and  lintstock ;  gun- 
ner of  the  right  pointed;  gunner  of  the  left  tended  vent;  4,  5,  6 
supplied  number  2  with  ammunition.  The  practice  of  dividing 
the  loading  exercise  into  motions,  separated  by  pauses,  together 
with  moving  the  piece,  unlimbered,  by  hand  to  the  front  and  rear, 
were  here  introduced.  Changing  wheel  and  carrying  piece  on  its 
limber  were  added  to  the  mechanical  manoeuvres;  and,  as  con- 
templated in  the  new  style  of  carriage,  provision  was  made  for 


32O      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE  ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

mounting  the  cannoneers  on  the  ammunition  chests,  and  for  dis- 
mounting them.  In  the  school  of  the  battery  the  double  column 
was,  as  usual,  the  habitual  column  of  manoeuvre,  and  under  cer- 
tain circumstances  column  of  half  batteries  was  used,  but  never 
the  single  column  of  pieces.*  Combining  the  practice  of  Kosci- 
usko  and  Lallemand,  Anderson  (as  have  his  successors)  formed 
the  double  column  from  line  by  moving  forward  either  the  centre 
or  either  flank. 

Anderson's  translation  introduced  several  new  and  important 
principles  of  manoeuvre.  They  were — (i)  disregarding  inversions, 
thereby  causing  the  designation  of  pieces  to  depend,  not  upon 
their  original,  but  upon  their  actual  positions  in  line  or  column  ; 
(2)  the  passage  of  carriages;  (3)  the  countermarch;  (4)  using  the 
movable  pivot  only,  with  the  guide  towards  the  pivot;  (5)  dis- 
pensing with  general  or  special  guides.  These  principles,  which 
were  mostly  rendered  practicable  through  the  discarding  of  the 
prolonge  (except  for  firing  in  retreat,)  greatly  added  to  the  flexi- 
bility of  the  mass;  and  now  it  could  be  said  with  truth  that  mo- 
bility in  a  correct  sense  for  field  artillery  was  first  secured. 

The  habitual  formations — column,  line,  in  battery — were  in 
detail  of  execution  somewhat  different  from  Lallemand.  '  In 
battery '  the  horses,  except  when  firing  in  retreat,  faced  as  they 
do  now — towards  the  enemy.  In  Lallemand  they  faced  from  the 
enemy.  As  in  other  arms  of  service,  both  the  column  and  the 
line  were  used  as  a  basis  of  manoeuvre.  The  reciprocal  move- 
ments of  passing  from  qolumn  into  line,  and  conversely,  were  first 
explained.  This  was  followed  by  the  formations  'in  battery  '- 
first  from  line  and  then  from  column.  The  passage  of  carriages, 
the  countermarch,  and  the  disregarding  inversions  permitted  an 
almost  unlimited  variation  of  former  manoeuvres,  while  '  right  (or 
left)  front  into  line,  faced  to  the  rear,'  was  added  to  those  already 
authorized.  The  intricate  changes  of  front  were  carefully  ex- 

*  Since  Kosciusko's  time  the  single  column  for  manoeuvring  has  been  either 
wholly  or  partially  discarded.  Lallemand,  Anderson,  and  the  'assimilation' 
proscribe  it.  The  instructions  of  1845  and  of  1860  recognize  the  fact  that  it 
might  be  necessary  to  manoeuvre  from  single  column,  and  stated  how,  when 
necessary,  it  should  be  done.  Kosciusko  was  in  this  matter  wiser  than  those 
who  have  succeeded  him. 

In  the  United  States  the  single  file  of  carriages  is  the  natural  column  of 
march,  as  the  roads  and  topography,  in  nineteen  cases  out  of  twenty,  do  not, 


TACTICS:    FIELD    ARTILLERY.  321 

plained  and  illustrated — an  example  followed  by  others,  until  the 
assimilated  tactics,  where  they  are  impotently  left  to  be  executed 
according  to  the  whim  of  each  battery  commander.  The  terms 
'interval'  and  'distance'  were  introduced,  and  so  calculated 
that  the  various  changes  of  formation  occupied  the  least  possible 
space.  Another  noticeable  feature  of  Anderson  was  the  character 
of  the  illustrations,  which  were  numerous,  exact,  and,  compared 
with  any  that  had  preceded  them,  elegant. 

For  the  field  artillery  the  year  1839  was  an  important  epoch. 
One  company  in  each  of  the  four  regular  regiments  had  been  at 
last  equipped  as  contemplated  by  the  reorganizing  act  of  1821. 
The  completion  and  issue  to  troops  of  carriages  upon  the  new 
system  had  not  only  increased  immensely  the  mobility  of  both 
foot  and  horse  artillery,  but  the  mounting  of  cannoneers  on 
limbers  and  caissons,  as  provided  for  the  former,  had  practically 
well-nigh  annihilated  the  difference  between  them,  so  far  as 
facility  of  movement  was  concerned.  Simultaneously  with  the 
providing  a  properly-equipped  personnel,  there  was  furnished  in 
Anderson's  work  a  very  complete  course  of  instruction,  giving 
the  details  of  field  artillery  organization  for  purposes  of  manoeu- 
vre, as  well  as  the  manoeuvres  themselves,  thus  adding,  so  far  as 
a  course  of  instruction  could  do,  all  that  was  needed  to  place  this 
arm  upon  a  proper  footing  for  service. 

The  circumstances  leading  to  the  revision  of  Anderson's  in- 
structions, which  appeared  in  1845,  have  been  detailed.  And 
notwithstanding  the  excellence  of  Anderson's  work,  if  proof  were 
needed  of  the  wisdom  of  the  changes  then  (1845)  made,  it  is 
found  in  the  fact  that  now,  after  being  continuously  in  use  for 
forty  years,  they  are  found  embodied  almost  literally  in  the  light 
artillery  tactics  of  the  present  day. 

The  new  instructions  (1845)  embraced  the  three  schools  of  the 

for  any  distance,  admit  of  two  carriages  moving  abreast.  Hence  it  almost 
always  happens  that  the  single  column  is  that  in  which  the  battery  will  ap- 
proach its  position  on  the  battle-field.  In  view  of  this  fact,  it  is  remarkable 
that  the  present  light  artillery  tactics,  being  a  revision  after  the  Civil  war  of 
the  instructions  of  I860,  and  purporting  to  contain  the  practical  suggestions 
gathered  in  that  eventful  struggle,  does  not  explain  the  manner  of  forming 
directly  'in  battery'  from  single  column,  although,  should  a  battery  take  the 
field,  the  chances  are  that,  if  marching  at  the  head  of  the  column,  this  is  the 
first  manoeuvre  it  would  be  required  to  perform  in  presence  of  the  enemy. 

41 


322      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

piece,  the  driver,  and  the  battery.  The  school  of  the  cannoneer 
mounted  of  Anderson  was  suppressed,  and,  for  the  preliminary 
instruction  needed  in  those  branches  of  service,  reference  was 
made  to  the  cavalry  and  infantry  tactics. 

In  the  school  of  the  piece,  the  French  manual,  introduced  by 
Lallemand  and  followed  by  Anderson,  was  discarded,  and  that 
at  present  in  use  adopted.  Previous  to*  this  two  gunners  had 
always  been  told  off  to  each  gun  detachment.  This  was  so  not 
only  in  the  French,  but  the  old  American  service.  Now  one 
sufficed.  Instead  of  numbers  i  and  2  working  together,  number 
i  alone  handled  the  sponge  and  rammer.  In  the  manual  the 
movement  of  detachments  to  the  front,  rear,  right,  and  left  of  the 
piece  limbered  were  introduced,  while  dismounting  and  mounting 
carriages  appeared  as  a  new  feature  of  the  mechanical  manoeuvres. 

Aside  from  the  changes  indicated,  the  most  important  difference 
between  the  old  and  the  new  systems  of  instruction  consisted  in 
the  introduction  of  the  'actions'  (right,  left,  and  front)  and  the 
manoeuvres  depending  on  them,  thus  perfecting  that  mobility 
which,  since  the  practice  of  Anderson's  new  principles  of  ma- 
noeuvre, had  characterized  the  movements  of  field  artillery  bat- 
teries. Pieces  could  now  be  brought  '  in  battery '  to  the  front, 
right  or  left,  when  on  the  line  they  were  to  occupy  in  action,  by 
the  gun  detachments  simply  turning  the  carriages  on  their  own 
ground,  thus,  if  desired,  effecting  an  important  saving  of  time  at 
a  critical  moment.  The  '  reverse '  was  for  the  first  time  employed, 
and  to  facilitate  the  execution  of  the  manoeuvre  of  coming  into 
'action'  (right,  left,  and  front).  Throwing  the  caissons  on  the 
flank  of  the  pieces  while  in  column,  with  the  formations  '  in  battery ' 
from  this  position,  was  now  for  the  first  time  also  authorized. 

The  style  of  commands  was  a  great  improvement  on  Anderson, 
being  briefer,  yet  clearer.  As  adding  to  the  value  of  the  work 
as  a  course  of  instruction,  the  careful  drawings  of  the  new  style 
of  carriage,  with  proper  explanations  thereof,  deserve  notice. 
Anderson's  translation  had  not  given  these,  which  are  neces- 
sary to  any  finished  work  of  this  nature.  The  most  important 
improvements,  however,  wrought  by  the  Instruction  of  1845 
consisted  in  the  changes  in  the  manual  exercise  and  in  the  intro- 
duction of  the  manoeuvres  '  action '  (right,  left,  and  for  coming 
into  front). 

Reference  has  been  made  to  the  circumstances  which  caused 


TACTICS:    FIELD    ARTILLERY.  323 

the  preparation  of  the  Instruction  of  1860  and  to  the  scope  of 
that  work.  In  the  various  schools — of  the  piece,  the  section,  and 
the  battery — the  preliminary  principles  were  stated  with  a  clearness 
and  fullness  that  left  nothing  to  be  desired.  For  exercise  without 
the  guns  the  company  in  double  rank  was  formed  into  detach- 
ments, of  which  those,  charged  with  the  particular  duties  of  the 
service  of  the  pieces  were  designated  gun  detachments.  On  the 
left  of  each  gun  detachment,  when  paraded,  were  the  drivers 
and  others  appertaining  to  the  piece  with  its  caisson,  the  whole 
divided  into  sets  of  eight  men  each,  and  constituting  with  that 
detachment  the  platoon.  Two  platoons  formed  a  section.  Ma- 
noeuvring by  detachment  was,  therefore,  in  all  respects  similar  to 
the  movements  by  sets  of  fours,  which  form  the  basis  of  the 
present  infantry  and  cavalry  tactics.  This  is  all  the  more  apparent 
in  Tidball's  Manual,  where  the  principles  of  the  artillery  instruc- 
tions of  1860  and  the  form  of  the  present  infantry  tactics  are 
blended,  the  commands  '  detachment  right, '  '  right  forward,  de- 
tachment right,'  &c.,  replacing  the  movements  by  fours  of  the 
infantry. 

In  the  mere  battery  manoeuvres  there  was  very  little  difference 
between  the  Instruction  of  1 860  and  its  predecessor.  Bricoles  were 
entirely  dispensed  with,  no  provision  being  made,  as  had  always 
been  the  case  before,  for  their  use  under  any  circumstances.  For 
short  distances  the  movements  by  hand,  both  unlimbered  and 
limbered — the  former  introduced  by  Anderson  and  the  latter  in 
1860 — had  rendered  bricoles  unnecessary,  while  for  long  distances 
horses  were  put  in  requisition.  In  Anderson  and  the  Instruction  of 
1845  the  guide,  in  obliquing,  had  always  been  on  the  side  opposite 
to  that  towards  which  the  movement  was  made.  For  instance,  if 
obliquing  towards  the  right,  the  guide  was  left;  and  vice  versa. 
This  was  now  changed,  the  guide,  as  it  has  remained  since,  being 
placed  on  the  side  towards  which  the  oblique  was  made.  In  the 
school  of  the  battery  the  guidon  was  introduced,  and  his  func- 
tions made  somewhat  similar  to  those  of  the  general  guides  of 
Lallemand.  Contrary  to  the  practice  of  Anderson  and  the  In- 
struction of  1845,  the  chief  of  caissons  was,  in  column,  placed  on 
the  side  opposite  the  captain. 

It  was  more  particularly  in  a  clear  exposition  of  the  principles 
on  which  field  artillery  rested,  both  as  regards  organization  and 
service,  both  in  war  and  in  peace,  in  campaign  as  well  as  on  the 


324      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,   U.  S.   ARMY. 

field  of  exercise,  and  in  its  entire  independence  of  other  tactics, 
that  the  Instruction  of  1860  surpassed  all  that  had  preceded  it. 
The  equipment  of  a  battery,  both  in  personnel  and  materiel;  and 
its  management,  both  as  a  school  for  subalterns  and  under  all  cir- 
cumstances of  war,  marches,  transportation,  encampment,  and 
conduct  in  action,  were  fully  and  clearly  laid  down  with  many 
practical  suggestions — the  result  of  experience  in  the  field. 

There  was,  however,  in  the  Instruction  of  1860  a  defect  which 
has  been  corrected  in  its  successor,  the  present  assimilated  artil- 
lery tactics.  It  was  an  attempt  to  generalize  too  much  in  the 
arrangement  of  details.  While  generalizations,  properly  pre- 
sented, facilitate  the  understanding  of  a  complex  subject,  by 
placing  the  salient  points  in  bold  relief  before  the  mind,  they 
cannot  be  carried  too  far  without  defeating  their  object,  which 
is,  to  make  easy  the  ready  comprehension  of  important  features, 
around  which  naturally,  and  with  little  mental  effort,  details 
may  be  left  to  arrange  themselves.  There  should,  therefore, 
be  a  direct  and  obvious  connection  between  the  main  head 
and  the  subordinate  heads  grouped  under  it;  but  this  in  the 
instructions  in  question  was  sometimes  wanting. 

Leaving  out  of  consideration  the  articles  on  organization, 
materiel,  and  service,  the  subject-matter  of  instruction  was  ar- 
ranged under  (i)  the  'school  of  the  piece,'  (2)  'school  of  the 
section, '  and  (3)  '  school  of  the  battery ' ;  but  except  the  last, 
it  was  not  possible,  without  examination,  to  divine  what  subjects 
were  classified  under  each.  The  'school  of  the  piece,'  for 
instance,  embraced  (i)  cannoneers  dismounted,  (2)  manual  and 
exercise  of  the  sabre,  (3)  exercise  of  gun  detachment,  dismounted, 
(4)  manual  of  the  piece,  (5)  mechanical  manoeuvres,  (6)  school 
of  the  soldier,  mounted,  (7)  riding  house  drill,  (8)  gun  detach- 
ment mounted  (horse  artillery),  and  (9)  school  of  the  driver. 
With  the  '  school  of  the  piece '  properly  speaking,  most  of  these 
subjects  of  instruction  had  nothing  directly  to  do.  There  was  not 
the  relation  between  them  of  antecedent  and  consequent.  The  im- 
propriety of  the  arrangement  seems  sufficiently  manifest,  and  led 
to  a  curious  error  in  the  contemporaneous  heavy  artillery  tactics, 
where  it  is  stated  that '  the  cannoneer,  previous  to  receiving  instruc- 
tion in  heavy  artillery,  should  be  thoroughly  instructed  in  the  school 
'  of  the  piece,  field  artillery. '  By  '  school  of  the  piece  '  is  here 
meant,  of  course,  manual  of  the  piece,  for  nothing  could  be  more 


TACTICS:    FIELD    ARTILLERY.  325 

absurd  or  unnecessary  than  to  require  foot  artillerymen,  as  a  pre- 
liminary to  heavy  artillery  exercise,  to  learn  all  that  appertained 
to  the  '  school  of  the  piece, '  field  artillery  instruction,  before 
enumerated. 

The  arrangement  of  the  '  school  of  the  section '  was  almost  as 
objectionable  as  the  other.  It  embraced  the  drill  of  several  de- 
tachments— (i)  dismounted,  (2)  mounted;  (3)  exercise  (mounted) 
of  several  pieces;  (4)  school  of  the  section,  i.  e.y  the  school  of 
the  section  was  a  sub-head  under  the  more  general  one,  '  school 
of  the  section' — than  which  a  more  confusing  and  incongruous 
classification  cannot  easily  be  imagined. 

While  it  is  theoretically  very  well  to  have  the  schools  of  the 
platoon  and  the  battery  distinct,  in  order  that  the  former  may  serve 
as  a  preliminary  to  the  latter,  it  is  practically  objectionable.  First, 
it  is  unnecessary,  the  school  of  the  battery  embracing  that  of  the 
platoon;  second,  because,  with  beginners,  of  the  constant  and  an- 
noying references  that  have  to  be  made  to  the  latter  school,  that 
a  proper  understanding  may  be  had  of  battery  manoeuvres.  In 
the  assimilated  tactics  these  schools  are  combined  into  that  of 
the  battery — a  change  which  seems  to  be  conducive  to  simplicity 
and  convenience. 

The  assimilated  tactics  which  appeared  in  1873  but  more 
fully  carried  out  attempts  in  that  general  direction  which  had 
marked  the  labors  of  military  writers  for  many  years.  Stevens  in 
his  system  of  discipline  based  the  dismounted  manoeuvres  of 
artillery  troops  on  the  infantry  instructions  of  Baron  Steuben — a 
facl  noticed  in  the  introduction,  in  the  following  words: 

"  I  must  acknowledge  myself  greatly  indebted  to  Baron  Steuben's  Regulations 
for  the  Discipline  of  the  Army,  from  which  I  have  received  abundant  assistance  in 
blending  the  duty  of  the  artillery  with  that  of  the  infantry.  Where  they  are 
connected  in  the  following  work  I  have  adopted  its  principles,  and  have 
extracted  from  it  whatever  I  deemed  necessary  or  useful  to  my  plan." 

In  pursuance  of  this  idea,  Anderson  and  his  successors  remarked 
that  "the  same  general  principles  regulate  the  manoeuvres  of 
infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery.  As  the  former,  however,  makes 
up  the  main  body  of  an  army,  its  movements  must  control  those 
of  other  arms  of  service.  Hence  the  infantry  forms  of  command 
have  been  adopted  for  the  artillery  where  the  difference  between 
the  two  services  would  permit.  A  battery  executes  nearly  the 
same  manoeuvres  as  a  battalion  (of  infantry),  but  with  less  pre- 


326      HISTORICAL    SKETCH    OF    THE    ARTILLERY,  U.   S.    ARMY. 

cision,  its  elements  not  being  susceptible  of  manoeuvring  with  the 
same  geometrical  accuracy  as  platoons  of  well -instructed  infantry." 

The  experience  of  the  Civil  war  showed  that  an  officer  might 
be  rapidly  transferred  from  one  arm  of  service  to  another.  The 
arms  themselves  were  sometimes  called  upon  to  interchange  their 
normal  duties;  the  infantry  to  serve  mounted,  the  cavalry  dis- 
mounted; the  artillery  to  act  sometimes  on  foot  and  again  on 
horseback. 

Although  each  arm  had  an  appropriate  code  of  its  own,  which 
could  not  be  subordinated  to  the  manoeuvres  of  other  troops,  it 
was  a  recognized  fact  that  the  same  general  principles  lay  at  the 
foundation  of  all.  Hence,  so  far  as  was  practicable,  the  experience 
acquired  in  any  one  should  be  made  available  in  the  others. 
That  this  might  the  more  easily  and  satisfactorily  be  done,  it  was 
peculiarly  proper  to  assimilate  the  instruction  for  the  three  arms, 
in  so  far  as  the  tactical  elements  of  each  and  the  character  of  each 
service  would  permit. 

In  executing  this  task  it  was  necessary,  on  the  one  hand,  to 
make  the  good  of  the  whole  service  paramount,  and,  disregarding 
mere  prejudices  or  fancies,  to  render  the  assimilation  as  complete 
as  possible;  on  the  other,  to  avoid  indulging  a  passion  for  change, 
which,  confounding  words  with  the  things  they  represent,  would, 
under  the  guise  of  assimilation,  apply  general,  inflexible  rules  to 
elements  peculiar  to  each  arm,  and  which  cannot  properly  be 
subjected  to  the  same  laws.  While  the  blending  process  went 
on  it  was  necessary  to  remember  that  each  arm  had  a  distinct  per- 
sonal identity  that  could  not  be  sacrificed  without  injury  to  not 
only  the  arm  itself  but  to  the  general  service. 

The  evolutions  of  a  brigade,  some  forms  of  inspection  and  re- 
view, an  article  on  horses  and  stable  duty  similar  to  that  of  the 
cavalry  tactics,  with  others  on  honors  to  be  paid  by  troops,  and 
on  the  service  of  the  mitrailleur,  embodied  in  the  assimilated 
tactics,  were  either  wholly  or  partially  new  to  light  artillery  in- 
struction; that  on  horses  and  stables  being  an  elaboration  of  the 
same  subject,  as  presented  in  the  Instruction  of  1860.  The  re- 
maining portion  of  the  work  was  a  recast  of  materials,  culled 
mostly  from  the  latter  system  of  artillery  instruction  and  from  the 
established  infantry  tactics. 

First  is  the  school  of  the  soldier  (squad  drill)  dismounted.  This 
is  identical,  or  nearly  so,  for  the  three  arms,  and  there  is  no  reason 


TACTICS:  FIELD  ARTILLERY.  327 

why  it  should  not  be.  The  manual  and  exercise  of  the  sabre,  the 
manual  of  the  piece,  and  mechanical  manoeuvres  are  essentially 
as  in  the  Instruction  of  1860.  In  the  manual  of  the  piece  the  only 
change  of  consequence  was  the  introduction  of  '  action  rear'  for 
forming  '  in  battery  '  in  the  direction  indicated. 

The  school  of  the  battery  dismounted  was  the  counterpart  of 
'  exercises  of  several  detachments  dismounted, '  instructions  of 
1860;  but  it  introduced  some  new  and  important  features  of  organi- 
zation which  deserve  notice.  That  which  before  was  known  as 
platoon  was  now  called  section;  that  formerly  designated  section 
now  became  platoon.  The  section  embraced  the  personnel  for 
the  service  of  a  piece  with  its  caisson;  two  sections  formed  a 
platoon.  In  the  school  of  the  battery  these  definitions  were  given 
a  slightly  different  significance;  there  a  piece  with  its  caisson, 
manned,  horsed,  and  equipped,  being  designated  a  section,  two 
sections  forming,  as  before,  a  platoon. 

The  school  of  the  soldier  mounted,  with  that  of  horse-artillery 
detachments,  was  but  slightly  changed  from  the  work  of  1860, 
whence  were  also  gathered  most  of  the  materials  for  the  school  of 
the  driver,  the  only  exceptions  being  in  the  latter,  and  embraced 
the  introduction  of  Lalle*mand's  school  of  the  battle  piece,  and 
the  exercise  of  a  single  unhitched  team.  In  this  school  (driver) 
the  'reverse'  of  former  tactics  becomes  'left  about';  the  former 
'  left  about '  changes  to  '  reverse. '  Differing  also  from  previous 
practices  in  the  passage  of  carriages,  that  which  is  passed  takes 
up  the  gait  of  the  passing  carriage;  formerly  the  converse  of  this 
was  true. 

The  manoeuvres  '  school  of  the  battery '  are  so  nearly  identi- 
cal with  those  of  1845  and  1860  as  not  to  require  further  notice. 
The .  difference  between  them  resulted  not  from  the  invention 
of  new  manoeuvres,  but  in  applying  the  principles  of  assimilation. 
The  movements  as  taken  from  former  tactics  are  supposed  to 
be  performed  by  commands  drawn  from  the  infantry.  This,  ap- 
parently, was  the  great  end  to  be  attained.  To  a  degree  the  labor 
was  successful.  The  similarity  of  commands  perhaps  enables 
one  versed  in  the  tactics  of  either  infantry  or  cavalry  to  more 
readily  acquire  those  of  the  artillery.  It  will  not  escape  notice, 
either,  that  rules  for  the  guides,  for  the  movements  of  the  guidon, 
changes  of  gait,  together  with  the  duties  in  all  formations  of  each 
of  the  battery  personnel,  are  more  carefully  prescribed  than  ever 


328      HISTORICAL   SKETCH    OF   THE   ARTILLERY,   U.   S.  ARMY. 

before.  This  gives  a  more  finished  school  than  others  had  done, 
for  these  details  are  not  embellishments — they  are  essentials  in 
any  perfect  system  of  instruction. 

It  would  be  useless  to  recite  the  various  points  of  difference 
between  the  assimilated  tactics  and  those  which  preceded  them. 
But  one  principle  for  giving  commands  may  be  mentioned,  as  its 
tendency  is  manifestly  in  the  direction  of  simplicity.  It  is  this: 
In  other  tactics  an  entirely  different  command  was  given  when  a 
movement  was  executed  from  a  halt  from  that  used  when  the 
same  movement  was  executed  from  the  march.  In  the  assimi- 
lation, the  commands  are  the  same,  except  the  addition  of  'trot' 
or  'gallop'  in  the  second  case.  For  instance,  being  in  line  at 
a  halt,  to  break  column  of  sections  to  the  front  by  the  old  system 
the  commands  were — (i)  by  section  from  the  right  (or  left)  front 
into  column;  (2)  march;  guide  left  (or  right).  Or  if  the  line  were 
advancing — (i)  by  the  right  (or  left),  break  sections;  (2)  march; 
(3)  guide  left  (or  right).  In  the  new  system,  whether  at  a  halt 
or  marching,  the  commands  are — (i)  right  (or  left),  by  platoons; 
(2)  march;  guide  (right  or  left):  if  marching,  and  the  movement 
is  to  be  performed  at  an  increased  gait,  the  command  '  trot '  or 
'gallop'  precedes  the  command  'march.'  The  principle  here 
illustrated  is  of  general  application,  and  is  in  accord  with  the 
infantry  rule.  Not  so,  however,  with  the  commands  (i)  forward, 
(2)  march,  which,  in  the  light  artillery  tactics,  are  not  given  ex- 
cept to  move  forward  from  a  halt  or  from  an  oblique;  never  after 
a  change  of  direction — an  innovation  not  in  the  line  of  assimila- 
tion to  the  infantry,  but  the  contrary. 

The  interchange  of  the  designations  'section'  and  'platoon,' 
the  movements  '  left  about '  and  '  reverse, '  was  apparently  inspired 
by  a  consuming  desire  for  varying  what  had  gone  before.  There 
is  no  reason  based  on  true  principles  of  assimilation  why  the  term 
'  section, '  to  designate  two  pieces  of  artillery  with  their  caissons, 
should  not  have  been  retained.  And  as  with  that  meaning  it  was 
well  established  in  the  military  vocabulary,  while  'platoon'  is 
not,  the  technical  language  has  been  garbled  without  correspond- 
ing benefit. 

In  the  United  States  service  the  designation  'platoon'  had 
been  applied  to  a  variable  number  of  men  in  ranks;  it  had  been 
used  in  the  tactics  of  artillery,  infantry  and  cavalry,  both  mounted 
and  dismounted,  but  the  idea  of  a  definite  number  of  units  of 


TACTICS:  FIELD  ARTILLERY.  329 

any  kind  was  never  associated  with  it.  On  the  other  hand, 
from  Lallemand  down,  when  a  battery  was  equipped,  the  term 
'  section '  had  been  used  to  designate  two  pieces  and  their  cais- 
sons— a  fixed  number.  In  infantry,  cavalry,  and  dismounted 
artillery,  'platoon'  retains  its  primitive  signification;  not  so,  how- 
ever, when  applied  to  field  batteries;  there  it  has  come  to  signify 
a  certain  unalterable  number.  This  is  a  violation  of  one  of  the 
first  principles  in  military  organization,  which  is  never,  if  possible 
to  avoid  it,  to  have  the  same  term  applied  to  things  essentially 
different  in  their  natures,  it  being  of  the  greatest  importance  that 
perfectly  distinct  names  should  be  used  in  all  armies. 

If  this  change  had  led  towards  the  goal  for  which  the  field 
artillery  tactics  were  revised — assimilation — it  would  have  been 
more  reasonable;  but  in  truth  nothing  of  the  kind  resulted.  The 
artillery  platoon  column  is  that  for  manoeuvre ;  in  infantry  the 
habitual  column  of  manoeuvre  is  that  of  fours  or  of  companies; 
assimilation  is  not  gained  here.  Moreover,  the  section  of  artillery, 
like  the  platoon,  is  a  unit  which  may  be  used  for  manoeuvre.  We 
have,  for  instance,  '  right  by  platoon, '  and  also  '  right  by  section ; ' 
and  as  both  are  thus  retained,  why  interchange  their  long-estab- 
lished meaning? 

It  may  be  answered  that  it  was  necessary  to  apply  a  definite 
term  to  the  piece,  taken  in  conjunction  with  its  caisson,  instead  of, 
as  formerly,  considering  them  a  unit,  covered  by  the  term  piece. 
While  attaching  no  importance  to  this,  as  the  old  nomenclature 
had  not  led  to  any  confusion,  it  is  remarked  that,  granting  this 
to  be  true,  it  had  been  far  better  in  the  assimilated  tactics  to 
have  given  the  designation  '  platoon '  to  a  piece  with  its  caisson, 
as  the  Instruction  of  1860  had  already  given  to  their  personnel, 
and  retained  '  section '  to  mean  two  platoons ;  it  would  have  been 
equally  as  conducive  to  assimilation,  and  would  have  retained  in 
the  artillery  vocabulary  terms  with  their  proper  and  well-known 
signification. 

So  in  regard  to  'reverse'  and  'left  about';  nothing  was 
gained  by  their  interchange.  There  is  no  'reverse'  in  infantry 
or  cavalry,  and  the  '  left  about '  with  these  arms  is  executed  on 
a  fixed  pivot,  while  in  field-battery  drill  it  is  always  executed  on 
a  movable  pivot.  Assimilation  was  not  gained  in  this  instance; 
therefore  the  only  result  was  the  mixing  up  of  terms  before  well 
understood. 
42 


330      HISTORICAL   SKETCH   OF   THE   ARTILLERY,  U.  S.  ARMY. 

The  great  object  kept  in  view  in  the  work  of  assimilation  seems 
to  have  been  to  render  the  commands  similar  to  those  of  infantry. 
While  the  new  signification  given  the  term  platoon  lends  a  color 
of  success  to  this  questionable  improvement,  it  is  plain  that  in 
other  respects,  notably  the  rules  for  guides,  the  changes  have  led 
in  the  reverse  direction.  Mere  similarity  of  commands  is  of  itself 
of  little  value,  which  cannot  justify  the  sacrifice  of  a  single  prin- 
ciple in  the  organization  or  manoeuvres  of  any  arm;  yet  if  this 
similarity  in  commands  be  conceded  the  crowning  triumph  of  the 
new  dispensation,  it  is  about  all  that  can  be  claimed  for  it.  This 
has  been  attained  at  the  expense  of  technical  language,  a  forced 
and  unnatural  parallelism  in  the  treatment  of  the  dissimilar 
elements  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery,  and  a  surrender  of 
artillery  (perhaps  cavalry)  independence,  which  cannot  lead,  if 
allowed  to  work  out  its  natural  results,  to  other  than  a  conscious 
self-abasement  of  that  arm,  which  is  made  to  feel  from  first  to 
last  that  its  identity  as  artillery  is  being  impaired,  and,  so  far  as 
possible,  destroyed. 


APPENDIX. 


A  [i]. 

List  of  Field  and  Staff  Officers  and  Captains  of  Colonel  Richard 
Gridley'  s  Regiment  of  American  Artillery, 


Colonel,  Richard  Gridley;  lieutenant-colonel,  William  Bur- 
beck;  first  major,  David  Mason;  second  major,  Scarborough 
Gridley;*  surgeon,  William  Eustis  ;  surgeon's  mates,  Samuel 
Tenny  and  Elijah  Hewins  ;  adjutant,  Jeremiah  Niles;  quarter- 
master, Thomas  Edes;  captains,  Edward  Crafts,  Joseph  Chad- 
wick,  Edward  Burbeck,  Thomas  Waite  Foster,  Thomas  Pierce, 
Samuel  Gridley,  John  Popkins,  Samuel  R.  Trevett,  John  Wiley,  f 
and  John  Callender.  £ 

Organization  of  Colonel  Richard  Gridley  s  Regiment. 

One  colonel,  i  lieutenant-colonel,  2  majors,  i  surgeon,  2  sur- 
geon's mates,  i  adjutant,  and  i  quartermaster.  (2  cadets,  4  con- 
ductors, i  store-keeper,  and  2  clerks  attached  to  regimental 
staff.) 

Ten  companies,  each  i  captain,  i  captain-lieutenant,  i  first 
lieutenant,  2  second  lieutenants  (who  were  also  fire-workers), 
4  sergeants,  4  corporals,  6  gunners,  6  bombardiers,  and  32 
matrosses. 

*  Dismissed  by  sentence  of  court-martial  September  24th,  1775,  for  miscon- 
duct at  Bunker  Hill.  Vacant  majority  offered  December  llth,  1775,  to  Mr. 
Thomas  Crafts,  Jr.  (declined.) 

f  Superseded  June  25th,  1775,  by  Ezra  Badlam. 

J  Dismissed  July  7th,  1775,  for  cowardice  at  Bunker  Hill. 

NOTE.  —  The  title  '  captain-lieutenant  '  was  taken  from  the  British,  where  it  had 
been  introduced  in  1720,  and  where,  by  Royal  warrant,  June  22d,  1772,  captain- 
lieutenants  of  artillery  and  of  engineers  were  given  the  rank  of  captains  in  the 
army  at  large.  The  title  was  abolished  in  the  Royal  artillery  in  1802,  and  that 
of  'second  captain'  substituted  for  it;  and  as  in  1872  the  first  captains  in  that 
service  were  designated  majors,  the  second  captains  dropped  the  '  second,'  and 
became  captains  (though  not  commanders)  of  the  batteries  of  the  Royal 
artillery.  In  the  American  service  the  title  captain-lieutenant  did  not  sur- 
vive the  Revolution,  and  nothing  took  its  place.  So  long  as  it  continued,  how- 
ever, the  position,  although  not  equal  to  that  of  captain,  was  markedly  above 
that  of  first  lieutenant,  the  grade  next  below,  and  which  finally  crowded  it  out. 
The  distinction  is  well  shown  in  the  rate  of  pay  given  by  Congress  pursuant 


332  APPENDIX. 

A   [2]. 

Organization  of  Fourth  Battalion,  Royal  Regiment  of  Artillery, 

1771. 

One  colonel  commandant,  i  lieutenant-colonel,  i  major,  i  adju- 
tant, i  quartermaster,  and  i  chaplain. 

Ten  companies,  each  i  captain,  i  captain-lieutenant,  2  first  lieu- 
tenants, 2  second  lieutenants,  2  sergeants,  2  corporals,  4  bom- 
bardiers, 8  gunners,  2  drummers,  and  52  matrosses. 


A  [3]. 

List  of  Commissioned  Officers  of  Colonel  Henry  Knox's  Regiment 
of  Continental  Artillery,  as  Organized  Pursuant  to  Resolve  of 
Congress,  December  2d,  1775,  and  Subsequent  Resolves. 

Colonel,  Henry  Knox;  first  lieutenant-colonel,  William  Bur- 
beck;  second  lieutenant-colonel,  David  Mason;  first  major,  John 
Crane;  second  major,  John  Lamb  (appointed  chief  of  artillery, 
northern  department,  pursuant  to  a  resolve  of  Congress,  January 
9th,  1776,  with  rank  of  major;  assigned  by  the  commander-in- 
chief  to  Knox's  regiment);  chaplain,  Rev.  Abiel  Leonard;  adju- 
tant, Jeremiah  Niles;  .quartermaster,  David  Bradley;  surgeon, 
William  Eustis. 

Captains — Edward  Crafts,  Thomas  Pierce,  Thomas  Waite 
Foster,  John  Popkins,  Edward  Burbeck,  William  Perkins,  Di- 
mond  Morton,  Stephen  Badlam,  Eliphalet  Newall,  William  Dana, 
Ebenezer  Stevens,  and  Jotham  Drury. 

Captain-lieutenants — Benjamin  Eustis,  William  Treadwell, 
Benjamin  Frothingham,  Timothy  Stow,  Jotham  Horton,  Edward 

to  resolve  of  July  29th,  1775.  While  a  captain  of  artillery  received  one-third 
more  pay,  a  captain-lieutenant  of  artillery  received  the  same  pay  as  a  captain 
of  infantry,  and  the  artillery  first  lieutenant  received  one-tenth  less  pay  than 
the  latter. 

The  title  '  fire-worker '  was  also  inherited  from  the  British,  where  it  was  the 
name  given  the  lowest  lieutenant  of  the  company,  who  was  generally,  though 
not  always,  promoted  from  cadet  gunners.  The  rank  fire-worker  was  abolished 
in  the  British  service  in  1771,  nor  did  it  long  survive  in  the  American.  No 
mention  of  it  is  made  in  any  organization  after  1777. 

NOTE. — The  Royal  artillery  was  reorganized  in  such  manner  in  1782  as  to  in- 
crease the  number  of  field  oificers  from  the  ratio  one  field  to  twenty-one  com- 
pany officers,  to  the  ratio  one  field  to  eight  and  one- half  company  officers.  The 
change  was  for  the  avowed  purpose  of  removing  the  stagnation  in  promotion 
that  had  weighed  down  that  arm  of  service. 


APPENDIX.  333 

Rumney,  David  Allen,  Winthrop  Sergeant,  John  Johnson, 
Thomas  Seward,  Asa  Rawson,  and  Benajah  Carpenter. 

First  lieutenants — Thomas  Randall,  David  Briant,  Henry  Bur- 
beck,  William  Stevens,  John  Welch  Edes,  Samuel  Treat,  John 
Bryant,  Isaac  Coren,  Isaac  Packard,  Jonas  Simmons,  David  Cook, 
and  John  Sluman. 

Second  lieutenants — Henry  Wells,  John  Lillie,  Joseph  Loring, 
Thomas  Vose,  Thomas  Deane,  David  Preston,  Thomas  Jackson, 
James  Furnivol,  Peter  King,  Joseph  Savage,  Joseph  Thomas, 
Sarhuel  Shaw,  Daniel  Parker,  Hardy  Peirce,  Isaiah  Simmons, 
Oliver  Brown,  John  Chandler,  Thomas  Machin,  Joseph  Blake, 
John  Bull,  James  Steele,  Thomas  Carnes,  Samuel  Daggatt,  and 
Jeremiah  Freeman. 

Organization  of  Knox's  Regiment,  1776. 

One  colonel,  2  lieutenant-colonels,  2  majors,  i  chaplain,  i  adju- 
tant, i  quartermaster,  i  surgeon,  i  surgeon's  mate,  i  drum- 
major,  and  i  fife-major. 

Twelve  companies,  each  i  captain,  i  captain-lieutenant,  i  first 
lieutenant,  2  second  lieutenants,  4  sergeants,  4  corporals,  6  bom- 
bardiers, 6  gunners,  i  drum,  i  fife,  and  32  matrosses. 


AW. 

List  of  Commissioned  Officers,  Battalion  of  Artillery,  Composed 
of  two  Companies  of  Knox^  s  Regiment,  Detached  March  28th, 
1776,  for  Service  with  Army  Operating  in  Canada,  and  given 
a  Battalion  Organization  by  the  Commanding  Generals,  North- 
ern Department. 

Stephen  Badlam,  captain,  commander,  with  rank  of  major; 
Thomas  Kendell,  chaplain,  appointed  by  General  Gates;  Alex- 
ander Stewart,  surgeon,  appointed  by  General  Thompson;  James 
Gardner,  quartermaster,  appointed  by  General  Thomas;  Ebenezer 
Stevens,  captain;  Benjamin  Eustis,  captain-lieutenant;  Asa  Raw- 
son,  captain-lieutenant;  Henry  Wells,  first  lieutenant;  David 
Cook,  first  lieutenant;  Thomas  Vose,  second  lieutenant;  Isaiah 
Simmons,  second  lieutenant;  John  Bull,  second  lieutenant;  Sam- 
uel Daggatt,  second  lieutenant;  James  Gardner,  conductor. 


NOTE. — These  companies  were  commanded  by  Captain  Stevens  while  en  route 
from  Boston  to  Canada,  where  Badlam  joined  them.  Although  provisionally 
arranged  as  a  battalion,  they  remained  part  of  Knox's  regiment. 


334  APPENDIX. 


A  [5]. 

Names,  Rank,  and  Dates  of  Commissions  of  the  Officers  of  Col- 
onel Charles  Harrison  s  Regiment  of  Continental  Artillery, 
Organized  Pursuant  to  Resolve  of  Congress,  November  26th, 
1776. 

N.  B. — The  data  which  follows  is  gathered  from  proceedings  of  the  Conti- 
nental Congress,  from  Saffell's  records  of  the  Revolutionary  war,  and  those  of 
the  State  Department,  Washington.  As  affecting  this  regiment,  the  State  De- 
partment records  are  only  fragmentary,  but,  so  far  as  they  go,  they  confirm 
generally  the  correctness  of  Saffell's  compilation. 

Colonel,  Charles  Harrison,  commissioned  November  3Oth,  1776; 
lieutenant-colonel,  Edward  Carrington,  commissioned  November 
3Oth,  1776;  major,  Christian  Holmer,  commissioned  November 
3Oth,  1776;  adjutant,  William  Camp,  commissioned  as  adjutant 
June  ist,  1778;  adjutant,  Richard  Waters,  commissioned  as  ad- 
jutant September  2ist,  1778;  paymaster,  Ambrose  Bohannon, 
commissioned  as  paymaster  June  ist,  1778;  quartermaster,  Jervis 
Adams,  commissioned  November  2  ist,  1777;  quartermaster, 
Clement  Skerrett,  commissioned  December  6th,  1779;  surgeon, 
Thomas  Chrystie,  appointed  April  ist,  1778;  surgeon's  mate, 
Jonathan  Calvert,  appointed  November  3oth,  1776;  surgeon's 
mate,  Alexander  Lajournade,  appointed  March  i5th,  1778;  ser- 
geant-major, John  Coale,  appointed  November  3oth,  1776;  quar- 
termaster-sergeant, Grifntt  Evans,  appointed  November  3oth, 
1776;  drum-major,  Robert  Hart,  appointed  November  3Oth,  1776; 
fife-major,  Thomas  Parr,  appointed  November  3Oth,  1776.  Cap- 
tains (commissioned  by  Congress  November  3oth,  1776) — Samuel 
Denny,  Nathaniel  Burwell,  William  Pierce,  Buller  C.  Claiborne, 
Joseph  Scott,  William  Murray,  Spotswood  Dandridge,  Matthew 
Smith,  Sir  John  Pettus,  and  William  Waters. 

The  Assembly  of  Virginia  was  authorized  to  appoint  the  sub- 
alterns. Of  the  captains,  Claiborne,  Scott,  and  Dandridge  de- 
clined, and  Congress,  February  7th,  1777,  appointed  Anthony 
Singleton,  John  Winter,  and  Jacob  Walker  in  their  stead. 

The  commissioned  officers  attached  to  the  various  companies 
on  the  dates  and  at  the  places  [specified  are  given  by  Saffell  as 
follows : 

Company  No.  i.  Valley  Forge,  June  3d,  1778. — Captain,  Will- 
iam Pierce,  commissioned  November  3Oth,  1776;  captain-lieu- 
tenant, William  Frazier,  commissioned  November  3Oth,  1776  ; 
first  lieutenant,  Thomas  Dix,  commissioned  January  i5th,  1778; 
first  lieutenant,  Samuel  Coleman,  commissioned  June  I5th,  1778. 

Company  No.  2.  Valley  Forge,  June  3d,  1778. — Captain,  Na- 
thaniel Burwell,  A.  D.  C.  to  Brigadier-General  Howe,  commis- 
sioned November  3oth,  1776;  captain-lieutenant,  John  Blair, 


APPENDIX.  335 

commissioned  November  3Oth,  1776;  first  lieutenant,  William 
Camp  (adjutant),  commissioned  November  3Oth,  1776;  first 
lieutenant,  William  Stevenson,  commissioned  June  i5th,  1778. 

Company  No.  3.  Valley  Forge,  June  3d,  1778. — Captain, 
Anthony  Singleton,  commissioned  February  ist,  1777;  captain- 
lieutenant,  Ambrose  Bohannon  (paymaster),  commissioned  Jan- 
uary 1 3th,  1777;  first  lieutenant,  William  Miller,  commissioned 
January  i3th,  1777  ;  second  lieutenant,  Henry  Wallace,  commis- 
sioned March  ist,  1778. 

Company  No.  4.  Pluckemin,  July  i6th,  1779. — Captain,  Drury 
Ragsdale,  commissioned  February  7th,  1777  ;  captain-lieutenant, 
William  Godman,  commissioned  January  ist,  1778;  first  lieuten- 
ant, Richard  Waters  (adjutant),  commissioned  January  i3th, 
1777  ;  second  lieutenant,  William  Darvil,  commissioned  February 
7th,  1777. 

Company  No.  5.  Valley  Forge,  June  3d,  1778. — Captain, 
James  Pendleton,  commissioned  February  7th,  1777;  captain-lieu- 
tenant, John  Prior,  commissioned  February  i3th,  1777. 

Company  No.  6.  Valley  Forge,  June  4th,  1778.  —  Captain, 
John  Dandridge,  commissioned  February  7th,  1777;  captain-lieu- 
tenant, William  Meredith,  commissioned  January  I3th,  1777  ;  first 
lieutenant,  Michael  McNamera,  commissioned  January  ist,  1778; 
second  lieutenant,  Walter  Richardson,  commissioned  March  4th, 
1778. 

Company  No.  7.  Valley  Forge,  June  3d,  1778. — Captain,  John 
Champe  Carter,  commissioned  October  3oth,  1777  ;  first  lieuten- 
ant, William  Poythress,  commissioned  November  2Oth,  1777 ; 
second  lieutenant,  Robert  Dandridge,  commissioned  October 
30th,  1777. 

Company  No.  8.  Valley  Forge,  June  3d,  1778. — Captain,  Sam- 
uel Eddens,  commissioned  January  ist,  1778;  captain-lieutenant, 
Lewis  Booker,  commissioned  January  i3th,  1777;  first  lieutenant, 
Richard  Hill,  commissioned  October  2oth,  1777  ;  second  lieu- 
tenant, Abraham  Cole,  commissioned  November  3Oth,  1777. 

Company  No.  9.  Valley  Forge,  June  3d,  1778. — Captain, 
Thomas  Bay  top,  commissioned  February  5th,  1778;  captain-lieu- 
tenant, William  Flemming  Gaines,  commissioned  October  2oth, 
1777  ;  first  lieutenant,  Holland  Haynie,  commissioned  November 
30th,  1777  ;  second  lieutenant,  William  Stevenson,  commissioned 
September  30th,  1777  ;  second  lieutenant,  James  Tyrie,  commis- 
sioned April  23d,  1778. 

Company  No.  10.  Valley  Forge,  June  3d,  1778. — Captain, 
John  Henry,  commissioned  February  7th,  1777;  captain-lieu- 
tenant, William  Meredith,  commissioned  January  I3th,  1777; 
first  lieutenant,  Thomas  Fenn,  commissioned  January  1 3th,  1777. 

By  orders  of  General  Washington,  May  3Oth,  1778,  the  two 
Maryland  companies  of  Captains  Brown  and  Dorsey  were  an- 
nexed to  Harrison's  regiment,  thus  bringing  it,  in  pursuance  of 


336  APPENDIX. 

the  resolve  of  Congress,  May  27th,  1778,  up  to  twelve  com- 
panies. 

Captain,  William  Brown,  commissioned  November  22d,  1777; 
captain-lieutenant,  James  Smith,  commissioned  November  220!, 
1777;  first  lieutenant,  James  McFadden,  commissioned  Novem- 
ber 22d,  1777;  second  lieutenant,  Clement  Skerritt  (quarter- 
master), commissioned  February  5th,  1778. 

Dorsey's  Company.  Valley  Forge,  June  3d,  1778. — Captain, 
Richard  Dorsey,  commissioned  May  4th,  1777;  captain-lieuten- 
ant, Ebenezer  Finley,  commissioned  July  4th,  1777;  first  lieuten- 
ant, Robert  Wilmott,  commissioned  November  24th,  1777  ; 
second  lieutenant,  Nicholas  Ricketts,  commissioned  December 
ist,  1777;  second  lieutenant,  Young  Wilkinson,  commissioned 
February  25th,  1778. 

Organization  of  Colonel  Harrisoris  Regiment,    Under  Resolve 
of  Congress,  November  26th,  1776,  and  Other  Resolves. 

One  colonel,  i  lieutenant-colonel,  i  major,  i  surgeon,  i  surgeon's 
mate,  i  adjutant,  i  quartermaster,  i  paymaster,  i  sergeant-major, 
i  quartermaster-sergeant,  i  fife-major,  and  i  drum -major. 

Ten  companies,  each  i  captain,  i  captain-lieutenant,  i  first  lieu- 
tenant, i  second  lieutenant,  i  sergeant,  4  corporals,  4  bombar- 
diers, 8  gunners,  and  48  matrosses. 


A  [6]. 

Writing  to  the  President  of  Congress  from  camp  above  Trenton 
Falls,  December  2Oth,  1776,  General  Washington  remarked: 
"Under  the  resolution  of  Congress  of  the  i2th  instant,  at  the 
instance  of  Colonel  Knox  and  the  pressing  advice  of  all  general 
officers  now  here,  I  have  ventured  to  order  three  battalions  of 
artillery  to  be  immediately  raised."  These  battalions,  command- 
ed by  Colonels  Lamb,  Crane,  and  Flower,  subsequently  formed 
the  Second  and  Third  regiments  of  regular  artillery  and  the  so- 
called  artillery-artificer  regiment  of  the  Revolutionary  army. 

List  of  Officers  of  Colonel  John  Crane's  Regiment  (or  Battalion] 
of  Continental  Artillery  as  First  Organized. 

Colonel,  John  Crane,  commissioned  January  ist,  1777;  lieu- 
tenant-colonel,   ;  major,  ;  adjutant,  James  Gardner, 

commissioned  January  ist,  1777;  quartermaster,  Thomas  Baker 
(April  1 2th,  1777,  to  November  ist,  1778);  paymaster,  Charles 
Knowles,  commissioned  January  ist,  1777;  surgeon,  Isaac  Spof- 
ford,  commissioned  January  ist,  1777;  surgeon's  mate,  Benjamin 
Upham,  commissioned  January  ist,  1777. 


APPENDIX.  337 

Captains  (commissioned  January  ist,  1777) — William  Perkins, 
Jotham  Drury,  Benjamin  Eustis,  William  Treadwell,  Jotham 
Horton,  David  Allen,  Thomas  Seward,  Winthrop  Sergeant;  and 
David  Bryant,  commissioned  May  loth,  1777. 

Captain-lieutenants  (commissioned  January  ist,  1777) — Henry 
Burbeck,  Thomas  Wells,  David  Cook,  John  Sluman,  Thomas 
Jackson,  Daniel  Parker,  Oliver  Brown,  Isaiah  Bussey;  and  John 
Gridley,  commissioned  June  ist,  1777. 

Supernumeraries  (commissioned  January  ist,  1777) — John 
Callender,  Thomas  Deane,  Joseph  Loring,  Joseph  Blake,  and 
Jeremiah  Niles. 

First  lieutenants  (commissioned  February  ist,  1777) — John 
Compston,  John  George,  John  Peirce,  Eli  Parsons,  Edward 
Proctor,  Noyes  Arnold,  Jacob  Goldthwaite,  Joseph  Andrews,  and 
Benjamin  Allen. 

Second  lieutenants  (commissioned  February  ist,  1777) — James 
Hall,  William  Price,  Zacheus  Dunnell,  John  Harris,  William 
Andrews,  Artemus  Knight,  Daniel  Jackson,  Samuel  Jefferds, 
Florence  Crowley,  Samuel  Bass,  Abijah  Hammond,  Joseph  Bliss, 
David  Mason,  Thomas  Bailey,  Samuel  Cooper,  John  Cooper, 
John  Hiwell,  Benjamin  Eaton,  Abraham  Eustis,  Jonathan  Clark, 

David  Putnam,  John  Crosier,  Le  Brum,  and  George 

Hutton. 

List  of  Officers  of  Crane's  Regiment,  September,  1778,  after  the 
Absorption  of  Lieutenant-  Colonel  Ebenezer  Stevens'  Battalion. 

Colonel,  John  Crane;  lieutenant-colonel,  John  Popkin,  com- 
missioned July  i5th,  1777;  major,  William  Perkins,  commissioned 
September  i2th,  1778;  adjutant,  James  Gardner;  paymaster, 
Charles  Knowles;  quartermaster,  Thomas  Baker;  surgeon,  Sam- 
uel Adams,  commissioned  May  i2th,  1778;  surgeon's  mate,  Ben- 
jamin Upham. 

Captains — Benjamin  Eustis,  William  Treadwell,  Benjamin 
Frothingham,  Winthrop  Sergeant,  Thomas  Seward,  Stephen 
Bucfcland,  Nathaniel  Donnell;  John  Winslow,  commissioned  June 
8th,  1777;  Henry  Burbeck,  commissioned  September  i2th,  1777; 
Thomas  Wells,  commissioned  May  I4th,  1778;  David  Cook,  com- 
missioned May  i4th,  1778;  John  Sluman,  commissioned  Sep- 
tember 1 2th,  1778. 

Captain-lieutenants — John  Lillie,  William  Johnson,  Thomas 
Vose,  Thomas  Jackson,  Samuel  Shaw,  Daniel  Parker,  Oliver 
Brown,  Joseph  Blake,  John  Callender,  Isaiah  Bussey,  John  Grid- 
ley;  John  Cumpston,  commissioned  September  i2th,  1777. 

First  lieutenants — Joseph  Perry,  John  Pierce,  John  George, 
Constant  Freeman,  James  Gardner,  Jacob  Goldthwaite,  Edward 
Proctor,  Jacob  Kemper,  Eli  Parsons;  James  Hall,  commissioned 
September  i2th,  1777;  Jacob  Welsh,  commissioned  September 

43 


33^  APPENDIX. 

1 2th,    1778;   Charles  Knowles,   commissioned   September    i2th, 
1778. 

Second  lieutenants — Daniel  McLane,  Zacheus  Dunnell,  William 
Price,  Artemus  Knight,  Daniel  Jackson,  John  Harris,  Isaac  Bar- 
ber, Joseph  Driskill,  Richard  Hunnewell,  Thomas  Bailey,  William 
Andrews,  David  Mason,  Samuel  Jefferds,  Florence  Crowley, 
Abijah  Hammond,  John  Crosier,  John  Hiwell,  George  Ingersoll, 
Joseph  Bliss,  Samuel  Cooper,  John  Cooper,  Samuel  Bass,  Ben- 
jamin Eaton,  David  Putnam,  John  Liswell,  David  Deming;  Elias 
Parker,  September  i2th,  1777;  Isaac  Morey,  January  ist,  1778; 
William  Downe,  May,  1778. 


A  [7]. 

Stevens'  corps  or  battalion  of  artillery,  absorbed  in  Crane's 
regiment  in  the  fall  of  1778,  was  organized  in  the  following  man- 
ner: As  the  terms  of  service  of  Knox's  two  companies,  detached 
as  already  mentioned  to  the  northern  department,  were  about  to 
expire,  the  Congressional  committee  which  was  sent  to  investigate 
the  cause  of  disasters  and  set  matters  to  rights  in  that  quarter 
authorized  the  raising  a  small  battalion  of  artillery,  as  appears  in 
the  following  letter  from  Stevens  to  General  Schuyler,  then  in 
command  at  Albany: 

"  TICONDEROGA,  November  25?A,  1776. 

!i  The  honorable  the  committee  of  Congress  have  been  pleased  to  determine 
that  a  corps  of  artillery  be  raised  in  this  department,  consisting  of  four  com- 
panies, three  of  artillery  and  one  of  artificers  ;  and  have  been  likewise  pleased 
to  give  me  command  thereof,  with  the  rank  of  major." 

The  next  month  Stevens  was  dispatched  by  Schuyler  to  Boston 
for  the  necessary  materiel  for  the  new  corps,  and  also  for  recruits, 
neither  of  which  could  be  obtained  at  Ticonderoga.  From  the 
circumstances  under  which  this  battalion  was  raised,  Stevens 
looked  upon  his  command  as  an  independent  organization.  At 
the  same  time,  however,  that  he  was  recruiting,  Colonel  Crane 
was  likewise  in  Massachusetts  raising  his  regiment,  under  the  au- 
thority of  the  commander-in-chief.  The  authorities  of  the  State, 
General  Knox,  and  Colonel  Crane  all  decided  that  Stevens'  corps 
formed  part  of  Crane's  regiment,  which,  in  consequence,  was 
raised  with  but  nine  companies,  the  three  of  Stevens  making  up 
the  complement.  The  controversy  led  to  a  bitter  personal  quar- 
rel between  Crane  and  Stevens,  the  latter  declaring  that  he  would 
resign  rather  than  yield.  This  alternative  would  probably  have 
been  forced  upon  him  had  it  not  been  for  the  fact  that  his  bat- 
talion served  in  the  northern  department,  without  contact  with 
the  artillery  regiments,  until  the  fall  of  1778,  when,  a  vacancy 
happening  in  the  lieutenant-colonelcy  of  the  Second  regiment, 


APPENDIX.  339 

Stevens  was  transferred  to  it,  and  his  three  artillery  companies 
formally  incorporated  into  Crane's  regiment.  That  Stevens  had 
practically  carried  his  point,  and  that  his  corps  was  in  fact  a  com- 
plete and  independent  organization,  the  following  roster  and  data 
will  abundantly  prove: 

Return  of  Stevens'  Corps,  June  2oth,  1777. 

Major,  Ebenezer  Stevens,  commissioned  November  gth,  1776; 
adjutant,  Hezekiah  Whetmore,  commissioned  February  ist,  1777; 
surgeon,  John  Stevenson,  commissioned  April  ist,  1777;  commis- 
sary of  military  stores,  Samuel  Hodgdon,  commissioned  February 
ist,  1777;  first  conductor,  Benjamin  Bartlett,  commissioned  January 
9th,  1777;  second  conductor,  Jasper  ManduitGidley,  commissioned 
June  ist,  1777;  director  of  laboratory,  John  Bull,  commissioned 
June  1 5th,  1777;  captain  of  artificers,  Noah  Nichols,  commissioned 
November  gth,  1776;  lieutenant  of  artificers,  Nathaniel  Call. 

COMPANY    OFFICERS. 

Captains  (commissioned  November  9th,  1776) — Stephen  Buck- 
land,  Nathaniel  Donnell;  John  Winslow,  commissioned  June  8th, 
1777  (paymaster,  June  ist,  1778). 

Captain-lieutenants  (commissioned  November  gth,  1776) — 
William  Johnson,  Thomas  Vose,  Thomas  Barr. 

First  lieutenants  (commissioned  November  9th,  1776) — Joseph 
Perry,  Constant  Freeman,  Jacob  Kemper. 

Second  lieutenants  (commissioned  November  gth,  1776) — Ja- 
cob Welsh,  Daniel  McLane,  George  Ingersoll,  Joseph  Driskill, 
Isaac  Barber  ;  Richard  Hunnewell,  commissioned  February  ist, 
1777;  John  Liswell,  commissioned  February  ist,  1777;  David 
Deming,  commissioned  February  ist,  1777;  Andrew  H.  Tracy, 
commissioned  June  ist,  1777. 

The  dating  of  commissions,  November  9th,  1776,  seems  to  have 
been  a  local  arrangement,  and  perhaps  was  part  of  the  '  inde- 
pendent corps '  idea.  Certain  it  is  that  the  records  of  the  State 
of  Massachusetts  do  not  credit  any  of  these  officers  with  service 
under  these  commissions  anterior  to  Janury  ist,  1777,  when  Crane's 
regiment  was  organized;  and  those  dated  November  gth,  1776, 
when  transferred  to  that  regiment  formally,  were  cut  down  to  date 
January  ist,  1777;  and  this  determined  their  position  in  the  Third 
artillery. 

The  anomalous  position  of  this  corps  seems  to  have  been  due 
to  the  fact,  in  the  first  instance,  that  its  organization  was  in  effect 
a  private  arrangement  between  a  Congressional  committee  and 
Captain  Stevens,  of  which  no  one  else  knew  anything,  but 
which  was,  nevertheless,  acquiesced  in  by  the  commanding  gen- 
erals of  the  northern  department.  The  corps  was  an  independent 
body,  so  long  as  it  remained  in  that  department,  and  was  a  law 
unto  itself  regarding  dates  of  commissions  and  details  of  organi- 


340  APPENDIX. 

zation.  Its  isolated  position,  and  the  acknowledged  ability,  high 
character,  and  distinguished  services  of  its  commander  made  this 
fiction  of  independence  a  practical  reality  until  the  corps  joined 
the  main  army  in  the  fall  of  1778;  then  a  readjustment  had  to  be 
effected  and  matters  placed  on  a  sound  basis.  This  was  done  by 
assigning  Stevens  to  a  vacancy  elsewhere,  and  placing  his  com- 
panies in  the  Massachusetts  artillery  regiment  upon  the  same 
footing  that  would  have  been  conceded  them  had  they  served 
with  it  from  the  date  of  its  organization. 

Of  Stevens  it  is  too  much  to  assert  that  in  ability  he  was 
the  peer  of  any  officer  of  the  Revolutionary  artillery.  He 
only  of  all  started  low  down,  and  was  carried  near  the  top  on 
merit  alone.  .  He  was  picked  out  by  Congress  and  given  rank 
step  after  step  over  the  heads  of  others,  in  disregard  of  rules  of 
promotion,  which  were  generally  treated  as  sacred.  The  justness 
of  this  statement  is  in  nowise  affected  by  the  position  of  General 
Knox  at  the  head  of  the  artillery;  nor  is  it  intended  to  disparage 
either  his  talents,  business  capacity,  or  attainments  in  his  special 
arm  of  service.  He  was  selected  from  civil  life,  and  given  com- 
mand of  the  artillery  because  of  his  youth,  great  energy,  intelli- 
gence, and  zeal  in  the  service  displayed  as  a  volunteer  under  the 
eye  of  the  commander-in-chief  at  a  time  when  youth  and  energy 
were  in  demand.  Having  gained  the  first  step,  his  subsequent 
advancement  was  both  natural  and  proper;  but  there  were  no 
competitors  in  the  field.  With  Stevens  the  case  was  different. 
Starting  after  the  general  reorganization  of  January,  1777,  with 
several  captains  above  him,  he  was  breveted  major  by  the  Con- 
tinental Congress  May  27th,  1777;  was  breveted  lieutenant- 
colonel  of  foot  April  30th,  1778,  and  made  full  lieutenant-colonel 
of  artillery  November  24th,  1778,  to  date  from  his  brevet  of 
April  3oth,  Congress  at  the  same  time  directing  that  he  should 
be  assigned  to  the  first  vacancy  happening  in  that  grade  and  arm. 
General  Washington  inclosed  his  commission  December  i7th 
following,  assigning  him,  vice  Oswald,  to  Lamb's  regiment,  which 
he  joined  on  the  22d  of  that  month. 

The  three  artillery  companies  of  which  Stevens'  corps  was 
composed  had  each  i  captain,  i  captain-lieutenant,  i  first  and 
3  second  lieutenants,  6  sergeants,  6  corporals,  6  bombardiers, 
6  gunners,  i  drummer,  i  fifer,  and  28  matrosses.  The  company 
of  artificers  had,  when  full,  i  captain  (Noah  Nicholls),  i  captain 
of  cartridge-makers  (Nathaniel  Call),  i  foreman  of  smiths  (Thomas 
Patton),  i  quartermaster  (Bela  Nicholls),  i  lieutenant  (Joseph 
Olmstead),  and  about  40  enlisted  men,  all  mechanics.  This  com- 
pany was  attached  to  the  artillery  park  of  the  main  army  when 
Stevens'  corps  was  broken  up. 


APPENDIX.  341 


A  [8]. 
Roster  of  Crane's  Battalion  {Regimenf),  April  i6th,  1780. 

Colonel,  John  Crane,  January  ist,  1777;  lieutenant-colonel, 
John  Popkin,  July  I5th,  1777;  major,  William  Perkins,  Septem- 
ber i2th,  1778;  adjutant,  James  Gardner,  January  ist,  1777; 
paymaster,  Charles  Knowles,  January  ist,  1777;  quartermaster, 
Samuel  Cooper,  May  gth,  1779;  surgeon,  Samuel  Adams,  May 
i4th,  1778;  surgeon's  mate,  Benjamin  Upham,  January  ist, 
1777. 

Captains — William  Treadwell,  January  ist,  1777;  Benjamin 
Frothingham,  January  ist,  1777;  Winthrop  Sergeant,  January  ist, 
1777;  Thomas  Seward,  January  ist,  1777;  Nathaniel  Donnell, 
January  ist,  1777;  Henry  Burbeck,  September  i2th,  1777;  David 
Cook,  March  i4th,  1778;  John  Sluman,  September  i2th,  1778; 
John  Lillie,  November  ist,  1778;  Thomas  Vose,  December  2d, 
1778;  Thomas  Jackson,  February  22d,  1780;  Samuel  Shaw,  April 
1 2th,  1780. 

Captain-lieutenants — William  Johnson,  January  ist,  1777; 
Thomas  Barr,  January  ist,  1777;  John  Callender,  January  ist, 
1777;  Isaiah  Bussey,  January  ist,  1777;  John  Gridley,  January 
ist,  1777;  John  Pierce,  September  i2th,  1778;  John  George, 
October  ist,  1778;  Constant  Freeman,  October  ist,  1778;  Jacob 
Kemper,  December  2d,  1778;  James  Gardner, February  220!,  1780; 
Jacob  Goldthwaite,  March  6th,  1780;  James  Hall,  April  i2th,  1780. 

First  lieutenants — Charles  Knowles,  August  ist,  1778;  Daniel 
McLane,  September  I2th,  1778;  William  Price,  September  i2th, 
1778;  Daniel  Jackson,  September  i2th,  1778;  Samuel  Jefferds, 
October  ist,  1778;  Florence  Crowley,  October  ist,  1778;  Abijah 
Hammond,  December  2d,  1778;  Joseph  Driskill,  May  7th,  1779; 
George  Ingersoll,  June  loth,  1779;  John  Hiwell,  February  220!, 
1780;  Isaac  Barber,  March  6th,  1780:  Thomas  Bayley,  April  i2th, 
1780. 

Second  lieutenants — William  Andrews,  February  ist,  1777; 
David  Mason,  February  ist,  1777;  John  Liswell,  February  ist, 
1777;  Joseph  Bliss,  February  ist,  1777;  Samuel  Cooper,  February 
ist,  1777;  Samuel  Boss,  February  ist,  1777;  Benjamin  Eaton, 
February  ist,  1777;  Elias  Parker,  September  I2th,  1777;  Moses 
Porter,  January  ist,  1778;  William  Moore,  September  9th,  1778; 
Edward  Blake,  September  loth,  1778. 

The  organization  of  Crane's  regiment,  when  raised,  was  the 
same  as  that  of  Lamb's  regiment,  authorized  at  the  same  time; 

NOTE. — Samuel  Shaw  was  brigadier-major  (assistant  adjutant-general)  of  the 
artillery  brigade  from  May  llth,  1777. 


342  APPENDIX. 

but  in  the  former,  as  has  been  mentioned,  Stevens'  corps  was  con- 
sidered as  furnishing  three  companies  to  complete  the  organization 
to  that  authorized  by  the  commander- in-chief.  It  was  as  follows: 

One  colonel,  i  lieutenant-colonel,  i  major,  i  adjutant,  i  quarter- 
master, i  paymaster,  i  surgeon,  i  surgeon's  mate,  i  sergeant- 
major,  i  quartermaster-sergeant,  i  drum-major,  and  i  fife-major. 

Twelve  companies,  each  i  captain,  i  captain-lieutenant,  i  first 
lieutenant,  3  second  lieutenants,  6  sergeants,  6  corporals,  6 
bombardiers,  6  gunners,  i  drum,  i  fife,  and  28  matrosses. 

It  is  probable  that  this  organization  for  artillery  regiments  was 
adopted  at  the  instance  of  General  Knox,  as  it  is  almost  identical 
with  that  proposed  by  him  to  the  commander-in-chief,  and  men- 
tioned by  the  latter  in  his  letter  of  December  2Oth,  1776,  to  the 
President  of  Congress.  [6,  ante.  ]  This  supposition  is  strengthened 
by  the  facl  that  when,  May  27th,  1778,  a  general  reorganization 
was  given  the  army,  including  the  artillery,  Crane's,  Lamb's, 
Harrison's,  and  Proctor's  regiments  were  all  given  the  organi- 
zation just  mentioned  as  that  of  Crane's  and  Lamb's  regiments, 
January  ist,  1777,  with  the  single  exception  that  while  in  the 
latter  the  adjutant,  quartermaster,  and  paymaster  were  extra 
lieutenants,  in  the  organization  of  May  27th,  1778,  these  staff 
officers  were  made  detailable  from  the  captains  and  subalterns  of 
each  regiment. 


A  [9]. 

List  of  Commissioned   Officers   of  Lamb 's   Regiment  as  First 

Organized. 

Colonel,  John  Lamb,  commissioned  January  ist,  1777;  lieuten- 
ant-colonel, Eleazer  Oswald,  commissioned  January  ist,  1777; 

major, ;  adjutant,  Isaac  Hubbell,  commissioned  January  ist, 

1777;  quartermaster,  William  Fenno,  commissioned  March  5th, 
1777;  paymaster,  John  Dutton  Crimshire,  commissioned  July  ist, 
1777;  surgeon, Hosmer;  surgeon's  mate,  Caleb  Austin,  com- 
missioned January  ist,  1777;  captain  of  artificers,  Anthony  Post, 
commissioned  January  ist,  1777;  lieutenant  of  artificers,  Garret 
Brower,  commissioned  January  ist,  1777;  foreman,  Samuel  John- 
son, commissioned  January  ist,  1777. 

Captains  (commissioned  January  ist,  1777) — Sebastian  Beau- 
man,  James  Lee,  Isaiah  Wool,  Samuel  Mansfield,  Samuel  Lock- 
wood,  Andrew  Moodie,  Robert  Walker,  Gresham  Mott,  John 
Doughty,  and  Thomas  Theodore  Bliss. 

Captain-lieutenants  (commissioned  January  ist,  1777) — Samuel 
Treat,  William  Stevens,  James  Simonds,  George  Flamming,  Joseph 
Thomas,  Joseph  Savage,  Thomas  Machin,  Thomas  Thompson, 
William  Powers,  James  McClure,  Daniel  Ganno,  and  Jonathan 
Pearsia. 


APPENDIX.  343 

Supernumeraries  (commissioned  January  ist,  1777)  —  Edward 
Archibald,  Jacob  Reed,  Cornelius  Swartwout,  and  Ephraim 
Fenno. 

First  lieutenants  (commissioned  February  ist,  1777)  —  Thomas 
Sutton,  Baxter  Howe,  Sheppard  Kollock,  John  Miles,  Isaac  Hub- 
bell,  Henry  Warring,  Clarkson  Edgar,  James  McNair,  Samuel" 
Webb,  Caleb  Brewster,  and  James  Mackinson. 

Second  lieutenants  (commissioned  February  ist,  1777)  —  Elisha 
Harvey,  Peter  Nestill,  Joseph  Ashton,  Isaiah  Thompson,  James 
Brewster,  Stephen  Ailing,  Isaac  Guion,  Francis  Shaw,  Peter 
Woodward,  Cornelius  Cunningham,  John  Troop,  George  Lay- 
craft,  Henry  Bogart,  Oliver  Lawrence,  William  Cebra,  James 
Hughes,  William  Hubbell,  John  Waldron,  Chilion  Ford,  Robert 
Parker,  Ezra  Patterson,  Ezekiel  Howell,  Samuel  Whiting,  Sam- 
uel Doughty,  Alexander  Guy,  and  George  Whipple. 

List  of  Commissioned  Officers  of  Colonel  Lamb'  s  Battalion  (or 
Regiment)  of  Artillery  ',  September  i2th, 


Colonel,  John  Lamb,  January  ist,  1777;  lieutenant-colonel, 
Eleazer  Oswald,  January  ist,  1777  (left  regiment  in  July,  1778; 
place  filled  December,  1778);  major,  Sebastian  Beauman,  Sep- 
tember 1  2th,  1778;  adjutant,  Joseph  Ashton;  quartermaster, 
William  Fenno,  March  5th,  1777;  paymaster,  John  Dutton  Crim- 
shire,  July  ist,  1777;  surgeon,  -  ;  surgeon's  mate,  Caleb 
Austin,  January  ist,  1777;  captain  of  artificers,  Anthony  Post, 
January  ist,  1777;  lieutenant  of  artificers,  Garret  Bower,  January 
ist,  1777;  foreman,  Samuel  Johnson,  January  ist,  1777. 

Captains  (commissioned  January  ist,  1777)  —  James  Lee,  Isaiah 
Wool,  John  Doughty,  Andrew  Moodie,  Gresham  Mott,  Thomas 
T.  Bliss,  Robert  Walker,  Samuel  Lockwood,  Andrew  Porter, 
Samuel  Mansfield,  Jonathan  Brown;  and  William  Stevens,  Sep- 
tember 1  2th,  1778. 

Captain-lieutenants  (commissioned  January  ist,  1777)  —  James 
Simonds,  George  Flemming,  Joseph  Savage,  Joseph  Thomas, 
Thomas  Machin,  Jacob  Reed,  Cornelius  Swartwout,  Thomas 
Thompson,  Daniel  Gano,  Edward  Archibald,  Ephriam  Fenno, 
James  McClure,  and  William  Power. 

First  lieutenants  (commissioned  January  ist,  1777)  —  Isaac 
Hubbell,  Baxter  Howe,  Henry  Warring,  Sheppard  Kollock,  John 
Miles,  Caleb  Brewster;  and  (commissioned  September  I2th,  1778) 
Isaac  Guion,  John  Waldron,  William  Hubbell,  Francis  Shaw^ 
Isaiah  Thompson,  and  Joseph  Ashton. 

Second  lieutenants  (commissioned  February  ist,  1777)  —  Elisha 

NOTE.  —  Swartwout  and  Fenno  were  considered  supernumeraries,  being  pris- 
oners with  the  enemy. 


344  APPENDIX. 

Harvey,  Peter  Nestill,  Samuel  Doty,  James  Brewster,  Stephen 
Ailing,  John  Throop,  Samuel  Whiting  (prisoner),  George  LeCraft, 
George  Hutton,  Oliver  Lawrence,  Chilion  Ford,  William  Cebra, 
Robert  Parker,  Ezra  Patterson,  Ezekiel  Howell,  Peter  Wood- 
ward; and  William  Strachan,  commissioned  September  23d,  1777. 
(For  authorized  organization  of  Lamb's  regiment,  under  the 
orders  of  the  commander-in-chief,  to  date  from  January  ist,  1777, 
and  also  under  the  resolve  of  Congress,  May  27th,  1778,  see  Crane's 
Battalion,  Appendix  [8,  ante].} 

List  of  the  Officers  of  Lamb 's  Regiment  at  the  end  of  the  Revo- 
lutionary War. 

Colonel,  John  Lamb;  lieutenant-colonel,  Ebenezer  Stevens; 
major,  Sebastian  Beauman  ;  surgeon,  Garret  Tunison. 

Captains — John  Doughty  (brigade  major  of  artillery),  Andrew 
Moodie,  Gresham  Mott,  Thomas  T.  Bliss,  William  Stevens,  George 
Flemming,  Joseph  Savage,  Joseph  Thomas,  Thomas  Machin,  and 
Jacob  Reed. 

Captain-lieutenants  —  Cornelius  Swartwout,  Ephriam  Fenno, 
Isaac  Hubbell,  John  Miles,  Caleb  Brewster,  Isaac  Guion,  Isaiah 
Thompson,  Elisha  Harvey,  Peter  Nestle,  and  James  Brewster. 

Lieutenants — Stephen  Ailing,  John  R.  Throop,  George  LeCraft, 
Chilion  Ford,  Robert  H.  Livingston,  Hiel  Peck,  John  Campbell, 
Michael  Wetzell,  Peter  Woodward,  William  Strachan,  James 
Bradford,  Henry  A.  Williams,  Henry  Cunningham,  Timothy 
Mix,  William  Pennington,  Alexander  Thompson,  John  Smith, 
Alexander  Clinton,  John  Reed,  Robert  Burnet,  William  LeCraft, 
William  Morris,  Isaac  Smith,  Peter  Tappen,  Jonas  Addoms, 
Henry  Demlar,  and  John  Shaw. 


A  [10]. 

List  of  Field   Officers  and   Captains  of  Proctor  s  Regiment  (or 
Battalion) — Fourth — of  Continental  Artillery. 

Colonel,  Thomas  Proctor,  commissioned  February  6th,  1771, 
resigned  April  gth,  1781  ;  lieutenant-colonel,  John  Martin  Stro- 
bagh,  promoted  from  captain  March  3d,  1777,  died  December  2d, 
1778  ;  Thomas  Forrest,  promoted,  vice  Strobagh,  resigned,  Octo- 
ber 7th,  1781  ;  lieutenant-colonel  commandant,  Andrew  Porter, 
promoted  from  major  December  24th,  1.782,  to  rank  from  January 
ist,  1782  ;  served  to  end  of  war. 

NOTE. — In  the  list  of  officers  (Lamb's  regiment)  given  above,  and  which  is 
certified  to  by  Colonel  Lamb  as  being  correct,  there  is  no  distinction  in  the 
grade  of  lieutenants;  i.  e.,  they  are  not  distinguished  as  first  and  second. 


APPENDIX.  345 

Majors  —  Thomas  Forrest,  from  captain,  February  5th,  1777 
(promoted) ;  Benjamin  Eustis,  commissioned  December  2d,  1778, 
died  October  6th,  1781.  [This  promotion  was  made  in  pursuance 
of  the  rule  established,  that  captains  and  officers  of  higher  rank 
should  be  advanced  in  the  artillery  line  at  large.  Eustis  came 
from  Crane's  regiment.]  Andrew  Porter,  from  captain,  April 
1 9th,  1781  (promoted)  ;  Isaac  Craig,  first  major,  from  captain, 
vice  Eustis,  to  rank  from  October  7th,  1781  ;  Francis  Proctor,  Jr., 
second  major,  December  24th,  1782,  ranking  from  January  ist, 
1782,  retired  January  ist,  1783. 

Captains — Gerard  Jacob  Dircks,  March  3d,  1777,  to  July  6th, 
1777  (resigned)  ;  Isaac  Craig,  March  3d,  1777,  to  October  7th, 
1781  (promoted)  ;  Hercules  Courtenay,  March  3d,  1777,  to  March 
30!,  1778  (dismissed);  Joseph  Rice,  March  3d,  1777,  to  August 
ist,  1780  (resigned);  Francis  Proctor,  Sr. ,  March  3d,  1777,10 
April  i4th,  1778,  (dimissed)  ;  Bartholomew  Van  Heer  (captain  of 
provost),  March  3d,  1777,  to  June  ist,  1778  (resigned)  ;  Amos 
Wilkinson,  March  i4th,  1777,  to  -  -;  Francis  Proctor, 

Jr.,  July   i6th,  1777  (promoted);    Charles  Turnbull,  July   i6th, 

1777,  to  -  — ,  served  to  end  of  war;  Patrick   Duffy,  Feb- 
ruary 29th,  1778,  to  October   I2th,    1781    (dismissed)  ;  William 
Ferguson,  April  i4th,  1778,  to  end  of  war  ;  John  Brice,  June  ist, 

1778,  to  end  of  war;  Robert  Coultman,  June  ist,  1778,  retired 
January  ist,  1783;  Worsley  Ernes,  September  26th,  1780,  retired 
January  ist,  1783;  Andrew  Porter,  transferred  from  Lamb's  regi- 
ment, January  ist,  1787  (promoted)  ;  James  Simonds,  transferred 
from  Lamb's,  January  ist,  1787,  served  to  end  of  war  ;  James  Mc- 
Clure  (vice  Porter),  April   igth,  1781,  retired  January  ist,  1783; 
William  Power  (vice  Craig),  October  7th,  1787,  retired  January 
ist,  1783  ;  Thomas  Douglass,  October  i2th,  1787,  retired  January 
ist,  1783  ;  and  William  Martin  (vice  Proctor),  January  ist,  1782, 
retired  January  ist,  1783. 

The  following  is  the  organization  of  the  regiment  as  authorized 
by  the  Pennsylvania  Council  of  Safety,  February  6th,  1777: 

One  colonel,  i  lieutenant-colonel,  i  major,  i  adjutant,  i  quar- 
termaster, i  paymaster,  i  surgeon,  i  surgeon's  mate,  i  sergeant- 
major,  i  quartermaster-sergeant,  i  drum-major,  i  fife-major,  and 
12  musicians  for  a  band. 

Eight  companies,  each   i  captain,  i  first  lieutenant,  i  second 

NOTE. — Although  the  record  of  the  field  officers  and  captains  of  this  regiment 
is  satisfactorily  given,  it  is  regretted  that  no  list  of  the  subalterns  has  been 
procured. 

The  grade  of  fireworker  was  unknown  in  any  of  the  regular  artillery 
organizations  at  this  time,  and  it  seems  soon  to  have  been  discarded  in  this, 
and  the  grade  of  captain-lieutenant  introduced  here  as  elsewhere  in  that  arm. 
The  date  of  this  change  is  not  known,  but  it  must  have  been  immediately  after 
the  date  of  organization,  as  Courtenay,  on  March  3d,  and  Francis  Proctor,  Jr., 
and  Turnbull.  on  July  10th.  1777.  were  promoted  to  be  captains  from  captain- 
lieutenants. 

44 


346  APPENDIX. 

lieutenant,    i   lieutenant-fireworker,   4  sergeants,   4  corporals,  i 
drummer,  i  fifer,  and  60  privates. 

Proctor's  regiment,  with  the  others,  partook  of  the  general 
change  of  organization  wrought  by  the  resolve  of  Congress,  May 
27th,  1778.  (See  Crane's  Regiment,  ante,  Appendix  [8].)  In  fact, 
however,  it  was  not  found  practicable  to  assign  Proctor  twelve 
companies,  as  contemplated  by  that  organization.  There  were 
with  the  army  when  this  change  was  proposed  two  companies  of 
New  Jersey  artillery,  the  officers  of  one  being  Thomas  Randall, 
captain;  John  Lillie,  captain-lieutenant;  Eli  Elmore,  first  lieu- 
tenant; Seth  Bowenand  David  More,  second  lieutenants.  Of  the 
other,  Thomas  Clark,  captain;  Thomas  Jenner  Carnes,  captain- 
lieutenant;  John  Vandyke,  first  lieutenant.  It  was  intended  to 
place  these  in  Lamb's  regiment,  and  take  therefrom  the  companies 
of  Captains  Porter  and  Lee.  These  latter,  with  another  com- 
manded by  Captain  Gibbs  Jones,  then  unattached,  were  raised  by 
no  particular  State,  but  chiefly  recruited  in  Philadelphia,  Delaware, 
and  New  Jersey.  It  was  proposed  to  attach  them  to  Proctor's  regi- 
ment. This  was  not  done;  and  Proctor  remained  with  but  eight 
companies  until  after  the  reorganization  of  October  3d  and  2ist, 
1780,  when  Porter's  and  Lee's  companies,  the  latter  now  com- 
manded by  Captain  James  Simonds,  were  transferred  from  Col- 
onel Lamb's  to  Proctor's  regiment,  where  Porter  rose  to  the 
rank  of  lieutenant-colonel  commandant. 

Under  the  resolve  of  Congress,  August  7th,  1782,  the  Fourth 
artillery  was  reduced,  January  ist,  1783,  to  a  battalion  of  four  com- 
panies, still  retaining,  however,  the  regimental  band.  The  com- 
missioned roster  was  as  follows  : 

Lieutenant-colonel  commandant,  Andrew  Porter;  major,  Charles 
Craig. 

Captains — Charles  Turnbull,  William  Ferguson,  John  Brice, 
and  James  Simonds. 

Captain-lieutenants — James  Lloyd,  James  Smith,  Robert  Mc- 
Connell,  and  Jesse  Crosley. 

First  lieutenants — John  Strieker,  Samuel  Doty,  Joseph  Ashton 
(paymaster),  and  John  B.  Webster  (quartermaster). 

Second  lieutenants — Robert  Parker  (adjutant),  Henry  Greer, 
Ezekiel  Howell,  Robert  Porter,  James  Gamble  (from  4th  Pennsyl- 
vania), John  Humphrey  (from  6th  Pennsylvania),  and  John  Van 
Court  (from  6th  Pennsylvania). 


A  [ii]. 

The  records  show  that  the  artillery-artificer  regiment  of  Colonel 
Flower  was  a  regiment  in  name  only.  Its  officers,  May  24th,  1780, 
were: 

Colonel,  Benjamin  Flower;  major,  Joseph  Eayres. 


APPENDIX.  347 

Captains — Coren,  Jordan,  Irish,  Wylie,  and  Chapman. 

Captain-lieutenants — William  E.  Godfrey  and  A.  Dow. 

Lieutenants — H.  Stroop,  George  Norris,  John  Sproules,  James 
Gibson,  and  Alexander  Power. 

There  was  no  regimental  staff.  Flower  was  commissary-general 
of  military  stores.  Major  Eayres,  who  was  borne  on  the  rolls  as- 
a  master  mechanic,  was  at  the  Springfield  (Massachusetts)  armory. 
The  captains  and  subalterns  before  mentioned  were  all  employed 
in  Pennsylvania,  either  at  the  armory  at  Philadelphia  or  the 
arsenal  and  laboratory  at  Carlisle.  The  artillery-artificers  formed 
in  fact,  while  an  important,  yet,  when  compared  with  the  civil 
branch,  an  altogether  secondary  feature  of  the  ordnance  depart- 
ment. 


A  [12]. 

SOUTH    CAROLINA    ARTILLERY    REGIMENT. 

November  I3th,  1775,  the  Provincial  Congress  of  South  Caro- 
lina resolved  to  raise  a  regiment  (more  properly  a  battalion)  of 
artillery  to  serve  not  less  than  six  months  nor  more  than  two 
years,  and  to  consist  of — 

One  lieutenant-colonel  commandant,  i  major,  i  adjutant,  i 
quartermaster,  i  surgeon,  i  surgeon's  mate,  i  paymaster,  i 
armorer,  i  assistant  armorer,  and  i  sergeant  workman,  to  attend 
laboratory. 

Three  companies,  each  i  captain,  i  first  and  i  second  lieutenant, 
2  lieutenant  fire-workers,  4  sergeants,  4  corporals,  10  gunners,  i 
drum,  i  fife,  and  86  matrosses. 

The  officers  chosen  by  the  Provincial  Congress  were:  Lieuten- 
ant-colonel commandant,  Owen  Roberts;  major,  Barnard  Elliott; 
captains,  Barnard  Beckman,  Charles  Drayton,  and  Sims  White; 
paymaster,  Paul  Townshend;  surgeon,  John  Budd. 

The  subalterns  were  to  be  selected  by  the  captains  with  the  ap- 
probation of  the  commandant. 

June  1 8th,  1776,  this  battalion,  although  not  expected  to  serve 
beyond  the  limits  of  South  Carolina,  was  taken  by  the  Continental 
Congress  into  the  pay  and  service  of  the  Revolutionary  Govern- 
ment. 


A  [13]. 

Organization  of  the  Regiments  of  Artillery,  Regular  Army  of 
the  United  States,  under  the  Resolves  of  Congress  of  October  $d 
and  2ist,  1780. 

One  colonel,  i  lieutenant-colonel,  i   major,  i   adjutant,  i   pay- 
master, i  quartermaster,  i  surgeon,  i  surgeon's  mate,  i  sergeant- 


348  APPENDIX. 

major,  i  quartermaster-sergeant,  i  drum-major,  i  fife-major,  and 
i  chaplain  (to  a  brigade  only). 

Ten  companies,  each  i  captain,  i  captain-lieutenant,  i  first  and 
3  second  lieutenants,  6  sergeants,  6  corporals,  6  bombardiers,  6 
gunners,  i  drum,  i  fife,  and  39  matrosses. 

This  remained  the  established  organization  until  the  end  of  the 
war. 


APPENDIX. 


349 


Troops  Provisionally  Retained  in  Service  when  the  Revolutionary  Army  was  Disbanded. 

y  3d,  1784,  Major-General  Knox  transmitted  to  the  president  of  Congress  a  list  of  the  officers  retained, 
lied  by  a  return  showing  the  organization  of  the  troops.  As  this  paper  is  certified  to  by  Knox  as  correct, 
Drove  of  general  interest,  it  is  inserted  here  entire: 

ARTILLERY.  INFANTRY. 

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350  APPENDIX. 

List  of  Officers. 

ARTILLERY. 

Major,  Sebastian  Beauman,  commissioned  September  i2th, 
1778;  captain,  John  Doughty,  commissioned  January  ist,  1777; 
captain-lieutenants,  William  Johnson,  commissioned  January  ist, 
1777,  and  Ephraim  Fenno,  commissioned  January  ist,  1777;  first 
lieutenants,  William  Price,  commissioned  September  i2th,  1778, 
and  Samuel  Jefferds,  commissioned  October  ist,  1778;  second 
lieutenant,  Joseph  Bliss,  commissioned  February  ist,  1777; 
lieutenant  and  adjutant,  James  Bradford,  commissioned  Septem- 
ber 1 2th,  1778;  lieutenants,  Alexander  Thompson,  commissioned 
May  3ist,  1779,  and  John  Reed,  commissioned  June  29th,  1781. 

Of  the  artillery,  seventy  non-commissioned  officers  and  ma- 
trosses  belonged  to  the  New  York  line;  fifty-five  to  the  Massa- 
chusetts line.  One  subaltern  and  twenty-one  men  were  en  route 
to  Fort  Schuyler  (Rome,  N.  Y.)  to  guard  stores  there  and  to  take 
possession  of  the  forts  on  the  western  lakes  when  surrendered  by 
the  British.  One  subaltern  and  twenty-three  men  were  in  New 
York  city  to  assist  in  restoring  civil  government.  The  rest  were 
at  West  Point  or  dependencies. 

INFANTRY. 

Colonel,  Henry  Jackson,  January  i2th,  1777;  lieutenant-colonel, 
William  Hull,  August  i2th,  1779;  major,  Caleb  Gibbs,  July  29th, 
1778;  adjutant,  Lieutenant  Charles  Seldon,  March,  1778;  quarter- 
master, Lieutenant  Henry  Nelson,  March  ist,  1782;  paymaster, 
Lieutenant  Thomas  H.  Condy,  March  ist  1779;  surgeon,  John 
Hart,  ;  surgeon's  mate,  Nathaniel  Leavenworth  —  — . 

Captains — Joseph  Williams,  January  ist,  1777;  Isaac  Frye, 
January  ist,  1777;  Job  Sumner,  January  ist,  1777;  William  Mills, 
May  nth,  1781;  John  Hobby,  July  24th,  1781;  Joseph  Potter, 
October  i6th,  1781;  Elnathan  Haskell,  April  ist,  1778;  Thomas 
Hunt,  March  ist,  1779;  Simon  Jackson,  April  ist,  1782. 

Lieutenants — Patrick  Phelon,  June  2oth,  1777;  Thomas  Cush- 
ing,  January  i4th,  1778;  Charles  Seldon,  (adjutant),  Jonathan 
Haskell,  February  5th,  1779;  Thomas  H.  Condy  (paymaster); 
Ralph  H.  Bowles,  March  2Oth,  1779;  Nathaniel  Stone,  March 
2oth,  1780;  Joshua  Merrow,  July  I2th,  1780;  Gamaliel  Bradford, 
September  3d,  1780;  John  Adams,  October  6th,  1781;  Henry 
Nelson  (quartermaster);  William  Pickard,  April  I4th,  1782. 

Ensigns — Caleb  Swan,  November  26th,  1779;  James  Sever, 
February  ist,  1781;  James  Sawyer,  February  22d,  1781;  Elisha 
Horton,  April  2d,  1781;  Jeremiah  Lord,  June  i5th,  1781;  John 
Rowe,  June  i5th,  1781;  John  Graton,  July  i6th,  1782;  Amasa 
Jackson,  October  i3th,  1782;  Charles  Jackson,  February  4th, 
1783- 


APPENDIX.  35! 

Of  the  infantry,  461  belonged  to  Massachusetts  and  103  to  New 
Hampshire. 

Invalids — Captains,  John  McGovern,  William  Williams,  Philip 
Seibert,  and  Leonard  Cooper;  captain-lieutenant,  William  Mc- 
Elhothen;  lieutenants,  Jonathan  Pugh  and  James  McLane. 

One  hospital  mate  ( Dr.  Coggswell)  and  one  steward  were,  be- 
sides those  enumerated,  retained  for  hospital  service  at  West  Point. 


A  [15]. 

Provisional  Force  Recommended  by  a  Congressional  Committee 
in  a  Report  of  May  i2th,  1784,  to  be  Enlisted  for  Three 
Years,  each  State  furnishing  its  Quota. 

One  adjutant-general,  i  inspector-general  (both  with  rank  and 
pay  of  major  of  infantry),  i  colonel,  i  lieutenant-colonel,  and  i 
major  of  engineers. 

Three  battalions  of  infantry,  the  staff  for  the  whole  being  i 
colonel,  i  captain  quartermaster,  i  captain  paymaster  and  cloth- 
ier, i  surgeon,  and  5  mates. 

Each  infantry  battalion  to  embrace  i  lieutenant-colonel,  i  major, 
4  captains,  5  lieutenants  (including  i  adjutant),  4  ensigns,  16  ser- 
geants, i  quartermaster-sergeant,  i  music-sergeant,  4  drummers, 
4  fifers,  and  200  privates. 

In  addition  to  the  three  infantry  battalions,  i  battalion  of  artil- 
lery was  recommended,  embracing  i  lieutenant-colonel,  i  major,  4 
captains,  4  captain-lieutenants,  4  first  lieutenants,  4  second  lieuten- 
ants, i  adjutant  lieutenant,  i  captain  quartermaster,  i  captain 
paymaster  and  clothier,  i  surgeon,  i  surgeon's  mate,  i  quarter- 
master sergeant,  i  sergeant  major,  i  music  sergeant,  24  ser- 
geants, 4  drums,  4  fifes,  100  artificers,  and  100  matrosses. 


A  [16]. 

Officers  of  Artillery  Retained  in  Service  Pursuant  to  Resolution 
of  Congress >  June  2d,  1784. 

Captain,  John  Doughty;  captain-lieutenant,  William  Johnson; 
lieutenants,  Samuel  Jefferds  and  James  Bradford. 

NOTE. — The  author  is  indebted  for  this  list  to  the  researches  of  Professor  A. 
B.  Gardner,  judge-advocate,  United  States  army. 

Commissioned  Officers  of  the  Detachment  of  Artillery,  Composed 
of  Fifty  Men,  Raised  in  Pennsylvania  Pursuant  to  Resolve  of 
Continental  Congress,  June  jd,  1784. 

Captain,  Thomas  Douglass;  lieutenant,  Joseph  Ashton. 


352  APPENDIX. 

Officers  of  the  Pennsylvania  Artillery  Detachment,  as  Reorgan- 
ized under  Resolve  of  Continental  Congress,  April  i2th,  1785. 

Captain,  William  Ferguson;  lieutenant,  Joseph  Ashton. 


A  [17]. 

Organization  of  the  Artillery  of  the  Legionary  Corps  into  which 
the  Troops  Raised  Pursuant  to  Resolves  of  April  i2th,  1785, 
and  October  2oth,  1786,  were  Arranged  under  War  Department 
Order  of  January  jot/i,  1787. 

One  battalion — i  major,  i  adjutant,  i  quartermaster,  i  pay- 
master and  clothier,  i  sergeant-major,  i  quartermaster-sergeant. 

Four  companies,  each  i  captain,  2  lieutenants  (no  distinction 
as  to  grades),  4  sergeants,  4  corporals,  4  artificers,  i  drum,  i  fife, 
and  45  matrosses. 

List  of  Officers  of  the  Artillery  Battalion,  Legionary  Corps. 

Major,  John  Doughty. 

Captains — William  Ferguson,  James  Bradford,  Henry  Burbeck, 
and  Joseph  Savage. 

Lieutenants — Joseph  Ashton,  Mahlon  Ford,  Dirck  Schuyler, 
John  Pierce,  Moses  Porter,  William  Moore,  Ebenezer  Smith 
Fowle,  and  Matthew  Ernest. 


A  [18]. 

October  3d,  1787,  the  battalion  organization  for  the  artillery 
was  retained  by  resolve  of  Congress,  but  the  personnel  of  the  ar- 
tillery company,  like  that  of  infantry,  was  4  sergeants,  4  cor- 
porals, 2  musicians,  and  60  privates. 

As  thus  modified,  the  battalion  passed,  two  years  later,  into 
the  regular  army  under  the  Constitutional  Government. 


A  [19]- 

The  President  nominated  the  officers  for  reappointment  in  the 
following  message: 

"UNITED  STATES,  September  13th,  1789. 

"  GENTLEMEN  OF  THE  SENATE  :  Agreeably  to  the  act  of  Congress  for  adopting 
the  establishment  of  troops  in  the  public  service  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States,  I  nominate  the  persons  specified  in  the  inclosed  list  to  be  the 
commissioned  officers  thereof.  This  nomination  differs  from  the  existing  ar- 
rangement only  in  the  following  cases,  to  wit:  *  *  *  *  Ensign  E.  Spear,  pro- 


APPENDIX.  353 

moted  to  vacant  lieutenancy  of  artillery  *•***.  It  is  to  be  observed  that 
the  order  in  which  the  captains  and  subalterns  are  named  is  not  to  affect  their 
relative  rank,  which  has  hitherto  been  imperfectly  settled,  owing  to  the  per- 
plexity of  promotions  in  the  State  quotas,  conformably  to  the  late  Confedera- 
tion." *  *  *  *  *  *  * 

Officers  of  the  Battalion  of  Artillery. 

Major  commandant,  John  Doughty. 

Captains — [3]*  Henry  Burbeck,  Massachusetts;  [i]  William 
Ferguson,  Pennsylvania;  [4]  Joseph  Savage,  Massachusetts;  and 
[2]  James  Bradford,  New  York. 

Lieutenants — [3]  John  Pierce,  Massachusetts ;  [4]  Moses  Por- 
ter, Massachusetts;  [5]  William  Moore,  Massachusetts;  [2]  Dirck 
Schuyler,  New  York;  [i]  Mahlon  Ford,  New  Jersey;  [6]  Mat- 
thew Ernest,  New  York;  [8]  Edward  Spear,  Pennsylvania;  and 
[7]  Ebenezer  Smith  Fowle,  Massachusetts. 

Surgeon's  mate,  Nathaniel  Hey  ward,  Massachusetts. 


A  [20], 

The  act  of  April  3Oth,  1790,  for  regulating  the  military  estab- 
lishment, gave  to  the  artillery  battalion  an  organization  which  in 
no  essential  particular  differed  from  that  prescribed  by  Secretary 
Knox,  January,  1787,  as  modified  by  the  resolve  of  October  3d, 
same  year.  That  provided  by  the  act  in  question  was  ; 

One  major  commandant,  i  adjutant,  i  quartermaster  and  pay- 
master (each  from  the  subalterns  of  the  line),  and  i  surgeon's  mate. 

Four  companies,  each  i  captain,  2  lieutenants,  4  sergeants,  4 
corporals,  2  musicians,  and  66  privates. 


A   [21]. 

Legion  of  the  United  States,  Organized  December,  1792,  by  the 
President,  Pursuant  to  Authority  Vested  in  Him  by  Act  of 
March  ^th,  1792. 

One  major-general  (or  legionary  general),  with  2  aids-de-camp, 
i  adjutant  and  inspector,  i  quartermaster,  i  deputy  quartermaster, 

*The  figures  inclosed  in  [  ]  indicate  the  relative  rank  of  the  officers  as 
fixed  upon  in  the  President's  message  of  June  2d,  1790.  The  date  of  their 
new  commissions  was,  in  every  instance,  fixed  at  September  29th,  1789.  (See 
letter  of  Secretary  of  War,  March  14th,  1*792,  "Executive  Journal,  Senate.") 
No  attempt  has  been  made  to  present  the  names  of  artillery  officers  at  any 
period  subsequent  to  the  adoption  of  the  military  establishment  by  Congress, 
September  29th,  1789,  under  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution.  These  will  be 
found  in  the  "Dictionary  of  the  Army"  and  in  Registers. 

45 


354  APPENDIX. 

i  surgeon,  i  chaplain,  i  major  commandant  of  cavalry,  and  i 
major  commandant  of  artillery. 

Four  sub-legions,  each  of  1280  rank  and  file,  arranged  as  follows: 

One  brigadier  (or  sub-legionary)  general,  with  i  aid-de-camp, 
i  brigade  (or  sub-legionary)  major  and  inspector,  i  quartermaster, 
and  i  surgeon. 

One  troop  of  dragoons,  to  consist  of  i  captain,  i  lieutenant,  i 
cornet,  6  sergeants,  6  corporals,  i  farrier,  i  saddler,  i  trumpeter, 
and  65  dragoons. 

One  company  of  artillery,  to  consist  of  i  captain,  2  lieutenants, 
4  sergeants,  4  corporals,  2  musicians,  and  50  privates,  to  include 
10  artificers. 

Two  battalions  of  infantry  and  i  battalion  of  riflemen,  each  i 
major,  i  adjutant,  i  quartermaster,  i  surgeon's  mate,  i  sergeant- 
major,  i  quartermaster-sergeant,  i  senior  musician ;  and 

Four  companies,  each  i  captain,  i  lieutenant,  i  ensign,  6  ser- 
geants, 6  corporals,  2  musicians,  and  81  privates;  to  the  rifle 
companies,  i  bugler  and  81  privates. 


A    [22]. 

Act  of  May  9th,  1794,  to  organize  a  corps  of  artillerists  and 
engineers,  to  be  incorporated  with  the  corps  of  artillery  already 
in  service  (entire  rank  and  file  992),  to  consist  of— 

One  lieutenant-colonel  commandant,  i  adjutant,  and  i  surgeon. 

Four  battalions,  each  i  major,  i  adjutant  and  paymaster,  i 
surgeon's  mate;  and 

Four  companies,  each  i  captain,  2  lieutenants,  2  cadets  (pay, 
clothing,  and  rations  of  sergeants),  4  sergeants,  4  corporals,  42  pri- 
vates, sappers,  and  miners,  10  artificers,  and  2  musicians. 

It  was  made  the  duty  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  provide,  at 
the  public  expense,  under  regulations  prescribed  by  the  President, 
the  necessary  books,  instruments,  and  apparatus  for  the  use  and 
benefit  of  the  corps,  which  was  to  serve  in  the  field,  on  the 
frontiers,  or  in  the  fortifications  on  the  sea-coast,  as  the  President 
should  deem  consistent  with  the  public  service. 


A  [23]. 

Organization   of  a   Regiment   of  Artillerists    and   Engineers ', 
Authorized  by  Act  of  April  2jth,  1798. 

One  lieutenant-colonel  commandant,  i  adjutant,  and  i  surgeon. 

Three  battalions,  eagh  i  major,  i  adjutant  and  paymaster,  i 
surgeon's  mate;  and 

Four  companies,  each  i  captain,  2  lieutenants,  2  cadets,  4  ser- 
geants, 4  corporals,  42  privates,  sappers,  and  miners,  10  artificers, 
and  2  musicians. 


APPENDIX.  355 

The  act  of  July  i6th,  1798,  to  augment  the  army,  authorized 
i  inspector  of  artillery  (froni  line  of  artillerists  and  engineers),  4 
teachers  of  the  arts  and  sciences,  or  a  less  number,  as  might  be 
necessary  for .  the  instruction  of  the  artillerists  and  engineers  (the 
teachers  each  fifty  dollars  per  month  and  double  rations). 


A  [24]. 

By  act  of  March  2d,  1799,  the  President  was  authorized,  in  case 
war  should  break  out  between  the  United  States  and  a  European 
power,  or  in  case  there  was  in  his  opinion  imminent  danger  of 
invasion  of  their  territory  by  any  such  power,  to  increase  the 
military  establishment  by  *  *  *  one  battalion  of  artillerists 
and  engineers,  *  *  *  the  authority  to  cease  at  the  expiration 
of  the  next  ensuing  session  of  Congress,  unless  by  future  law  con- 
tinued in  force.  The  continuation  was  rendered  unnecessary  by 
the  general  law  of  March  2d,  1799  (same  date),  reorganizing  the 
army,  and  which  for  the  artillerists  and  engineers  gave  the  corps 
and  the  regiment  the  same  organization,  viz. : 

One  lieutenant-colonel  commandant;  i  adjutant,  i  quarter- 
master, i  paymaster,  (extra  lieutenants);  i  surgeon,  2  surgeon's 
mates,  and  i  chief  and  10  other  musicians. 

Four  battalions,  each  i  major,  i  sergeant-major,  i  quarter- 
master-sergeant ;  and 

Four  companies,  each  i  captain,  2  lieutenants,  2  cadets,  4  ser- 
geants, 4  corporals,  and  56  privates,  including  8  artificers. 

The  increase  here  authorized  for  the  regiment  of  artillerists  and 
engineers  was  held  to  supplant  the  necessity  that  might  exist  for 
raising  the  battalion  of  that  arm  authorized  by  the  preceding  act 
of  the  same  date.  The  reorganizing  act  prescribed  that  a  "  regi- 
ment of  artillery ' '  should  consist  of,  &c. ;  but  this  was  construed 
to  mean  ' '  regiment  of  artillerists  and  engineers, ' '  which  branch 
of  service  thereafter,  and  until  1802,  was  arranged  to  two  regi- 
ments, styled  the  First  and  Second.  The  First  regiment  sup- 
planted the  old  corps  of  artillerists  and  engineers  of  1794. 

Two  engineers  were  authorized,  distinct  from  the  officers  of 
artillerists  and  engineers,  with  the  rank  and  pay  of  lieutenant- 
colonels;  also  an  inspector  of  fortifications,  to  be  taken  either  from 
the  army  or  civil  life,  and  to  have  the  rank  of  major. 


A  [25]. 

Organization  of  the  Regiment  of  Artillerists,  Act  of  March  i6th, 

1802. 

One  colonel,  i  lieutenant-colonel,  4  majors  i  adjutant. 

Five  battalions,  20  companies;  each  company  i  captain,  i  first 


356  APPENDIX. 


lieutenant,,  i  -second  lieutenant,  2  cadets,  4  sergeants,  4  corporals, 
4  musicians,  8  artificers,  and  56  privates. 


—  This  act  formally  separated  the  artillerists  from  the  engineers.  In 
the  former  the  grade  of  second  lieutenant  was  introduced  for  the  first  time  since 
the  army  was  disbanded  in  1783.  [The  musicians  were  intended  in  great 
part  for  a  regimental  band.  The  act  of  February  28th,  1803,  provided  for  two 
teachers  of  music  for  the  regiment  of  artillerists.] 


A  [26], 

Organization  of  a  Regiment  of  Light  Artillery,  Acts  of  April 
1 2th,  1808,  and  March  jd,  1815. 

One  colonel,  i  lieutenant  colonel,  i  major;  i  adjutant,  i 
quartermaster,  i  paymaster,  each  taken  from  subalterns;  i  sur- 
geon, i  surgeon's  mate,  i  sergeant-major,  i  quartermaster-ser- 
geant, and  2  principal  musicians. 

Ten  companies,  each  i  captain,  i  first  lieutenant,  i  second 
lieutenant,  2  cadets,  4  sergeants  4  corporals,  2  musicians,  8  artifi- 
cers, and  58  matrosses. 

[Act  of  February  24th,  1812,  provided  that  this  regiment  should 
be  mounted,  in  whole  or  in  part,  when  deemed  expedient;  and 
when  so  mounted,  the  officers  were  entitled  to  forage,  or  money 
value  thereof,  on  same  terms  as  the  light  dragoons;  and  that  one 
farrier  and  one  saddler  should  be  added  to  each  company.  Act  of 
May  i6th,  1812,  gave  a  regimental  paymaster,  (pay  and  emolu- 
ments of  captain  of  his  regiment,)  and  added  twelve  drivers  to 
each  company  of  light  artillery.  Act  of  January  2oth,  1813, 
gave  the  regiment  a  second  major;  to  each  company  a  third  lieuten- 
ant and  a  fifth  sergeant.  The  act  of  March  3d,  1815,  restored 
the  light  artillery  to  its  original  organization,  i.  e. ,  that  of  April 
1 2th,  1808.] 


A  [27]. 

Organization  of  the  Second  and   Third  Regiments  of  Artillery, 
Authorized  by  Act  of  January  nth,  1812. 

One  colonel,  2  lieutenant-colonels,  2  majors,  2  adjutants,  i 
quartermaster,  i  paymaster,  i  surgeon,  2  surgeon's  mates,  2  ser- 
geant-majors, 2  quartermaster  sergeants,  and  2  senior  musicians. 

Two  battalions,  each  10  companies;  each  company  i  captain,  i 
first  lieutenant,  i  second  lieutenant,  2  cadets,  4  sergeants,  4  corpo- 
rals, 8  artificers,  2  musicians,  and  72  privates.  [Act  of  March  28th, 
1812,  authorized  four  conductors  of  artillery,  pay  and  emoluments 
of  a  lieutenant.] 


APPENDIX. 


A  [28]. 

Act  of  March  30,  1814,  arranged  the  First,  Second,  and  Third 
artillery  regiments  into  a  corps  of  12  battalions,  with  6  lieutenant- 
colonels,  6  majors,  12  adjutants,  12  quartermasters,  and  48  com- 
panies; each  i  captain,  i  first  lieutenant,  2  second  lieutenants 
(one  to  be  conductor  of  artillery  for  his  company,  with  ten  dollars 
additional  per  month),  i  third  lieutenant,  5  sergeants,  i  quarter- 
master-sergeant, 8  corporals,  4  musicians,  and  100  privates. 

The  officers  of  artillery,  whether  of  the  corps  or  of  the  light 
regiment,  were  given  dragoon  pay. 


A  [29]. 

Plan  for  the  Organization  of  the  Artillery  of  the  United  States, 
proposed  to  the  Secretary  of  War  July  igth,  1812,  with  Remarks 
thereon  by  Colonel  George  Izard. 

"  It  is  proposed  to  substitute  for  the  four  regiments,  making  ten  battalions,  a 
regular  force,  of  which  all  the  component  parts  shall  be  assimilated  to  each 
other ;  to  connect  the  engineer  department  with  that  of  the  artillery,  and  thus 
to  place  at  the  disposal  of  the  Government  a  body  of  officers  and  men  who, 
from  the  nature  of  the  institution,  will  progressively  become  more  and  more 
useful. 

';  The  establishment  will  embrace  1  colonel-in-chief,  4  colonels,  1  lieutenant- 
colonel  (adjutant-general  of  the  corps),  8  lieutenant-colonels  (commanding 
battalions),  1  major  and  assistant  adjutant-general  of  the  corps,  8  majors,  10 
captains  (assistant  inspectors),  64  captains  (commanding  companies),  74  first 
lieutenants,  148  second  lieutenants,  74  cadets,  8  sergeant-majors,  8  quarter- 
master-sergeants, 8  senior  musicians,  320  sergeants,  320  corporals,  128  musi- 
cians, 256  fire-workers,  456  artificers.  100  sappers  and  miners,  1,792  privates 
of  the  first  class,  and  2,560  privates  of  the  second  class.  The  whole  arranged 
to  eight  battalions,  eight  companies  each,  except  the  colonel-in-chief,  4  colonels, 

1  lieutenant-colonel,  1  major,  10  captains,  10  first  lieutenants,  20  second  lieu- 
tenants, 10  cadets,  four  companies  of  artificers,  50  each,  and  two  companies  of 
sappers  and  miners,  50  each.     Each  company  of  the  battalion  to  consist  of  1 
captain,  1  first  lieutenant,  1  second  lieutenant,  1  cadet,  5  sergeants,  5  corporals, 

2  musicians,  4  fire- workers,  4  artificers,  28  privates  of  the  first  and  40  privates 
of  the  second  class. 

"  The  proportion  between  the  number  of  officers  and  men  depends  upon  the 
nature  of  the  duties  to  be  performed.  In  the  field  service  of  artillery  it  is  as- 
certained by  experience  that  the  superintendence  of  more  than  two  pieces  in 
action  cannot  be  executed  by  one  officer  well.  In  the  French  system  a  division 
or  company  embraces  4  officers  and  88  non-commissioned  officers  and  soldiers, 
including  artificers  and  musicians.  Each  company  is  subdivided  into  four 
squads,  one  of  which  is  supernumerary,  to  supply  loss  of  men  in  action ;  each 
remaining  squad  has  two  pieces,  commanded  by  a  subaltern.  The  captain  com- 
mands the  division  or  company ;  eight  companies  are  in  one  battalion  ;  eight 
battalions  make  up  a  corps  of  artillery. 

"  It  will  be  asked,  Where  is  the  flying  or  horse  artillery  in  this  arrangement? 
Let  me  in  turn  inquire  what  are  the  peculiarities  in  the  service  of  horse  artil- 
lery which  distinguish  it  from  artillery  on  foot?  Is  there  one  circumstance  in 
their  manoeuvres  or  in  the  construction  of  their  gun-carriages  and  caissons 


358  APPENDIX. 

which  need  vary  from  those  adopted  in  the  latter?  Wherefore  is  the  soldier 
of  horse  artillery  mounted  on  horseback?  Not  to  do  cavalry  duty  in  any 
shape  whatever,  but  simply  to  expedite  his  transportation  from  one  distant 
point  to  another.  All  that  it  is  essential  for  him  to  know,  which  his  comrade 
on  foot  may  dispense  with,  is  to  sit  upon  his  horse  in  moving  for  an  hour  or 
so  at  a  rapid  pace." 


A  [30]. 

The  act  of  March  3d,  1815,  fixed  the  military  peace  establish- 
ment at  not  to  exceed  10,000  men,  of  artillery,  infantry,  and 
riflemen,  in  such  proportions  as  the  President  should  deem  proper; 
the  regiment  of  light  artillery  to  be  retained  as  organized  April 
i2th,  1808 ;  the  corps  of  artillery  as  organized  March  3oth,  1814. 

Under  the  discretionary  authority  given  him,  the  President 
retained  in  service  eight  of  the  twelve  battalions  into  which  the 
corps  of  artillery  was  organized  by  the  act  last  mentioned. 

[By  act  of  April  24th,  1816,  one  paymaster  was  allowed  each 
battalion  of  artillery,  who  was  also  to  be  a  district  paymaster,  to 
be  appointed  from  subalterns  or  citizens,  with  pay  and  emolu- 
ments of  major.  Act  of  April  2Oth,  1818,  fixed  the  commission- 
ed officers  of  a  light  artillery  company  at  I  captain,  I  first  lieu- 
tenant, 2  second  lieutenants  (one  to  act  as  conductor  of  artillery); 
of  a  company  of  the  corps  of  artillery,  at  i  captain,  2  first  lieuten- 
ants and  2  second  lieutenants  (one  to  act  as  conductor  of  artillery) ; 
while  to  each  battalion  of  artillery,  and  to  the  regiment  of  light 
artillery,  i  armorer  was  attached  (with  same  pay  as  in  ordnance 
department).] 


A  [31]- 

Organization  of  the  Artillery  under  the  Act  of  March  2d,  1821, 
to  Reduce  and  Fix  the  Military  Establishment. 

Four  regiments,  each  i  colonel,  i  lieutenant  colonel,  i  major, 

1  captain,  supernumerary  for  ordnance  duty,  (repealed  by  acl 
April  5th,  1832,)  i  adjutant,  from  the  line  of  subalterns,  i  sergeant- 
major,  and  i  quartermaster  sergeant;  and 

Nine  companies,  one  of  which  it  was  directed  should  be  desig- 
nated and  equipped  as  light  artillery;  each  company  i  captain, 

2  first  lieutenants,  2  second  lieutenants,  4  sergeants,  4  corporals, 

3  artificers,  2  musicians,  and  42  privates.     Ordnance  department 
merged  in  the  artillery;  officers  of  artillery  to  be  selected  for  ord- 
nance duties,  and,  when  so  serving,  to  be  under  orders  of  War 
Department  only;  the  number  of  enlisted  men  in  the  ordnance 
department  to  be  reduced  to  fifty-six. 

[Acl:  of  April  5th,  1832,  reorganized  the  ordnance  department 
with  no  officer  under  rank  of  captain.    It  authorized  the  President 


APPENDIX.  359 

to  sele6l  from  the  artillery  such  number  of  lieutenants  as  might  be 
necessary  for  ordnance  duties.  Act  of  July  5th,  1838,  added  i 
company  to  each  regiment  of  artillery,  organized  as  those  already 
in  service;  reduced  the  number  of  second  lieutenants  for  each 
company  to  one,  and  added  16  privates  to  each.  A6t  of  August 
23d,  1842,  took  away  these  16  privates,  and  also  i  artificer  from 
each  company  of  artillery,  leaving  the  enlisted  strength  of  each 
at  4  sergeants,  4  corporals,  2  artificers,  2  musicians,  and  42  pri- 
vates.] 


360 


APPENDIX. 


A  [32]. 


Table  Showing  the  Reorganization  of  the  Artillery,  June,  1821, 
Under  the  Act  of  Congress  to  Reduce  and  Fix  the  Military 
Peace  Establishment  of  the  United  States,  Approved  March  2d, 
1821. 


Organization  prior  to 
1821. 

Captains. 

Became  in  Reorganization. 

A   Light  Artillery  

McDowell  

A,  1st  Artillery. 
G, 
C, 
H, 
G,  4th  Artillery. 
H,  3d           " 
D,  1st          " 
n  April,  1821. 
E,  3d  Artillery. 
A,  4th       « 

itary  Division. 

I,  1st  Artillery. 
F,  1st         ' 
C,  2d          ' 
B,  1st         ' 
A,  3d          ' 
C,  3d 
Broken  up. 
H,  2d  Artillery. 
B, 
G.           " 
D| 
A, 
E,  1st  Artillery. 
I,   2d         " 
Broken  up. 
F,  2d  Artillery. 

vision. 

F,  4th  Artillery. 
B,  3d          " 
B,  4th        " 
C,  4th        " 
F,  3d          " 
Broken  up. 
D,  4th  Artillery. 
Broken  up. 
H,  4th  Artillery. 
D,  3d          " 
See  C,  4th  Artillery  (list  below). 
I,  4th  Artillery. 
E,  4th 
I,  3d 
G,  3d          " 
See  E,  3d  Artillery  (list  below). 

B 

Leonard 

n 

Brooks           .... 

D 

Wilkins     

E 

Hobart     

F,                             
a 

Eastman  

H, 

Was  broken  up 

I 

K, 
Corps  Artille 
A    2d  Battalion  

Bell  
ry,  Northern  Mil 
Erving  

B    4th        "          

Read     

C     3d         "        

Mountfort  
Crane  

D    2d         "        

E    3d         "        

F     3d 

G    4th                  

Dearborn  

H   4th                  

I     1st 

Gates 

K   4th                  

L    1st 

Heilman            . 

M   2d 

Beall 

N    2d 

Churchhill  
Pierce     

0    1st 

P    1st 

Farley     

O    3d 

Zantzinger  

South 
A   3d  Battalion 

ern   Military   D\ 
Sands  

B9d          " 

Wilson           .  .. 

C    3d          "          .     ... 

Humphrey  
Fanning  
Burd 

D    4th        "          

El  af             U 

F    3d          " 

Whiting  
Root 

G3d          " 

H   4th         " 

Archer     

I     1st         " 

Mason     

K   2d          " 

Jones      

L    4th*       " 

T,nnmis     . 

M    4th          "                           Ridrllp  

N    1st         " 

0    9d         "             .    .. 

Allen  

P    2d          " 

Lomax  

Q      1st            «             

O'Conner  

APPENDIX. 


36i 


New  Organization. 


Regiment. 

Co. 

Captains. 

Organized  From— 

1st  Artillery... 
« 

A... 
B 

McDowell  
Crane 

A,  Light  Artillery. 
D   2d  Battalion   Northern  Division 

« 

c 

Brooks 

C   Light  Artillery 

« 

D... 

Eastman  

G,      "            " 

u 

E 

Churchill 

N  2d  Battalion  Northern  Division 

u    ' 

F 

Worth 

B   4th         "                                u 

u 

G... 

Mason. 

B,  Light  Artillery. 

14 

U 

2d  Artillery.... 

H... 
I  
A... 

H.  Whiting  ... 
F.  Whiting.... 
Fanning  

D,      « 
A,  2d  Battalion,  Northern  Division. 
M,  2d  Battalion,   Northern  Division    and 

a 

B 

Gates 

detachment  at  West  Point,  N.  Y. 
I    1st  Battalion   Northern  Division 

u 

c 

Roach 

C   3d         "                 "               " 

u 

D... 

Heilman  

L,  1st        "                 "               " 

u 

E 

Nourse 

6th  Infantry  Recruits 

u 

F... 

Beltoii  

Q,  3d  Battalion,  Northern  Division 

u 
u 
u 

G... 
H... 
I  

Zantzinger  
Mountfort  
Legate  

K,  4th       "                .«               " 
H,  4th       "                 "               " 
0    1st        "                 "               " 

3d  Artillery.... 

A 

Ansart  

E,  3d         "                 "               " 

R 

Wilson  

B,  2d         "          Southern        " 

a 

C... 

Jones  

F,  3d         "          Northern        " 

a 

D... 
E... 

Stockton  
Craig  

K,  2d        "          Southern        " 
I,  Light  Artillery   and   Q    1st  Battalion 

a 

F. 

Laval  

Southern  Division. 
E    1st  Battalion   Southern  Division 

u 

G 

Lomax  

P,  2d         "                 "               u 

u 

H... 

Morris  

F   Light  Artillery 

a 

I  

Baker  

0    2d  Battalion  Southern  Division 

4th  Artillery 

A... 

Bell  

K,  Light  Artillery 

u 
« 

B.... 
C.... 

Humphrey  
Burd  

C,  3d  Battalion,  Southern  Division. 
D  and  part  of  L   4th  Battalion   Southern 

M 

D... 

Pierce  

Division. 
G,  3d  Battalion  Southern  Division 

(. 

E 

Payne  

N,  1st         "                 "               " 

U 

F... 

Hayden  

A,  3d         "                 "               " 

a 

G... 

Hobart  

E,  Light  Artillery. 

a 

H... 

Erving  

I,  and  part  of  E,  1st  Battalion  Southern 

« 

I     . 

Sands 

Division. 
M   4th  Battalion   Southern  Division 

NOTE. — The  author  is  indebted  for  the  preceding  interesting  and  valuable 
table  to  the  researches  of  Mr.  Heitman,  Adjutant-General's  Office,  Washington, 
who,  with  the  kind  permission  of  Adjutant-General  Drum,  devoted  much  time 
to  its  preparation.  It  is  with  great  pleasure  that  this  acknowledgment  is  made. 

46 


362  APPENDIX. 

•A  [33]. 

The  legislation  affecting  the  artillery  and  growing  out  of  the 
Mexican  war  was  initiated  by  the  act  of  May  I3th,  1846,  which 
authorized  the  President  to  increase  the  number  of  privates 
in  each  company  to  one  hundred  [reduced,  act  August  i4th, 
1848].  This  was  followed  by  the  act  of  February  nth,  1847, 
giving  to  each  regiment  an  additional  major,  to  be  taken  from  the 
captains  of  the  army;  and  a  regimental  quartermaster,  to  be  se- 
lected from  the  subalterns. 

The  act  of  March  3d,  1847,  added  to  each  regiment  of  artillery 
two  companies,  two  principal  musicians,  one  principal  teamster, 
and  to  each  company  two  teamsters.  The  President  was  em- 
powered, when  he  should  deem  it  necessary,  to  designate  four 
other  companies,  one  in  each  regiment,  to  be  organized  and 
equipped  as  light  artillery,  the  officers  and  men  of  the  light 
artillery,  when  serving  as  such  and  mounted,  to  receive  the  same 
pay  and  allowance  as  dragoons. 

The  various  additions  made  to  the  artillery,  except  the  two 
companies  to  each  regiment,  were  intended  to  be  but  temporary 
in  nature,  and  to  terminate  with  the  war.  As  to  the  regimental 
quartermaster,  the  principal  teamster  to  each  regiment,  and  the 
teamsters  for  the  companies,  the  original  purpose  was  carried 
out.  The  majors  were,  by  a6l  of  July  iQth,  1848,  made  part  of 
the  permanent  organization  of  the  artillery  regiments,  while  the 
principal  musicians  were  allowed  to  disappear  by  casualties  of 
service,  their  places  not  being  filled. 

[By  acl  of  June  i7th,  1850,  the  enlisted  strength  of  light  artil- 
lery companies  was  fixed  at  4  sergeants,  4  corporals,  2  artificers, 
2  musicians,  and  64  privates.  By  the  same  acl:  the  President 
was  authorized  to  properly  mount  and  equip  such  portions  of  the 
army  as  served  habitually  on  foot  whenever,  in  his  opinion,  the 
exigencies  of  the  public  service  might  require  it.  This,  of  course, 
empowered  the  President  to  temporarily  equip  as  field  artillery, 
or  as  cavalry,  any  of  the  foot  artillery  companies.  Under  the 
provisions  of  the  acl;  of  July  i7th,  1862,  officers  when  so  mounted 
were  authorized  to  receive  cavalry  pay.] 


A  [34]- 

Organization  of  the  Fifth  Regiment,  United  States  Artillery, 
Raised  Pursuant  to  the  President's  Proclamation,  May  jd, 
1861,  and  Act  of  July  2yth,  1861. 

One  colonel,  i  lieutenant-colonel,  i  major  (to  every  four  bat- 
teries) ;  i  adjutant,  i  quartermaster  and  commissary,  (to  be  taken 
from  the  lieutenants  of  the  regiment);  i  sergeant-major,  i  quar- 
termaster-sergeant, i  commissary  sergeant,  2  principal  musicians, 
i  hospital  steward,  and  i  band  of  not  more  than  24  musicians. 


APPENDIX.  363 

Not  more  than  12  batteries,  each  i  captain,  i  first  lieutenant,  i 
second  lieutenant,  i  first  sergeant,  i  quartermaster-sergeant,  4 
sergeants,  8  corporals,  2  musicians,  2  artificers,  i  wagoner,  and 
not  exceeding  122  privates,  at  the  option  of  the  President,  who 
was  authorized  to  add  to  each  battery  i  first  lieutenant,  i  second 
lieutenant,  2  sergeants,  and  4  corporals. 

This  was  the  organization,  save  in  the  matter  of  artificers,  of  a 
6-gun  battery  on  a  war  establishment,  as  prescribed  in  the  author- 
ized light-artillery  tactics  of  the  time.  The  Fifth  was  raised  as  a 
regiment  of  artillery  simply.  The  term  '  light  artillery '  nowhere 
appears  in  the  a6l  of  July  29th,  1861 ;  nevertheless,  the  personnel 
of  each  battery  was  that,  as  has  been  seen,  appertaining  to  field 
artillery  only.  This  fact  has  given  rise  to  the  general  but  erro- 
neous impression  that  the  Fifth  was  organized  as  a  regiment  of 
field  artillery. 


A  [35]. 

By  the  act  of  July  28th,  1866,  the  four  old  regiments  of  artil- 
lery were  each  given  the  same  organization  as  the  Fifth  regiment, 
except  that  the  regimental  adjutants,  the  quartermasters  and 
commissaries  were  made  extra  lieutenants.  The  acl;  of  March 
3d,  1869,  allowed  each  artillery  regiment  i  chief  musician,  in- 
sructor  of  music.  The  acl  of  July  i5th,  1870,  abolished  the 
grades  of  regimental  commissary-sergeant  and  hospital  steward, 
and  the  number  of  corporals  in  each  battery  was  reduced  by  it  to  4. 

Under  the  provisions  of  the  Revised  Statutes  the  organization 
of  each  regiment  of  artillery  is  i  colonel,  i  lieutenant-colonel,  i 
major  for  every  four  batteries,  i  adjutant,  i  quartermaster  and  com- 
missary, i  sergeant-major,  i  quartermaster-sergeant,  i  chief  mu- 
sician, 2  principal  musicians,  and  12  batteries;  each  i  captain,  i 
first  lieutenant,  -i  second  lieutenant,  i  first  sergeant,  i  quarter- 
master-sergeant, 4  sergeants,  4  corporals,  2  musicians,  2  artificers, 
i  wagoner,  and  privates,  as  many,  not  exceeding  122,  as  the  Presi- 
dent may  direct. 

NOTE. — The  President  may  add  at  his  discretion   1  first  and  1  second  lieu 
tenant,  1  sergeants,  and  4  corporals  to  each  battery. 

The  actual  personnel  of  artillery  organizations  under  existing 
orders  at  this  time  (1883)  is  as  follows  : 


Field  battery  

Captains. 
I 

.  First 
Lieutenants. 

') 

Second 
Lieutenants. 

2* 

First 
Sergeants. 
1 

Sergeants. 

(j 

1 

2 

I 

I 

4 

Field  battery  

Corporals. 
4 

Musicians. 
') 

Artificers. 
2 

Wagoners. 
1 

Privates. 

49    v 

Foot  battery  

4 

2 

2 

1 

26 

*  At  present  half  the  field  batteries  have  2,  the  others  1  second  lieutenant. 


364  APPENDIX. 

A  [36]. 

[General  Orders  No.  49.— Extract.] 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  November  6th,  1838. 

******* 
IV.  Captain  Ringgold  having  been  instructed  to  organize  and  equip  a  com- 
pany of  light  artillery,  in  conformity  with  the  act  of  1821,  at  Carlisle  Barracks, 
the  men  detailed  from  the  First  and  Second  regiments  of  artillery  for  this  service 
will  now  be  dropped  from  the  rolls  of  their  respective  companies  and  be  mus- 
tered -as  C  company  of  the  Third  regiment.  Captain  Ringgold's  former  com- 
pany, now  in  the  field,  will  4ae  broken  up,  the  men  transferred  to  the  other 
companies  of  the  regiment,  and  the  subalterns  will  join  their  company  at  Car- 
lisle, when  the  lieutenants  of  the  First  and  Second  Artillery  now  on  duty  there 
will  proceed  to  join  their  respective  regiments. 


A   [37]. 

[General  Orders  No.  46. — Extract.] 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 
WASHINGTON,  August  19th,  1841. 

******* 
II.  The  following  order  has  also  been  received  from  the  Department  of  War : 

"1.  In  the  order  of  the  Department  of  War,  April  29th,  1840,  adopting  the  'Instruction 
for  Field  Artillery,  Horse  and  foot,'  it  is  said  that  so  much  thereof  'as  relates  to  the 
manoeuvres  of  horse  artillery  is  for  the  present  suspended,  and  will  not  be  adopted  in  prac- 
tice until  otherwise  ordered  by  the  Department.' 

"  2.  -The  President  of  the  United  States,  through  the  Department  of  War,  now  directs 
that  all  parts  of  the  said  system  be  followed  in  future  both  by  the  horse  and  foot  artillery, 
and  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  systems." 

The  foregoing  addenda  and  order  are  announced  to  the  army  by  the  major- 
general  commanding. 

For  the  purpose  of  diffusing  instruction,  the  lieutenants  of  the  four  artillery 
regiments  will  be  passed  through  the  school  of  horse  artileryin  their  respective, 
regiments,  so  that  no  lieutenant  be  in  that  school  more  than  one  year  at  any 
one  tour.  From  this  rule  may  be  excepted  lieutenants  who  are  actually  in 
command  of  companies,  staff  lieutenants,  and  such  others  who  from  accidental 
causes  may  be  unable  to  ride ;  and  the  colonel  will  make  all  the  other  changes 
herein  indicated. 


A   [38]. 

By  Special  Orders  No.  96  of  1842  it  was  announced  that,  as  the 
number  of  enlisted  men  allowed  each  company  had  been  reduced 
by  act  of  Congress,  only  four  pieces  would  be  manned  by  each 
company  of  light  artillery;  the  other  pieces  would  be  stored  for 
future  use. 

The  detail  of  lieutenants  for  service  with  these  companies  was 
regulated  by  the  following  order: 


APPENDIX.  365 

[General  Orders  No.  33. — Extract.] 
HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  July  Sth,  1844. 
*  *  *  *  *  *  •*  *  * 

AFTER    ORDER. 

1.  So  much  of  General  Orders  No.  46  of  1841  having  reference  to  the  detail 
of  subalterns  for  the  four  companies  of  light  artillery  as  requires  the  first  lieu- 
tenants to  be  annually  relieved  is  hereby  rescinded;   and  they  will  in  future 
be  attached  to  those  companies  in  the  same  manner  as  the  first  lieutenants  of 
the  other  artillery  companies. 

2.  The  respective  colonels  will  accordingly  select  the  first  lieutenants  who 
are  to  be  permanently  assigned   to  the  light  companies,  so  that  the  arrange- 
ment may  take  effect  after  the  30th  of  September  next. 

3.  The  brevet  second   lieutenants  now  attached   to  the  light  artillery  com- 
panies will  be  transferred   to  other  companies  after  the  1st  of  October,  when 
they  will  be  relieved  by  other  brevet  second  lieutenants,  so  that  the  comple- 
ment, including  the  graduates  of  this  year,  will  be  two  for  each  light  company. 


A  [39]- 

[General  Orders  No.  42.] 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  October  IfaA,  1844. 

In  order  to  extend  the  peculiar  instructions  now  imparted  to  light  companies 
of  artillery  by  periodical  changes  in  their  regiments,  and  to  have  the  number  of 
officers  and  men  necessary  at  each  school  to  manoeuvre  with  a  full  battery,  in- 
stead of  four  pieces  as  at  present,  in  the  First  regiment  of  artillery,  company  1 
will  [be]  exercised  with  K;  in  the  Second,  F  with  A  ;  in  the  Third,  F  with  C ; 
in  the  Fourth,  K  with  JB. 

Accordingly  K  company.  Fourth  artillery,  will  repair  to  Carlisle  Barracks  as 
soon  as  relieved  by  F  company  of  the  Third  artillery,  which  will  be  put  in  mo- 
tion for  Fort  McIIenry  the  moment'that  transportation  for  it  can  be  obtained. 

Each  of  the  additional  four  companies  designated  above  for  joint  instruction 
in  light  artillery  will  remain  as  before,  under  the  charge  of  its  own  officers,  ex- 
cept in  respect  to  the  exercise  and  mano3uvres,  as  field  artillery,  and  in  the  care 
of  batteries,  horses,  harness,  and  stables.  In  these  particulars  only  the  duties 
of  the  two  companies  will  be  blended  and  equalized  under  the  orders  of  the 
senior  officer  on  duty  with  the  companies. 

On  the  arrival  of  the  additional  company  of  the  Fourth  artillery  at  Carlisle 
Barracks  the  lieutenant-colonel  of  that  regiment  will  become  the  commander 
of  the  post,  and  a  field  officer  of  the  Third  artillery  will,  as  soon  as  practicable, 
be  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  two  companies  of  his  regiment  to  be  at  Fort 
McHenry. 


A  [40]. 

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  June  18th,  1845. 
Lieut.-Col.  WM.  GATES,  or 

Com'd'g  Officer  Fort  Moultrie,  Charleston,  S.  C. 

SIR  :  On  the  receipt  of  this  you  will  immediately  dispatch  by  sea  company 
E,  Third  artillery,  to  New  Orleans  barracks  to  await  further  orders.     I  am,  sir, 
(Signed)  R.  JONES,  Adft- General. 


366  APPENDIX. 

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  June  18th,  1845. 
First  Lieut.  B.  BRAGG,  3d  Art'y,  or 

Comd'g  Officer  Co.  E,  Third  Art'y,  care  U.  S.  Q'rm'r,  New  Orleans. 
SIR  :  A  battery  of  two  pieces  and  two  howitzers,  fully  equipped  for  service 
(with  horses),  and  supplied  with  the  necessary  ammunition,  has  been  ordered  to 
New  Orleans  barracks  for  your  company.  You  will  take  charge  of  it  imme- 
diately on  your  arrival  at  the  barracks,  and  then  proceed  as  expeditiously  as 
possible  to  join  the  brigade  ordered  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  near  the  mouth  of 
the  Sabine,  under  the  command  of  Brig.-Gen'l  Taylor,  to  whom  you  will  re- 
port. I  am,  sir,  &c., 

(Signed)  R.  JONES,  Adft-Gen'l. 

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 
Brig. -General  Z.  TAYLOR,  WASHINGTON,  June  18£A,  1845. 

Com'd'g  First  Dep't,  Fort  Jesup,  La. 

SIR  :  The  colonel  of  ordnance  has  been  this  day  instructed  to  send  without 
delay  to  New  Orleans  barracks  a  field  battery  of  two  pieces  and  two  howitzers, 
equipped  for  service  with  horses,  with  a  full  supply  of  ammunition.  A  com- 
pany of  the  Third  artillery  has  been  ordered  from  Fort  Moultrie  to  New  Orleans, 
there  to  receive  the  battery,  and  will  proceed  thence  to  join  you  on  the  gulf.  To 
avoid  the  delay  attending  the  purchase  and  shipment  of  horses,  it  is  deemed 
best  to  leave  you  the  procuring  of  such  number  as  may  be  required  for  the  com- 
pany, and  you  will  therefore  please  give  the  necessary  orders  on  the  subject, 
&c.  I  am,  sir,  &c., 

(Signed)  R.  JONES,  Adft-Gen'l. 


A  [41]. 

[Special  Orders  No.  74.] 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  August  loth,  1845. 

Light  companies  A,  Second  artillery,  and  C.  Third  artillery,  having  been 
ordered  to  Texas,  companies  F  of  the  Second  and  F  of  the  Third  artillery, 
united  with  them  for  the  purpose  of  instruction,  by  General  Orders  No.  42,  of 
1844,  will  turn  over  to  the  ordnance  department  their  sabres,  &c.,  and  resume 
their  former  equipments. 


A  [42]. 

[General  Orders  No.  218.] 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

PUEBLA,  July  16th,  1847 

In  compliance  with  General  Orders  No.  16,  dated  April  15th,  1847,  from  the 
War  Department,  the  general-in-chief  designates  the  following  companies  of 
the  four  regiments  of  artillery  as  those  to  be  equipped  as  light  artillery  under 
the  act  of  March  3d,  1847  : 

Captain  J.  B.  Magruder's  company  I,  First  artillery. 
Captain  J.  F.  Roland's  company  M,  Second  artillery. 
Captain  T.  W.  Sherman's  company  E,  Third  artillery. 
Captain  S.  H.  Drum's  company  G,  Fourth  artillery. 
By  command  of  Major-General  Scott: 

(Signed)  H.  L.  SCOTT,  A.  A.  A.  G. 


APPENDIX.  367 

A  [43]- 

[General  Orders  No.  14.] 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  August  11th,  1849 

For  the  purpose  of  diffusing  instruction,  the  lieutenants  of  the  four  artillery 
regiments  will  be  passed  through  the  school  of  light  artillery  in  their  respect- 
ive regiments,  so  that  no  lieutenant  be  in  that  school  more  than  two  years  at 
any  one  tour. 

From  this  rule  may  be  excepted  lieutenants  in  command  of  companies  the 
captains  of  which  are  indefinitely  absent,  adjutants,  regimental  quartermasters, 
together  with  such  others  as  from  accidental  causes  may  be  unable  to  ride. 

Two  first  lieutenants  and  a  second  lieutenant  will  be  attached  to  each  light 
company.  No  brevet  second  lieutenant  will  be  allowed  to  a  battery  except 
where  the  captain  is  indefinitely  absent. 

To  secure  constantly  with  each  battery  at  least  one  instructed  subaltern, 
only  a  portion  of  the  officers  will  be  changed  at  the  same  time.  Accordingly, 
one  of  the  first  lieutenants  and  the  second  lieutenant  will  be  relieved  the  1st  of 
October  next,  the  other  first  lieutenant  October  1st,  1850,  and  so  on  in  suc- 
cessive years. 

Commanding  officers  of  regiments  will  make  the  change  herein  indicated. 


A  [44]- 

[Special  Orders  No.  70.] 

HEADQUARTERS  TROOPS  SERVING  IN  KANSAS, 
FORT  LEAVENWORTH,  September  18th,  1857. 

I.  In  obedience  to  instructions  from  the  War  Department,  company  M  of  the 
Second  artillery  will   be  furnished  with  the  field  battery  of  four  guns  (com- 
plete), now  at  this  post.  . 

II.  The  quartermaster's  department  will  procure  without  delay  the  neces- 
sary number  of  horses  to  equip  this  battery,  including  six  horses  to  each  piece 
and  caisson. 

III.  The  commanding  officer  of  this  battery  will  use  every  exertion  to  pre- 
pare it  for  the  field  as  soon  as  practicable. 

By  order  of  General  Harney : 

(Signed)  A.  PLEASANTON, 

Captain  Second  Dragoons,  Acfg  Ass't  Adft- General. 


A  [45]. 

[Special  Orders  No.  52.] 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 
NEW  YORK,  April  10th,  1858. 

I.  Captain  and  Brevet  Major  John  F.  Reynolds'  company  C,  Third  artillery, 
is  announced  as  one  of  the  light  companies  of  that  regiment. 

II.  Light  company  C,  Third  artillery,  now  at  Fort  Monroe,  will  proceed  with- 
out unnecessary  delay  to  Fort  Leavenworth,  where  its  horses  will  be  furnished. 
The  company  will  thence  join  the  Army  of  Utah  with  the  reinforcements  al- 
ready designated   for  that  command,   and    upon  its    arrival  in    Utah  will  be 


368  APPENDIX. 

equipped  with  the  battery  at  present  under  the  charge  of  Brevet  Captain  Jesse 
S.  Reno,  ordnance  department. 

By  command  of  Bv't  Lieutenant  General  Scott: 

(Signed)  IRWIN  MCDOWELL, 

Ass't  Adjutant- General. 


A  [46]. 

[Special  Orders  No.  141.— Extract.] 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  June  18th,  18*70. 

1.  For  the  purpose  of  diffusing  instruction,  the  lieutenants  of  the  five  artillery 
regiments  are  expected  to  serve  in  turn  with  the  light  battery  of  their  respective 
regiments,  not  exceeding  two  years  at  any  one  tour,  as  directed  in  General  Or- 
ders No.  14,  Headquarters  of  the  Army,  August  24th,  1849.  From  this  rule 
may  be  excepted  lieutenants  in  command  of  companies  the  captains  of  which 
are  indefinitely  absent,  regimental  staff  officers,  and  such  officers  as  from  acci- 
dental causes  are  unable  to  ride.  Commanding  officers  of  regiments  will,  in  due 
season  to  carry  out  this  arrangement,  report  to  the  adjutant-general  of  the 
army  the  names  of  officers  who  should  be  transferred  under  this  order. 


A  [47]- 

[Special  Orders  No.  25.] 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  February  4th,  1878. 

******* 
5.  In  conformity  with  section  1101,  Revised  Statutes,  the  President  directs  that 
company  L,  Second  artillery,  Captain  John  I.  Rogers  commanding,  be  tempora- 
rily equipped  as  a  battery  of  light  artillery.  The  commanding  general,  Depart- 
ment of  Texas,  will  give  the  necessary  instructions  for  the  proper  execution  of 
this  order.  *  *  * 


A  [48]. 

[Special  Orders  No.  208.] 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  TEXAS, 

SAN  ANTONIO,  TEXAS,  October  13th,  1880. 

•**•#•**•*#•*# 
III.  To  meet  the  requirements  of  General  Orders  No.  11,  current  series,  and 
subsequent  instructions  from  the  headquarters  military  division  of  the  Missouri, 
directing  the  movements  of  batteries   E,  G,  and  L,  Second  Artillery,  the  fol- 
lowing will  govern : 

1.  Batteries  E  (Fort  Brown)  and  L  (Fort  Clark)  will  proceed  to  Little  Rock 
Barracks,  Arkansas  ;  Battery  G,  to  Jackson  Barracks,  Louisiana.  Light  battery 
L  will  move  (mounted)  to  San  Antonio,  Texas,  where  the  guns,  horses,  etc., 
will  be  duly  transferred,  under  special  instructions  from  these  headquarters  ; 
thereafter  the  battery  will  proceed  dismounted. 
By  command  of  Brigadier-General  Ord. 

THOMAS  M.  VINCENT, 
Assistant  Adjutant- General. 


APPENDIX.  369 

A  [49]. 

[Special  Orders  No.  246.] 

HEADQUARTERS  OP  THE  ARMY,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  November  1th,  188Q._ 

1.  In  conformity  with  section  1101,  Revised  Statutes,  the  President  directs 
that  Battery  F,  Second  Artillery,  Captain  E.  B.  Williston  commanding,  be 
temporarily  equipped  as  a  battery  of  light  artillery.  The  commanding  general, 
Department  of  Texas,  will  give  the  necessary  instructions  for  the  proper  execu- 
tion of  this  order. 


A  [50]. 
[General  Orders  No.  96.] 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  August  15th,  1882. 

I.  The  following  order  has  been  received  from  the  War  Department : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON  CITY,  August  Hth,  1882. 

The  President,  under  the  authority  conferred  by  section  1101  of  the  Revised  Statutes, 
providing  that  an  additional  battery  in  each  regiment  of  artillery  may  be  mounted  and 
equipped  as  a  battery  of  light  artillery,  designates  the  following  as  the  additional  light 
batteries : 

1st  Artillery,  Battery  E— Captain  Franck  E,  Taylor. 

2d  Artillery,  Battery  F— Captain  E.  B.  Williaton  (now  temporarily  equipped  as  a  bat- 
tery of  light  artillery). 

3d  Artillery,  Battery  F— Captain  James  M.  Lancaster. 
4th  Artillery,  Battery  F— Captain  Frank  G.  Smith. 
5th  Artillery,  Battery  D— Captain  Jacob  D.  Rawles. 

ROBERT  T.  LINCOLN, 

Secretary  of  War. 

II.  The  batteries  named  above  will  take  station  as  follows  : 

Battery  E,  1st  Artillery,  at  Vancouver  Barracks,  Washington  Territory. 

Battery  F,  3d  Artillery,  at  San  Antonio,  Texas. 

Battery  F,  4th  Artillery,  at  Fort  Snelling,  Minnesota. 

Battery  D,  5th  Artillery,  at  Fort  Omaha,  Nebraska. 

Battery  F,  2d  Artillery,  will  remain  at  Fort  Leavenworth. 

The  batteries  of  the  1st,  3d,  4th,  and  5th  Artillery  herein  designated  will 
proceed  to  the  posts  named,  where  they  will  be  filled  to  a  minimum  strength 
of  sixty-five  enlisted  men,  and  equipped  as  batteries  of  light  artillery  under  the 
direction  of  the  respective  department  commanders. 

III.  By  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  on  the  recommendation  of  the 
General  of  the  Army,  the  tour  of  service  of  captains  with   light  or  mounted 
batteries  of  artillery  shall  hereafter  be  three  years,  commencing  with  January 
1st,  1883,  and  of  lieutenants  as  at  present  detailed — two  years. 

IV.  Such  of  the  captains  as  shall  have  commanded  light  batteries  three  or 
more  years  on  the  date  named  in  the  last  preceding  paragraph  of  this  order 
will  be  relieved  by  others,  to  be  designated  in  orders  from  this  office. 

V.  Regimental   commanders  of  artillery  will,  respectively,  as   occasion   re- 
quires, nominate  to  the  Adjutant-General,  as  is  now  done  in  the  detail  of  lieu- 
tenants, the  captains  to  replace  those  whose  tours  of  duty  with  the  light  bat- 
teries are  about  to  expire. 

VI.  To  avoid  complaints  of  injustice  having  been  done  in  the  selection,  and 
that  the  instruction  in  regiments  may  be  as  uniform  as  practicable,  the  regi- 
mental roster  for  the  detail  of  captains  shall  commence  with  the  senior  captain 

47 


370  APPENDIX. 

eligible  for  detail,  and  continue  downwards,  until  all  the  captains  shall  have 
had  instruction  as  such  in  the  command  of  light  batteries,  when  it  will  again 
commence  with  the  senior  captain. 

Those  captains  relieved  on  the  first  operation  of  this  order,  or  who  have  re- 
cently been  in  command  of  light  batteries  for  three  years  or  longer,  will  not  be 
regarded  as  eligible  for  detail  until  all  the  other  captains  of  the  regiment  have 
had  a  tour  of  duty  in  command  of  the  light  batteries. 

VII.  To  insure  that  none  but  those  possessing  the  more  soldierly  qualities 
and  regimental  esprit  should  be  attached  to  so  favorite  and  distinguished  an 
arm  of  the  service,  an  officer  who  has  not  served  with  his  regiment  continu- 
ously (including  cumulative  leaves)  for  at  least  the  previous  two  years  will 
not  be  considered  eligible  for  detail  to  the  light  batteries.  Exception  will  only 
be  made  by  the  special  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  where  the  circum- 
stances attending  the  absence  of  an  officer  do  not  indicate  a  desire  to  avoid 
the  performance  of  ordinary  regimental  and  company  duty. 


A  [51]. 

[Special  Order  No.  168.] 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
CAMP  NEAR  NEW  BRIDGE,  VA.,  June  2d,  1862. 

********* 

V.  Commanders  of  army  corps  will,  with  the  least  practicable  delay,  organize 
from  the  field  batteries  attached  to  the  divisions  composing  their  respective 
corps  an  artillery  reserve,  to  consist  of  about  one-half  the  whole  field  artillery 
force  attached  to  the  corps,  and  to  be  placed  under  the  command  of  a  suitable 
light-artillery  officer.  This  reserve  will  be  subject  only  to  the  orders  of  the 
corps  commander. 

********** 
By  command  of  Major-General  McClellan. 

S.  WILLIAMS, 
Ass't  Adjutant- General. 


A  [52]. 

It  will  not  be  uninteresting  to  notice  the  organization  of  the 
artillery-brigades  of  the  Union,  the  artillery-battalion  of  the  Con- 
federate, and  the  artillery-divisions  of  the  German  and  Austrian 
armies. 

ist. — UNION   ARMY,  ARTILLERY-BRIGADE.     (Robertson's,  in 
1863,  is  taken  for  illustration.) 

One  commander,  senior  captain  of  brigade,  ex-qfficio  chief  of 
artillery  of  the  army  corps.  Staff — i  assistant  adjutant-general, 
from  lieutenants  of  brigade  ;  i  acting  inspector-general,  from  lieu- 
tenants of  brigade  ;  i  acting  ordnance  officer,  from  lieutenants  of 
brigade;  i  quartermaster  (assigned  from  that  department  of  U.  S. 
volunteers) ;  i  commissary  officer  (from  that  department  of  U.  S. 
volunteers) ;  i  or  2  medical  officers  (from  that  department  of  U.  S. 


APPENDIX.  371 

volunteers.)  Non-commissioned  staff — i  sergeant-major,  from 
sergeants  of  the  batteries  ;  i  ordnance-sergeant,  from  sergeants 
of  the  batteries ;  i  commissary-sergeant,  from  sergeants  of  the 
batteries  ;  i  hospital  steward,  from  regular  medical  department. 
Troops — 6  batteries,  four  of  them  each  with  six  3-inch  rifles,  and 
two  each  with  four  i2-pounder  Napoleons. 

In  addition  to  the  ammunition  wagons  forming  part  of  the  reg- 
ular war  organization  of  the  batteries,  there  were  for  its  exclusive 
use  attached  to  the  brigade  75  wagons  for  transportation  of  ord- 
nance and  other  stores  ;  or  the  total  number  of  supply  wagons 
accompanying  and  forming  part  of  the  brigade  was  about  3^i  per 
gun. 

2d. — CONFEDERATE  ARMY,  ARTILLERY-BATTALION.     (Alex- 
ander's, of  Longstreet's  corps,  in  fall  of  1863.) 

One  colonel  commanding,  and  i  major.  Staff — i  adjutant,  i 
acting  ordnance  officer,  (with  sergeant  and  train  of  reserve  ammu- 
nition-wagons, forges,  and  battery  wagons);  i  quartermaster,  from 
that  department,  with  sergeant  and  wagons;  i  commissary,  from 
that  department,  with  sergeant  and  wagons;  i  or  2  medical  offi- 
cers. Troops — 6  batteries,  five  of  them  each  with  four  and  one 
battery  with  six  pieces. 

Enlisted  strength  of  batteries:  to  every  4  guns,  100  enlisted 
men;  to  6  guns,  150  enlisted  men,  /.  <?.,  these  numbers  were 
allowed  by  regulations.  There  was  no  regular  non-commis- 
sioned staff. 

3d. — ARTILLERY-DIVISION,  GERMAN  ARMY. 

One  major  or  lieutenant  colonel.  Staff — i  adjutant,  i  pay- 
master (from  regimental  staff),  i  medical  officer  (is  part  of  regi- 
mental staff,  but  may  be  attached  to  the  division  staff).  Non- 
commissioned staff — i  sergeant-clerk,  5  corporals  and  privates, 
to  assist  in  various  ways.  Troops — 4  batteries,  each  6  guns  and 
8  caissons. 

4th. — ARTILLERY-DIVISION,  AUSTRIAN  ARMY. 

One  field  officer.  Staff — i  lieutenant-adjutant,  i  lieutenant- 
paymaster,  i  quartermaster  and  commissary  (from  the  supply 
department),  i  officer  charged  with  money  accounts  (from  the  sup- 
ply department),  i  medical  officer.  Non-commissioned  staff,  etc. — 
i  veterinary  (with  horse  artillery),  3  non-commissioned  officers, 
5  drivers  and  cannoneers,  5  orderlies.  Troops — 2,  3,  or  4  bat- 
teries, each  8  guns ;  generally  3  or  4  batteries. 

Superficial  examination  might  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
administrative  machinery  of  the  Union  artillery-brigade  or  the 
Confederate  artillery-battalion  was  more  complete  than  were  those 
of  the  artillery-divisions  of  the  German  and  Austrian  armies.  If 


372  APPENDIX. 

we  more  fully  consider  the  organizations  of  the  latter,  it  will  be 
evident  that  this  is  not  the  case. 

1.  The  artillery-brigade  of  the  Union  army  embraced  all  the 
batteries  assigned  to  the  army  corps.     Every  principle  of  organ- 
ization demanded  that  its  staff  should  be  perfect.     There  was  in 
the  corps  no  artillery  authority  above  that  of  the  artillery-brigade 
commander,  who  by  law  was  chief  of  artillery  and  ordnance  of 
the  corps.    Under  these  circumstances,  it  was  absolutely  necessary 
that  the  brigade  should  have  within  itself  facilities  for  securing  sup- 
plies and  administering  its  affairs  equal  to  the  demands  and  exingen- 
cies  of  service.     Had  it  been  otherwise,  the  artillery  would  have 
been  left  helpless,   dependent  perhaps,  at  the  supreme  moment 
upon  others  who  did  not  understand  its  wants. 

The  commander  of  artillery  at  army  headquarters  was  often  far 
removed  from  the  batteries  attached  to  troops.  The  supervision 
he  exercised  over  them  was  general  in  character.  It  was  not  of 
that  direct  and  energetic  character  which  alone  in  an  emergency 
could  procure  either  sustenance  for  the  personnel,  materiel  for 
necessary  equipment,  or  munitions  for  the  batteries  in  action.  To 
attend  to  these  indispensable  matters,  it  was  -necessary  that  the 
staff  of  the  artillery-brigade  should  be  complete,  embracing  every 
branch  both  of  administration  and  supply. 

2.  Few  of  the  Confederate  artillery-battalions  were  so  completely 
organized  as  was  Alexander's,  previously  mentioned.     Some  of 
them  had  neither  ordnance,  commissary,  or  quartermaster  trains. 
The  staff  was  limited  to  an  adjutant  detailed  from  the  subalterns  of 
the  battalion,  an  ordnance  officer  (i.  e.,  artillery  officer  on  ordnance 
duty)  also  a  lieutenant,   and  a  regular  quartermaster  and  com- 
missary.   There  was  no  non-commissioned  staff.    Each  army  corps 
had  a  reserve  ammunition  train  of  about  twenty  wagons,  and  the 
general  ammunition  train  of  the   Army  numbered  about   sixty 
wagons.     This  was  the  practice  in  the  army  of  Northern  Vir- 
ginia, the  most  thoroughly  organized  army  of  the  Confederacy. 
As  this  army  was  organized,  August  3ist,  1864,  the  first  corps 
had  eighteen  batteries,  arranged  to  five  battalions  ;  the  second 
corps  had  nineteen  batteries,  in  five  battalions  ;  so,  likewise,  had 
the  third  corps ;   two    chiefs  of  corps-artillery  were    brigadiers ; 
the  other  was  a  colonel;  the  chief  of  artillery  of  this  army  was  a 
brigadier-general . 

3.  In  the  German  army,  although  the  arrangement  is  not  uni- 
form, the  principle  is  the  same  throughout,  i.  <?.,  the  artillery  is 
distributed  to  army  corps,  each  of  which  as  a  rule  has  an  artil- 
lery brigade  consisting  of  two  regiments.     One  of  these  regi- 
ments, styled   'divisional  artillery,'  has  eight  batteries,  grouped 
into  two  divisions  of  four  batteries  each;  each  division  is  part  and 
parcel  of  one  of  the  two  infantry  divisions  which  make  up  the 
army  corps.     The  other  regiment  of  the  artillery  brigade  is  styled 
'  corps  artillery. '     It  has  nine  batteries,  equally  arranged  to  three 
divisions,  which  are  held  in  a  corps  reserve. 


APPENDIX.  373 

The  complete  staffs  of  both  the  divisional  and  the  corps-artillery 
regiments  accompany  the  army  corps.  The  artillery-brigade  staff 
is  also  present  with  corps  headquarters. 

With  each  army  corps  there  are  six  artillery  ammunition  col- 
umns. The  personnel  of  each  column  is  i  captain,  i  medical 
officer,  i  paymaster,  i  veterinary  (non-commissioned  officer),  and 
169  men;  the  wagons  of  each  are  19  caissons,  i  store  wagon,  i 
forge,  i  baggage  wagon,  and  4  park  wagons. 

These  ammunition  columns  are  under  the  orders  of  the  chief  of 
artillery  of  the  corps;  hence  there  is  no  danger  of  the  artillery- 
divisions  being  left  without  a  full  supply  of  ammunition. 

4.  The  same  principles  of  organization  govern  in  the  Austrian 
service.  One  artillery  regiment  is  permanently  attached  to  each 
army  corps.  But  this  regiment  on  a  war  footing  has  fifteen  bat- 
teries, while  the  German  artillery  brigade  has  but  seventeen.  The 
fifteen  batteries  are  arranged  to  six  divisions.  Three  of  the  divi- 
sions, embracing  each  three  batteries,  are  attached  to  the  infantry 
divisions  of  the  corps.  The  six  remaining  batteries,  grouped  in 
divisions  of  two  batteries  each,  form  together  the  corps  or  reserve 
artillery. 

The  colonel  of  the  regiment  is  chief  of  artillery  of  the  corps. 
He  has  a  staff  sufficiently  numerous  to  enable  him,  with  the  assist- 
ance of  the  small  staffs  of  the  artillery-divisions,  to  administer  all 
the  affairs  of  the  regiment. 

Four  ammunition  columns,  embracing  a  total  of  ninety  wagons, 
and  all  under  the  orders  of  the  colonel,  supply  the  six  divisions 
with  ammunition.  The  personnel  of  the  four  columns  embraces 
6  officers  and  448  men. 

From  the  foregoing,  it  is  evident  that,  as  the  arm  is  at  present 
organized,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  administrative  arrangements 
of  the  German  and  Austrian  artillery-divisions  be  so  complete  as 
was  required  with  the  brigades  of  the  Union  artillery,  for  this 
administrative  machinery  is  supplied  in  their  respective  regimental 
and  brigade  staffs,  which  invariably  accompany  the  army  corps  to 
which  the  regiments  are  permanently  attached.  As  with  these, 
so  with  the  other  armies  of  Continental  Europe. 

Questions  of  administration  and  organization  have  not,  how- 
ever, primarily  determined  that  in  all  large  armies  of  recent  times 
artillery  should  be  handled  by  grouping  the  batteries  together. 
This  has  been  decided  from  purely  tactical  considerations,  which, 
in  battle,  should  and  do  dominate  all  others.  It  is  seen  that,  to  use 
artillery  effectively,  massing  to  a  greater  or  less  degree  is  neces- 
sary. Correct  tactical  principles  require  that  this  arm  must  be 
used — not  a  gun  or  even  a  battery  here  and  there,  but  that, 
when  practicable,  several  batteries  should  come  into  action  to- 
gether, and,  by  weight  of  metal  thrown,  endeavor  to  beat  down 
all  opposition.  And  as  tactics  render  it  necessary  that  they  must 
fight  together,  it  is  natural  and  proper  that  in  the  organization  of 


374  APPENDIX. 

the  arm  the  batteries  should  be  united  in  sufficiently  large,  yet 
not  unwieldy  masses,  which,  when  necessary,  may  be  moved 
from  point  to  point  with  facility  and  effect.  The  question  of 
administration  in  turn  follows  that  of  organization,  and  is  only  this: 
How  shall  the  batteries  thus  brought  together  be  commanded  and 
supplied  to  insure  the  highest  attainable  degree  of  efficiency  when 
they  come  on  the  field? 


B  [i]. 

PARIS,  FRANCE,  September  16th,  1776. — Articles  of  Agreement  between  S.  Deane 
Agent  for  the  United  Colonies  of  North  America,  and  Sieur  Phillipus  Charles 
John  Baptist  Trouson  du  Coudray,  Adjutant  General  of  Artillery,  in  the 
service  of  France. 

I.  Sieur  du  Coudray,  under  title  of  general  of  artillery  and  ordnance  and 
rank  of  major  general  in  the  forces  of  the  United  Colonies,  shall  have  direction 
of  whatever  relates  to  the  artillery  and   corps  of  engineers,  under  orders  and 
control  only  of  Congress,  their  board  of  war,  and  the  commander-in-chief,  for 
the  time  being. 

II.  The  corps  of  artillery  and  engineers,  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  same, 
shall  be  under  his  immediate  command,  with  all  the  privileges  and  authority 
annexed  to  such  command  respecting  either  rewards  and  punishments ;  and  in 
case  of  vacancies  in  said  corps  by  death,  removal,  or  new  creations  it  shall  be 
for  him  to  recommend  to  the  Congress,  or  their  committee  of  war,  the  persons 
proper  for  filling  the  same. 

Ill/  Whatever  relates  to  the  supplying  the  said  corps  with  provision,  to  the 
construction  of  artillery  and  fortification,  to  any  plan  or  scheme  relative  to 
these  objects,  will  be  consulted  on  with  him,  and  the  execution  of  whatever 

may  be  agreed  on  committed  to  him,  as  within  his  department. 

********* 

V.  Mons.  du  Coudray  shall  be  furnished  with  an  adjutant,  two  aids-de-camp, 
or  one  aide  and  a  secretary,  and  designer,  at  the  expense  and  in  the  pay  of 

the  United  States. 

********* 

X.  Mons.  du  Coudray  will  exert  himself  in  the  dispatch  of  artillery  and  stores 
agreed  on  ;  also  will  embark  himself  as  early  in  the  season  as  is  consistent  with 
such  dispatch. 

His  title  and  emoluments  were  to  date  from  August  ist,  1776, 
and  he  was  given  the  privilege  of  choosing  for  assistants  2  engi- 
neers, 4  captains,  4  lieutenants,  and  i  adjutant-general.  But  his 
preparations  were  still  more  elaborate,  as  there  arrived  in  the 
Amphitrite  with  him  i  doctor,  i  adjutant-general,  3  captains  and 
4  lieutenants  of  engineers,  i  captain  and  2  lieutenants  of  mines,  2 
captains,  3  captain-lieutenants  and  6  lieutenants  of  artillery,  i 
captain  and  i  lieutenant  of  bombardiers,  i  lieutenant  of  workmen, 
and  12  sergeants  of  artillery.  Among  these  captains  of  artillery 
was  Louis  de  Tousard,  who,  in  consequence  of  the  loss  of  an  arm 
while  gallantly  fighting  his  guns  in  an  action  against  the  enemy 
in  Rhode  Island,  in  1778,  was  brevetted  lieutenant-colonel,  and 
given  a  pension  of  thirty  dollars  per  month  during  life.  This  was 


I  APPENDIX.  375 

the  officer  subsequently  appointed  major  in  the  corps  of  artillerists 
and  engineers,  promoted  lieutenant-colonel  commandant,  Second 
artillerists  and  engineers,  and  appointed  inspector  of  artillery  for 
the  army  of  the  United  States.  Being  disbanded  in  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  1802,  he  devoted  himself  to  the  completion  of  a  task  which 
he  had  undertaken  at  the  special  request  of  President  Washington, 
and  in  1809  published  the  Artillerist's  Companion,  the  first  elab- 
orate and  comprehensive  work  on  the  practical  and  scientific  duties 
of  the  arm  produced  in  this  country.  Considering  the  paucity  of 
literary  facilities  at  the  time,  the  difficulty  in  procuring  materials, 
the  little  interest  in  military  affairs  taken  by  a  government  still 
struggling  to  vindicate  the  principle  that  an  army  was  not  neces- 
sary to  its  existence,  the  publication  of  these  volumes  must  ever 
be  regarded  as  a  remarkable  achievement.  They  remain  a  noble, 
enduring  monument  to  the  patriotic  zeal,  high  professional  attain- 
ments, and  indefatigable  industry  of  the  distinguished  author. 
The  artillery  has  reason  to  remember  the  advent  of  Du  Coudray 
to  American  shores,  if  only  for  the  felicitous  circumstance  that 
thereby  the  honorable  list  of  its  officers  was  embellished  with  the 
name  of  Louis  de  Tousard. 

It  may  not  be  uninteresting  to  briefly  note  the  fate  of  Du  Cou- 
dray and  his  followers.  It  will  be  noticed  that  by  the  terms  of  his 
agreement  he  was  to  be  chief  of  both  engineers  and  artillery. 
But  it  transpired  that  provision  for  the  former  had  already  been 
made  under  authority  of  Congress,  whose  committee  of  secret 
correspondence  had  been  instructed  so  early  as  December  2d, 
1775,  to  procure  four  good  European  engineers.  A  contract  was 
entered  into  February  i3th,  1777,  by  Benjamin  Franklin  and 
others,  at  Paris,  with  certain  officers,  who  received  leaves  of 
absence  for  the  purpose. 

On  July  22d,  1777,  Chevalier  Du  Portail,  colonel  of  engineers, 
the  officer  highest  in  rank  of  these  Frenchmen,  was  placed  in 
command  of  all  engineers  in  United  States  service — a  position  he 
retained  until  the  end  of  the  war.  With  Knox  as  cnief  of  artil- 
lery and  Du  Portail  as  chief  of  engineers  there  was  nothing  left  for 
Du  Coudray  except  the  ordnance  feature  of  the  Deane  contract. 
He  was  accordingly,  August  nth,  1777,  chosen,  with  rank  of 
major-general,  to  perform  the  duties  of  inspector-general  of  ord- 
nance and  military  manufactories — an  office  created  for  him.  He 
was  not  a  man  to  be  flattered  with  the  shadow,  while  the  sub- 
stance of  his  agreement  was  being  enjoyed  by  others.  He  de- 
clined the  office,  and  informed  the  President  that  all  he  wanted 
was  an  opportunity  to  fight  for  America,  with  whatever  rank 
Congress  chose  to  give  him.  Upon  this  he  'Was  chosen  captain, 
his  officers  lieutenants,  and  his  non-commissioned  officers  en- 
signs, and  commissions  were  ordered  to  be  made  out  accordingly. 
Soon  after,  while  hastening  to  join  the  army  retreating  from 
Brandywine,  he  was  drowned  in  the  Schuylkill  river.  Congress 


APPENDIX. 

ordered  his  remains  to  be  buried  with  the  honors  of  war.  The 
result  of  that  battle  was  to  bring  foreigners  once  more  into  favor  ; 
the  distrust  and  disappointment  caused  by  the  importunities,  pre- 
sumption, and  incompetence  of  most  of  those  already  taken  into 
the  service  of  the  States  was  again  temporarily  forgotten;  and, 
October  nth,  1777,  Du  Coudray's  friends,  both  commissioned 
and  enlisted,  were  given  the  offices  and  pay  stipulated  for  them 
by  Mr.  Deane.  Had  Du  Coudray  lived,  he  would  probably, 
like  De  Kalb,  have  been  appointed  a  major-general  in  the  line. 


B  M. 

MARCH  23d,  1852. — Ordered  to  be  printed. 
Mr.  Shields  made  the  following  report,  to  accompany  Bill  S. 
No.  304: 

The  Committee  on  Military  Affairs  respectfully  reporteth — 

That  since  the  termination  of  the  Mexican  war,  the  artillery  has  been  so 
much  neglected  that  discontent  and  discouragement  begin  to  prevail  at  the 
present  time  in  that  important  branch  of  military  service. 

The  exigencies  of  our  extended  frontier  service,  and  the  imperative  necessity 
which  compelled  the  department  to  make  the  whole  military  force  as  available 
as  possible  to  act  against  the  Indians  and  protect  the  frontier  settlements,  and 
the  additional  circumstance  that  the  artillery  consists  nominally  of  four  regi- 
ments, under  four  colonels,  making  four  distinct  and  separate  commands,  sub- 
ject to  no  common  and  recognized  head,  will  sufficiently  account  for  the  present 
neglected  and  almost  disorganized  state  of  that  important  corps. 

To  avoid  all  misconception  on  this  head,  we  wish  to  state  distinctly  that  for 
the  present  condition  of  the  artillery  no  blame  or  censure  can  justly  attach  to 
the  department,  to  the  general-in-chief  who  made  every  possible  effort,  under 
the  circumstances,  to  preserve  it  in  a  state  of  efficiency,  or  to  the  officers  of  the 
corps  who,  as  a  body,  are  as  intelligent  and  energetic  as  any  other  body  of  offi- 
cers of  equal  number  in  any  service ;  but  to  causes  already  alluded  to,  and  to 
others,  which  it  is  unnecessary  at  this  time  to  particularize. 

There  never  was  a  time  in  the  military  history  of  the  world  when  so  much 
attention  was  bestowed  upon  the  instruction  and  improvement  of  artillery  as 
at  present.  The  extraordinary  progress  of  the  present  age  in  the  arts  and 
sciences  is  felt  to  the  full  extent  in  this  branch  of  the  military  service. 

The  whole  efforts  of  the  nation  should  be  directed,  not  to  increase  the  quan- 
tity of  this  force,  but  to  improve  its  quality,  and  to  make  it,  both  in  its  personnel 
and  materiel,  -the  most  perfect  of  its  kind  in  the  world.  It  should  be  in  every 
particular  a  model  army — a  nucleus  around  which  the  nation  should  rally  in 
any  great  national  emergency.  Artillery  is  the  work  of  time.  Its  efficiency 
depends  upon  a  high  order  of  intelligence  and  careful  instruction,  and  its 
perfection  can  only  be  obtained  by  the  zealous  application  to  its  service  of 
time,  intelligence,  and  practice. 

Two  companies  of  the  forty-eight  in  service  are  equipped  as  light  artillery  ; 
the  remainder  are,  far  the  greater  part,  armed,  equipped,  and  disciplined  as 
infantry.  They  are  thus  deprived  of  any  opportunity  of  acquiring  that  knowl- 
edge which  is  absolutely  necessary  for  the  defense  of  our  coast  in  time  of  war — 
which  includes  the,  use  of  heavy  artillery  in  all  its  forms.  Great  care  and 
skill  are  now  required  in  the  preparation  of  the  different  species  of  munitions, 
in  the  arrangement  of  shell  for  efficient  use,  in  the  repair  of  carriages  and  the 


APPENDIX.  377 

re-establishment  of  guns  dismounted  by  accident  or  the  enemy's  fire,  which 
can  only  be  acquired  by  application  and  practice,  and  which  are  more  neces- 
sary and  essential  now  than  ever,  owing  to  the  celerity  with  which  steamers, 
or  vessels  towed  by  them,  can  pass,  independent  of  wind  and  tide,  to  the  object 
of  their  attack. 

In  addition  to  all  this,  there  is  the  use  of  artillery  in  field  and  siege  service, 
in  which  our  troops  will  soon  become  lamentably  deficient  without  competent- 
instruction  and  practice.  It  is  only  within  a  few  months  that  even  a  system 
of  instruction  in  the  manual  exercise  of  the  heavy  artillery  has  been  given  to 
the  army  ;  for  which  the  service  is  indebted  to  the  general-in-chief,  under 
whose  orders  it  was  compiled  by  a  board  of  officers. 

There  are  still  other  important  duties  belonging  to  the  artillery,  of  which 
ours,  under  the  present  system  of  arrangement,  can  acquire  no  practical  knowl- 
edge— such  as  the  construction  of  their  own  batteries  in  field  works,  of  siege 
works,  including  the  parapets,  embrasures,  platforms,  magazines,  &c. 

The  condition  and  efficiency  of  the  artillery  as  an  arm  of  the  military  service 
may  be  taken  as  the  best  test  at  any  time,  and  as  a  certain  test  at  the  present 
time,  of  the  military  efficiency  of  the  nation  to  which  that  service  belongs. 

If  the  present  condition  of  our  artillery  be  taken  as  a  test,  ours  might  be 
considered  as  the  most  inefficient  and  worst  managed  military  service  in  the 
world.  But  as  this  nation  is  anomalous  in  many  respects,  so  it  is  in  this.  The 
personnel  of  our  artillery,  so  far  as  it  consists  of  the  corps  of  artillery  officers, 
is,  in  point  of  intelligence,  scientific  knowledge,  and  preparatory  instruction, 
equal  as  a  body  to  the  officers  of  any  other  service ;  and  with  equal  oppor- 
tunities for  practice  and  improvement,  owing  to  the  practical  energy  and  in- 
ventive energy  of  our  people,  they  would  surpass  in  general  efficiency  any 
other  equal  number  of  artillery  officers  in  any  service.  It  must  be  gratifying 
to  the  American  people  to  see  the  officers  of  the  army,  instead  of  concealing 
the  defects  Df  the  service  from  the  public,  the  first  to  point  them  out,  and  to 
call  aloud  for  assistance  and  reform. 

This  is  the  spirit  which  should  animate  Americans  in  every  branch  of  the 
public  service,  whether  civil  or  military,  and  without  which  the  public  service 
is  liable  to  become  almost  as  much  neglected  and  badly  managed  in  a  republic 
as  under  any  other  form  of  government. 

The  first  essential  to  improve  the  condition  of  the  artillery  and  render  it  effi- 
cient is  unity.  This  is  the  first  essential  in  every  kind  of  military  service,  and 
is  indispensable  to  the  artillery.  The  committee  propose,  therefore,  to  give  it  a 
directing  head,  and  to  make  the  head,  who  ought  to  be  one  of  the  most  effi- 
cient officers  of  the  army,  responsible  for  the  condition  and  efficiency  of  this 
branch  of  the  service.  It  is  now  a  body  without  any  head,  or  rather  it  has  as 
many  heads  as  it  has  regiments ;  but  there  is  no  one  whose  duty  it  is  to  super- 
intend its  management,  supervise  its  instruction,  and  diffuse  life  and  energy 
into  the  whole  as  a  distinct  corps  of  the  army.  The  next  measure  is  to  author- 
ize the  chief  of  artillery,  under  the  direction  of  the  President,  to  eliminate  from 
the  present  artillery  force  a  sufficient  number  of  officers  and  companies  to  con- 
stitute a  competent  corps  for  instruction,  practice,  and  improvement  in  every 
species  of  artillery  service,  and  employ  the  residue  as  cavalry  or  as  infantry 
companies  for  the  defense  of  the  frontier.  This  new  arrangement  will  not 
diminish  the  general  efficiency  of  our  little  army  for  frontier  service,  and  will 
not  increase  its  expense ;  and  yet,  simple  as  it  is,  it  will  render  our  artillery 
disciplined  and  efficient,  and  keep  it  in  a  state  of  readiness,  by  which  it  can  be 
expanded,  in  any  emergency,  to  any  extent  commensurate  with  the  wants  and 
wishes  of  the  nation. 
48 


378  APPENDIX. 

B  [3]- 

[General  Orders  No.  6.] 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 

WASHINGTON,  January  30^,  1866. 

A  permanent  artillery  board  is  hereby  organized,  to  which  questions  pertain- 
ing to  the  artillery  arm  of  service  may  be  referred  by  the  Secretary  of  War  or 
the  general-in-chief  for  discussion  and  recommendation. 

The  board  shall  also  have  the  power  to  make  original  recommendations  to 
the  general-in-chief  in  reference  to  the  interests  and  efficiency  of  the  artillery 
arm. 

The  members  shall  sit  on  the  board  in  accordance  with  their  rank  in  the 
artillery,  and  the  senior  member  shall  be  president.  He  shall  have  power  to 
call  meetings  at  such  times  and  places  as  shall  be  approved  by  the  general-in- 
chief,  in  addition  to  those  called  by  the  Secretary  of  War  or  general-in-chief. 

A  complete  record  of  the  proceedings  of  the  board  will  be  kept  by  the  secre- 
tary, who,  on  being  relieved,  shall  turn  it  over  to  his  successor  or  the  adjutant- 
general  of  the  army. 

*  *  1«  *  *  *  * 

By  command  of  Lieutenant-General  Grant. 

E.  S.  TOWNSEND,  Assistant  Adjutant- General. 


Position  and  Functions  of  Brigadier-  Generals  and  Lieutenant- 
Colonels ',  Royal  Artillery,  in  the  Field,  British  Regulations* 

The  brigadier-generals  and  commanders  of  corps  and  divisional  artillery  in 
the  field  form  an  integral  part  of  the  army  corps  staff  and  divisional  staff, 
respectively.  They  will  encamp  with  the  staff  and  receive  orders  from  their 
respective  generals. 

The  commanding  officer  of  corps  artillery  will  encamp  with  his  artillery  and 
receive  his  orders  from  the  brigadier-general.  When  divisional  artillery  is 
withdrawn  from  its  division  for  the  purpose  of  being  massed  with  the  corps  ar- 
tillery, it  will  be  under  the  immediate  orders  of  the  brigadier-general ;  but  on 
other  occasions  the  lieutenant-colonel  in  command  of  the  divisional  artillery 
will  have  the  entire  responsibility  for  the  use  of  his  batteries,  under  the  orders 
of  the  divisional  general. 

In  the  field,  brigadier-generals  and  lieutenant-colonels  of  artillery  will  be 
made  acquainted  with  the  general  plan  of  operations  and  the  part  which  the 
artillery  under  their  command  is  expected  to  play.  They  will  communicate  as 
much  of  this  information  as  may  be  necessary  to  the  officers  commanding  bat- 
teries. The  brigadier-general  will,  as  a  rule,  accompany  the  general  officer  of 
the  army  corps,  and  only  leave  him  when  the  artillery  is  massed.  Similarly, 
the  commanding  officer  of  divisional  artillery  will  accompany  the  generals  of 
division,  but  will  take  personal  command  when  the  divisional  artillery  is  massed. 

*When  the  British  army  takes  the  field,  there  is,  according  to  the  published  accounts 
of  its  organization,  with  each  army  corps  a  brigadier-general,  chief  of  artillery.  Each 
corps  has  three  divisions ;  each  division  has  three  batteries  (18  guns),  commanded  by  a 
lieutenant-colonel.  Each  corps  has  an  artillery  reserve,  called  corps  artillery,  of  three 
horse  and  two  field  batteries,  commanded  by  a  colonel. 


APPENDIX.  379 

Responsibility  of  Different  Ranks  of  Officers. 

In  order  that  no  question  may  arise  as  to  the  responsibility  of  officers  of  dif- 
ferent ranks  in  action,  the  following  general  rules  will  be  observed  : 

The  brigadier -general  will  be  responsible  that  the  lieutenant-colonels  or  other 
officers  in  command  of  more  than  one  battery  in  the  field  are  acquainted  with  the 
position  of  the  corps  ammunition  columns,  the  probable  position  of  the  corplf 
staff,  and  every  other  necessary  information  which  does  not  come  strictly  under 
the  government  of  general  officers  commanding  divisions.  He  will  also  be  re- 
sponsible, under  the  orders  of  the  general  officer  in  command  of  the  corps,  for 
the  tactical  use  of  the  whole  of  the  artillery  not  at  the  time  under  the  command 
of  general  officers  commanding  divisions. 

Whenever  corps  and  divisional  artillery  are  massed,  he  will  take  immediate 
command  of  the  mass,  assigning  to  each  section  the  portion  of  the  objective  at 
which  it  is  to  fire,  and  the  commanding  officer  of  each  section  will  divide  the 
portion  so  assigned  amongst  the  batteries  under  his  command. 

Any  order  given  by  him  to  the  artillery  is  to  be  considered  as  coming  from 
the  general  commanding  the  corps. 

Lieutenant-colonels,  or  other  officers  of  less  rank,  being  in  command  of  a  sec- 
tion of  artillery,  will  be  responsible  for  the  tactical  handling  of  the  batteries 
under  their  command,  including  the  general  choice  of  positions  and  the  part  of 
the  objective  to  be  fired  at.  When  their  batteries  are  massed,  they  will  assign 
the  position  to  be  taken  up  by  the  wagons  and  spare  horses,  and  direct  the  re- 
placement of  casualties. 

Officers  commanding  batteries  will  be  responsible  for  the  range  and  nature  of 
projectiles  used,  as  well  as  for  the  actual  movements  of  their  batteries.  In  ac- 
tion, they  should  separate  themselves  from  the  smoke  of  the  guns  and  watch 
carefully  the  result  of  the  fire,  correcting  errors  from  time  to  time.  They  will 
note  down  the  object,  the  apparent  effect  of  the  fire,  and  the  changes  made  in 
projectiles,  range  and  direction,  the  movements  of  their  batteries,  the  hour  at 
which  movements  and  opening  or  ceasing  fire  occur,  together  with  any  useful 
remarks.  The  books  in  which  these  notes  are  made  should  be  preserved  for 
future  reference.  They  will  also  be  responsible,  when  acting  singly,  that  the 
caisson-wagons  are  within  reach,  and  that  the  guns  in  action  are  kept  duly  sup- 
plied with  everything  needful  for  their  efficient  working. 


B[5]- 

The  organization  of  the  German  artillery,  for  administrative 
purposes,  in  peace,  is  as  follows  : 

1.  A  general  or  lieutenant-general  as  inspector  of  artillery. 

2.  Four  artillery  inspections,  each  supervised  by  a  lieutenant- 
general  or  a  major-general. 

3.  Fourteen  or  more  artillery  brigades,  each  commanded  by  a 
major-general  or  colonel,  and  each  composed  of  two  or  three 
regiments. 

4.  Corps  and  divisional  artillery  ;  the  former  is  in  reality  the 
reserve  for  the  army  corps,  while  the  latter  embraces  the  batteries 
attached  to  army  divisions,  two  or  three  of  which  make  up  each 
army  corps. 

When  the  army  takes  the  field  in  war,  the  inspector-general 
[i]  joins  the  headquarters  of  the  commander-in-chief ;  the  sub- 
inspectors  [2]  join  the  headquarters  of  the  operating  armies, 


380  APPENDIX. 

where  they  act  as  chiefs  of  artillery.  The  artillery  brigade  com- 
manders accompany  their  corps  headquarters,  where  they  act  as 
chiefs  of  artillery  for  their  respective  army  corps. 

The  corps  artillery  (i.  e.,  corps  reserve)  is  a  regiment  com- 
manded by  its  colonel. 

The  divisional  artillery  embraces  three  or  four  batteries  organ- 
ized into  an  artillery  division  and  commanded  by  a  field  officer. 

Regarding  the  duties  of  the  inspector-general,  the  following 
very  general  information  has  been  secured  through  the  American 
minister  at  Berlin  : 

"The  inspector-general  is  both  an  executive  and  administrative  officer.  His 
duties  consist  in  inspecting  all  the  artillery  in  his  district,  in  attending  their 
shooting  practice,  &c.  Questions  of  discipline,  however,  are  settled  by  the  army 
corps  commander.  On  the  declaration  of  war,  his  peace  duties  cease  altogether, 
and  he  becomes  the  chief  artillery  officer  at  the  headquarters  of  an  army  com- 
mander. In  battle,  it  is  his  duty  to  secure  good  positions  for  the  artillery  of  the 
different  corps,  but  always  in  consultation  with  his  commanding  general. 

"He  is  supposed  to  know  the  intentions  of  the  general,  and  do  all  in  his 
power  to  forward  them  in  directing  the  artillery.  He  may  form  no  independ- 
ent plans,  and  consequently  is  not  supposed  '  to  give  any  orders  originating  with 
himself,'  except  so  far  as,  after  knowing  confidentially  the  general's  plans,  he 
believes  they  will  be  thus  most  successfully  executed.  There  are  no  rules  laid 
down  to  prevent  conflict  of  authority  between  inspectors-general  and  com- 
manding-generals of  army  corps.  In  time  of  peace  the  latter  seldom  interfere 
with  the  artillery  of  their  district,  but  may,  if  they  like,  inspect  it  at  any  time. 
In  time  of  war,  the  artillery-general  of  an  army  has  to  regulate  the  proper  supply 
and  disposition  of  ammunition  as  well  as  its  reserves." 


C  [i]. 

Regulations  United  States  Army  of  May  6th,  1813. 

The  artillery  will  be  distributed  for  field  service  into  divisions  or  half  divi- 
sions. A  division  of  artillery  will  consist  of  six  pieces  of  ordnance,  viz.,  four 
cannon  of  the  same  calibre  and  two  howitzers  or  six  cannon  of  not  more  than 
two  calibres.  A  half  division  of  artillery  will  consist  of  two  pieces  of  cannon 
of  the  same  calibre  and  of  one  howitzer,  or  of  three  pieces  of  cannon  of  the 
same  calibre.  To  each  pair  of  three-pounders  will  be  allotted  one  ammunition- 
wagon  or  caisson ;  to  each  sixr-pounder  the  same ;  to  each  howitzer,  double 
this  allowance;  to  each  gun  of  larger  calibre  than  a  six-pounder,  two,  or  at 
most  three,  ammunition-wagons  or  caissons. 

To  each  division  of  artillery  will  be  allotted  three  wagons,  provided  with 
assorted  and  spare  articles  of  equipment,  ammunition,  harness,  entrenching  and 
artificers'  tools,  &c. ;  to  each  half  division,  one  wagon,  with  assorted  spare 
articles  and  tools  as  above  ;  to  each  division  of  flying  artillery  and  every  two 
divisions  of  foot  artillery  will  be  allotted  one  traveling  forge.  *  *  *  Wagons 
will  be  provided  with  mining  and  laboratory  tools  and  utensils,  together  with 
additional  quantities  of  entrenching  and  artificers'  tools,  whenever  necessary. 

By  the  Regulations  of  1820  each  company  of  artillery,  with 
six  pieces  of  ordnance  and  their  proper  stores,  constituted  a  divi- 
sion of  artillery.  The  *divisipn  was  divided  into  subdivisions, 
each  consisting  of  two  pieces  of  ordnance  of  the  same  kind. 

By  the  Regulations  of  1835  the  term  division  was  changed  to 


APPENDIX.  381 

battery,  and  the  artillery  for  field  service  was  distributed  into  bat- 
teries, half-batteries,  and  sections,  corresponding  in  composition 
to  the  former  divisions,  half-divisions,  and  subdivisions.  We 
thus  see  that  the  Gribeauval  system,  not  only  as  regards  materiel, 
but  as  regards  the  organization  of  the  personnel,  disappeared^  in 
all  its  parts  immediately  after  the  introduction  of  the  stock-trail 
system  of  carriages. 

The  inconvenience  that  results  from  having  the  legal  designa- 
tion of  the  artillery  tactical  unit — company — different  from  that 
prescribed  by  regulations — division  or  battery — is  manifest.  The 
incongruity  remained,  however,  as  part  of  the  military  system 
until  the  Fifth  artillery  was  organized  in  1861,  when  it  was  par- 
tially, and  in  the  reorganization  of  1866  it  was  wholly,  abated  by 
the  introduction  of  the  term  battery  to  designate  the  smallest  legal 
artillery  unit. 

As  germane  to  the  subject-matter  of  this  note,  the  following 
extract  from  the  fourth  note  of  Napoleon's  Dictations  at  St. 
Helena,  made  upon  General  Rogniat's  "  Considerations  sue  L' Art 
de  la  Guerre,"  published  in  1861,  will  be  interesting: 

"  The  artillery  division  has  been  fixed  by  General  Gribeauval  at  eight  pieces — 
4,  8,  and  12-pounders,  or  6-inch  howitzers — because  it  is  necessary,  first,  that 
a  division  of  artillery  may  be  able  to  divide  itself  into  two  or  four  batteries  ; 
second,  because  eight  pieces  can  be  followed  by  a  company  of  120  men,  having 
a  reserve  detachment  in  the  park ;  third,  because  the  wagons  and  carriages 
necessary  for  the  service  of  these  eight  pieces  can  be  harnessed  by  a  company 
of  the  equipage  of  the  train  ;  fourth,  because  a  good  captain  can  look  after  that 
number  of  pieces ;  fifth,  the  number  of  carriages  and  wagons  which  composed 
a  battery  of  eight  pieces  provide  sufficient  work  for  one  forge  and  one  ammu- 
nition-wagon, and  because  two  spare  gun-carriages  are  sufficient  for  the 
division. 

"  If  the  division  were  composed  of  a  less  number  of  pieces,  so  many  more 
forges,  ammunition-wagons,  and  spare  gun-carriages  would  be  needed. 

"Napoleon  suppressed  the  4  and  8-pounders,  and  for  them  substituted  the 
6-pounder.  Experience  had  shown  him  that  the  infantry  generals  made  use 
indiscriminately  of  the  4  and  8-pounders,  without  regard  to  the  effect  they 
desired  to  produce.  He  suppressed  the  6-inch  howitzer,  substituting  for  it  the 
o.]-inch  howitzer,  because  two  cartridges  of  the  first  weigh  as  much  as  three 
of  the  second  (5£-inch),  and,  besides,  the  5^-inch  howitzer  is  found  to  have  the 
same  calibre  as  the  24-pounder,  used  so  much  in  siege-trains  and  forts.  He 
formed  his  foot  artillery  divisions  of  two  5j-inch  howitzers  and  six  6-pounders. 
or  of  two  long-range  5^-inch  howitzers  and  six  12-pounders  ;  the  horse  artillery 
divisions,  of  four  6-pounders  and  two  howitzers  ;  but  it  would  be  preferable, 
if  they  [the  horse  artillery  divisions]  had  the  same  compositions  as  the  foot 
artillery,  that  is  to  say,  two  5j-inch  howitzers  and  six  6-pounders.  '  The  pro- 
portions of  the  various  calibres  were  twelve-twentieths  6-pounders,  three- 
twentieths  12-pouhders,  and  five-twentieths  howitzers. 

"  These  changes  modified  M.  de  Gribeauval's  system.  They  were  mad'e  in 
his  spirit,  and  he  would  not  have  disowned  them.  He  reformed  a  great  deal ; 
he  simplified  a  great  deal.  The  artillery  is  yet  too  heavy,  too  complicated;  it  must 
again  be  simplified,  rendered  uniform,  and  reduced  to  its  simplest  form. 

"  The  equipage  of  sixty  pieces,  formed  on  Napoleon's  principles,  was  thirty- 
six  6-pounders,  nine  12-pounders,  fifteen  howitzers,  forming  seven  divisions  and 
a  half,  and  required  thirty-two  forges,  ammunition-wagons,  and  spare  gun-car- 
riages for  the  divisions ;  eighty-one  caissons  for  6-pounders,  forty  and  a  half 


382  APPENDIX. 

for  12-pounders,  sixty-seven  and  a  half  for  howitzers,  twenty-nine  wagons  and 
carriages  of  the  park,  thirty  wagons  for  infantry,  twenty  of  bridge  equipage — 
in  all,  three  hundred  and  sixty  carriages,  or  six  carriages  for  each  piece.  By 
this  means  the  supply  was  three  hundred  and  six  shot  per  piece,  without  count- 
ing what  was  in  the  small  ammunition-chest. 

"M.  de  Gribeauval,  who  had  fought  through  the  seven  years'  war  in  the 
Austrian  army,  and  had  a  genius  for  artillery,  made  the  rule  that  the  extent  of 
the  equipage  should  be  at  the  rate  of  four  pieces  to  1,000  men,  or  thirty-six 
pieces  for  a  division  of  9,000,  or  one  hundred  and  sixty  pieces  for  an  army  of 
40,000  men.  The  imperial  arrangement  was  120  pieces  for  a  corps  d'arme'  of 
40,000  men,  composed  of  4  infantry,  1  light  cavalry,  1  dragoon,  and  1  cuiras- 
sier division.  Of  the  fifteen  artillery  divisions,  two  were  attached  to  each  in- 
fantry division,  three  were  in  reserve.  Of  the  remainder — the  horse  artillery 
divisions — one  was  with  the  light  cavalry,  one  with  the  dragoons,  and  two  with 
the  cuirassiers.  The  whole  embraced  seventy-two  6-pounders,  eighteen  12- 
pounders,  thirty  howitzers,  and  nearly  six  hundred  wagons,  including  the  pieces, 
the  double  supply  of  stores,  and  the  infantry  ammunition-wagons. 

"It  is  necessary  that  an  army  have  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery  in  just 
proportions.  These  different  arms  cannot  supply  each  other's  places.  "We 
have  seen  some  occasions  where  the  enemy  had  almost  won  the  battle.  He 
occupied  a  fine  position  with  a  battery  of  fifty  or  sixty  pieces.  It  would  have 
been  in  vain  to  attack  him  with  4,000  horse  and  8,000  infantry.  A  battery  of 
equal  power  was  necessary,  under  the  protection  of  which  the  colums  of  attack 
advanced  and  deployed. 

"  The  proportions  of  the  three  arms  have  always  been  the  object  of  the  medi- 
tations of  the  great  generals. 

"They  have  agreed  that  it  must  be — first,  four  pieces  for  1,000  men,  giving 
one-eighth  of  the  army  for  the  artillery  personnel ;  second,  a  cavalry  equal  to 
one-fourth  of  the  infantry. 

"A  good  infantry  is  without  doubt  the  nerve  of  the  army  ;  but  if  it  had  to 
fight  a  long  time  against  a  very  superior  artillery,  it  would  be  demoralized  and 
destroyed.  In  the  first  campaigns  of  the  war  of  the  Revolution,  France  had 
always  the  best  artillery.  I  don't  know  a  single  instance  in  this  war  where 
twenty  pieces  of  cannon  advantageously  posted  have  been  taken  by  the 
bayonet." 


C    [2]. 

February  3d,  1840,  the  ordnance  committee,  when  it  had  been 
in  session  nearly  a  year,  addressed  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  on  the  subject  of  the  proper  metal  for  field  ordnance,  calling 
attention  to  the  following  facts:  i.  The  board  of  1835  had  recom- 
mended bronze.  2.  The  board  of  1838,  four  to  one,  did  the 
same,  and  also  recommended  that  experiments  be  made  to  test 
the  durability  of  cast-iron  and  malleable  cast-iron.  3.  The  results 
showed  that  no  dependence  could  be  placed  on  iron  guns  of 
either  description.  4.  This  was  the  opinion  among  artillerists 
abroad.  5.  The  committee  therefore  found  no  difficulty  in  unani- 
mously recommending  the  adoption  of  bronze. 

The  Secretary  replied  in  the  following  rather  caustic  letter, 
dated  War  Department,  February  i8th,  1840: 

"The  report  of  the  board  of  ordnance  in  relation  to  the  best  material  for  field 
artillery  has  been  carefully  examined ;  and  notwithstanding  the  concurrent 


APPENDIX.  383 

opinions  of  so  many  boards  of  ordnance  that  have  considered  this  matter,  and 
that  of  the  existing  board,  in  favor  of  the  exclusive  use  of  bronze  for  field  can- 
non, the  Department  of  War  does  not  deem  it  expedient  to  renounce  altogether 
the  use  of  iron  for  this  purpose.  Judging  from  the  experiments  quoted  by  the 
board,  it  appears  certain  that  iron  is  abundantly  strong,  and  that  if  guns  some- 
times fail,  it  is  not  because  the  gun  is  of  iron,  but  because  the  founder  is  not  per- 
fect in  his  art.  At  present,  he  makes  a  good  gun  by  accident,  whereas  it  is~by- 
accident  only  he  should  make  a  bad  one. 

"  The  iron  6,  12,  and  18-pounders  in  use  during  the  last  war  prove  that  we 
formerly  possessed  the  art  of  making  strong,  light,  and  serviceable  guns.  The 
uncertainty  which  attends  the  proof  of  the  new  iron  guns  arises  from  some  irreg- 
ularity in  the  selection,  mixing,  or  the  management  of  the  metal ;  but  the  pre- 
cise nature  of  the  difference  in  this  respect  between  a  good  and  a  bad  gun  is  not 
fully  known,  and  ought  to  be  ascertained  with  all  possible  accuracy.  This 
must  be  regarded  as  the  first  and  most  important  thing  to  be  learned,  being  more 
necessary  even  than  to  decide  upon  the  pattern  and  other  details.  In  fixing  on 
the  latter,  however,  it  will  be  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  uncertainty 
complained  of  is  due  in  some  measure  to  the  frequent  changes  made  by  the  ord- 
nance office  in  the  length  and  weight  of  the  guns.  No  sacrifice  of  safety  and 
solidity  ought  to  be  made  to  lighten  the  weight  of  the  metal.  *  *  *  It  would 
seem  that  it  would  be  no  less  difficult  to  introduce  the  art  of  casting  bronze 
than  iron  guns.  We  possess  the  best  quality  of  iron  ;  but  copper  is  not  found 
or  not  wrought  in  sufficient  quantities,  and  tin  not  at  all ;  and  it  is  important 
that  the  armament  of  our  navy,  fortifications,  and  troops  should  be  drawn  from 
an  independent  source. 

"  The  partial  use  of  bronze  field  artillery  is  not  objected  to  ;  but  the  board  of 
ordnance  must  apply  itself  to  acquire  sufficient  knowledge  of  the  subject  to  cast 
the  guns  within  our  own  arsenals,  as  this  Department  is  not  satisfied  with  those 
that  have  been  hitherto  made  at  private  foundries.  For  this  purpose  an  intel- 
ligent officer  should  be  sent  to  visit  the  foundries  of  bronze  cannon  in  Europe. 
A  few  pieces  of  field  artillery  may  be  purchased  there,  on  condition  of  the  privi- 
lege being  granted  of  assisting  at  all  the  operations  of  mixing  the  metals  and 
fusing  and  casting  the  guns.  Two  officers  of  industry  and  capacity  ought  to 
be  immediately  stationed  at  two  of  the  principal  foundries  (in  this  country),  in 
order  to  make  themselves  familiar  with  all  the  usual  processes  of  iron  work,  so 
that  when  they  enter  the  foreign  establishments  they  may  be  able  to  discern 
what  is  new  and  peculiar,  and  lose  no  time  in  learning  abroad  things  equally 
well  understood  and  practiced  at  home. 

"  The  Department  will  take  measures  to  ascertain  the  method  pursued  by  the 
Prussian  Government  in  the  reception  of  iron  guns  for  its  artillery,  and  pursue 
the  same  course  in  procuring  a  few  light  pieces  from  Sweden  ;  and  it  is  proposed 
that  the  officers  spoken  of  above  should,  when  sufficiently  acquainted  with  the 
subject,  proceed  to  that  country,  superintend  the  casting  of  our  own  guns,  and 
acquire  accurate  information  in  relation  to  the  selection  of  metals,  their  mixing, 
fusing,  and  casting,  and  the  method  of  proving  cannon,  as  practiced  by  the 
Swedish  and  foreign  officers  at  those  foundries.  Connected  with  this  subject  is 
an  inquiry  into  the  effect  produced  by  the  increased  strength  of  the  powder 
now  in  use,  both  with  regard  to  its  application  to  common  service  and  to  prove 
guns."  *  *  * 

The  rejoinder  of  the  committee,  dated  February  2Oth,  was  as 
follows : 

The  board  of  ordnance  officers  has  attentively  examined  the  decision  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  of  February  18th,  upon  the  proposition  submitted  to  him  of  the 
best  materiel  for  field  artillery  ;  and  while  it  admits  the  correctness  of  his  views 
and  the  propriety  of  the  means  to  be  adopted  for  accomplishing  the  objects  to 
be  attained,  the  subject  is  of  so  grave  a  nature,  involving  interests  of  such  im- 


3^4  APPENDIX. 

portance  to  the  country  as  well  as  the  reputation  of  the  ordnance  corps,  that 
the  board  begs  leave  to  submit  the  following  remarks  and  propositions  for  his 
consideration  : 

1.  The  board  is  of  opinion,  as  before  stated,  that  iron  field  guns  can  be  made. 
It  also  fully  concurs  with  the  Secretary  that  the  means  pointed  out  should  be 
put  in  practice  with  as  little  delay  as  practicable,  to  insure  castings  of  good 
quality ;  but  it  is  evident  some  time  must  elapse  before  we  can  get  the  benefit 
of  their  results. 

2.  In  addition  to  the  field  guns  required  for  our  own  service,  several  of  the 
States  require  iron  field  guns  for  arming  their  militia,  and  others  require  field 
guns  of  bronze.     More  than  one  hundred  guns  of  this  material  have  been  issued 
to   the  States  within  the  last  two  years ;  and  in  relation  to  this  matter,  the 
board  is  of  opinion  that  the  skill  acquired  in  this  branch  of  manufacture  has 
been  underrated.     We  have  the  principal  French  publications  on  the  subject — 
Mouge  and  Dartein.     They  have  been  closely  followed,  except  in  moulding. 
We  make  use  of  a  first-rate  furnace,  better  moulding  materials,  and  the  same 
mode  of  mixing  the  materials  as  the  French.     We  have  succeeded  in  making 
castings  perfectly  sound  and   homogeneous,  of  the  same  specific  gravity  as 
foreign  bronze,  the  actual  weights  of  the  guns  corresponding  with  their  com- 
puted weights.     The  durability  of  some  of  our  bronze  guns  exceeds  that  of 
many  foreign  guns. 

********* 
4.  The  board  considers  the  ordnance  department  capable  to  furnish  immedi- 
ately bronze  field  guns  fit  for  service,  and  they  propose  to  make  patterns  of  these 
guns  the  dimensions  of  which  will  be  such  that  their  carriages  will  be  able  to 
receive  iron  guns  when  prepared.  Should  the  Secretary  of  War  agree  to  this 
proposition,  they  will  arrange  all  the  details,  so  that  our  artillery  could  be 
supplied  with  field  batteries  complete  immediately ;  and  they  could  at  the 
same  time  proceed  to  put  in  practice  the  measures  proposed  to  perfect  the 
manufacture  of  iron  guns,  which,  when  perfected,  could  be  introduced  without 
delay  and  without  altering  the  system,  as  the  same  carriages,  &c.,  Avould  suit 
for  both.  The  necessity  of  adopting  a  system  at  once  is  evident;  and  by  pur- 
suing the  course  here  recommended,  we  would  be  able  now  to  put  our  resources 
in  operation  to  furnish  what  is  absolutely  necessary — a  system  for  the  immediate 
use  of  our  artillery. 

The  subject  of  chambered  guns  will  also  receive  the  prompt  attention  of  the 
board  ;  but  this,  even  supposing  the  principle  established,  would  require  some 
time  and  experiments  to  arrange  the  details. 

FEBRUARY  29th,  1840. — The  drawings  of  pattern  field  guns, 
brass  and  iron,  were  completed  and  sent  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
with  the  following  statement  for  his  consideration: 

The  board  of  ordnance  officers,  in  conformity  with  the  instructions  of  the 
Secretary  of  War,  has  the  honor  to  submit  drawings  for  bronze  and  iron  field 
cannon,  the  latter  of  such  dimensions  as  they  confidently  believe  will  impart 
to  them  sufficient  strength,  provided  the  material  is  of  good  quality,  without 
which  the  board  would  have  no  faith  in  iron  of  any  pattern.  The  patterns  for 
the  bronze  guns  are  reduced  somewhat  in  length  from  those  established  in  1835, 
so  as  to  conform  in  length  to  the  iron  guns,  for  the  purpose  of  allowing  the 
latter  to  be  mounted  upon  the  carriages  established  for  the  brass  guns,  simply 
by  a  small  increase  in  the  width  of  the  rondels  and  the  length  of  the  assem- 
bling bolts. 

The  12-pounder  bronze  gun  of  1835,  being  sixteen  calibres  long  and  weighing 
1,800  pounds,  is  of  too  great  weight  for  field  service  generally,  though  particu- 
larly adapted  to  field  works  and  batteries  of  position.  The  pattern  now  pro- 
posed is  for  a  light  12-pounder ;  and  as  it  is  not  expedient  to  alter  the  diameters 
(which  would  affect  the  strength  of  the  piece),  they  are  obliged  to  reduce  its 


APPENDIX.  385 

length  to  thirteen  calibres,  which  is  nearly  the  same  as  the  English  light  12- 
pounder.  This  gun  takes  the  place  of  the  9-pounder  of  1835,  which  has  been 
abolished. 

The  G-pounders  have  been  fixed  at  fourteen  calibres  length  of  bore,  for  the  same 
reasons,  viz.,  that  the  strength  of  the  guns  should  be  augmented  without  add- 
ing too  much  to  their  weight;  and  notwithstanding  a  majority  of  the  board 
would  prefer  guns  of  an  increased  length,  if  made  exclusively  of  bronze,  they_ 
have  yielded  such  preference  to  the  necessity  of  preserving  a  uniformity  between 
the  length  of  the  guns  of  the  two  metals  and  in  the  carriages  for  them,  it  being 
very  important  to  avoid  a  multiplication  of  models  for  field  carriages. 

The  board  having  considered  the  subject  of  chambered  guns,  is  of  opinion 
that  a  few  field  guns  should  be  bored  with  chambers,  and  that  their  force  and 
durability  should  be  compared  with  the  ordinary  guns. 

The  reply  of  the  Secretary  of  War  to  the  above  was  dated 
War  Department,  March  5th,  1840: 

The  Secretary  of  War  has  attentively  considered  the  remarks  and  proposals 
of  the  board  of  ordnance,  made  in  reply  to  his  communication  of  the  18th 
ultimo,  on  the  subject  of  field  artillery,  and  cannot  concur  in  the  one  or  the 
other.  However  important  it  may  be  that  our  artillery  should  be  supplied  at 
once  with  field  batteries  complete,  it  is  more  so  that  the  guns  which  compose 
those  batteries  should  be  perfect,  and  the  patterns  to  be  adopted  unobjection- 
able and  permanent.  The  frequent  attempts  to  adopt  a  system  at  once  for  the  im- 
mediate use  of  our  artillery,  without  an  adequate  acquaintance  with  the  subject, 
have  led  to  the  protracted  delay  we  have  already  experienced  in  this  matter. 
The  Secretary  is  therefore  opposed  to  all  temporary  expedients.  The  patterns 
presented  for  approval,  in  conformity  with  the  proposals,  are  confessedly  defective, 
and  have  been  devised  because  the  material  is  supposed  not  to  be  good  or  the 
knowledge  of  the  foundries  imperfect.  The  weight  is  not  considered  material, 
but  the  length  is  very  objectionable.  It  is  not  such  as  the  board  would  have 
recommended  if  it  had  believed  that  the  metal  now  in  use  would  have  borne 
such  an  increased  number  of  calibres  as  would  place  our  light  artillery  on  an 
equality  with  that  of  Europe  and  suffice  to  fight  the  guns  advantageously  be- 
hind field-Avorks.  From  a  desire  to  use  the  same  carriages,  the  bronze  gun  is 
likewise  reduced,  extending  these  serious  objections  to  all  the  light  artillery, 
whether  iron  or  brass. 

The  board  is  satisfied  "that  such  additions  to  the  knowledge  of  founding 
bronze  guns  as  could  be  made  by  visiting  European  establishments  would  un- 
doubtedly enable  them  to  perform  the  work  at  any  one  of  the  arsenals,  in  case 
a  national  foundry  should  not  be  authorized  by  Congress."  The  Secretary 
thinks  this  remark  equally  applicable  to  iron  guns.  And  in  the  absence  of  au- 
thority to  establish  a  foundry,  the  board  ought  to  possess  such  additional 
knowledge  of  the  subject  as  to  enable  its  members  to  regulate  the  founding  of 
bronze  and  iron  guns  by  contract  with  the  proprietors  of  private  foundries,  in 
such  manner  as  to  secure  the  strict  application  of  scientific  principles  to  the 
founding  of  cannon  ;  and  he  is  not  satisfied  that  the  corps,  collectively  or  individu- 
ally, possess  that  practical  knowledge  which  the  importance  of  the  subject,  both  to  the 
country  and  the  reputation  of  the  corps,  ivould  seem  to  require.  He  repeats,  there- 
fore, his  wish  that  this  desirable  knowledge  should  be  acquired  with  as  little 
delay  as  practicable,  and  for  that  purpose  proposes  that  the  three  junior  mem- 
bers of  the  board  should  proceed  to  Europe,  accompanied  by  a  practical  founder. 

Although  the  subject  of  light  artillery  alone  is  now  under  consideration,  it 
may  be  well  to  advert  to  our  defective  system  of  heavy  ordnance  as  a  further 
motive  for  the  course  recommended.  During  the  absence  of  the  members  of 
the  board  who  are  designated  to  proceed  to  Europe,  it  will  be  advisable  to  sus- 
pend the  casting  of  light  artillery,  and  to  make  no  contracts  for  heavy  ord- 
nance. 

49 


386  APPENDIX. 

c[3]. 

The  following  letter  from  Colonel  Wadsworth  to  a  prominent 
officer  of  the  army,  whose  aid  he  solicited  in  the  furtherance  of 
the  important  work  marked  out  in  the  letter  itself,  sufficiently 
indicates  the  prompt  manner  in  which  he  proceeded  to  the  task 
of  introducing  symmetry  and  simplicity  into  the  artillery  service. 
It  is  dated  Washington,  D.  C.,  May  2yth,  1813  : 

"Although  it  has  been  near  a  twelve-month  since  I  came  into  this  office,  but 
little  could  be  accomplished  before  General  Armstrong  became  Secretary  of  War. 
At  the  commencement  of  hostilities  we  were  destitute  of  seasoned  timber  for 
gun-carriages,  as  well  as  establishments  and  sufficient  workmen  for  their  con- 
struction. Heretofore  they  have  been  procured  partly  by  contracts  and  partly 
constructed  by  the  artificers  of  the  artillery.  Every  superintendent  selected 
whatever  pattern  and  introduced  whatever  alteration  his  fancy  suggested.  The 
American  artillery,  including  that  belonging  to  the  individual  States,  comprises, 
I  believe,  every  calibre  made  use  of  either  in  the  English  or  French  service,  by 
sea  or  land,  with  endless  variations  in  the  proportions  of  each  calibre.  The 
necessity  of  some  regulation  to  secure  simplicity  and  uniformity  must  be  obvious 
to  all ;  yet  men  of  reflection  and  experience  alone  can  duly  estimate  the  im- 
portance of  these  two  qualities.  Every  variation  in  the  proportions  of  pieces  of 
the  same  calibre  exacts  a  corresponding  change  in  the  carriage,  and  for  every 
distinct  calibre  will  be  required  not  only  a  suitable  carriage  but  its  appropriate 
equipments  and  ammunition.  In  a  word,  unless  the  number  of  our  calibres  and 
their  variations  be  reasonably  reduced,  and  the  whole  be  settled  by  some  per- 
manent regulation,  no  possible  exertion  can  give  to  our  artillery  that  perfec- 
tion its  importance  merits  and  which  the  public  service  requires. 

"  In  France,  by  the  Regulations  of  1732,  calibres  for  land  service  were  reduced 
to  five — 24,  16,  12,  8  and  4-pounders.  The  military  writers  of  that  country 
date  from  that  period  the  improvement  of  their  artillery.  Experience  had 
taught  the  celebrated  Vauban  the  necessity  for  such  a  reformation,  which  was 
solicited,  however,  in  vain  during  his  life. 

"  I  feel  anxious  to  get  the  following  system  established  relative  to  the  calibres 
of  cannon  in  the  United  States  : 

"  For  field  service,  let  there  be  : — light  3,  6,  and  12-pounder  guns  on  traveling 
carriages,  and  5^  inch  howitzers,  i.  e,  the  diameter  of  the  24-pounder  hoAvitzer. 

"  For  siege  :  heavy  18  and  24-pounders  on  traveling  carriages,  8  and  5T8^-inch 
howitzers  on  traveling  carriages,  and  8,  10,  and  13-inch  mortars. 

"  For  fixed  batteries  on  seaboard  :  heavy  18  and  24-pounders  on  fixed  car- 
riages, and  10-inch  mortars. 

"For  movable  batteries  on  seaboard  :  light  12-pounders  and  8-inch  howit- 
zers on  traveling  carriages. 

"  Thus  the  whole  reduced  to  five  calibres  of  cannon,  two  of  howitzers,  and 
three  of  mortars. 

"  Were  any  alterations  allowed,  it  might  be  in  the  entire  suppression  of  the 
heavy  18-pounders,  whose  place  should  be  supplied  by  the  24-pounders,  on  the 
supposition  that  a  light  18-pounder  might  be  annexed  to  the  field  train. 

"  The  proportion  of  3-pounders  and  12-pounders  in  a  field  train  should  be 
small,  letting'  the  division  consist  principally  of  6-pounders  and  5T?j-inch 
howitzers. 

"  The  difference  between  3-pounder  and  4-pounder  shot  or  case  is  immaterial ; 
but  the  former  are  preferable,  used  in  conjunction  with  the  6-pounder,  as  they 
are  not  so  nearly  like  each  other — danger  of  mistakes  avoided. 

"  The  range  of  an  8-inch  shell  from  howitzers  exceeds  that  of  random  can- 
non shot,  for  this  reason  that  piece  is  superior  to  all  others  for  attacking  a 
ship  at  anchor  on  our  coast  or  in  our  bays  and  rivers.  In  attacking  a  ship  with 


APPENDIX.  387 

two  or  three  18-pounders  or  24-pounders  on  traveling  carriages  commonly  se- 
lected for  the  purpose,  unless  the  ground  should  particularly  favor  the  assail- 
ant, the  chance  is  the  fire  of  the  ship,  from  the  superior  number  of  her  guns, 
would  compel  him  to  give  over  the  attack ;  whereas  a  single  8-inch  howitzer 
placed  out  of  the  reach  of  a  ship's  guns  would  annoy  her  so  as  to  compel  a 
change  of  station,  much  more  than  which  ought  not  to  be  expected. 

"The  light  12-pounder  is  perfectly  adapted  to  impede  and  prevent  the  land- 
ing of  boats. 

"  The  9-pounder  is  indeed  a  very  good  piece,  yet  need  not  be  retained. 

"  If  you  require  a  gun  heavier  than  the  6-pounder,  let  the  12-pounder  be  used  ; 
if  lighter  than  a  12-pounder,  use  the  6-pounder. 

"The  3-pounder  will  be  particularly  useful  for  the  defense  of  distant  posts 
on  the  frontier  and  interior,  where  the  difficulties  of  transportation  render 
economy  of  ammunition  an  important  object. 

"  I  give  the  preference  to  the  6-pounder  rather  than  to  either  the  4-pounder 
or  8-pounder  of  the  French,  and,  joined  to  the  5T8^  inch  or  24-pound  howitzer, 
consider  it  capable  almost  of  superseding  all  other  kinds  of  field  artillery. 

"  The  influence  of  a  single  individual  cannot  reach  far  enough  to  attain  the  ob- 
ject I  have  in  view — of  bringing  our  artillery  to  a  system  of  simplicity  and  uniformity. 
The  public  mind  must  be  fully  impressed  with  the  idea  of  its  necessity  before  a 
change  can  be  wrought." 


INDEX 


PAGE. 

ADMINISTRATION  : 

General  considerations  affecting  early  artillery 108-112 

Of  artillery  affairs  from  1802  to  1812 164 

Existing  system  of,  in  the  United  States  artillery 178-188 

AMMUNITION  : 

Train,  accompanying  Army  of  Potomac 101 

Special,  organized  to  accompany  army 102 

Retained  when  army  reserve  (artillery)  was  broken  up 102 

ANDERSON,  CAPTAIN  ROBERT  : 

Translates  instruction  for  field  artillery 305 

evolutions  of  field  batteries 307 

ARMISTEAD,  CAPTAIN  GEORGE,  appointed  major  3d  artillery 39 

ARMISTEAD,  WALKER  K.,  colonel  3d  artillery 46 

ARMY  : 

Plans  for  peace  establishment  of  the 17,  18,  19,  20,  21 

Detachment  of,  retained  provisionally  at  the  peace 22 

Measures  adopted  to  secure  small  regular 22,  23,  24 

Of  April  9th,  1787,  composed  of  1  infantry  regiment  and  1  artillery 

battalion 25 

Of  confederation  adopted  under  Constitution 25 

Reorganized  into  a  legion 26 

upon  Lieutenant-General  Washington's  plan 30 

Increase  of,  by  10  infantry,  2  artillery,  and  1  dragoon  regiment 38 

Of  Potomac:  Strength  of  Divisions  and  corps  of. 83 

Organization  of  artillery  in  (1864) 86 

Of  Northern  Virginia:  Artillery  organization  of. 93 

ARTICLES  or  WAR,  provisions  of,  affecting  the  artillery 108,  109 

ARTIFICERS  : 

Recommended  by  Knox 4 

100  to  be  attached  to  artillery  in  the  field 5 

Regiment  of,  formed  of  one  of  the  proposed  artillery  battalions..... 7 

Regiment  of,  mustered  out  of  service 14 

Large  number  provided  for  (act  of  March  16th,  1802) 114 

ARTILLERISTS  AND  ENGINEERS  : 

Corps  of,  prganized 27 

Regiment  of,  organized '. 29 

Teachers  authorized  for  cadets  of 30 

Reorganization  of  corps  and  regiment  of 30 

Failure  of  plan  to  make  military  school  of 31 

Circumstances  attending  raising  of  corps  of. 191 

ARTILLERY  : 

Organization  of,  United  States  (Appendix  A  [1]  ) 1 

Volunteer  companies  of,  before  Revolution 1 

Colonial,  associated  with  English  Royal  regiment 1 

One  company  Royal,  accompanies  Braddock's  expedition 1 

Laws,  customs,  traditions  of  Royal  regiment  ingrafted  into  Colonial...        1 

Major  John  Crane's  company  of  Rhode  Island 2 

Gridley's  regiment  of,  reorganized,  Knox  in  command 3 

Standing  of  the  arm  in  service  secured  by  Knox 3,  4 

Two  companies  of  Knox's  regiment  dispatched  to  Canada 4 

(389) 


3QO  INDEX. 

PAGE. 
ARTILLERY — Continued. 

Nine  companies  move  to  New  York;  one  remains  at  Boston... 4 

Companies  of  Captains  Beauman  and  Hamilton  join  Knox 4 

Project  for  improvement  of,  submitted  by  Knox  to  Congressional  Com- 
mittee     4,  5,  6 

Claim  set  up  for  superiority  of  British 5 

Inadequacy  of  the,  for  needs  of  service 5 

Proportion  of,  to  other  arms  of  service 5 

The  English  taken  as  model  for  building  up  Colonial 6 

Erroneous  ideas  regarding  supposed  influence  of  the  French 6 

General  Washington  authorizes  raising  three  battalions 6,  7 

Origin  of  the  several  regiments  (or  battalions)  of  regulars 7,  8 

The  regiments  of  regular  Continental 8 

Relative  order  of  precedence  established  for  regiments  of. 8 

Colonel  Ebenezer  Stevens'  corps  of. 9 

Incorporation  of  companies  of  Stevens'  corps  into  Crane's  artillery 9 

Companies  and  battalions  of,  belonging  to  Colonies,  distinct  from  reg- 
ular establishment 9 

Colonial,  status  of,  as  compared  to  regular 10 

Reorganization  of  regular 12,  14 

Assignment,  regular  regiments  of,  to  State  quotas 14 

At  siege  of  Yorktown 14 

First  and  Fourth  regiments  of,  move  South 14 

Second  and  Third  regiments  of,  remain  North 15 

Rule  for  promotion  in .- 15,  16,  17 

Views  as  to  proper  peace  establishment  for 17,  18,  19,  20,  21 

Of  peace  establishment,  organized  into  battalion 24 

Position  of,  in  the  legion 26,  27 

Reorganization  of,  as  corps  of  artillerists  and  engineers 27 

Organization  of  regiment  of  artillerists  and  engineers 29 

Light,  recommended  ;  one  regiment  organized 33 

Its  equipment 34 

Equipment  first  company  as  such 34,  35 

Regiment  of,  concentrated  at  New  Orleans 35 

March  of  light  company,  Baltimore  to  Pittsburg 35 

Company  of  light,  dismounted 36 

Condition  of  regiment  of  light,  before  war  of  1812 38 

Two  additional  regiments  organized 38 

Principal  officers  of,  detached  from  their  commands 40 

Slight  changes  in  personnel  of 42 

Corps  of,  formed  by  consolidation  of  First,  Second,  and  Third  regiments     42 

Remarks  on  organization  of  corps  of. 42,  43 

Reorganization  of,  act  of  March  3d,  1815 44 

Designation  of  companies  by  letters  of  alphabet 45 

Slight  changes  in  organization  of. 45 

Reorganization  of. 46 

Light,  one  company  of  each  regiment  to  be  equipped  as 46 

(C),  Third  Artillery,  equipped  as 50 

Four  additional  companies  of,  authorized 51 

Career  of,  in  Rio  Grande  valley 51 

Report  introduced   by  Senate  Military  Committee  favoring  chief  of 

artillery 51 

Bill  introduced  in  Congress  for  reorganization  of. 51,  52 

School  of  Practice  for,  at  Fortress  Monroe 52 

Fifth  regiment  of  regular,  organized 53 

Light,  note  regarding  use  of  term 54,  55 

Question  of  a  proper  mount  for 56,  57 

One  company  in  each  regiment  of,  equipped  as  field  artillery 59 


INDEX.  391 

PAGE. 
ARTILLERY — Continued. 

Light,  letter  of  Adjutant-General  concerning  utility  of. 61 

Excellence  of  captains,  &c.,  commanding  companies  of. 61 

Additional  companies  equipped  as 62,  63 

Companies  dismounted  and  remounted  after  Mexican  war....  63,  64 

Remarks  of  Secretary  Conrad  concerning U5 

Money  specifically  appropriated  for  mounting 66 

Companies  re-equipped  as 66,  67 

Companies  of,  stationed  on  Indian  frontier 68 

Companies  of,  dispersed  ;  condition  at  beginning  of  Civil  war...     69 
Fifth    regiment   of,  organized  with    tactical    units   designated  l  bat- 
teries' 69 

Field,  effort  to  organize  powerful,  in  Army  of  the  Potomac 69,  70 

Horse  batteries  reorganized 70 

Formed  into  brigades 70,  71 

Field,  general  dismounting  of,  after  Civil  war 71 

Batteries  retained  as 71 

Effect  of  section  1101,  Rev.  Stats.,  regarding 72,  73 

Companies  equipped  as  (1884) ; 73,  74 

Claims  to  recognition,  of  old  light  companies 74,  75 

Brigades  of,  formed  after  Chancellorsville 83,  84 

Advantages  of  assignment  to  large  tactical  units 84 

Erroneous  ideas  concerning  proper  organization  of. 84 

General  reserve,  Army  of  Potomac,  broken  up ,- 86,  87,  88 

Results  flowing  from  breaking  up  reserve 88,  89,  91 

Siege  before  Petersburg,  Va 88 

Recapitulation  of  changes  in  Army  of  Potomac 89-92 

Of  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 93 

Changes  in 93-95 

The  organization  of,  into  brigades  an  outgrowth  of  war 95 

Reserves 96-107 

Confederate  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  organized  on  plan  now  uni- 
versal in  Europe 94 

Advantageous  position  of  American,  at  beginning  of  Revolution..  108-112 

Better  pay  of  officers  of  the 110 

Field  batteries  of,  made  schools  of  instruction 132-137 

Posts  of  field  batteries 137-141 

Target  record  of,  in  1879,  and  results 145-147 

Technical  duties  of,  performed  by  artillery  officers 148 

Commissaries  for,  appointed 149 

Attainments  of  the  personnel  from  1802  to  1812 166 

Recommendations  made  in  1811  for  improvement  of  artillery  arm 167 

Views  of  Colonel  Izard 167 

United  with  the  ordnance  department 168 

Propositions  looking  to  the  securing  a  chief  of. 186-188 

Horse  (or  light),  the  organization  of,  advocated  by  the  Secretary  of 

War , 192 

Steps  taken  to  fit  the  artillery  for  the  field 193,  194 

The  results  flowing  from  efforts  to  organize  artillery  for  active  service 

in  war  of  1812 196-200 

Character  of  the  service  rendered  by,  from  1815  to  1846 200 

Companies  of,  equipped  as  light  artillery  in  Mexican  war 201 

Functions  of,  usurped  by  ordnance 201-206 

Chief  of,  question  as  to'his  proper  function 208-222 

Status  of,  during  Revolution 208-210 

War  of  1812 210 

As  fixed  by  regulations  of  1816 210 

By  Scott's  regulations 211,  212 


392  INDEX. 

PAGE. 
ARTILLERY — Continued. 

Chief  of,  regulations  of  1841  and  of  185*7 212 

McClellan's  orders 213 

Hooker's  position  regarding 214,  215 

Meade's  orders 216,  217 

Confederate  orders  concerning 218,  219 

General  remarks  regarding  position  of. 220,  221,  222 

Materiel  of. 223,  298 

Personnel  of  the  combatant  always  under  command  of  the  general-in- 

chief 178,179 

Authority  of  colonels  of 179 

Remarks  on  present  condition  of  the  combatant 180-182 

Proposed  measures  for  improvement 187,  188 

Colonel  Wadsworth's  proposed  system  of  materiel 233-237 

English  block-trail  system  of. 237-239 

Materiel  of — Adoption  of  English  system  of,  by  France 239 

Americanized  Krupp  system 272,  273 

Revolutionary  system  of. 275,  276 

System  of,  1816 278 

Proposed  by  ordnance  board  of  1818 279,  280 

1835 280 

Calibres  of,  proposed  in   1835 281 

1839 282 

1850 283 

1861 286 

Contest  between  the  smooth-bore  and  the  rifle 289,  290 

Muzzle  and  breech-loader 291-293 

Chamber  introduced  in  construction  of 293 

Recent  improvements  in  siege  and  field 294-295 

Report  of  board  on  light 295,  296 

Systems  of  1868  and  1880 297,  298 

Mobility  of  the,  at  epoch  of  war  of  1812 315 

BRIGADES  OF  UNION  ARMY  :  Battalions  of  Confederate  ;  divisions  of  German 
and  Austrian  Artillery 370-374 

BANKHEAD,  MAJOR  JAMES,  assigned  to  corps  of  artillery 44 

Retained  in  1821 ". 46 

BARBOUR,  SECRETARY  OF  WAR,  remarks  of,  concerning  school  of  practice..  123 

BARRY,  GENERAL  WILLIAM  F.  : 

Addresses  General  McClellan  regarding  field  artillery 69 

Principles  formulated  by,  for  organization  of  artillery 80 

Chief  of  artillery,  Army  of  Potomac 82 

Relieved  as  chief  of  artillery,  Army  of  Potomac 82 

Appointed  inspector  of  artillery 82 

Orders  assigning  to  duty  as  inspector  of  artillery 186,  187 

BEAUMAN,  SEBASTIAN  : 

Captain  New  York  artillery 4 

Retained  in  service 350 

BEAUMARCHAIS  :  contractor  for  artillery  supplies 224 

BOARD — 

Of  ordnance,  recommended  by  Knox 5 

Of  war  and  ordnance,  remodeled 10,  11 

Personnel  of  the,  when  remodeled 11 

Attempts  of,  to  supplant  commander-in  chief...      11 

Frustrated 12 

Of  ordnance:  Fenwick,  Ewing,  Talcott,  Baker,  and  Mordecai 56 

Of  officers,  recommends  measures  affecting  artillery 167 

Appointed  to  improve  condition  of  artillery. ..234,  243,  244,  245 


INDEX.  393 

PAGE. 

BOMFORD,  GEORGE  : 

Lieutenant-colonel  of  artillery 46 

Labors  of,  as  head  of  the  ordnance  department 117 

BRAGG,  BRAXTON  : 

Lieutenant,  commanding  company  equipped  as  light  artillery 62 

Captain,  succeeds  to  command  of  horse  artillery  company tm_     62 

Conduct  at  battle  of  Buena  Vista 62,  63 

BROOKS,  MAJOR:  regiment  of  artillerists  and  engineers 29 

BRASS  : 

Foundry,  recommended  by  Knox 4 

Ordnance,  in  which  army  stood  in  need 5 

The  favorite  metal  for  cannon  during  Revolution 257 

Composition  of  early  gun-metal 257,  258 

Supplanted  by  cast-iron  for  field-guns 260 

Investigations  begun  looking  to  a  return  to  brass 261,  262 

Manufacture  of  first  ten  bronze  guns  by  Ames  Manufacturing  Co 263 

Definitely  adopted  for  field  ordnance 265 

Plan  for  converting  field-guns  into  rifled  ordnance 266 

BROWN  :  captain  of  artillery  company  attached  to  Harrison's  regiment 12 

BROWN,  GENERAL  : 

Gives  reasons  for  establishment  of  artillery  school  of  practice 122 

Death  of. 124 

BROWN,  LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  HARVEY,  commandant  school  of  practice....   125 

BUFFINGTON,  LIEUTENANT-COLONEL,  design  of  depressing  gun-carriage 256 

BURBECK,  WILLIAM  : 

Lieutenant-colonel  Gridley's  regiment 2 

Knox's  regiment '. 3 

Note  concerning  his  declining  colonelcy 3 

Dismissed 4 

BURBECK,  HENRY: 

Captain  of  artillery 25 

Colonel  commandant  corps  artillerists  and  engineers 32 

Colonel  of  artillerists 32 

Retired  from  service 33 

CALHOUN,  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  : 

Plan  to  improve  condition  of  the  artillery 1 15,  116 

for  merging  artillery  and  ordnance 169 

Not  the  originator  of  merging  plan  put  in  execution 172 

CALIBRES  OF  ARTILLERY  : 

List  of,  during  Revolution 275-276 

At  the  epoch  of  the  war  of  1812 277 

CAMP  OF  INSTRUCTION  at  Trenton,  N.  J 58 

CARRIAGES,  ARTILLERY  : 

English  patterns  used  by  Americans  during  Revolution 223,  225 

Features  of  the  Gribeauval  introduced 229,230 

The  Gribeauval  system  of. 231 

Purchases  from  France 231,  232 

Wheels  for,  in  British  service,  of  same  size 227 

Colonel  Wadsworth's  pattern  of. 233 

Efforts  of  board  of  1831  to  secure  proper 247 

Recommendations  of  board  of  1835  regarding 248 

French  stock-trail,  adopted  into  United  States  service 248 

Metallic,  advantages  of  early  patterns 249 

Recent  improvements  in  construction  of. 250 

Recommendations  of  light  artillery  board 250,  251 

Difficulties  in  constructing  proper 251,  252 

50 


394  INDEX. 

PAGE. 

CARRIAGES,  ARTILLERY — Continued. 

Systems  of  siege,  garrison,  and  sea-coast 25;i 

Introduction  of  cast-iron  in  construction  of. 254 

wrought-iron 255 

Depressing 256 

CARRINGTON,  EDWARD  : 

Lieutenant-colonel  Virginia  artillery  regiment 7 

Claims  colonelcy  Fourth  artillery 17 

Quartermaster  of  Southern  army 190 

CAPTAIN-LIEUTENANT,  introduction  of  title  into  American  service 331 

CASS,  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  : 

Reports  on  unsettled  condition  of  the  ordnance 243 

Appoints  board  for  improvement  of 243 

Sanctions  return  to  brass  for  field  ordnance 263 

Introduces  mountain  howitzer  into  United  States  service 282 

CHANCELLORSVILLE,  composition  of  Union  Army  at 83 

CHIEF  OF  ARTILLERY,  the  question  of  the  status  or  functions  of 208-222 

COMMANDER  OF  ARTILLERY  : 

Recommendations  of,  favorably  acted  on  by  Congress 5,  6 

Authority  curtailed  by  department  of  commissary-general  of  military 

stores 11, 12 

New  powers  given  by  resolves  of  Congress 154,  155 

All  artillery  affairs  placed  practically  under  his  control 155 

COMMISSARY-GENERAL  OF  MILITARY  STORES  : 

Department  of 11 

Resolutions  of  Congress  concerning 150,  151 

Its  career  short-lived 152 

Experiences  of  department 152-158 

Field  department  of,  or  field  ordnance  department  organized 153,  154 

Readjustment  of. 158 

COMMITTEE  : 

Of  Congress,  reports  adversely  to  Gridley 2,  3 

to  investigate  army  affairs 4 

suggestions  of  Colonel  Knox  to 4,  5 

to  consider  subject  of  peace  establishment 17 

Of  ordnance  officers,  appointed  by  Secretary  Poinsett.... 264 

commission  from,  sent  to  Europe 264 

Deliberation  of,  results  in  adoption  of  brass  for  field  ordnance 264,  265 

CONFEDERATE  ARMY: 

Organization  of  artillery  in 84,  86,93,  94,  95 

The  pioneer  in  present  plan  of  artillery  organization 94 

Rule  for  assignment  of  artillery  officers  in 86 

Command  and  administration  of  artillery  affairs  in 218,  219,  370,  374 

CONGREVE,  CAPTAIN,  improvements  of,  English  artillery 237 

CONRAD,  SECRETARY  OF  WAR,  report  of,  regarding  light  artillery  companies..     65 

CONWAY,  GENERAL  : 

Made  inspector-general 11 

Cabal,  result  of 12 

CRANE : 

Major  John's  company  Rhode  Island  artillery 2 

Major  in  Knox's  artillery  regiment 3 

Colonel  of  one  of  the  artillery  regiments  raised  by  order  of  General 

Washington 7 

The  ranking  colonel  of  artillery 8 

Regiment  of  Colonel,  third  in  order  of  precedence 8 

Chief  of  artillery,  Department  of  the  Highlands 209 

List  of  officers  in  regiment  of,  as  first  organized 336,  337 

in  1780....  ..  341 


INDEX.  395 

PAGE. 

CEAIG,  CAPTAIN  ISAAC,  promoted  major  Fourth  artillery 1  7 

CRAIG,  COLONEL  H.  K.,  remarks  of,  relative  to  the  performance  of  artillery 
duties  by  officers  and  men  of  the  ordnance  department 6*7,  68 

DAVIS,  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  : 

Remounts  three  of  the  field  artillery  companies 66 

Proposes  to  re-establish  artillery  school  of  practice 125 

DEARBORN,  HENRY: 

Secretary  of  War 34 

Authorizes  equipment  of  light  artillery  company 34 

Interest  and  labors  in  field  of  technical  artillery 165 

Introduces  many  features  of  the  Gribeauval  carriage 230 

DEARBORN,  GENERAL  HENRY  : 

Complains  of  scarcity  of  artillery  officers 41 

DE  FATT,  CAPTAIN,  inspector  of  Georgia  artillery 10 

DE  LISLE,  MAJOR  ROMAN,  commander  Georgia  artillery 10 

DE  SAGULIER,  improvements  of,  English  artillery 238 

DORSE Y,  CAPTAIN,  artillery  company  of,  attached  to  Harrison's  artillery 12 

DOUGHTY,  BREVET  MAJOR  JOHN  : 

Company  of,  provisionally  retained  at  the  peace  (1T83) 23 

Promoted  to  major  artillery  battalion 24 

Declines  appointment  of  lieutenant  colonel  commandant  of  infantry...     26 

Retires  from  the  artillery 26 

Returns  to  it 29 

Retires  from  service 32 

DOUGLASS,  CAPTAIN  THOMAS  : 

Commands  artillery  company  on  peace  establishment 351 

Du  COUDRAY : 

Compact  with  American  agent  at  Paris Ill 

Results  flowing  therefrom 3*75 

DUCROT:  Attack  of,  with  cavalry  at  Sedan  (note) 105 

Du  PORTAIL,  CHIEF  OF  ENGINEERS  : 

Views  of,  regarding  peace  establishment 17 

ELLIOTT,  BARNARD:  Major  of  South  Carolina  artillery  battalion 10 

ENGLISH  : 

Artillery  of,  taken  as  a  model  by  Knox 6 

System  of. 237 

ENGINEERS  : 

Two,  distinct  from  corps  of  artillerists  and  engineers,  authorized 31 

EUSTIS,  CAPTAIN  BENJAMIN:  Promoted  to  fourth  artillery 16 

EUSTIS,  DOCTOR  WILLIAM,  Secretary  of  War : 

Dismounts  light  artillery  company 36 

Remarks  of,  regarding  use  of  horse  artiller}7" 37 

Favorably  inclined  towards  proposed  plan  of  reorganization  of  artil- 
lery   41 

Introduces  Gribeauval  carriage 231 

EUSTIS,  ABRAHAM:  Captain  in  light  artillery,  promoted  to  major 37 

Retained  in  1811 46 

Equips  three  companies  of  horse  artillery 196 

FENWICK,  JOHN  R.  : 

Lieutenant-colonel  of  light  artillery 40 

Commands  artillery  on  Canadian  border 40,  196 

Colonel  Fourth  artillery 46 

President  of  board  of  ordnance % 56 

FIRE-WORKER,  title  of,  introduced  into  American  service 332 


396  INDEX. 

PAGE. 
FLOWER  : 

Colonel  of  so-called  artillery-artificer  regiment "7 

Commissary-general  of  military  stores 149,  151 

Death  of  Colonel , 156 

List  of  officers  in  so-called  regiment  of  Colonel 346 

FORD,  MAHLON,  major  of  artillerists,  discharged 32 

FORNEY,  DANIEL  M.,  major  Second  artillery 39 

FORREST,  THOMAS  : 

Major  of  Pennsylvania  artillery  regiment 7 

Lieutenant-colonel  Pennsylvania  artillery  regiment 16 

FOUNDRY  for  casting  brass  ordnance  recommended 4 

FORT  RILEY,  KANSAS:  School  for  light  batteries  there  established 137 

FRANCE : 

Army  officers  of  that  nation  in  service  of  colonies 6 

Erroneous  ideas  concerning  their  influence 6 

Embarrassments  caused  by  officers  of  that  nationality 166 

FRANKLIN,  BENJAMIN  :  correspondence  of,  with  regard  to  artillery  officers...  Ill 

FREDERICKSBURG  :  composition  of  the  Union  army  at 83 

FREEMAN,  CONSTANT  : 

Major  of  artillerists  and  engineers 28 

Lieutenant-colonel  of  artillerists 32 

Retired  from  service  in  1821 33 

GATES,  GENERAL  HORATIO  : 

President  board  of  war  and  ordnance 11 

Is  given  a  command 12 

GERMAN  ARTILLERY  : 

Successful  employment  of,  war  1870  and  1871 105 

Organization  of  artillery  in  the  field 371,  374 

Function  of  artillery  commanders  in  war 380 

GIBSON,  CAPTAIN  : 

Marches  company  horse  artillery  to  Albany,  N.  Y 195 

Letter  of,  to  Secretary  of  War 197 

GRIBEAUVAL  : 

Artillery   system   of,   unknown   to    Americans   at   time   of  Revolu- 
tion    223,  224,  225 

Features  of  carriage  adopted  by  Secretary  Dearborn 230 

Carriage  introduced  into  U.  S.  service 231 

GRIDLEY,  RICHARD  : 

Colonel  First  regiment  Continental  artillery 1 

Discontent  in  regiment  of. 2 

Superseded  in  command  of  artillery 3 

List  of  officers,  regiment  of. 331 

GEIDLEY,  SCARBOROUGH  : 

Second  major  artillery  regiment 2 

Dismissed  the  service  for  misconduct 2 

HAMILTON,  ALEXANDER  : 

Captain  New  York  artillery 4 

Makes  report  on  peace  establishment 19 

Inspector-general,  work  on  system  of  discipline  for  the  artillery 300 

HAMPTON,  MAJOR-GENERAL  WADE  : 

Complains  of  the  inexperience  of  artillery  officers  with  him 41 

HANCOCK,  MAJOR-GENERAL  : 

Remarks  of,  relative  to  field-artillery  schools,  &c 140 

HARMAR:  Lieutenant-colonel  "  First  American  regiment" 23 


INDEX.  397 

PAGE. 

HARRISON.  CHARLES  : 

Colonel  of  the  Virginia  artillery  regiment -7 

Third  in  order  of  rank  regular  artillery 8 

Regiment  of  colonel,  first  in  order  of  precedence 8 

List  of  officers  in  regiment  of. 334-336 

HINDMAN,  CAPTAIN  : 

Appointed  major  Second  artillery ::;> 

Retained  in  1821 46 

HODGDON,  SAMUEL : 

Quartermaster-general 26 

Field  commissary  of  military  stores 156 

Retained  in  service  after  Revolutionary  war 158 

HOLMAN,  CHRISTIAN,  major  Virginia  artillery  regiment 7 

HOOKER,  MAJOR-GENERAL,  policy  of  regarding  functions  of  chief  of  artillery.  215 

HOOPS,  ADAM,  major  of  artillerists  and  engineers 29 

HOUSE,  CAPTAIN  JAMES  : 

Appointed  lieutenant-colonel 39 

Retained  as  lieutenant-colonel 46 

HUNT,  GENERAL  HENRY  J. : 

Commander  of  artillery  reserve  Army  of  the  Potomac 82 

Succeeds  to  position  chief  of  artillery  Army  of  the  Potomac 82,  83 

Organizes  special  ammunition  column 102 

One  of  the  committee  on  field  artillery  armament  (note) 297 

INSPECTOR  OP  ARTILLERY  : 

Appointed 114 

Duties  of. 114 

Colonel  of  artillerists  performs  the  duties  of. 115 

Necessity  for  the  office  represented  by  Secretary  of  War 163 

INSTRUCTION  : 

Artillery  schools  for,  established 68 

Consideration  of  general  subject  of,  for  the  artillery 112-147 

Plan  of  Mr.  Calhoun  for  artillery 115,  116 

Plan  of,  inaugurated  by  G.  0.  A.  G.  0.,  1859 117,  118 

Of  artillery  personnel,  plan  proposed  by  permanent  artillery  board..  117,  118 

Text-books  for  theoretical 118,  119 

Importance  of  inspectors  to  supervise 120 

Knox  the  first  to  recommend  schools  for  artillery 120 

Inadequacy  of  scheme  for,  inaugurated  in  1794 121 

Field  batteries,  made  schools  for 132-137 

General  remarks  upon  the  importance  of  field  artillery  posts 138-141 

IRON,  CAST  : 

Metal  adopted  for  sea-coast  carriages 254 

Gradual  introduction  of,  in  constructing  ordnance 258.  259 

Supplants  brass  as  a  metal  for  field-guns 260 

Dearborn's  system  of  field-guns 260,  261,  262 

Recommended  to  be  superseded  by  bronze  for  field-guns 262 

Circumstances  attending  readoption  of  bronze 263-265 

Pure  and  simple,  for  heavy  ordnance 267-269 

Combined  with  other  metals  for  heavy  ordnance 269.  270 

Malleable : 

Experiments  with,  for  field  ordnance 263 

IRON,  WROUGHT  : 

Metal  adopted  for  siege  and  sea-coast  carriages 255 

Field-guns  (note) 259 

Failure  of  guns  for  field  ordnance 265 

51 


398  INDEX. 

PAGE. 
IRON,  WROUGHT — Continued. 

General  use  of,  for  field  artillery 266 

Unsuitableness  of,  for  heavy  ordnance 271 

Conversion  of  3-inch  field-guns  into  breech-loaders 274 

IZARD,  GEORGE  : 

Colonel  Second  artillery 39 

Brigadier-general 39 

Plan  for  reorganization  of  artillery 41 

Organization  of  artillery  for  field  service,  1814 77,  78 

Efforts  to  equip  his  regiment  as  field  artillery 194 

Constructs  some  Wurst  caissons , 232 

Correspondence  of,  concerning  equipping  light  artillery 198 

JACKSON,  DANIEL  : 

Major  of  artillerists  and  engineers 29 

Major  of  artillerists 32 

KING,  MAJOR  :  design  of  depressing  gun  carriage 256 

KNOX,  HENRY  : 

Volunteer  in  army  under  General-Washington. 3 

Appointed  colonel  of  artillery  regiment,  vice  Gridley 3 

On  special  duty  at  New  York,  Albany,  and  Ticonderoga 3 

Moves  to  New  York  city  with  nine  companies 4 

Suggestions  of,  for  improvement  of  artillery 4 

Recommends  five  battalions  of  artillery 6 

Chosen  brigadier-general  of  artillery 7 

Secretary  at  War,  reorganizes  peace  establishment  into  a  legion 24 

Instructions  of,  to  artillery  officers  on  detachment 76,  77 

Supervises  department  of  technical  artillery 113 

Recommends  schools  for  artillery  officers 120 

Remarks  of,  concerning  the  ordnance  department 152,  153 

Proposes  to  unite  the  duties  of  Secretary  at  War  and  of  master-general 

of  ordnance 160 

Appointed  Secretary  at  War 160 

Duties  of,  as  such 160,  161 

As  Secretary  at  War,  commands  the  army 160 

surrenders  command  of  the  army  to  the  first  Pres- 
ident under  the  Constitution 161 

Promoted  to  major-general,  assigned  to  West  Point 190 

Receives  manual  of  Gribeauval  artillery  from  Lieutenant-colonel  Nadal..  224 

Views  of,  concerning  qualifications  of  artillery  officers 110 

Submits  list  of  artillery  to  be  taken  in  campaign  of  1779 275 

Failure  of  plan  for  organization  of  militia 300 

List  of  commissioned  officers,  the  regiment  of. 332 

KOSCIUSKO  :    System  of  horse  artillery  manoeuvres  written  by 300 

KRUPP: 

Twelve-inch,  gun,  recommended  to  be  purchased  by  board  convened 

in  1872 272 

Attempt  to  graft  breech  mechanism  of,  on  American  conversions  and 

new  constructions 272,  273 

Failure  of  this  attempt 272 

LABORATORIES  recommended  by  Knox 4 

LALLEMAND,  GENERAL  HENRY:  Treatise  of,  on  artillery 302 

LAMB,  JOHN  : 

Major  of  Knox's  regiment 3 

Prisoner  with  the  enemy 4 


INDEX.  399 

PAGE. 
LAMB,  JOHN — Continued. 

Colonel  of  artillery  regiment 8 

Colonel,  second  in  order  of  rank.. 8 

Regiment  of  Colonel,  second  in  order  of  precedence 8 

Appointed  surveyor  of  ordnance 150 

List  of  officers  in  regiment  of  Colonel 342,  344 

LEE,  GENERAL  CHARLES,  strictures  of,  regarding  commander-in- chief -....  10 

LINDSAY,  WILLIAM  : 

Major  and  lieutenant-colonel  Second  artillery 39 

MACOMB : 

Colonel  of  Third  artillery 39 

Appointed  brigadier-general 39 

Chief  of  artillery  for  General  Wilkinson 40 

General-in-chief,  views  of,  concerning  school  of  practice 124 

MACREA,  WILLIAM  : 

Major  of  artillerists 32 

Lieutenant-colonel  corps  of  artillery 44 

Retained 46 

MASON,  DAVID  : 

Major  of  Gridley's  regiment 2 

Lieutenant-colonel  of  Knox's  regiment 3 

Mustered  out  of  service . • 157 

MARCY,  SECRETARY  :  Promulgates  rule  by  which  captains  of  field  batteries 

are  to  be  selected 65 

MATERIEL  OP  ARTILLERY  : 

Gribeauval  system 223 

Carriages. 223,  256 

Sources  whence  America  was  supplied 223,  224,  225 

Secretary  McHenry  moves  against  the  Revolutionary  system 227 

Modifications  in,  wrought  by  Secretary  Dearborn 228,  231 

Secretary  McHenry 231,  232 

Colonel  of  the  ordnance  department 233 

And  results 234-237 

Appointment  of  boards  of  1831,  1835,  1837,  1838,  and  of  the  ordnance 

committee,  to  ameliorate  condition  of 243,  246 

Result  of  their  labors 246,  249 

Recommendations  of  light  artillery  board  concerning 250 

The   question    of    suitable    metals    for    ordnance  —  brass,    cast-iron, 

wrought-iroTi,  steel 257-274 

Calibres  and  natures  of  ordnance  in 'the  various  systems  of,  that  have 
been  adopted t 275-298 

McDouGALL,  MAJOR-GENERAL  :  Court-martialed 209,  210 

MCHENRY,  SECRETARY  : 

Advocates  introduction  of  horse  artillery 192 

Remarks  on  necessity  for  educated  officers 31 

Remarks  concerning  the  failure  of  plan  to  educate  cadets 121 

Observations  on  the  unsatisfactory  condition  of  the  ordnance 163 

MclNTosH,  CAPTAIN  :   Marches  company  light  artillery  en  route  to  Canada..   195 

McCLELLAN,  GENERAL  GEORGE  B. : 

Assumes  command  of  Army  of  Potomac "80 

Remarks  of,  on  organization  of  artillery 81 

Army  commanded  by,  on  Peninsula 82 

Order  of,  defining  position  of  the  chief  of  artillery 213 

MF.ADE,  MAJOR-GENERAL  :  Order  of,  defining  status  of  chief  of  artillery 216 

MIFFLIN: 

Quartermaster-General 11 


400  INDEX. 

PAGE. 

MIFPLIN — Continued. 

Member  board  of  war  and  ordnance 11 

Resigns  his  commission 12 

MILITARY  ACADEMY  : 

Influence  of 78 

At  West  Point,  placed  on  sound  basis 121 

Character  of  education  there  acquired 121-123 

MITCHELL,  GEORGE  E. : 

Major  and  lieutenant-colonel  Third  artillery 39 

Retained  at  reorganization  of  1821 46 

MORTARS  : 

Two  thirteen-inch  (13-in.),  dragged  through  wilderness  to  Canada  by 

companies  of  Knox's  regiment 4 

Foundries  for  casting  brass,  recommended 4 

Rifle  recommended 273 

MULLER'S  TREATISE  ON  ARTILLERY  the  standard  for  constructions 224v 

MUSICIANS:  Object  of,  in  organization  (1802) 33 

NICOLL,  A.  T.,  MAJOR:  Adjutant  and  Inspector-General,  resigned 44 

NYE,  SAMUEL  :  Major  Third  artillery 39 

OFFICERS: 

Field;  paucity  of,  in  Royal  artillery 2 

Increased  number  of,  in  Gridley's  regiment 2 

Disputes  among,  concerning  rank  and  precedence 7 

Difficulty  in  obtaining,  for  Crane's  and  Lamb's  regiments 8 

Number  of,  in  reorganized  artillery 13 

Academy  for  instruction  of,  recommended  .". 4 

Of  American  artillery  equal  to  demands  of  service 6 

Relative  rank  of  colonels 8 

Of  artillery  battalion,  Legion  of  United  States 24,  25 

Ranking,  of  artillerists  and  engineers 27,  28 

Educated,  efforts  to  secure  from  Europe 30,  31 

Of  light  artillery,  allowed  forage  for  horses 38 

Of  artillery,  habitually  detached 40 

Of  old  army,  selected  for  vacancies  in  the  increase  given  artillery 49 

Field,  selected  for  Fifth  regular  artillery 53 

Of  artillery,  unjustly  discriminated  against 85 

Provisions  made  for  technical  instruction  of. 112 

Protest  of  American,  against  Du  Coudray's  compact Ill 

List  of,  retained  in-service,  when  Revolutionary  army  was  disbanded..  350 

retained  in  service  after  June  2d,  1784 351 

in  Pennsylvania  detachment  (1784) 351 

(1785) 352 

Artillery  battalion,  Legionary  corps,  in  1787 352 

under  constitutional  government 353 

OR  GANIZATION  : 

Of  First  Colonial  regiment  of  artillery  based  on  that  of  a  battalion 

Royal  artillery 2 

Gridley's  regiment 331 

Battalion  Royal  artillery 332 

Major  John  Crane's  Rhode  Island  company 2 

Knox's  artillery  regiment 333 

Five  battalions  recommended  by  Knox 7 

The  regular  artillery  and  artificer  regiments 334—346 

Stephens'  corps 338 


INDEX.  401 

PAGE. 

ORGANIZATION — Continued. 

Oi  Colonial  companies  and  battalions,  other  than  those  of  regular 

establishment 9 

Regular  artillery  (1778) 12,  14 

Corps  of  artillerists  and  engineers 27 

Regiment  of  artillerists 29 

Second  and  Third  artillery 38 

Corps  of  artillery 42 

March  3d,  1815,  corps  retained 44 

Four  artillery  regiments 46 

Slight  changes  in  personnel  of  artillery  regiments 48 

Artillery  for  field  service  in  Revolution 76 

in  War  of  1812 77,  78 

under  McClellan  (1862) 78,  80,  81 

Artillery  of  army  in  Mexico 78,  79 

in  western  armies  during  Civil  war 79 

Change  in  artillery,  immediately  after  battle  of  Chancellorsville.  83,  84 

Elements  of  weakness  in  the  artillery  after  1821 170-173 

Propositions  to  modify  that  of  the  artillery 186 

Measures  proposed,  looking  to  same  end 187,  188 

South  Carolina  artillery  regiment 347 

Artillery  regiments,  resolves  of  October  3d  and  21st,  1780 347 

Troops  retained  when  army  disbanded  in  1783 349 

Proposed  temporary  force,  in  1784 351 

Artillery,  Legionary  corps  of  1787 352 

under  resolve  of  Congress  October  3d,  1787 352 

Legion  of  the  United  States  under  act  of  March  5th,  1792 353 

Corps  of  artillerists  and  engineers 354 

Regiment 354 

Regiment  of  light  artillery 356 

Second  and  Third  regiments  of  artillery 356 

Plan  of,  proposed  by  Colonel  Izard  to  Secretary  of  War 357 

Of  military  establishment  under  act  March  3d,  1815 358 

Reorganization  of  artillerists  and  engineers,  ]  799 355 

Reorganization  of  artillerists  pursuant  to  act  March  16th,  1802 355 

Reorganization  of  artillery,  March  2d,  1821 358 

Table  showing  reorganization  of  1821 360,  361 

ORDNANCE  DEPARTMENT : 

Proposed  reorganization  of. 52 

Organized  by  act  of  May  14th,  1812 115 

Technical  artillery  duties  confided  to 115 

'Assumes  role  of  artillery  staff. 143-147 

Of  the  Revolution 149 

Resolutions  of  Congress  establishing 150,  151 

Remarks  of  Knox  concerning 152,  153 

Merged  in  the  artillery 168 

Result  of  the  merging  scheme 168-172 

Of  Confederate  States  (1861-'65) 172 

Resuscitation  of,  in  1832 173 

Career  of  the,  United  States,  since  1832 173-177 

Usurpation  of  artillery  duties 201-205 

Ordnance  Committee  appointed  by  Secretary  Poinsett 246 

OSWALD,  ELEAZER  : 

Lieutenant-colonel  Second  regular  artillery 8 

Resigns  September,  1778 '. 9 

OVERTON,  MAJOR  W.  H. : 

Assigned  to  corps  artillery 44 


402  INDEX. 

PAGE. 

PARROTT :  System  of| rifled  guns 285,286 

PERKINS,  WILLIAM  : 

Major  Third  regular  artillery 8 

Commander  of  artillery  at  West  Point 209 

PETERS,  RICHARD  :  Member  board  of  war  and  ordnance 11 

PETER,  GEORGE  : 

Captain  light  artillery 34 

Company  of,  equipped  as  light  artillery 34,  35 

Marches  to  New  Orleans,  Louisiana  ;  resigns 36 

PICKERING  : 

Adjutant-general 11 

Member  board  of  war  and  ordnance 11 

Quartermaster-general 109 

Secretary  of  War 259 

PINCKNEY,  MAJOR-GENERAL  :  -Work  on  a  system  of  discipline  for  the  artillery.  300 

PITTS,  CAPTAIN  THOMAS  : 

Promoted  major  light  artillery  ;  resigns 42 

POINSETT,  JOEL  R.,  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  : 

Services  of,  for  benefit  of  the  artillery 50-54,  55 

Calls  attention  to  our  lack  of  light  artillery 58 

Sends  ordnance  commission  to  Europe 174 

Results  of  its  visit 264,  265 

Introduces  rocket  service  into  United  States 282 

Controversy   with    ordnance    committee   as    to    construction   of  field 
guns 382-385 

PORTER,  MAJOR  ANDREW  :  Lieutenant-colonel  commandant  Fourth  artillery.     17 

PORTER,  MOSES  : 

Major  of  artillerists 32 

Colonel  of  light  artillery  ;  retained  as  colonel  of  First  regiment 46 

Brevet  brigadier-general  commander  of  artillery,  Northern  Army 210 

POPKINS,  JOHN  :  Lieutenant-colonel  Third  regular  artillery 9 

PRACTICE-FIRING,  ARTILLERY: 

Plan  for,  instituted 116 

Successive  changes  wrought  in  plan 141-143 

Position  of  chief  of  ordnance  in  this  feature  of  artillery  instruction 143 

PRINCE  FREDERICK  CHARLES  at  battle  of  Gravelotte  (note) 106 

PROCTOR,  THOMAS  : 

Colonel  of  Pennsylvania  artillery 7 

Fourth  in  rank  in  artillery  service 8 

Regiment  of,  Colonel,  fourth  in  order  of  precedence 8 

Resigned  his  commission 17 

PROCTOR,  FRANCIS,  JR.  : 

Major  Fourth  artillery;  retires 17 

List  of  officers  in  regiment  of  Colonel 344,  346 

PROMOTION  : 

Rule  of,  in  regular  artillery 15,  16, 17 

Variable  in  peace  establishment...  21 

Disregarded  by  President  Adams 32 

Failure  of  this  attempt 32 

For  the  three  artillery  regiments 39 

Executive  attempts  to  set  at  defiance  is  defeated  by  Senate....     42 

Followed  in  filling  certain  vacancies 49 

created  by  act  March  3d,  1847 51 

PROPERTY,  GOVERNMENT  :  No  system  of  accountability  therefor  for  many 

years  after  Revolution 162 

PURVEYOR  OP  PUBLIC  SUPPLIES:  Office  created;  duties  of. 162 


INDEX.  403 

PAGE. 
QUARTERMASTER  : 

For  artillery,  recommended  by  Knox 5 

Department  remodeled 11 

Failure  of  plan 12 

REED,  GOVERNOR:  Criticizes  the  construction  of  gun-carriages 157 

RESERVE  ARTILLERY  : 

Organized  during  Revolution 96 

Not  used  during  War  of  1812  or  Mexican  War 97 

Organization  of,  Army  of  Potomac 97,98,99,100 

Of  Army  of  Potomac  broken  up 100 

Services  rendered  by,  Army  of  Potomac 100,  101 

Of  Armv  of  Potomac  re-establishes  itself. 102 

Of  Army  of  Northern  Virginia 103 

General  considerations  affecting % 104,  105 

Inexpediency  of  dispensing  with 105-107 

REYNOLDS,  MAJOR  J.  F. :  Proceeds  to  Utah  with  light  battery  (C)  Third 

artillery 67 

RIFLED  GUNS  : 

Early  experiments  to  test  principle 284 

Give  rise  to  so-called  "punching  system"  of  attack  on  iron-clads 287 

Development  of  heavy-rifle  system  retarded  by  Civil  war 287,  288 

Experimental  cast-iron 288 

Private  foundries  supply  heavy  during  the  Civil  war 288 

RINGGOLD,  SAMUEL,  CAPTAIN  AND  BREVET  MAJOR  : 

Commanding  company  horse  artillery 55 

Secures  modification  of  field-artillery  instruction 306 

Killed  at  battle  of  Palo  Alto  ..: 62 

RIVARDI,  J.  J.  U.  : 

Major  of  artillerists  and  engineers ; 27 

Disbanded  at  reorganization  of  the  army 32 

ROBERTS,  OWEN  : 

Lieutenant-colonel  commandant  South  Carolina  artillery  battalion 10 

Mortally  wounded  at  Stono  River 10 

ROCHEPONTAINE,  STEPHEN  : 

Lieutenant-colonel  commandant  artillerists  and  engineers 27 

Dismissed  the  service 29 

RODMAN,  LIEUTENANT  : 

Develops  system  of  cooling  cast  guns  from  the  interior 283,  284 

Develops  a  system  of  heavy  ordnance 283,  284 

Member  of  committee  to  select  field  armament 297 

SANDERS,  CAPTAIN  JOHN  : 

Appointed  major  of  light  artillery 34 

Note  concerning  successor  to 37 

SCOTT,  WINFIELD  : 

Captain  in  regiment  of  light  artillery  (note) 37 

Lieutenant-colonel  and  colonel  Second  artillery 39 

Brigadier-general 40 

Remarks  concerning  the  equipment  of  light  artillery 66 

Regulations  compiled  by 211 

Makes  proposition  to  War  Department  to  go  to  Europe  ;  proposition 
rejected , 301 

SCHOOL  OF  PRACTICE  : 

Established 122 

Broken  up 124 

Re-established .    125 


404  INDEX. 

PAGE. 
SCHOOL  OF  PRACTICE — Continued. 

Career  of. 121-128 

Remarks  upon  course  there  pursued 128-132 

Light  artillery 137,  138 

European  practices 140 

SCHOFIELD,  MAJOR-GENERAL  : 

As  Secretary  of  War,  establishes  field  artillery  school 137 

Efforts  to  secure  sucqess  of  same...., 138 

SECRETARY  AT  WAR:  Duties  of. 160 

SECRETARY  OF  AVAR  : 

Fulfills  functions  of  former  Secretary  at  War 161 

Has  supervision  of  artillery  technical  affairs  from  Revolution  to  1812..   165 

SERGEANTS,  ORDNANCE  :  Grade  established 47 

SHERMAN,  CAPTAIN  T.  W.  : 

Company  commanded  by,  equipped  as  light  artillery 62 

His  company  (E),  Third  artillery,  re-equipped  as  field  artillery 64,  65 

SHIELDS,  SENATOR  :   Introduces  bill  to  create  office  of  chief  of  artillery 186 

SOUTH  CAROLINA  regiment  of  artillery 9,  347 

STEEL  :  Introduction  of,  in  heavy  ordnance  construction 271-273 

STEVENS,  EBENEZER  : 

Lieutenant-colonel  commandant  of  artillery  in  Northern  Department..       8 

Origin  of  corps  commanded  by 9,  338-340 

Distinguished  conduct  of ; 9 

Assignment  of,  to  Second  artillery,  September,  1778 10 

STEVENS,  CAPTAIN  WILLIAM  : 

Remarks  on  personal  armament  of  artillerymen 190 

System  of  discipline  for  the  artillery 299 

ST.  CLAIR  : 

Appointed  major-general 26 

Defeated  by  Miami  Indians 26 

Superseded  by  General  Wayne 26 

STODDARD,  MAJOR  AMOS,  compiles  system  of  artillery  manoeuvres 301 

STROBAGH,  JOHN  MARTIN: 

Lieutenant-colonel  Pennsylvania  artillery  regiment 7 

Death  of 16 

SUPERINTENDENT  OF  MILITARY  STORES,  duties  of. 161,  162 

SURVEYOR  OF  ORDNANCE : 

Office  of,  created 155 

Reports  of,  and  results 157,  158 

TACTICS  : 

Instruction  for  field  artillery 59,60 

Deficiency  of  artillery  during  Revolution 77 

Stevens'  System  of  Discipline  the  pioneer  work  in  the  United  States....  299 

Systems  prepared  by  Hamilton,  Pinckney,  and  Wilkinson 300 

Proposition  of  Captain  Winfield  Scott  to  improve  the 301 

Major  Amos  Stoddard's  System  of. 301 

The  Artillerists'  Companion,  to  some  extent  a  treatise  on 302 

Works  of  H.  Lallemand 302,  303 

Tyler's  Translation  of  Manual  for  Artillery 303 

Gribeauval  system  of. 304,  305 

Anderson's  instruction  for  field  artillery 305 

modifications  in,  promulgated  in  1845 306 

Systems  of,  for  siege,  mountain,  and  heavy  artillery 306 

field  artillery  of  1860 307 

The  assimilated,  promulgated  in  1873 308,  309 

TidbalFs  Manual  for  Heavy  Artillery 309,  310 


INDEX.  405 

PAGE. 
TACTICS —  Continued. 

Field  artillery 312-330 

Tactics  of  Revolution  merely  traditional 312 

Tousard's  mention  of  the  Revolutionary 312 

The  manual  of  the  piece,  by  Revolutionary  practices 313 

The  main  features  of  Kosciusko's  system 313-315 

Stoddard's 315,  316 

Lallemand's 316-318 

Anderson's  Translation 319,  321 

The  system  of  1845 321,  322 

1860 323-325 

Early  attempts  at  assimilating 325,  326 

Assimilation  should  not  be  indulged  at  a  sacrifice  of  the  natural  tac- 
tical elements  of  the  various  arms  of  service 326 

The  assimilated  system  of  1872 325-330 

TIDBALL,  CAPTAIN  : 

Company  of,  equipped  as  horse  artillery 70 

Major,  manual  of  heavy  artillery 310 

TOUSARD,  BREVET  LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  Louis  DE  : 

Major  artillerists  and  engineers 27 

Appointed  inspector  of  artillery 29-114 

Promoted  lieutenant-colonel  commandant  Second  regiment  artillerists 

and  engineers 32 

Discharged  from  active  service 32 

TOWSON,  CAPTAIN  NATHAN  : 

Assigned  to  light  artillery ; 44 

Nominated    from   paymaster-general    to    colonelcy    Second   artillery 

(note) 46,  41!,  48,  49 

TROOPS  provisionally  retained  in  service  when  Revolutionary  army  dis- 
banded   349 

TRUMBULL,  JOSEPH:  Member  board  of  war  and  ordnance 11 

TYLER,  LIEUTENANT  DANIEL  : 

Services  in  the  line  of  technical  artillery 239-242 

Translations  of  tactics 303,  305 

VALLEY  FORGE  : 

Army  encamped  at 10 

reorganized  at.. 12 

WADE,  WILLIAM:  Remarks  of  regarding  artillery  carriages 233 

WADSWORTH,  DECIUS  : 

Major  of  artillerists 32 

Chief  of  ordnance 173 

Devises  a  system  of  artillery  materiel 233 

Strictures  of,  on  report  of  an  ordnance  board 235 

Retirement  of,  from  service 236 

Recommends  artillery  system  adopted  in  1816 278 

Letter  of,  regarding  this  system 386,  387 

WALBACH,  MAJOR  JOHN  B. :  Retained  at  reorganization  of  1821 46 

WASHINGTON  : 

General,  invested  with  extraordinary  powers 6 

authorizes  raising  three  artillery  battalions 6 

intrigues  against 11 

intrigues  against  result 12 

Lieutenant-general,  proposes  plan  for  organization  of  army 30 

General,  apportions  the  field  artillery  to  brigades •. 76 

Order  of,  relating  to  artillery  personnel 209 

recommends  the  procuring  brass  guns 257 

52 


406  INDEX. 

PAGE, 
WAYNE,  MAJOR-GENERAL  : 

Commanding  the  forces  on  frontier 26 

Defeats  Miami  Indians 27 

WILKINSON,  JAMES  : 

Letter  of  General,  regarding  light  artillery  company 36,  195 

equipment  of  light  artillery 198 

Work  of  General,  on  a  system  of  tactics.. : 300 

WILLIAMS,  JONATHAN  : 

Major  Fourth  battalion  Second  regiment  artillerists  and  engineers 31 

Appointed  chief  of  corps  of  engineers 121 

Translates  Kosciusko's  system  of  manreuvres 313 

WOOLSTONECRAFT,  CAPTAIN:  Report  concerning  light  artillery 195 


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